Process and policy: Resource-bounded nondemonstrative reasoning

Computational Intelligence

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 1-38

  Loui, Ronald P ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST LOUIS   (United States)

Author keywords

Defeasible reasoning; Formal dialectics; Nonmonotonic reasoning

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATION THEORY; INTELLIGENT CONTROL; KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEMS; THEOREM PROVING;

FORMAL DIALECTICS; NON-MONOTONIC REASONING;

FORMAL LOGIC;

EID: 0031999134     PISSN: 08247935     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0824-7935.00055     Document Type: Article

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