Institutions for marine ecosystems: Economic incentives and fishery management

Ecological Applications

Volumn 8, Issue 1 SUPPL., 1998, Pages

  Hanna, Susan S ^a  

^a OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Economic incentives; Ecosystem management; Fisheries management; Management flexibility; Management legitimacy; Management process; Management structure; Organizational efficiency; Property rights regimes; Resource management institutions; Time horizons

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031929782     PISSN: 10510761     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2641376     Document Type: Review

References (9)

1. Bromley, D. W. 1991. Environment and economy: property rights and public policy. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, UK.
2. Eggertsson, T. 1990. Economic behavior and institutions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
3. Hanna, S. S. 1994. Co-management. Pages 233-242 in K. L. Gimbel, editor. Limiting access to marine fisheries: keeping the focus on conservation. Center for Marine Conservation and the World Wildlife Fund, Washington, D.C., USA.
4. Hanna, S., C. Folke, and K.-G. Mäler. 1996. Rights to nature: ecological, economic, cultural and political principles of institutions for the environment. Island, Washington, D.C., USA.
5. Jentoft, S. 1989. Fisheries co-management: delegating responsibility to fishermen's organizations. Marine Policy 13(2):137-154.
6. _. 1993. Dangling lines: the fisheries crisis and the future of coastal communities: the Norwegian experience. Social and Economic Studies, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. Johns, Newfoundland, Canada.
7. North, D. C. 1992. Transactions costs, institutions, and economic performance. Institute for Contemporary Studies, San Francisco, California, USA.
8. Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
9. Runge, C. F. 1984. Institutions and the free rider: the assurance problem in collective action. Journal of Politics 46(1):154-181.