The political economy of Israel's demand for Palestinian labour

Third World Quarterly

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 297-311

  Kadri, Ali ^a   Macmillen, Malcolm ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EXETER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

LABOUR MARKET; PALESTINIAN PEOPLE; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

ISRAEL;

EID: 0031902518     PISSN: 01436597     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01436599814479     Document Type: Article

References (39)

1. In the peak commuting period between 1974 and 1987, a third to half the labour force in the territories was employed in Israel. Exact figures are difficult to obtain because many workers did not register with the labour exchange office. Workers commuted daily to work, held menial and physically demanding jobs, and were generally forbidden to stay overnight in Israel. Although such a move entails the crossing of an internationally recognised border, it is taking place from an administered territory home sector to an administrator's destination sector on a daily basis. It is a unique case in that it embodies characteristics of permanent migration situations not only in the de jure sense, but also insofar as it reallocates resources between these economies. In addition to this, the risk factors associated with commuting become as important as those associated with permanent relocation situations, especially in times of political unrest. The term 'oscillating labour' was used to differentiate such cases from suburban-urban commuting, eg commuting from South African Bantustans. The Statistical Abstract of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem, various years.
2. J Hiltermann, Merip Report, October-December 1985, p 17.
3. The percentage of agriculture in total output has dropped by more than half over the period of occupation. The share of manufacturing in total output went from 8% in 1974 to 7% in 1987. Statistical Abstract of Israel, various years.
4. A Kubursi, 'Jobs, education and development', in G Abed (ed), The Palestinian Economy, London: Routledge, 1988, pp 223-224.
5. A Mansour, Palestine: une Économie de Résistance en Cisjordanie et à Gaza, Paris: Armattan, 1983.
6. H Kabouji, speaking at the Jerusalem Conference, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, 14 January 1996.
7. UNCTAD The Agricultural Sector of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, United nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, 12 October 1993.
8. The United Nations agencies in the region, the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA), and the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), have repeatedly reported this high rate of unemployment, and the associated worsening economic conditions arising from closure. Al Quds, London, various issues in May 1993.
9. 'Basic changes in the labour force indicators in the Palestinian Territories during 1995-1997', Labour Force Survey, Palestinian Central Bureau of statistics, 1997.
10. The conditions in the territories during long periods of closures left the following impressions on some journalists: 'Any look of festivity disappeared from the occupied territories as a result of the military siege imposed on these areas ... Palestinian experts foresee an economic catastrophe wherein hunger and increased poverty shall represent the main social trends'. Al Quds, 31 May 1993.
11. In order to ensure the success of this measure, buses used to transport strike breakers into Israel were attacked by militants. The leadership of the intifada did not have the resources to sustain a strike for a long period of time. The main reasons for this may be summarised in three points: a) The Palestinian leadership did not control the accumulated tax fund to which commuters had contributed in Israel. b) The Palestinian leadership did not configure an alternative financial support mechanism for commuters. Palestinian resources were channelled towards servicing already existing national establishments, and not for the creation or strengthening of alternative commuters' support funds. c) Restrictions on the independent organisation of Palestinian commuting workers limited the prospects of financial independence. Israel consistently allowed in unregistered commuters, partly because it did not want to expose itself to any pressures of reorganising this labour subject to its sheer mass. However, the main reason for hiring commuting labour remains its comparative cheapness. These issues loosened the grip of the Palestinian leadership on the deployment of commuting labour as a political instrument.
12. Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues.
13. Elia Mazro, 'The effect of the closure on agriculture', Maarif, 24 May 1993.
14. M Semyonomv & N Lewin-Epstein, Hewers of Wood and Drawers of Water, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1987, p 88.
15. It may also be possible to add the value of indirect benefits from amenities and services accrued by the Israeli worker as a result of the reinvested commuter's taxes in Israel. Hence, the wages and benefits amassed by the Israeli workers in the same group are likely to be above this observed level.
16. Al Quds, January 1997.
17. United Nations General Assembly Resolution, no 3379(XXX) of 10 November, 1975; rescinded by resolution number 46/86 in 1992.
18. The prominent Egyptian thinker M Lotfi Alkhouli is the leading advocate of this proposition.
19. The Middle East by the Year 2000, (Israeli government publication) Jerusalem: Information Division, 1983.
20. For a detailed exposition of the relative advances of the Israeli economy and the structure of its trade, see M Syrquin, 'Economic growth and structural change', in Y Ben Porath, (ed), The Israeli Economy, Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press, 1986, p 171. See also a more recent assessment of Israel's economic performance by H Abu-Anaml, 'Changes in the Israeli economy', Majalat Aldirasat Alfilistinia, Institute for Palestine Studies, 29, 1997, pp 71-76.
21. For a detailed exposition of the relative advances of the Israeli economy and the structure of its trade, see M Syrquin, 'Economic growth and structural change', in Y Ben Porath, (ed), The Israeli Economy, Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press, 1986, p 171. See also a more recent assessment of Israel's economic performance by H Abu-Anaml, 'Changes in the Israeli economy', Majalat Aldirasat Alfilistinia, Institute for Palestine Studies, 29, 1997, pp 71-76.
22. The major undertakings of Israeli industry are as follows: a) An advanced chemical industry with exports of US$400 million in 1975. One-third of its raw materials are imported and reprocessed for sale abroad: b) Metal work, which remains dependent on foreign sources for raw materials. Its imports are in the range of US$500 million; c) The military industry, exporting US$1 billion yearly in equipment (1980); d) Consumer goods, ranging from auto sales (US$100 million) to canned foods and textiles (US$400 million). See Oil and Development, Beirut, 12, 1982.
23. Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues.
24. CAO Van Niewenhuijze, Sociology of the Middle East: A Stocktaking and Interpretation, Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 1971, p 240.
25. M Shimon Perez was Israel's foreign minister at that time.
26. A Arnon, A. Spivak & J. Weinblatt, 'Trade between Israel, the Palestinians and Jordan', The World Economy, January 1996.
27. Central Bank of Jordan, 'Geographic distribution of external trade', Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, June 1997.
28. Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues.
29. Abu Anaml, 'Changes in the Israeli economy', p 76
30. The direct intervention of western governments in the Gulf should not diminish Israel's gendarme role. One can easily envisage a scenario in which Syria or Iran ally themselves with Iraq. Would Israel then stand aside?
31. The relatively high qualifications of this labour force inhibits its involvement in menial or physically demanding jobs.
32. First two quotes from Al Quds, 1 April 93; quotes three and four from Yadiout, 9 April 93; and fifth and sixth quarter from Maarif, 24 May 1993.
33. First two quotes from Al Quds, 1 April 93; quotes three and four from Yadiout, 9 April 93; and fifth and sixth quarter from Maarif, 24 May 1993.
34. First two quotes from Al Quds, 1 April 93; quotes three and four from Yadiout, 9 April 93; and fifth and sixth quarter from Maarif, 24 May 1993.
35. 'Protocol on economic relations between the Palestine Liberation Organization and the government of the state of Israel', Article IV, paragraph 10a., Paris, 29 April 1994.
36. M Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964.
37. I Mattar 'Settlements in the occupied territory', and SG Brown, 'The economic impact of occupation', in Nasser Aruri Occupation: Israel over Palestine, London: Westview Press, (ed), 1986. Both articles cite crop defoliation, plantation removal, and at times the piecemeal removal of whole villages as standard practice by successive Israeli governments.
38. I Mattar 'Settlements in the occupied territory', and SG Brown, 'The economic impact of occupation', in Nasser Aruri Occupation: Israel over Palestine, London: Westview Press, (ed), 1986. Both articles cite crop defoliation, plantation removal, and at times the piecemeal removal of whole villages as standard practice by successive Israeli governments.
39. The percentage is calculated for the period of commuting beginning after the 1973 war and ending in 1987, ie the year of the intifada. Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues.