-
2
-
-
84865914770
-
-
7 November
-
Ministry of Agriculture (MA), Comissão Nacional das Aldeias Comunais (CNAC), Aldeias Comunais (AC)/190, Comissão Provincial das Aldeias Comunais (CPAC)/Tete, 'Relatório da Reunião Provincial das Aldeias Comunais', 7 November 1979.
-
(1979)
Relatório da Reunião Provincial Das Aldeias Comunais
-
-
-
10
-
-
26444505113
-
-
15 November
-
MA, CNAC, AC/003: Governo Provincial (GP)/Tete, 'Aldeias Comunais', 15 November 1977.
-
(1977)
Aldeias Comunais
-
-
-
11
-
-
26444505113
-
-
Aldeias Comunais, 1977. Ibid. This situation, as much as the pronouncements of Frelimo's Third Congress, was behind the major re-organisation of state structures concerned with these issues in 1977 and 1978.
-
(1977)
Aldeias Comunais
-
-
-
12
-
-
26444568841
-
-
S/12413, 10 October [French version]
-
By late 1977, according to UN estimates, the war had affected 25,000 people in Tete, 15,000 in Gaza, and 10,000 in Manica. MA, CNAC, AC/057: UN Report, A/32/268. S/12413, 10 October 1977 [French version].
-
(1977)
UN Report, A/32/268
-
-
-
15
-
-
26444568841
-
-
S/12413, 20 October [French version]
-
MA, CNAC, AC/057: UN Report, A/32/268. S/12413, 20 October 1977 [French version].
-
(1977)
UN Report, A/32/268
-
-
-
19
-
-
84865908960
-
-
Araújo, 'Características da Distribuição Espacial da População Rural', pp. 187-194. According to Araújo, Tete communal villages had the following origins: 13 per cent were formed in the 'liberated areas' during the armed struggle; 0.7 per cent were formed through peasant mobilisation; 26.7 per cent were formed as a consequence of natural disasters; 46.6 per cent were formed from the transformation of former aldeamentos; and 13 per cent were formed by 'returnees'.
-
Características da Distribuição Espacial da População Rural
, pp. 187-194
-
-
Araújo1
-
25
-
-
26444554204
-
-
note
-
Interview, Tete, July 1992.
-
-
-
-
30
-
-
84865911306
-
-
8 May
-
MA, CNAC, AC/009: CIPCNAC, 'Relatório da visita às Províncias de Tete, Sofala, Zambézia e Manica, pelos camaradas Lopes Tembe e Lourenço Mutaca, na qualidade de responsável e responsável-adjunto da Comissão Inter-Provincial das Calamidades Naturais e Aldeias Comunais', 8 May 1978.
-
(1978)
Relatório da Visita Às Províncias de Tete, Sofala, Zambézia e Manica, Pelos Camaradas Lopes Tembe e Lourenço Mutaca, na Qualidade de Responsável e Responsável-adjunto da Comissão Inter-Provincial Das Calamidades Naturais e Aldeias Comunais
-
-
-
31
-
-
84865906695
-
-
Some of these commissars caused problems in Cahora Bassa, another disaster area, where they relocated villages which had already started building on the grounds that they should be near the main road.' Most of the people whose houses were torn down refused to rebuild, and the area became 'very difficult to villagise', according to the district authorities. MA, CNAC, AC/009, CIPCNAC, 'Acta da Reunião', p. 21.
-
Acta da Reunião
, pp. 21
-
-
-
35
-
-
26444502262
-
-
note
-
Interview, Maxwell Amone Mwanza and Miguel Luís Coutinho, Chief and Head, respectively, Technical Division of the Tete Department of Physical Planning, Tete, July 1992. Mwanza participated in the brigades which established most of the Tete communal villages.
-
-
-
-
36
-
-
26444488745
-
-
30 June
-
MA, CNAC, AC/003: CPAC/Tete, 'Piano de Actividades para 1978', 30 June 1978. Significantly, 'dynamising of agricultural production and craft cooperatives as well as household production' appears as only the seventh priority in the first yearly plan.
-
(1978)
Piano de Actividades para 1978
-
-
-
37
-
-
26444539139
-
-
note
-
'Nucleation' was conceived of as the grouping of people into larger centres. Most of these nucleations, particularly in Moatize and Changara, had been aldeamentos, while those in Zumbo, Morávia, Macanga and Mágòe had been círculos in Frelimo liberated areas.
-
-
-
-
38
-
-
26444487815
-
-
note
-
Interview, Romão Tembo, Tete, July 1992.
-
-
-
-
47
-
-
26444439651
-
-
16 May
-
MA, Gabinete de Organização e Desenvolvimento das Cooperativas Agrárias (GODCA), G/134: DPA/Tete, '2o Seminario Provincial das Cooperativas Agrarias', 16 May 1982, pp. 21-22.
-
(1982)
2o Seminario Provincial Das Cooperativas Agrarias
, pp. 21-22
-
-
-
58
-
-
26444590106
-
-
note
-
While yields decreased from 1,610 to 168 tonnes, as seen in the table, the number of cooperative members increased from 493 to 1,175 in the same period.
-
-
-
-
60
-
-
84865909183
-
-
4 September
-
There were only six in Tete in 1978. MA, CNAC, AC/119: Comissão Nacional de Abastecimento, 'Informação', 4 September 1977.
-
(1977)
Informação
-
-
-
61
-
-
84865909183
-
-
Informação 1977. Ibid.
-
(1977)
Informação
-
-
-
77
-
-
26444570524
-
-
note
-
Interview, Maxwell Amone Mwanza and Miguel Luís Coutinho, Chief and Head, respectively, Technical Division of the Tete Department of Physical Planning, Tete, July 1992.
-
-
-
-
78
-
-
4243445101
-
A Crise da Produça̧o Familiar nas Aldeias Comunais em Moçambique
-
A. Y. Casai, 'A Crise da Produça̧o Familiar nas Aldeias Comunais em Moçambique', Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos, 8/9 (1988), p. 176.
-
(1988)
Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos
, vol.8-9
, pp. 176
-
-
Casai, A.Y.1
-
79
-
-
26444454100
-
-
note
-
Interview, Tete, July 1992.
-
-
-
-
83
-
-
26444530237
-
-
note
-
Interview, Maxwell Amone Mwanza and Miguel Luís Coutinho, Tete, July 1992.
-
-
-
-
85
-
-
26444596822
-
-
30 November
-
MA, CNAC, AC/131: CPAC/Tete, 'No. 287/CPAC/82 (Confidencial)', 30 November 1982; Interview, Maxwell Amone Mwanza and Miguel Luís Coutinho, Tete, July 1992.
-
(1982)
No. 287/CPAC/82 (Confidencial)
-
-
-
86
-
-
84897265120
-
-
Vines, Renamo, pp. 54-55.
-
Renamo
, pp. 54-55
-
-
Vines1
-
87
-
-
26444435965
-
-
note
-
This route was used by Frelimo during the independence struggle in the 1970s. It was the most direct path from Malawi to Gorongosa. The Gorongosa mountains had been strategically important for controlling Mozambique's central areas since the times of the prazeiro Gouveia in the nineteenth century.
-
-
-
-
88
-
-
26444517400
-
-
note
-
Interview, Maxwell Amone Mwanza and Miguel Luís Coutinho, Tete, July 1992.
-
-
-
-
89
-
-
26444594531
-
-
note
-
According to Countinho, Renamo operations to the south of the city of Tete were confined to Changara for a long time, and were limited to the west by the Mazoe river. Military convoys only became necessary on the road to Songo and Cahora Bassa in 1988. Ibid.
-
-
-
-
91
-
-
0003891337
-
-
Washington DC, Department of State/Bureau for Refugee Programs
-
A general pattern of Renamo attacks, similar to the ones in this area, is described in Robert Gersony, 'Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique', Washington DC, Department of State/Bureau for Refugee Programs, 1988, p. 19.
-
(1988)
Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique
, pp. 19
-
-
Gersony, R.1
-
93
-
-
0005713514
-
The Roots of the Mozambican Counter-Revolution
-
Some, such as Gervase Clarence-Smith, hastily inferred a popular base for Renamo from the people's reaction to Frelimo's rural policies. This and other related questions have sparked sometimes bitter debate between those who tended to explain Renamo's growth on the basis of its Rhodesian/South African connections, and those who considered Mozambique's rural policies as a major cause for the rapid spread of Renamo's influence. Both parties had reasons for their focus, since the causes of Renamo's 'success' are complex: on the one hand, the emergence of Renamo as a direct instrument of Rhodesia and South Africa for destabilising Mozambique, as well as the continuous direct support of South Africa throughout the war, is unquestionable; on the other hand, it is also now unquestionable that internal conflicts, deriving in part from rural contradictions, played an important role in the growth of Renamo 'beyond South Africa's wildest dreams', as Clarence-Smith puts it. See contributions to the debate sparked by Gervase Clarence-Smith, 'The Roots of the Mozambican Counter-Revolution', Southern African Review of Books, 2, 4 (1989), pp. 7-10,
-
(1989)
Southern African Review of Books
, vol.2
, Issue.4
, pp. 7-10
-
-
Clarence-Smith, G.1
-
94
-
-
26444543512
-
-
from William Minter, Paul Fauvet, Michel Cahen and Otto Roesch, in Southern African Review of Books, 2, 6 (1989);
-
(1989)
Southern African Review of Books
, vol.2
, Issue.6
-
-
Minter, W.1
Fauvet, P.2
Cahen, M.3
Roesch, O.4
-
95
-
-
26444498146
-
-
William Minter, Paul Fauvet, Michel Cahen Otto Roesch, Southern African Review of Books, 3, 2 (1989-1990);
-
(1989)
Southern African Review of Books
, vol.3
, Issue.2
-
-
Minter, W.1
Fauvet, P.2
Cahen, M.3
Roesch, O.4
-
96
-
-
26444614340
-
-
William Minter, Paul Fauvet, Michel Cahen Otto Roesch, Southern African Review of Books, 5, 5 (1990).
-
(1990)
Southern African Review of Books
, vol.5
, Issue.5
-
-
Minter, W.1
Fauvet, P.2
Cahen, M.3
Roesch, O.4
-
97
-
-
0005713522
-
A Base Social da Guerra em Mocambique
-
Also see Bridget O'Laughlin, 'A Base Social da Guerra em Mocambique', Estudos Moçambicanos, 10 (1992), pp. 107-142.
-
(1992)
Estudos Moçambicanos
, vol.10
, pp. 107-142
-
-
O'Laughlin, B.1
-
98
-
-
0005713520
-
Clarence-Smith on Mozambique
-
William Minter, 'Clarence-Smith on Mozambique', Southern African Review of Books, 2, 6 (1989), p. 22.
-
(1989)
Southern African Review of Books
, vol.2
, Issue.6
, pp. 22
-
-
Minter, W.1
-
99
-
-
26444597091
-
Mozambique the Debate Continues
-
Also see Otto Roesch, 'Mozambique the Debate Continues', Southern African Review of Books, 5, 5 (1990).
-
(1990)
Southern African Review of Books
, vol.5
, Issue.5
-
-
Roesch, O.1
-
102
-
-
84873844269
-
-
6 January
-
MA, GODCA, G/249: CADECO (Projecto CO-I), 'Relatório', 6 January 1983.
-
(1983)
Relatório
-
-
-
103
-
-
84873844269
-
-
Relatório 1983. Ibid.;
-
(1983)
Relatório
-
-
-
105
-
-
26444470107
-
-
note
-
The situation partially improved in the second half of 1983. However, a major Renamo offensive in 1985 brought external support practically to a halt. For many years thereafter, most of Tete was simply a war zone.
-
-
-
-
107
-
-
0005762829
-
-
Oxford
-
Ken Wilson, 'The Socio-Economic Impact of War and Flight in Posto Derre, Morrumbala District, Zambezia', Oxford, 1992, describes Renamo's expansion in this period as 'greatly facilitated by its collaboration with pre-existing or emergent bandit and guerrilla forces who ranged from small groups of armed robbers to populist militia opposed to state rural development programmes'.
-
(1992)
The Socio-Economic Impact of War and Flight in Posto Derre, Morrumbala District, Zambezia
-
-
Wilson, K.1
-
108
-
-
0003437736
-
-
Geffray, A Causa das Armas, referring to Nampula in a later period, shows a mutually beneficial relationship between traditional authority and Renamo: Renamo used traditional authorities as a form of indirect rule, while traditional authorities used Renamo to restore at least part of the role they played before the arrival of Frelimo. In general, as the war progressed, and areas became more 'stable', this type of phenomenon probably became more common.
-
A Causa Das Armas
-
-
Geffray1
-
109
-
-
0025628528
-
Social Decomposition and Armed Violence in Post-Colonial Mozambique
-
Gueorgui Derluguian, 'Social Decomposition and Armed Violence in Post-Colonial Mozambique', Review, 13, 4 (1990), p. 157.
-
(1990)
Review
, vol.13
, Issue.4
, pp. 157
-
-
Derluguian, G.1
-
110
-
-
0005763969
-
Clarence-Smith on Mozambique
-
Paul Fauvet, 'Clarence-Smith on Mozambique', Southern African Review of Books, 2, 6 (1989), pp. 26-27, concluded that since the areas with the most villagisation did not correspond to the areas most affected by war, there was no relationship between villagisation and war. He thus neglects other causes for the territorial localisation of the war. He draws on the example of Cabo Delgado province, which is usually depicted as Frelimo's stronghold in Mozambique, noting that it was the most villagised area, and simultaneously the least affected by the war. However, he does not mention that Cabo Delgado is the furthest province from the former Rhodesia, Malawi and South Africa, which all provided Renamo with support. Nor does he take into account the history of colonial aldeamentos in Cabo Delgado: these were seen as less problematic here than in other areas because people were used to larger and more stable villages than elsewhere, a factor which eased the transition from the aldeamentos to the communal villages (in Cabo Delgado around 70 per cent of the communal villages, and not just 'some', as Fauvet claims, had their origins in former aldeamentos).
-
(1989)
Southern African Review of Books
, vol.2
, Issue.6
, pp. 26-27
-
-
Fauvet, P.1
|