Endogenous ideology formation and economic policy in former colonies

Economic Development and Cultural Change

Volumn 46, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 263-290

  Chai, Sun Ki ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEVELOPING COUNTRY; DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY; ECONOMIC POLICY; POLITICAL ECONOMY; POLITICAL IDEOLOGY; STATE INTERVENTION;

EID: 0031836155     PISSN: 00130079     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/452338     Document Type: Article

References (128)

1. For broad discussions of these measures, see Wing Thye Woo, "The Art of Economic Development: Markets, Politics and Externalities," International Organization 44, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 403-29; and Dwight H. Perkins, "Economic Systems Reform in Developing Countries," in Reforming Economic Systems in Developing Countries, ed. Dwight H. Perkins and Michael Roemer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Institute for International Development, 1991), pp. 13-53. See also World Bank, World Development Report 1991 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), chaps. 4, 5.
2. For broad discussions of these measures, see Wing Thye Woo, "The Art of Economic Development: Markets, Politics and Externalities," International Organization 44, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 403-29; and Dwight H. Perkins, "Economic Systems Reform in Developing Countries," in Reforming Economic Systems in Developing Countries, ed. Dwight H. Perkins and Michael Roemer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Institute for International Development, 1991), pp. 13-53. See also World Bank, World Development Report 1991 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), chaps. 4, 5.
3. For broad discussions of these measures, see Wing Thye Woo, "The Art of Economic Development: Markets, Politics and Externalities," International Organization 44, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 403-29; and Dwight H. Perkins, "Economic Systems Reform in Developing Countries," in Reforming Economic Systems in Developing Countries, ed. Dwight H. Perkins and Michael Roemer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Institute for International Development, 1991), pp. 13-53. See also World Bank, World Development Report 1991 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), chaps. 4, 5.
4. See, e.g., Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), p. 116; Pamela Johnson Conover and Stanley Feldman, "The Origins and Meaning of Liberal/Conservative Self-Identification," American Journal of Political Science 25, no. 4 (November 1981): 617-45, esp. 638.
5. See, e.g., Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), p. 116; Pamela Johnson Conover and Stanley Feldman, "The Origins and Meaning of Liberal/Conservative Self-Identification," American Journal of Political Science 25, no. 4 (November 1981): 617-45, esp. 638.
6. For a number of cross-sectional studies, see Ian M. D. Little, Tibor Scitovsky, and Maurice F. G. Scott, Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries (London: Oxford University Press, 1970); Anne Krueger, Liberalization Attempts and Consequences (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1978); Jagdish Bhagwati, Anatomy and Consequences of Exchange Control Regimes (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1978); Bela Balassa et al., Development Strategies in Semi-Industrial Economies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Ramgopal Agarwala, "Price Distortions and Growth in Developing Countries," World Bank Staff Paper no. 575 (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1983); Daniel Landau, "Government and Economic Growth in the Less Developed Countries: An Empirical Study," Economic Development and Cultural Change 35, no. 1 (October 1986): 35-75; Vinod Thomas, Nadab Halevi, and Julie Stanton, "Does Policy Reform Improve Performance?" World Bank Background Paper (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1987); Demetrios Papageorgiou, Armeane M. Choski, and Michael Michaely, Liberalizing Foreign Trade in Developing Countries: The Lessons of Experience (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1990); and David Dollar, "Outward-Oriented Economies Really Do Grow More Rapidly: Evidence from 95 LDCs, 1976-85," Economic Development and Cultural Change 40, no. 3 (April 1992): 520-44.
7. For a number of cross-sectional studies, see Ian M. D. Little, Tibor Scitovsky, and Maurice F. G. Scott, Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries (London: Oxford University Press, 1970); Anne Krueger, Liberalization Attempts and Consequences (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1978); Jagdish Bhagwati, Anatomy and Consequences of Exchange Control Regimes (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1978); Bela Balassa et al., Development Strategies in Semi-Industrial Economies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Ramgopal Agarwala, "Price Distortions and Growth in Developing Countries," World Bank Staff Paper no. 575 (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1983); Daniel Landau, "Government and Economic Growth in the Less Developed Countries: An Empirical Study," Economic Development and Cultural Change 35, no. 1 (October 1986): 35-75; Vinod Thomas, Nadab Halevi, and Julie Stanton, "Does Policy Reform Improve Performance?" World Bank Background Paper (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1987); Demetrios Papageorgiou, Armeane M. Choski, and Michael Michaely, Liberalizing Foreign Trade in Developing Countries: The Lessons of Experience (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1990); and David Dollar, "Outward-Oriented Economies Really Do Grow More Rapidly: Evidence from 95 LDCs, 1976-85," Economic Development and Cultural Change 40, no. 3 (April 1992): 520-44.
8. For a number of cross-sectional studies, see Ian M. D. Little, Tibor Scitovsky, and Maurice F. G. Scott, Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries (London: Oxford University Press, 1970); Anne Krueger, Liberalization Attempts and Consequences (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1978); Jagdish Bhagwati, Anatomy and Consequences of Exchange Control Regimes (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1978); Bela Balassa et al., Development Strategies in Semi-Industrial Economies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Ramgopal Agarwala, "Price Distortions and Growth in Developing Countries," World Bank Staff Paper no. 575 (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1983); Daniel Landau, "Government and Economic Growth in the Less Developed Countries: An Empirical Study," Economic Development and Cultural Change 35, no. 1 (October 1986): 35-75; Vinod Thomas, Nadab Halevi, and Julie Stanton, "Does Policy Reform Improve Performance?" World Bank Background Paper (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1987); Demetrios Papageorgiou, Armeane M. Choski, and Michael Michaely, Liberalizing Foreign Trade in Developing Countries: The Lessons of Experience (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1990); and David Dollar, "Outward-Oriented Economies Really Do Grow More Rapidly: Evidence from 95 LDCs, 1976-85," Economic Development and Cultural Change 40, no. 3 (April 1992): 520-44.
9. For a number of cross-sectional studies, see Ian M. D. Little, Tibor Scitovsky, and Maurice F. G. Scott, Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries (London: Oxford University Press, 1970); Anne Krueger, Liberalization Attempts and Consequences (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1978); Jagdish Bhagwati, Anatomy and Consequences of Exchange Control Regimes (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1978); Bela Balassa et al., Development Strategies in Semi-Industrial Economies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Ramgopal Agarwala, "Price Distortions and Growth in Developing Countries," World Bank Staff Paper no. 575 (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1983); Daniel Landau, "Government and Economic Growth in the Less Developed Countries: An Empirical Study," Economic Development and Cultural Change 35, no. 1 (October 1986): 35-75; Vinod Thomas, Nadab Halevi, and Julie Stanton, "Does Policy Reform Improve Performance?" World Bank Background Paper (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1987); Demetrios Papageorgiou, Armeane M. Choski, and Michael Michaely, Liberalizing Foreign Trade in Developing Countries: The Lessons of Experience (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1990); and David Dollar, "Outward-Oriented Economies Really Do Grow More Rapidly: Evidence from 95 LDCs, 1976-85," Economic Development and Cultural Change 40, no. 3 (April 1992): 520-44.
10. For a number of cross-sectional studies, see Ian M. D. Little, Tibor Scitovsky, and Maurice F. G. Scott, Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries (London: Oxford University Press, 1970); Anne Krueger, Liberalization Attempts and Consequences (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1978); Jagdish Bhagwati, Anatomy and Consequences of Exchange Control Regimes (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1978); Bela Balassa et al., Development Strategies in Semi-Industrial Economies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Ramgopal Agarwala, "Price Distortions and Growth in Developing Countries," World Bank Staff Paper no. 575 (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1983); Daniel Landau, "Government and Economic Growth in the Less Developed Countries: An Empirical Study," Economic Development and Cultural Change 35, no. 1 (October 1986): 35-75; Vinod Thomas, Nadab Halevi, and Julie Stanton, "Does Policy Reform Improve Performance?" World Bank Background Paper (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1987); Demetrios Papageorgiou, Armeane M. Choski, and Michael Michaely, Liberalizing Foreign Trade in Developing Countries: The Lessons of Experience (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1990); and David Dollar, "Outward-Oriented Economies Really Do Grow More Rapidly: Evidence from 95 LDCs, 1976-85," Economic Development and Cultural Change 40, no. 3 (April 1992): 520-44.
11. For a number of cross-sectional studies, see Ian M. D. Little, Tibor Scitovsky, and Maurice F. G. Scott, Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries (London: Oxford University Press, 1970); Anne Krueger, Liberalization Attempts and Consequences (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1978); Jagdish Bhagwati, Anatomy and Consequences of Exchange Control Regimes (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1978); Bela Balassa et al., Development Strategies in Semi-Industrial Economies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Ramgopal Agarwala, "Price Distortions and Growth in Developing Countries," World Bank Staff Paper no. 575 (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1983); Daniel Landau, "Government and Economic Growth in the Less Developed Countries: An Empirical Study," Economic Development and Cultural Change 35, no. 1 (October 1986): 35-75; Vinod Thomas, Nadab Halevi, and Julie Stanton, "Does Policy Reform Improve Performance?" World Bank Background Paper (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1987); Demetrios Papageorgiou, Armeane M. Choski, and Michael Michaely, Liberalizing Foreign Trade in Developing Countries: The Lessons of Experience (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1990); and David Dollar, "Outward-Oriented Economies Really Do Grow More Rapidly: Evidence from 95 LDCs, 1976-85," Economic Development and Cultural Change 40, no. 3 (April 1992): 520-44.
12. For a number of cross-sectional studies, see Ian M. D. Little, Tibor Scitovsky, and Maurice F. G. Scott, Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries (London: Oxford University Press, 1970); Anne Krueger, Liberalization Attempts and Consequences (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1978); Jagdish Bhagwati, Anatomy and Consequences of Exchange Control Regimes (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1978); Bela Balassa et al., Development Strategies in Semi-Industrial Economies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Ramgopal Agarwala, "Price Distortions and Growth in Developing Countries," World Bank Staff Paper no. 575 (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1983); Daniel Landau, "Government and Economic Growth in the Less Developed Countries: An Empirical Study," Economic Development and Cultural Change 35, no. 1 (October 1986): 35-75; Vinod Thomas, Nadab Halevi, and Julie Stanton, "Does Policy Reform Improve Performance?" World Bank Background Paper (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1987); Demetrios Papageorgiou, Armeane M. Choski, and Michael Michaely, Liberalizing Foreign Trade in Developing Countries: The Lessons of Experience (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1990); and David Dollar, "Outward-Oriented Economies Really Do Grow More Rapidly: Evidence from 95 LDCs, 1976-85," Economic Development and Cultural Change 40, no. 3 (April 1992): 520-44.
13. For a number of cross-sectional studies, see Ian M. D. Little, Tibor Scitovsky, and Maurice F. G. Scott, Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries (London: Oxford University Press, 1970); Anne Krueger, Liberalization Attempts and Consequences (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1978); Jagdish Bhagwati, Anatomy and Consequences of Exchange Control Regimes (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1978); Bela Balassa et al., Development Strategies in Semi-Industrial Economies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Ramgopal Agarwala, "Price Distortions and Growth in Developing Countries," World Bank Staff Paper no. 575 (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1983); Daniel Landau, "Government and Economic Growth in the Less Developed Countries: An Empirical Study," Economic Development and Cultural Change 35, no. 1 (October 1986): 35-75; Vinod Thomas, Nadab Halevi, and Julie Stanton, "Does Policy Reform Improve Performance?" World Bank Background Paper (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1987); Demetrios Papageorgiou, Armeane M. Choski, and Michael Michaely, Liberalizing Foreign Trade in Developing Countries: The Lessons of Experience (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1990); and David Dollar, "Outward-Oriented Economies Really Do Grow More Rapidly: Evidence from 95 LDCs, 1976-85," Economic Development and Cultural Change 40, no. 3 (April 1992): 520-44.
14. For a number of cross-sectional studies, see Ian M. D. Little, Tibor Scitovsky, and Maurice F. G. Scott, Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries (London: Oxford University Press, 1970); Anne Krueger, Liberalization Attempts and Consequences (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1978); Jagdish Bhagwati, Anatomy and Consequences of Exchange Control Regimes (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1978); Bela Balassa et al., Development Strategies in Semi-Industrial Economies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Ramgopal Agarwala, "Price Distortions and Growth in Developing Countries," World Bank Staff Paper no. 575 (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1983); Daniel Landau, "Government and Economic Growth in the Less Developed Countries: An Empirical Study," Economic Development and Cultural Change 35, no. 1 (October 1986): 35-75; Vinod Thomas, Nadab Halevi, and Julie Stanton, "Does Policy Reform Improve Performance?" World Bank Background Paper (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1987); Demetrios Papageorgiou, Armeane M. Choski, and Michael Michaely, Liberalizing Foreign Trade in Developing Countries: The Lessons of Experience (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1990); and David Dollar, "Outward-Oriented Economies Really Do Grow More Rapidly: Evidence from 95 LDCs, 1976-85," Economic Development and Cultural Change 40, no. 3 (April 1992): 520-44.
15. For a survey of some of these tests, see Harold L. Wilensky, Gregory M. Luebbert, Susan Reed Hahn, and Adrienne M. Jamieson, "Comparative Social Policy: Theories, Methods, Findings," in Comparative Policy Research: Learning from Experience, ed. Meinolf Dierkes, Hans N. Weiler, and Ariane Berthoin Antal (New York: St. Martin's, 1987), pp. 381-458, esp. pp. 384-91; and Aaron Wildavsky, "Why Government Grows," in Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary Processes, ed. Aaron Wildavsky, 2d ed. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1986), 12: 360-68.
16. For a survey of some of these tests, see Harold L. Wilensky, Gregory M. Luebbert, Susan Reed Hahn, and Adrienne M. Jamieson, "Comparative Social Policy: Theories, Methods, Findings," in Comparative Policy Research: Learning from Experience, ed. Meinolf Dierkes, Hans N. Weiler, and Ariane Berthoin Antal (New York: St. Martin's, 1987), pp. 381-458, esp. pp. 384-91; and Aaron Wildavsky, "Why Government Grows," in Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary Processes, ed. Aaron Wildavsky, 2d ed. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1986), 12: 360-68.
17. Adolf Wagner, "The Nature of the Fiscal Economy," in Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, ed. Richard A. Musgrave and Alan R. Peacock (London: Macmillan, 1958), pp. 1-8.
18. Peter Katzenstein, "The Small European States in the International Economy: Economic Dependence and Corporatist Politics," in The Antinomies of Interdependence, ed. John Ruggie (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 91-130, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), and Corporatism and Change: Austria, Switzerland and the Politics of Industry (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984).
19. Peter Katzenstein, "The Small European States in the International Economy: Economic Dependence and Corporatist Politics," in The Antinomies of Interdependence, ed. John Ruggie (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 91-130, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), and Corporatism and Change: Austria, Switzerland and the Politics of Industry (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984).
20. Peter Katzenstein, "The Small European States in the International Economy: Economic Dependence and Corporatist Politics," in The Antinomies of Interdependence, ed. John Ruggie (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 91-130, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), and Corporatism and Change: Austria, Switzerland and the Politics of Industry (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984).
21. Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982).
22. See, e.g., the literature on the political business cycle. See Edward Tufte, The Political Control of the Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978). For views on presidential and parliamentarian systems, see Terry M. Moe, "The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy," in Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond, ed. Oliver Williamson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 116-53. See also the discussion in Alexander M. Hicks and Duane Swank, "Politics, Institutions and Welfare Spending in Industrialized Democracies, 1960-82," American Political Science Review 86, no. 3 (September 1992): 658-74. Hicks and Swank also address the differences between majoritarian and proportional voting systems.
23. See, e.g., the literature on the political business cycle. See Edward Tufte, The Political Control of the Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978). For views on presidential and parliamentarian systems, see Terry M. Moe, "The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy," in Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond, ed. Oliver Williamson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 116-53. See also the discussion in Alexander M. Hicks and Duane Swank, "Politics, Institutions and Welfare Spending in Industrialized Democracies, 1960-82," American Political Science Review 86, no. 3 (September 1992): 658-74. Hicks and Swank also address the differences between majoritarian and proportional voting systems.
24. See, e.g., the literature on the political business cycle. See Edward Tufte, The Political Control of the Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978). For views on presidential and parliamentarian systems, see Terry M. Moe, "The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy," in Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond, ed. Oliver Williamson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 116-53. See also the discussion in Alexander M. Hicks and Duane Swank, "Politics, Institutions and Welfare Spending in Industrialized Democracies, 1960-82," American Political Science Review 86, no. 3 (September 1992): 658-74. Hicks and Swank also address the differences between majoritarian and proportional voting systems.
25. For fiscal centralization, see J. Fred Giertz, "Centralization and Government Budget Size" Publius 2, no. 1 (Winter 1981): 119-28; John A. C. Conybeare, "The Rent-Seeking State and Revenue Diversification," World Politics 35, no. 1 (October 1982): 25-42. For indirect taxation, see David R. Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis," American Political Science Review 72 (1978): 1243-61; and Conybeare. For labor organization, see R. Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange, "The Political Economy of Macroeconomic Performance," American Political Science Review 85 (1991): 539-56.
26. For fiscal centralization, see J. Fred Giertz, "Centralization and Government Budget Size" Publius 2, no. 1 (Winter 1981): 119-28; John A. C. Conybeare, "The Rent-Seeking State and Revenue Diversification," World Politics 35, no. 1 (October 1982): 25-42. For indirect taxation, see David R. Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis," American Political Science Review 72 (1978): 1243-61; and Conybeare. For labor organization, see R. Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange, "The Political Economy of Macroeconomic Performance," American Political Science Review 85 (1991): 539-56.
27. For fiscal centralization, see J. Fred Giertz, "Centralization and Government Budget Size" Publius 2, no. 1 (Winter 1981): 119-28; John A. C. Conybeare, "The Rent-Seeking State and Revenue Diversification," World Politics 35, no. 1 (October 1982): 25-42. For indirect taxation, see David R. Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis," American Political Science Review 72 (1978): 1243-61; and Conybeare. For labor organization, see R. Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange, "The Political Economy of Macroeconomic Performance," American Political Science Review 85 (1991): 539-56.
28. For fiscal centralization, see J. Fred Giertz, "Centralization and Government Budget Size" Publius 2, no. 1 (Winter 1981): 119-28; John A. C. Conybeare, "The Rent-Seeking State and Revenue Diversification," World Politics 35, no. 1 (October 1982): 25-42. For indirect taxation, see David R. Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis," American Political Science Review 72 (1978): 1243-61; and Conybeare. For labor organization, see R. Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange, "The Political Economy of Macroeconomic Performance," American Political Science Review 85 (1991): 539-56.
29. Hence this definition is free from the pejorative connotations sometimes attached to discussions of ideology. Ideologies will not be assumed to be necessarily wrong or based on delusion, but simply not proven by the facts available. See discussion in Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. David E. Apter (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 47-76. Reprinted in Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic, 1973), chap. 8.
30. Hence this definition is free from the pejorative connotations sometimes attached to discussions of ideology. Ideologies will not be assumed to be necessarily wrong or based on delusion, but simply not proven by the facts available. See discussion in Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. David E. Apter (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 47-76. Reprinted in Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic, 1973), chap. 8.
31. Merilee Grindle, "Positive Economics and Negative Politics," in Politics and Policy-Making in Developing Countries: Perspectives on the New Political Economy, ed. Gerald Meier (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991), pp. 41-67, quote on p. 54.
32. Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 62-63.
33. Robert H. Bates and Anne O. Krueger, "Generalizations Arising from the Country Studies," in Political and Economic interactions in Economic Policy Reform: Evidence from Eight Countries, ed. R. Bates and A. Krueger (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 444-72, quote on p. 456.
34. Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 46.
35. Douglass North, "Three Approaches to the Study of Institutions," in Neoclassical Political Economy: The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities, ed. David Colander (Cambridge, Mass.: Balinger, 1984), pp. 33-40, quote on p. 34.
36. Stephen D. Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," Comparative Politics 16, no. 2 (January 1984): 223-46, quote on 228.
37. See David Kreps, "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, ed. James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 90-143; Ernest Gellner, "The Gaffe-Avoiding Animal, or a Bundle of Hypotheses," in Relativism and the Social Sciences, ed. Ernest Gellner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 68-82; Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981), chap. 5, sec. 2, and Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chap. 3, sec. 3; Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and Environmental Dangers (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982), chaps. 1-4; Jon Elster, "When Rationality Fails," in Solomonic Judgements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 1, sec. 3.
38. See David Kreps, "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, ed. James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 90-143; Ernest Gellner, "The Gaffe-Avoiding Animal, or a Bundle of Hypotheses," in Relativism and the Social Sciences, ed. Ernest Gellner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 68-82; Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981), chap. 5, sec. 2, and Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chap. 3, sec. 3; Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and Environmental Dangers (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982), chaps. 1-4; Jon Elster, "When Rationality Fails," in Solomonic Judgements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 1, sec. 3.
39. See David Kreps, "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, ed. James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 90-143; Ernest Gellner, "The Gaffe-Avoiding Animal, or a Bundle of Hypotheses," in Relativism and the Social Sciences, ed. Ernest Gellner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 68-82; Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981), chap. 5, sec. 2, and Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chap. 3, sec. 3; Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and Environmental Dangers (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982), chaps. 1-4; Jon Elster, "When Rationality Fails," in Solomonic Judgements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 1, sec. 3.
40. See David Kreps, "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, ed. James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 90-143; Ernest Gellner, "The Gaffe-Avoiding Animal, or a Bundle of Hypotheses," in Relativism and the Social Sciences, ed. Ernest Gellner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 68-82; Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981), chap. 5, sec. 2, and Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chap. 3, sec. 3; Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and Environmental Dangers (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982), chaps. 1-4; Jon Elster, "When Rationality Fails," in Solomonic Judgements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 1, sec. 3.
41. See David Kreps, "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, ed. James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 90-143; Ernest Gellner, "The Gaffe-Avoiding Animal, or a Bundle of Hypotheses," in Relativism and the Social Sciences, ed. Ernest Gellner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 68-82; Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981), chap. 5, sec. 2, and Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chap. 3, sec. 3; Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and Environmental Dangers (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982), chaps. 1-4; Jon Elster, "When Rationality Fails," in Solomonic Judgements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 1, sec. 3.
42. See David Kreps, "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, ed. James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 90-143; Ernest Gellner, "The Gaffe-Avoiding Animal, or a Bundle of Hypotheses," in Relativism and the Social Sciences, ed. Ernest Gellner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 68-82; Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981), chap. 5, sec. 2, and Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chap. 3, sec. 3; Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and Environmental Dangers (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982), chaps. 1-4; Jon Elster, "When Rationality Fails," in Solomonic Judgements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 1, sec. 3.
43. North, "Three Approaches to the Study of Institutions," p. 39.
44. Gerald Meier, "The Political Economy of Policy Reform," in Meier, ed. (n. 11 above), pp. 299-316, quote on pp. 300-301.
45. For a dissenting note, see Ronald Rogowski, "Structure, Growth and Power: Three Rationalist Accounts," in Toward a Political Economy of Development, ed. Robert Bates (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 300-330, quote on pp. 314-15. This discussion originally appeared in International Organization, vol. 37 (1983).
46. For a dissenting note, see Ronald Rogowski, "Structure, Growth and Power: Three Rationalist Accounts," in Toward a Political Economy of Development, ed. Robert Bates (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 300-330, quote on pp. 314-15. This discussion originally appeared in International Organization, vol. 37 (1983).
47. For collections of such writings, see Peter Hall, ed., The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989); "Special Issue: Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination," International Organization 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992); and Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993). The terms "ideas" and "ideology" are generally used interchangeably in this literature.
48. For collections of such writings, see Peter Hall, ed., The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989); "Special Issue: Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination," International Organization 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992); and Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993). The terms "ideas" and "ideology" are generally used interchangeably in this literature.
49. For collections of such writings, see Peter Hall, ed., The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989); "Special Issue: Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination," International Organization 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992); and Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993). The terms "ideas" and "ideology" are generally used interchangeably in this literature.
50. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane state: "We do not seek to explain the sources of . . . ideas; we focus on their effects." See "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework," in Goldstein and Keohane, eds., pp. 3-30, quote on p. 7.
51. Most notably "strain" theories, which associate ideologies with rapid socioeconomic change. See Francis X. Sutton et al., The American Business Creed (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), esp. chap. 15; Edward Shils, "Ideology," in The International Encyclopedia of Social Science, ed. David Sills (New York: Crowell Collier & Macmillan, 1968), 7:66-75. Geertz isolated four ways in which ideologies can address strain: catharsis, morale boosting, solidarity creating, and an explanation of underlying discontents. See Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," (n. 10 above), p. 54. Using a slightly different approach, Lane proposed a paradigm in which ideological change is attributed to exogenous changes in "existential base" (socioeconomic conditions), cultural premises, personal qualities, and social conflicts, each of which is to a limited extent autonomous from the others. See Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does (New York: Free Press, 1962), chap. 25. In a completely different vein, Raymond Boudon focuses on four different cognitive effects, which he labels positional, dispositional, communication, and "e" (epistemological). See his The Analysis of Ideology (Oxford: Polity, 1989), esp. chap. 5.
52. Most notably "strain" theories, which associate ideologies with rapid socioeconomic change. See Francis X. Sutton et al., The American Business Creed (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), esp. chap. 15; Edward Shils, "Ideology," in The International Encyclopedia of Social Science, ed. David Sills (New York: Crowell Collier & Macmillan, 1968), 7:66-75. Geertz isolated four ways in which ideologies can address strain: catharsis, morale boosting, solidarity creating, and an explanation of underlying discontents. See Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," (n. 10 above), p. 54. Using a slightly different approach, Lane proposed a paradigm in which ideological change is attributed to exogenous changes in "existential base" (socioeconomic conditions), cultural premises, personal qualities, and social conflicts, each of which is to a limited extent autonomous from the others. See Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does (New York: Free Press, 1962), chap. 25. In a completely different vein, Raymond Boudon focuses on four different cognitive effects, which he labels positional, dispositional, communication, and "e" (epistemological). See his The Analysis of Ideology (Oxford: Polity, 1989), esp. chap. 5.
53. Most notably "strain" theories, which associate ideologies with rapid socioeconomic change. See Francis X. Sutton et al., The American Business Creed (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), esp. chap. 15; Edward Shils, "Ideology," in The International Encyclopedia of Social Science, ed. David Sills (New York: Crowell Collier & Macmillan, 1968), 7:66-75. Geertz isolated four ways in which ideologies can address strain: catharsis, morale boosting, solidarity creating, and an explanation of underlying discontents. See Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," (n. 10 above), p. 54. Using a slightly different approach, Lane proposed a paradigm in which ideological change is attributed to exogenous changes in "existential base" (socioeconomic conditions), cultural premises, personal qualities, and social conflicts, each of which is to a limited extent autonomous from the others. See Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does (New York: Free Press, 1962), chap. 25. In a completely different vein, Raymond Boudon focuses on four different cognitive effects, which he labels positional, dispositional, communication, and "e" (epistemological). See his The Analysis of Ideology (Oxford: Polity, 1989), esp. chap. 5.
54. Most notably "strain" theories, which associate ideologies with rapid socioeconomic change. See Francis X. Sutton et al., The American Business Creed (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), esp. chap. 15; Edward Shils, "Ideology," in The International Encyclopedia of Social Science, ed. David Sills (New York: Crowell Collier & Macmillan, 1968), 7:66-75. Geertz isolated four ways in which ideologies can address strain: catharsis, morale boosting, solidarity creating, and an explanation of underlying discontents. See Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," (n. 10 above), p. 54. Using a slightly different approach, Lane proposed a paradigm in which ideological change is attributed to exogenous changes in "existential base" (socioeconomic conditions), cultural premises, personal qualities, and social conflicts, each of which is to a limited extent autonomous from the others. See Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does (New York: Free Press, 1962), chap. 25. In a completely different vein, Raymond Boudon focuses on four different cognitive effects, which he labels positional, dispositional, communication, and "e" (epistemological). See his The Analysis of Ideology (Oxford: Polity, 1989), esp. chap. 5.
55. Most notably "strain" theories, which associate ideologies with rapid socioeconomic change. See Francis X. Sutton et al., The American Business Creed (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), esp. chap. 15; Edward Shils, "Ideology," in The International Encyclopedia of Social Science, ed. David Sills (New York: Crowell Collier & Macmillan, 1968), 7:66-75. Geertz isolated four ways in which ideologies can address strain: catharsis, morale boosting, solidarity creating, and an explanation of underlying discontents. See Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," (n. 10 above), p. 54. Using a slightly different approach, Lane proposed a paradigm in which ideological change is attributed to exogenous changes in "existential base" (socioeconomic conditions), cultural premises, personal qualities, and social conflicts, each of which is to a limited extent autonomous from the others. See Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does (New York: Free Press, 1962), chap. 25. In a completely different vein, Raymond Boudon focuses on four different cognitive effects, which he labels positional, dispositional, communication, and "e" (epistemological). See his The Analysis of Ideology (Oxford: Polity, 1989), esp. chap. 5.
56. See, e.g., R. E. Knox and J. A. Inkster, "Postdecisional Dissonance at Post Time," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 8 (1968): 319-23; J. C. Younger, L. Walker, and A. J. Arrowood, "Postdecision Dissonance at the Fair," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 3 (1977): 284-87.
57. See, e.g., R. E. Knox and J. A. Inkster, "Postdecisional Dissonance at Post Time," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 8 (1968): 319-23; J. C. Younger, L. Walker, and A. J. Arrowood, "Postdecision Dissonance at the Fair," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 3 (1977): 284-87.
58. Originating from work by Leon Festinger; see his A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957).
59. Albert O. Hirschman, "Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a Quasi-Vanishing Act," Economic Development and Cultural Change 13, no. 4, pt. 1 (July 1965): 385-93, and Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 94-96, 113-14, and app. E; John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), chap. 4; Shlomo Maital, Minds, Markets and Money: Psychological Foundations of Economic Behavior (New York: Basic, 1982), chap. 6; Jeffrey James and Efraim Gutkind, "Attitude Change Revisited: Cognitive Dissonance Theory and Development Policy," World Development 13, nos. 10/11 (October/November 1985): 1139-49; Benjamin Gilad, Stanley Kaish, and Peter D. Loeb, "Cognitive Dissonance and Utility Maximization: A General Framework," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 8, no. 1 (March 1987): 61-73; George A. Akerlof and William T. Dickens, "The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance," American Economic Review 72 (June 1982): 307-19; George A. Akerlof, "The Economics of Illusion," Economics and Politics 1, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 1-15; Peter E. Earl, "On the Complementarity of Economic Applications of Cognitive Dissonance Theory and Personal Construct Psychology," in New Directions in Economic Psychology: Theory, Experiment and Application, ed. Stephen E. G. Lea, Paul Webley, and Brian M. Young (Hants: Edward Elgar, 1992), pp. 49-65; Elster, "When Rationality Fails" (n. 17 above), chap. 1, sec. 4, and Jon Elster, Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chap. 1.
60. Albert O. Hirschman, "Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a Quasi-Vanishing Act," Economic Development and Cultural Change 13, no. 4, pt. 1 (July 1965): 385-93, and Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 94-96, 113-14, and app. E; John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), chap. 4; Shlomo Maital, Minds, Markets and Money: Psychological Foundations of Economic Behavior (New York: Basic, 1982), chap. 6; Jeffrey James and Efraim Gutkind, "Attitude Change Revisited: Cognitive Dissonance Theory and Development Policy," World Development 13, nos. 10/11 (October/November 1985): 1139-49; Benjamin Gilad, Stanley Kaish, and Peter D. Loeb, "Cognitive Dissonance and Utility Maximization: A General Framework," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 8, no. 1 (March 1987): 61-73; George A. Akerlof and William T. Dickens, "The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance," American Economic Review 72 (June 1982): 307-19; George A. Akerlof, "The Economics of Illusion," Economics and Politics 1, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 1-15; Peter E. Earl, "On the Complementarity of Economic Applications of Cognitive Dissonance Theory and Personal Construct Psychology," in New Directions in Economic Psychology: Theory, Experiment and Application, ed. Stephen E. G. Lea, Paul Webley, and Brian M. Young (Hants: Edward Elgar, 1992), pp. 49-65; Elster, "When Rationality Fails" (n. 17 above), chap. 1, sec. 4, and Jon Elster, Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chap. 1.
61. Albert O. Hirschman, "Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a Quasi-Vanishing Act," Economic Development and Cultural Change 13, no. 4, pt. 1 (July 1965): 385-93, and Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 94-96, 113-14, and app. E; John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), chap. 4; Shlomo Maital, Minds, Markets and Money: Psychological Foundations of Economic Behavior (New York: Basic, 1982), chap. 6; Jeffrey James and Efraim Gutkind, "Attitude Change Revisited: Cognitive Dissonance Theory and Development Policy," World Development 13, nos. 10/11 (October/November 1985): 1139-49; Benjamin Gilad, Stanley Kaish, and Peter D. Loeb, "Cognitive Dissonance and Utility Maximization: A General Framework," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 8, no. 1 (March 1987): 61-73; George A. Akerlof and William T. Dickens, "The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance," American Economic Review 72 (June 1982): 307-19; George A. Akerlof, "The Economics of Illusion," Economics and Politics 1, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 1-15; Peter E. Earl, "On the Complementarity of Economic Applications of Cognitive Dissonance Theory and Personal Construct Psychology," in New Directions in Economic Psychology: Theory, Experiment and Application, ed. Stephen E. G. Lea, Paul Webley, and Brian M. Young (Hants: Edward Elgar, 1992), pp. 49-65; Elster, "When Rationality Fails" (n. 17 above), chap. 1, sec. 4, and Jon Elster, Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chap. 1.
62. Albert O. Hirschman, "Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a Quasi-Vanishing Act," Economic Development and Cultural Change 13, no. 4, pt. 1 (July 1965): 385-93, and Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 94-96, 113-14, and app. E; John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), chap. 4; Shlomo Maital, Minds, Markets and Money: Psychological Foundations of Economic Behavior (New York: Basic, 1982), chap. 6; Jeffrey James and Efraim Gutkind, "Attitude Change Revisited: Cognitive Dissonance Theory and Development Policy," World Development 13, nos. 10/11 (October/November 1985): 1139-49; Benjamin Gilad, Stanley Kaish, and Peter D. Loeb, "Cognitive Dissonance and Utility Maximization: A General Framework," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 8, no. 1 (March 1987): 61-73; George A. Akerlof and William T. Dickens, "The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance," American Economic Review 72 (June 1982): 307-19; George A. Akerlof, "The Economics of Illusion," Economics and Politics 1, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 1-15; Peter E. Earl, "On the Complementarity of Economic Applications of Cognitive Dissonance Theory and Personal Construct Psychology," in New Directions in Economic Psychology: Theory, Experiment and Application, ed. Stephen E. G. Lea, Paul Webley, and Brian M. Young (Hants: Edward Elgar, 1992), pp. 49-65; Elster, "When Rationality Fails" (n. 17 above), chap. 1, sec. 4, and Jon Elster, Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chap. 1.
63. Albert O. Hirschman, "Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a Quasi-Vanishing Act," Economic Development and Cultural Change 13, no. 4, pt. 1 (July 1965): 385-93, and Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 94-96, 113-14, and app. E; John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), chap. 4; Shlomo Maital, Minds, Markets and Money: Psychological Foundations of Economic Behavior (New York: Basic, 1982), chap. 6; Jeffrey James and Efraim Gutkind, "Attitude Change Revisited: Cognitive Dissonance Theory and Development Policy," World Development 13, nos. 10/11 (October/November 1985): 1139-49; Benjamin Gilad, Stanley Kaish, and Peter D. Loeb, "Cognitive Dissonance and Utility Maximization: A General Framework," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 8, no. 1 (March 1987): 61-73; George A. Akerlof and William T. Dickens, "The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance," American Economic Review 72 (June 1982): 307-19; George A. Akerlof, "The Economics of Illusion," Economics and Politics 1, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 1-15; Peter E. Earl, "On the Complementarity of Economic Applications of Cognitive Dissonance Theory and Personal Construct Psychology," in New Directions in Economic Psychology: Theory, Experiment and Application, ed. Stephen E. G. Lea, Paul Webley, and Brian M. Young (Hants: Edward Elgar, 1992), pp. 49-65; Elster, "When Rationality Fails" (n. 17 above), chap. 1, sec. 4, and Jon Elster, Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chap. 1.
64. Albert O. Hirschman, "Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a Quasi-Vanishing Act," Economic Development and Cultural Change 13, no. 4, pt. 1 (July 1965): 385-93, and Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 94-96, 113-14, and app. E; John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), chap. 4; Shlomo Maital, Minds, Markets and Money: Psychological Foundations of Economic Behavior (New York: Basic, 1982), chap. 6; Jeffrey James and Efraim Gutkind, "Attitude Change Revisited: Cognitive Dissonance Theory and Development Policy," World Development 13, nos. 10/11 (October/November 1985): 1139-49; Benjamin Gilad, Stanley Kaish, and Peter D. Loeb, "Cognitive Dissonance and Utility Maximization: A General Framework," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 8, no. 1 (March 1987): 61-73; George A. Akerlof and William T. Dickens, "The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance," American Economic Review 72 (June 1982): 307-19; George A. Akerlof, "The Economics of Illusion," Economics and Politics 1, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 1-15; Peter E. Earl, "On the Complementarity of Economic Applications of Cognitive Dissonance Theory and Personal Construct Psychology," in New Directions in Economic Psychology: Theory, Experiment and Application, ed. Stephen E. G. Lea, Paul Webley, and Brian M. Young (Hants: Edward Elgar, 1992), pp. 49-65; Elster, "When Rationality Fails" (n. 17 above), chap. 1, sec. 4, and Jon Elster, Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chap. 1.
65. Albert O. Hirschman, "Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a Quasi-Vanishing Act," Economic Development and Cultural Change 13, no. 4, pt. 1 (July 1965): 385-93, and Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 94-96, 113-14, and app. E; John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), chap. 4; Shlomo Maital, Minds, Markets and Money: Psychological Foundations of Economic Behavior (New York: Basic, 1982), chap. 6; Jeffrey James and Efraim Gutkind, "Attitude Change Revisited: Cognitive Dissonance Theory and Development Policy," World Development 13, nos. 10/11 (October/November 1985): 1139-49; Benjamin Gilad, Stanley Kaish, and Peter D. Loeb, "Cognitive Dissonance and Utility Maximization: A General Framework," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 8, no. 1 (March 1987): 61-73; George A. Akerlof and William T. Dickens, "The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance," American Economic Review 72 (June 1982): 307-19; George A. Akerlof, "The Economics of Illusion," Economics and Politics 1, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 1-15; Peter E. Earl, "On the Complementarity of Economic Applications of Cognitive Dissonance Theory and Personal Construct Psychology," in New Directions in Economic Psychology: Theory, Experiment and Application, ed. Stephen E. G. Lea, Paul Webley, and Brian M. Young (Hants: Edward Elgar, 1992), pp. 49-65; Elster, "When Rationality Fails" (n. 17 above), chap. 1, sec. 4, and Jon Elster, Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chap. 1.
66. Albert O. Hirschman, "Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a Quasi-Vanishing Act," Economic Development and Cultural Change 13, no. 4, pt. 1 (July 1965): 385-93, and Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 94-96, 113-14, and app. E; John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), chap. 4; Shlomo Maital, Minds, Markets and Money: Psychological Foundations of Economic Behavior (New York: Basic, 1982), chap. 6; Jeffrey James and Efraim Gutkind, "Attitude Change Revisited: Cognitive Dissonance Theory and Development Policy," World Development 13, nos. 10/11 (October/November 1985): 1139-49; Benjamin Gilad, Stanley Kaish, and Peter D. Loeb, "Cognitive Dissonance and Utility Maximization: A General Framework," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 8, no. 1 (March 1987): 61-73; George A. Akerlof and William T. Dickens, "The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance," American Economic Review 72 (June 1982): 307-19; George A. Akerlof, "The Economics of Illusion," Economics and Politics 1, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 1-15; Peter E. Earl, "On the Complementarity of Economic Applications of Cognitive Dissonance Theory and Personal Construct Psychology," in New Directions in Economic Psychology: Theory, Experiment and Application, ed. Stephen E. G. Lea, Paul Webley, and Brian M. Young (Hants: Edward Elgar, 1992), pp. 49-65; Elster, "When Rationality Fails" (n. 17 above), chap. 1, sec. 4, and Jon Elster, Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chap. 1.
67. Albert O. Hirschman, "Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a Quasi-Vanishing Act," Economic Development and Cultural Change 13, no. 4, pt. 1 (July 1965): 385-93, and Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 94-96, 113-14, and app. E; John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), chap. 4; Shlomo Maital, Minds, Markets and Money: Psychological Foundations of Economic Behavior (New York: Basic, 1982), chap. 6; Jeffrey James and Efraim Gutkind, "Attitude Change Revisited: Cognitive Dissonance Theory and Development Policy," World Development 13, nos. 10/11 (October/November 1985): 1139-49; Benjamin Gilad, Stanley Kaish, and Peter D. Loeb, "Cognitive Dissonance and Utility Maximization: A General Framework," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 8, no. 1 (March 1987): 61-73; George A. Akerlof and William T.
68. Albert O. Hirschman, "Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a Quasi-Vanishing Act," Economic Development and Cultural Change 13, no. 4, pt. 1 (July 1965): 385-93, and Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 94-96, 113-14, and app. E; John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), chap. 4; Shlomo Maital, Minds, Markets and Money: Psychological Foundations of Economic Behavior (New York: Basic, 1982), chap. 6; Jeffrey James and Efraim Gutkind, "Attitude Change Revisited: Cognitive Dissonance Theory and Development Policy," World Development 13, nos. 10/11 (October/November 1985): 1139-49; Benjamin Gilad, Stanley Kaish, and Peter D. Loeb, "Cognitive Dissonance and Utility Maximization: A General Framework," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 8, no. 1 (March 1987): 61-73; George A. Akerlof and William T. Dickens, "The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance," American Economic Review 72 (June 1982): 307-19; George A. Akerlof, "The Economics of Illusion," Economics and Politics 1, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 1-15; Peter E. Earl, "On the Complementarity of Economic Applications of Cognitive Dissonance Theory and Personal Construct Psychology," in New Directions in Economic Psychology: Theory, Experiment and Application, ed. Stephen E. G. Lea, Paul Webley, and Brian M. Young (Hants: Edward Elgar, 1992), pp. 49-65; Elster, "When Rationality Fails" (n. 17 above), chap. 1, sec. 4, and Jon Elster, Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chap. 1.
69. Albert O. Hirschman, "Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a Quasi-Vanishing Act," Economic Development and Cultural Change 13, no. 4, pt. 1 (July 1965): 385-93, and Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 94-96, 113-14, and app. E; John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), chap. 4; Shlomo Maital, Minds, Markets and Money: Psychological Foundations of Economic Behavior (New York: Basic, 1982), chap. 6; Jeffrey James and Efraim Gutkind, "Attitude Change Revisited: Cognitive Dissonance Theory and Development Policy," World Development 13, nos. 10/11 (October/November 1985): 1139-49; Benjamin Gilad, Stanley Kaish, and Peter D. Loeb, "Cognitive Dissonance and Utility Maximization: A General Framework," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 8, no. 1 (March 1987): 61-73; George A. Akerlof and William T. Dickens, "The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance," American Economic Review 72 (June 1982): 307-19; George A. Akerlof, "The Economics of Illusion," Economics and Politics 1, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 1-15; Peter E. Earl, "On the Complementarity of Economic Applications of Cognitive Dissonance Theory and Personal Construct Psychology," in New Directions in Economic Psychology: Theory, Experiment and Application, ed. Stephen E. G. Lea, Paul Webley, and Brian M. Young (Hants: Edward Elgar, 1992), pp. 49-65; Elster, "When Rationality Fails" (n. 17 above), chap. 1, sec. 4, and Jon Elster, Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chap. 1.
70. See Joel Cooper and Russell H. Fazio, "A New Look at Dissonance Theory," Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 17 (1984): 229-66.
71. These generalizations are clearly related to some of the propositions explored in Lewis Coser's classic, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1956), esp. chap. 5. However, unlike Coser's discussion, which emphasizes efforts on the part of group leaders to enforce intragroup ideological conformity under conditions of outside conflict, this analysis shows why conformist ideologies might in fact be internalized by group members.
72. Fritz Heider, "Attitudes and Cognitive Organization," Journal of Psychology 21 (1946): 107-12.
73. Robert Cialdini, Influence: Science and Practice (Glenview, Ill.: Scott Foresman, 1988), chap. 5.
74. Jack W. Brehm, A Theory of Psychological Reactance (New York: Academic Press, 1966).
75. Latin American countries that gained independence in the nineteenth century will not be considered in this category, both because the group with status quo control was not identified with a clear economic ideology and because the countries had gained independence such a long time ago, a point that will be elaborated on below.
76. Of course, the theory would predict more extreme oppositional ideology formation within ex-Western colonies where conflict with the colonial power was particular long lasting and costly. However, measuring such variations in costliness is beyond the scope of this article and will be put aside in favor of examining the general tendencies toward oppositional ideology formation arising from anticolonial conflicts.
77. For general discussion on this point, see Paul Sigmund, "Introduction to the First Edition," in The Ideologies of the Developing Nations, ed. Paul Sigmund, 2d ed. (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 1-40, esp. pp. 13-15.
78. Kwame Nkrumah, Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare (London: Panaf, 1968), pp. 1-2.
79. Amilcar Cabral, Unity and Struggle (New York: Monthly Review, 1979), p. 127.
80. Jawaharlal Nehru, Toward Freedom, 2d ed. (Boston: Beacon, 1958), p. 392.
81. Leopold Sedar Senghor, On African Socialism, 2d ed. (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 96.
82. For contrasts between different systems of colonial rule, see Tony Smith, The Pattern of Imperialism: The United States, Great Britain and the Late-industrializing World since 1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Miles Kahler, Decolonialization in Britain and France: The Domestic Consequences of International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).
83. For contrasts between different systems of colonial rule, see Tony Smith, The Pattern of Imperialism: The United States, Great Britain and the Late-industrializing World since 1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Miles Kahler, Decolonialization in Britain and France: The Domestic Consequences of International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).
84. See, e.g., Crawford Young, Ideology and Development in Africa (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 189.
85. See Sigmund, "Introduction to the First Edition." See also Charles F. Andrain, "Democracy and Socialism," in Apter, ed. (n. 10 above), pp. 155-205. In Africa, Young has done a survey of the basic development strategies of 17 African countries, all of which are ex-Western colonies. Eight are classified as "Afro-Marxist," six as "populist socialist," and only three as "African capi-talist." See Young, chap. 1, and table 6.1 on p. 299.
86. See Sigmund, "Introduction to the First Edition." See also Charles F. Andrain, "Democracy and Socialism," in Apter, ed. (n. 10 above), pp. 155-205. In Africa, Young has done a survey of the basic development strategies of 17 African countries, all of which are ex-Western colonies. Eight are classified as "Afro-Marxist," six as "populist socialist," and only three as "African capi-talist." See Young, chap. 1, and table 6.1 on p. 299.
87. Wole Soyinka, "Africa again Betrayed," San Francisco Chronicle (June 5, 1991), Briefing Section, p. 2.
88. Young, p. 98.
89. Daniel Bell, "Ethnicity and Social Change," in Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, ed. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 141-74, quote on pp. 150-51.
90. John Plamenatz, On Alien Rule and Self-Government (London: Longmans, 1960), p. 130.
91. Most notably Julius Nyerere, Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968).
92. Ibid.
93. Paul Sigmund, "Introduction to the Second Revised Edition," in Sigmund, ed. (n. 34 above), pp. 41-67, quote on p. 49.
94. Ibid., p. 13.
95. "Back to the Future" (interview with Yoweri Museveni), New African 286 (July 1991): 10.
96. Leopold Sedar Senghor, "What Is Negritude?" West Africa (November 4, 1961). Reprinted in Sigmund, ed. (n. 34), pp. 250-52. For a discussion of some of the links between African socialism and negritude, see Cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development: An Analytic Study (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), pp. 73-81.
97. Leopold Sedar Senghor, "What Is Negritude?" West Africa (November 4, 1961). Reprinted in Sigmund, ed. (n. 34), pp. 250-52. For a discussion of some of the links between African socialism and negritude, see Cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development: An Analytic Study (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), pp. 73-81.
98. Plamenatz (n. 45 above), p. 29.
99. See O. Mannoni, Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization (New York: Praeger, 1964), pt. 1. See also the critique in Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (New York: Grove, 1967), chap. 4.
100. See O. Mannoni, Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization (New York: Praeger, 1964), pt. 1. See also the critique in Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (New York: Grove, 1967), chap. 4.
101. See Frantz Fanon, "Racism and Culture," in Racial Conflict, Discrimination and Power: Historical and Contemporary Studies, ed. William Barclay, Krishna Kumar, Ruth Simms (New York: AMS Press, 1976), pp. 51-53, quote on p. 51.
102. See Jee-Peng Tan and Alain Mingat, Education in Asia (New York: World Bank, 1992), for a discussion of the adoption of Western-style education. On other Western practices, see David Abernethy, "Bureaucratic Growth and Economic Stagnation in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Africa's Development Challenge and the World Bank, ed. Stephen K. Commins (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1988), pp. 179-214.
103. See Jee-Peng Tan and Alain Mingat, Education in Asia (New York: World Bank, 1992), for a discussion of the adoption of Western-style education. On other Western practices, see David Abernethy, "Bureaucratic Growth and Economic Stagnation in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Africa's Development Challenge and the World Bank, ed. Stephen K. Commins (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1988), pp. 179-214.
104. "Schools Brief: Capitalism or Bust," Economist 322, no. 7745 (February 8, 1992): 49.
105. Arthur E. Tiedmann, "Big Business and Politics in Prewar Japan," in Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan, ed. James William Morley (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 267-318, esp. pp. 285-87.
106. Immanuel Wallerstein, "Class, Tribe and Party in West African Politics," in Party Systems and Voter Alignments, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (New York: Free Press 1967), pp. 497-518, p. 500.
107. For the example of the Congress Party, see Nehru (n. 37 above), pp. 138-39, 350-51. For the United Gold Coast Convention before the Convention People's Party split, see David E. Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 168-72.
108. For the example of the Congress Party, see Nehru (n. 37 above), pp. 138-39, 350-51. For the United Gold Coast Convention before the Convention People's Party split, see David E. Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 168-72.
109. See, e.g., the OECD's Development Cooperation Report (Paris: OECD, 1992), table 2.
110. Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise of Self-Assertion among Asian and African Peoples (Boston: Beacon, 1962), pp. 376-77.
111. Such analysis, of course, requires some fudging of a unitary model of the state. However, it can be retained formally by viewing this generational turnover as a structural attribute of the state rather than as a disaggregation.
112. In fact, if there is considerable political conflict between the first generation of anticolonial elites and a group of newer challengers to power, the theory would predict that a "counteroppositional" ideology would form around the challengers and that a kind of "cycling" may occur. For a discussion of this sort of phenomenon see James Smoot Coleman, Education and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 27.
113. For a detailed description of the original version of the data set, see Robert Summers, I. B. Kravis, and Alan Heston, "International Comparisons of Real Product and Its Composition, 1950-77," Review of Income and Wealth 26, no. 1 (March 1980): 19-66. For a description of a more recent version, see Robert Summers and Alan Heston, "The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-1988," Quarterly Journal of Economics (May 1991), pp. 327-40. The version used here is Mark 5.6, which has data up to 1992. This is available via anonymous ftp from nber.harvard.edu.
114. For a detailed description of the original version of the data set, see Robert Summers, I. B. Kravis, and Alan Heston, "International Comparisons of Real Product and Its Composition, 1950-77," Review of Income and Wealth 26, no. 1 (March 1980): 19-66. For a description of a more recent version, see Robert Summers and Alan Heston, "The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-1988," Quarterly Journal of Economics (May 1991), pp. 327-40. The version used here is Mark 5.6, which has data up to 1992. This is available via anonymous ftp from nber.harvard.edu.
115. The 1992 version, with data from 1948-91, which is available from the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).
116. The 1995 version, with data from 1971-94, which is available from ICPSR.
117. World Bank (see n. 1 above), p. 279.
118. Overall spending levels were obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) data set, while economic services spending levels were obtained from the Government Finance Statistics. They were divided by measures of GDP, obtained from the same data sets. Price-corrected goods and services as a share of GDP were obtained from the Penn World Tables.
119. This statistic was obtained from the Penn World Tables. It has been used as a measure of government intervention in Dollar (n. 3 above) and also was adopted in the 1991 issue of the World Bank's World Development Report, chaps. 4 and 5. A discussion of the justification for using aggregate relative prices as a measure of government-induced distortion can be found in Dollar, pp. 525-27.
120. One way of testing this is to check exchange rate premiums (the gap between official and black market exchange rates). An official exchange rate that assigns a positive premium to local currency indicates distortions that inflate aggregate local prices relative to international prices, while a negative premium indicates distortions that deflate local prices. A premium of zero indicates non-distortive policies (see World Bank, World Development Report 1991, p. 82, for a discussion). Examination of 1990 estimates in the International Currency Yearbook (New York: International Currency Analysis, 1991), shows no cases where a negative premium occurs.
121. One way of testing this is to check exchange rate premiums (the gap between official and black market exchange rates). An official exchange rate that assigns a positive premium to local currency indicates distortions that inflate aggregate local prices relative to international prices, while a negative premium indicates distortions that deflate local prices. A premium of zero indicates non-distortive policies (see World Bank, World Development Report 1991, p. 82, for a discussion). Examination of 1990 estimates in the International Currency Yearbook (New York: International Currency Analysis, 1991), shows no cases where a negative premium occurs.
122. A total of 74 countries in the three data sets were classified as ex-Western colonies. They were (with year of independence and colonial power in parentheses, B = British, F = French, O = other): Algeria (1962, F), Angola (1975, O), Bahamas (1972, B), Bangladesh (1947, B), Barbados (1966, B), Belize (1981, B), Benin (1960, F), Bhutan (1949, B), Botswana (1966, B), Burkina Faso (1960, F), Burundi (1962, B), Cameroon (1960, O), Cape Verde (1975, O), Central African Republic (1960, F), Chad (1960, F), Comoros (1975, F), Congo-Brazzaville (1960, F), Djibouti (1978, F), Fiji (1970, B), Gabon (1960, F), Gambia (1965, B), Ghana (1957, B), Grenada (1974, B), Guinea (1958, F), GuineaBissau (1974, O), Guyana (1966, B), India (1947, B), Indonesia (1949, O), Ivory Coast (1960, F), Jamaica (1962, B), Kenya (1963, B), Laos (1953, F), Lesotho (1966, B), Madagascar (1960, F), Malawi (1964, B), Malaysia (1957, B), Mali (1960, F), Malta (1964, B), Mauritania (1960, F), Mauritius (1968, B), Morocco (1956, F), Mozambique (1975, O), Myanmar (1948, B), Niger (1960, F), Nigeria (1960, B), Pakistan (1947, B), Papua New Guinea (1973, B), Philippines (1946, O), Reunion (1990, F), Rwanda (1961, O), Saint Lucia (1979, B), Saint Vincent and Grenadines (1979, B), Senegal (1960, F), Seychelles (1976, B), Sierra Leone (1961, B), Singapore (1959, B), Solomon Islands (1978, B), Somalia (1960, O), Sri Lanka (1948, B), Sudan (1956, B), Surinam (1975, O), Swaziland (1968, B), Syria (1946, F), Tanzania (1961, B), Togo (1960, F), Tonga (1970, B), Trinidad and Tobago (1962, B), Tunisia (1956, F), Uganda (1962, B), Vanuatu (1980, O), Western Samoa (1962, O), Zaire (1960, O), Zambia (1964, B), Zimbabwe (1980, O). Former British protectorates where indigenous rulers retained a measure of formal political control for long periods of time (e.g., Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Nepal, and the gulf states) were not considered as former colonies, although their inclusion did not significantly change the results of regressions. Among the former colonies not covered in any of the data sets are Cambodia, Equatorial Guinea, Lebanon, Libya, and Vietnam.
123. The Latin America category included Antigua Barbuda, Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The African category included Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, the Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Reunion, Rwanda, Sao Tome Principe, Senegal, the Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The East Asian category included Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam.
124. The achievement of independence can be likened to the boundary change or other disruptive events that Olson (n. 7 above) uses to mark the beginning of the formation of distributive coalitions.
125. Among other authors who have used aggregate prices as a measure of intervention, Dollar (pp. 526-28) purges for labor and land costs by including independent variables for per capita GDP and population density. The World Bank uses a slightly different methodology, with variables for urbanization, land area and population. See World Bank, World Development Report 1991, p. 163.
126. Data for GDP and populations variables were obtained from the same data sets as the dependent variables against which they were regressed. The IMF GDP data were in local currency, so figures in constant dollars were obtained by dividing each by the current local currency unit per dollar exchange rate, then by the current GDP deflator for the United States (1985 dollars = 1 for IFS; 1990 dollars = 1 for GFS). Data for land area were obtained primarily from the World Bank's World Development Report 1991.
127. When each data set was reduced to those observations that included complete data for these models, they consisted of time series with varying starting points and lengths for different countries. In order to provide reasonably stable estimates of cross-sectional heteroscedacity, observations for countries whose times series were shorter than 10 years were deleted. However, no attempt was made to convert the data sets into panels, because this would have resulted in deletion of most of the data for the IMF data sets and an unrepresentative sample biased toward industrialized countries.
128. 1/2 and for subsequent observations subtracting from each variable in each vector r multiplied by the variable's single-period lagged value.