The seven degrees of relevance: Why should real-world environmental attorney's care now about sustainable development policy?

Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum

Volumn 8, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 273-294

  Ruhl, J B ^a  

^a SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 0031803537     PISSN: 10643958     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (103)

1. At its broadest, sustainable development is the philosophy (1) that today's progress must not come at tomorrow's expense and (2) that human progress thus must be sustained not just in a few places for a few years but for the entire planet into the distant future. See Jonathan Lash, Toward a Sustainable Future, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 83, 83 (1997). The prevailing working definitions and sources of policy designed to reduce that philosophy to realworld law and policy are discussed infra. It is difficult to provide citations to a comprehensive set of authorities and commentaries defining what sustainable development is as a matter of law and where the law of sustainable development is found - indeed, that is the central point of this Essay. This Essay is by no means an attempt to canvass all the law and commentary relevant to sustainable development, but rather to explore whether that body of work is relevant to anything else. For a thorough bibliography of sustainable development literature, see ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND SUSTAINABLE FUTURES: A CRITICAL GUIDE TO RECENT BOOKS, REPORTS, AND PERIODICALS (Michael Marien ed., 1996).
2. At its broadest, sustainable development is the philosophy (1) that today's progress must not come at tomorrow's expense and (2) that human progress thus must be sustained not just in a few places for a few years but for the entire planet into the distant future. See Jonathan Lash, Toward a Sustainable Future, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 83, 83 (1997). The prevailing working definitions and sources of policy designed to reduce that philosophy to realworld law and policy are discussed infra. It is difficult to provide citations to a comprehensive set of authorities and commentaries defining what sustainable development is as a matter of law and where the law of sustainable development is found - indeed, that is the central point of this Essay. This Essay is by no means an attempt to canvass all the law and commentary relevant to sustainable development, but rather to explore whether that body of work is relevant to anything else. For a thorough bibliography of sustainable development literature, see ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND SUSTAINABLE FUTURES: A CRITICAL GUIDE TO RECENT BOOKS, REPORTS, AND PERIODICALS (Michael Marien ed., 1996).
3. The distinction between "hard" and "soft" law to apply has been explored most fully in international law commentary: The question of whether there is a "soft law" in international law has been the subject of recent debate. To some extent we recognize a limited normative force of certain norms even though we concede that those norms would not be enforceable by an international court or other international organ. In this respect there is a kind of "soft law." To say that it does not exist because it is not of the "enforceable" variety that most legal norms exhibit might blind us to another dimension of the reality of international practice. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 55 (Anthony D'Amato & Kirsten Engel eds., 1996). My point is that this distinction between enforceable "hard" law and unenforceable, but normatively significant, "soft" law is not limited to international law questions and thus helps us understand how powerful concepts like sustainable development grow in relevance to domestic law practitioners.
4. As a crude representation of this status, a LEXIS search in November 1997 for the phrase "sustainable development" produced over 800 documents from the law review and environmental regulation databases, while producing less than thirty documents from databases containing federal and state documents and judicial opinions. None of the cases and few of the other documents contained the search terms in ways meaningful to the use meant in this Essay. Many of the documents that do use the term in that sense do so only in passing. Illustrations of how sustainable development is treated in these various levels of legal authority are provided infra.
5. I developed this "seven degrees of relevance" model specifically for the purpose of answering the question posed by this Essay, but it strikes me as being applicable generally to the question of how policy ideas in environmental law and other fields evolve toward having relevance to practicing attorneys. My research assistant has been driven to fits trying to determine whether such an approach has been taken elsewhere, though I cannot say we have canvassed all the literature of legal epistemology. The closest analogy I have found is to the concept of "graduated normativity" some commentators use to explain the significance of "soft" law in international law. See INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 2, at 57-62; see also Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 420, 429-31 (1991) (describing the "contagion" which affects the transformation of "soft" law instruments into "hard" ones"). Some of the distinctions I make between the "degrees" are subtle, though they seemed relevant to me when I was practicing environmental law full time. Of course, it is less critical to the model that the process be divided into seven degrees than to demonstrate that relevance of ideas is a matter of degree in general and that it precedes the evolution of fully-formed law to apply. That focus, moreover, is not the same as asking how law itself evolves; rather, I am reporting the evolution of sustainable development policy and law as a given and asking when in that process it ought to matter to practicing attorneys. For a discussion of various theories of the evolution of law, see J. B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996).
6. I developed this "seven degrees of relevance" model specifically for the purpose of answering the question posed by this Essay, but it strikes me as being applicable generally to the question of how policy ideas in environmental law and other fields evolve toward having relevance to practicing attorneys. My research assistant has been driven to fits trying to determine whether such an approach has been taken elsewhere, though I cannot say we have canvassed all the literature of legal epistemology. The closest analogy I have found is to the concept of "graduated normativity" some commentators use to explain the significance of "soft" law in international law. See INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 2, at 57-62; see also Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 420, 429-31 (1991) (describing the "contagion" which affects the transformation of "soft" law instruments into "hard" ones"). Some of the distinctions I make between the "degrees" are subtle, though they seemed relevant to me when I was practicing environmental law full time. Of course, it is less critical to the model that the process be divided into seven degrees than to demonstrate that relevance of ideas is a matter of degree in general and that it precedes the evolution of fully-formed law to apply. That focus, moreover, is not the same as asking how law itself evolves; rather, I am reporting the evolution of sustainable development policy and law as a given and asking when in that process it ought to matter to practicing attorneys. For a discussion of various theories of the evolution of law, see J. B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996).
7. I developed this "seven degrees of relevance" model specifically for the purpose of answering the question posed by this Essay, but it strikes me as being applicable generally to the question of how policy ideas in environmental law and other fields evolve toward having relevance to practicing attorneys. My research assistant has been driven to fits trying to determine whether such an approach has been taken elsewhere, though I cannot say we have canvassed all the literature of legal epistemology. The closest analogy I have found is to the concept of "graduated normativity" some commentators use to explain the significance of "soft" law in international law. See INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 2, at 57-62; see also Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 420, 429-31 (1991) (describing the "contagion" which affects the transformation of "soft" law instruments into "hard" ones"). Some of the distinctions I make between the "degrees" are subtle, though they seemed relevant to me when I was practicing environmental law full time. Of course, it is less critical to the model that the process be divided into seven degrees than to demonstrate that relevance of ideas is a matter of degree in general and that it precedes the evolution of fully-formed law to apply. That focus, moreover, is not the same as asking how law itself evolves; rather, I am reporting the evolution of sustainable development policy and law as a given and asking when in that process it ought to matter to practicing attorneys. For a discussion of various theories of the evolution of law, see J. B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996).
8. Environmental justice refers to the "fair treatment of people of all races, cultures and income with respect to the development, implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies." Solicitation Notice for Fiscal Year (FY) 1994 Environmental Justice Grants to Community Groups, 58 Fed. Reg. 63,955, 63,956 (1993). The topic of environmental justice, and whether injustice truly exists, has exploded in the last decade into legal and social commentary; see, e.g., DAVID E. NEWTON, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK (1996); Symposium, Urban Environmental Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 431 (1994); Symposium, Class, Race, and Environmental Regulation, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 839 (1992); and legal academic texts, see, e.g., KENNETH A. MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND JUSTICE (1995). This Essay does not attempt to survey the full breadth of environmental justice law and commentary. For thorough bibliographies of the law, commentary, and legal materials pertaining to the environmental justice issue, see Carita Shanklin, Pathfinder: Environmental Justice, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 333 (1997); Adam D. Schwartz, The Law of Environmental Justice: A Research Pathfinder, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10543 (1995).
9. Environmental justice refers to the "fair treatment of people of all races, cultures and income with respect to the development, implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies." Solicitation Notice for Fiscal Year (FY) 1994 Environmental Justice Grants to Community Groups, 58 Fed. Reg. 63,955, 63,956 (1993). The topic of environmental justice, and whether injustice truly exists, has exploded in the last decade into legal and social commentary; see, e.g., DAVID E. NEWTON, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK (1996); Symposium, Urban Environmental Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 431 (1994); Symposium, Class, Race, and Environmental Regulation, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 839 (1992); and legal academic texts, see, e.g., KENNETH A. MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND JUSTICE (1995). This Essay does not attempt to survey the full breadth of environmental justice law and commentary. For thorough bibliographies of the law, commentary, and legal materials pertaining to the environmental justice issue, see Carita Shanklin, Pathfinder: Environmental Justice, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 333 (1997); Adam D. Schwartz, The Law of Environmental Justice: A Research Pathfinder, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10543 (1995).
10. Environmental justice refers to the "fair treatment of people of all races, cultures and income with respect to the development, implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies." Solicitation Notice for Fiscal Year (FY) 1994 Environmental Justice Grants to Community Groups, 58 Fed. Reg. 63,955, 63,956 (1993). The topic of environmental justice, and whether injustice truly exists, has exploded in the last decade into legal and social commentary; see, e.g., DAVID E. NEWTON, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK (1996); Symposium, Urban Environmental Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 431 (1994); Symposium, Class, Race, and Environmental Regulation, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 839 (1992); and legal academic texts, see, e.g., KENNETH A. MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND JUSTICE (1995). This Essay does not attempt to survey the full breadth of environmental justice law and commentary. For thorough bibliographies of the law, commentary, and legal materials pertaining to the environmental justice issue, see Carita Shanklin, Pathfinder: Environmental Justice, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 333 (1997); Adam D. Schwartz, The Law of Environmental Justice: A Research Pathfinder, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10543 (1995).
11. Environmental justice refers to the "fair treatment of people of all races, cultures and income with respect to the development, implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies." Solicitation Notice for Fiscal Year (FY) 1994 Environmental Justice Grants to Community Groups, 58 Fed. Reg. 63,955, 63,956 (1993). The topic of environmental justice, and whether injustice truly exists, has exploded in the last decade into legal and social commentary; see, e.g., DAVID E. NEWTON, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK (1996); Symposium, Urban Environmental Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 431 (1994); Symposium, Class, Race, and Environmental Regulation, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 839 (1992); and legal academic texts, see, e.g., KENNETH A. MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND JUSTICE (1995). This Essay does not attempt to survey the full breadth of environmental justice law and commentary. For thorough bibliographies of the law, commentary, and legal materials pertaining to the environmental justice issue, see Carita Shanklin, Pathfinder: Environmental Justice, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 333 (1997); Adam D. Schwartz, The Law of Environmental Justice: A Research Pathfinder, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10543 (1995).
12. Environmental justice refers to the "fair treatment of people of all races, cultures and income with respect to the development, implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies." Solicitation Notice for Fiscal Year (FY) 1994 Environmental Justice Grants to Community Groups, 58 Fed. Reg. 63,955, 63,956 (1993). The topic of environmental justice, and whether injustice truly exists, has exploded in the last decade into legal and social commentary; see, e.g., DAVID E. NEWTON, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK (1996); Symposium, Urban Environmental Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 431 (1994); Symposium, Class, Race, and Environmental Regulation, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 839 (1992); and legal academic texts, see, e.g., KENNETH A. MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND JUSTICE (1995). This Essay does not attempt to survey the full breadth of environmental justice law and commentary. For thorough bibliographies of the law, commentary, and legal materials pertaining to the environmental justice issue, see Carita Shanklin, Pathfinder: Environmental Justice, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 333 (1997); Adam D. Schwartz, The Law of Environmental Justice: A Research Pathfinder, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10543 (1995).
13. Environmental justice refers to the "fair treatment of people of all races, cultures and income with respect to the development, implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies." Solicitation Notice for Fiscal Year (FY) 1994 Environmental Justice Grants to Community Groups, 58 Fed. Reg. 63,955, 63,956 (1993). The topic of environmental justice, and whether injustice truly exists, has exploded in the last decade into legal and social commentary; see, e.g., DAVID E. NEWTON, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK (1996); Symposium, Urban Environmental Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 431 (1994); Symposium, Class, Race, and Environmental Regulation, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 839 (1992); and legal academic texts, see, e.g., KENNETH A. MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND JUSTICE (1995). This Essay does not attempt to survey the full breadth of environmental justice law and commentary. For thorough bibliographies of the law, commentary, and legal materials pertaining to the environmental justice issue, see Carita Shanklin, Pathfinder: Environmental Justice, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 333 (1997); Adam D. Schwartz, The Law of Environmental Justice: A Research Pathfinder, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10543 (1995).
14. Any doubt that sustainable development is a widely discussed topic is quickly dispelled by plugging "sustainable development" into any Internet search engine, which produces thousands of "hits" evidencing the grass-roots level and international scope of sustainable development dialogue. The presence of an idea on the World Wide Web, of course, does not alone make it relevant to practicing environmental law attorneys.
15. One of the founders and leading advocates of the environmental justice movement described its central thesis in highly normative terms, alleging that "[c]ommunities consisting primarily of people of color continue to bear a disproportionate burden of this nation's air, water, and waste problems" and that such "[e]nvironmental racism exists within local zoning boards as well as the Environmental Protection Agency." Robert D. Bullard, The Threat of Environmental Racism, 7 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 23 (Winter 1993). For a discussion of Professor Bullard's founding and continuing role in the environmental justice movement, see Shanklin, supra note 5, at 353 n.74.
16. See WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T AND DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987). For some background on this report and its importance to the origin of domestic sustainable development policy, see Donald A. Brown, Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: The Emergence of Global Environmental Problems and the Critical Need to Develop Sustainable Development Programs at State and Local Levels in the United States, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 175, 197-98 (1996).
17. See WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T AND DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987). For some background on this report and its importance to the origin of domestic sustainable development policy, see Donald A. Brown, Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: The Emergence of Global Environmental Problems and the Critical Need to Develop Sustainable Development Programs at State and Local Levels in the United States, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 175, 197-98 (1996).
18. OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 8, at 43.
19. Indeed, the principles embodied in the Brundtland Commission's definition had previously been expressed for domestic purposes in the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), which defined the "continuing responsibility of the Federal government to . . . (1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations; (2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings; [and] (3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1995). That these ideals are now expressed much more succinctly through the sustainable development label illustrates the potency of reducing norm statements to such easily expressed phrases. Of course, while it may be the Brundtland Commission's report that will be recalled as the primary origin of domestic sustainable development law, NEPA may play an important role in rediscovering a pre-existing national commitment to what we today call sustainable development, and thus will provide a starting point for building a domestic law and policy base of sustainable development. See John Dernbach et al., U.S. Adherence to Its Agenda 21 Commitments: A Five-Year Review, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10504, 10520 (1997) (describing NEPA as "part of the legal and policy foundation necessary to build such a strategy"); James McElfish, Back to the Future, ENVTL. F., Sept. - Oct. 1995, at 14. On the other hand, some commentators have suggested that NEPA's purely procedural focus and lack of post-decision monitoring may make it ineffective, or even counterproductive, in the effort to craft law for sustainable development. See David Hodas, Law, Externalities and Sustainable Development, WIDENER L. SYMPOSIUM J. (forthcoming June 1998) (manuscript at 57, on file with author).
20. Indeed, the principles embodied in the Brundtland Commission's definition had previously been expressed for domestic purposes in the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), which defined the "continuing responsibility of the Federal government to . . . (1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations; (2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings; [and] (3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1995). That these ideals are now expressed much more succinctly through the sustainable development label illustrates the potency of reducing norm statements to such easily expressed phrases. Of course, while it may be the Brundtland Commission's report that will be recalled as the primary origin of domestic sustainable development law, NEPA may play an important role in rediscovering a pre-existing national commitment to what we today call sustainable development, and thus will provide a starting point for building a domestic law and policy base of sustainable development. See John Dernbach et al., U.S. Adherence to Its Agenda 21 Commitments: A Five-Year Review, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10504, 10520 (1997) (describing NEPA as "part of the legal and policy foundation necessary to build such a strategy"); James McElfish, Back to the Future, ENVTL. F., Sept. - Oct. 1995, at 14. On the other hand, some commentators have suggested that NEPA's purely procedural focus and lack of post-decision monitoring may make it ineffective, or even counterproductive, in the effort to craft law for sustainable development. See David Hodas, Law, Externalities and Sustainable Development, WIDENER L. SYMPOSIUM J. (forthcoming June 1998) (manuscript at 57, on file with author).
21. Indeed, the principles embodied in the Brundtland Commission's definition had previously been expressed for domestic purposes in the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), which defined the "continuing responsibility of the Federal government to . . . (1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations; (2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings; [and] (3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1995). That these ideals are now expressed much more succinctly through the sustainable development label illustrates the potency of reducing norm statements to such easily expressed phrases. Of course, while it may be the Brundtland Commission's report that will be recalled as the primary origin of domestic sustainable development law, NEPA may play an important role in rediscovering a pre-existing national commitment to what we today call sustainable development, and thus will provide a starting point for building a domestic law and policy base of sustainable development. See John Dernbach et al., U.S. Adherence to Its Agenda 21 Commitments: A Five-Year Review, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10504, 10520 (1997) (describing NEPA as "part of the legal and policy foundation necessary to build such a strategy"); James McElfish, Back to the Future, ENVTL. F., Sept. - Oct. 1995, at 14. On the other hand, some commentators have suggested that NEPA's purely procedural focus and lack of post-decision monitoring may make it ineffective, or even counterproductive, in the effort to craft law for sustainable development. See David Hodas, Law, Externalities and Sustainable Development, WIDENER L. SYMPOSIUM J. (forthcoming June 1998) (manuscript at 57, on file with author).
22. The contention that environmental protection regulation has led to racial and income inequality has been challenged, however, as paying too little attention to causes of disparate impact other than alleged discrimination. See Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L. J. 1383 (1994).
23. See J. Baird Callicott & Karen Mumford, Ecological Sustainability as a Conservation Concept, 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 32, 34 (1997) (discussing sustainable development's transformation of the resourcism versus preservationism debate). The same process of distilling competing labels to one dominant expression of the norm took place in the environmental justice arena, as an early competitor label was "environmental racism." See Nelson Smith & David Graham, Environmental Justice and Underlying Societal Problems, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10568 n.3 (1997) (noting that "justice" and "racism" are antonyms).
24. See J. Baird Callicott & Karen Mumford, Ecological Sustainability as a Conservation Concept, 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 32, 34 (1997) (discussing sustainable development's transformation of the resourcism versus preservationism debate). The same process of distilling competing labels to one dominant expression of the norm took place in the environmental justice arena, as an early competitor label was "environmental racism." See Nelson Smith & David Graham, Environmental Justice and Underlying Societal Problems, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10568 n.3 (1997) (noting that "justice" and "racism" are antonyms).
25. See, e.g., John F. Potter, Sustainable Development: Are We Being Conned?, 17 THE ENVIRONMENTALIST 147, 147 (1997) ("[t]he glib and frequent use of the political phrase 'sustainable development' leaves most of us currently being conned"); Bill Willers, Sustainable Development: A New World Deception, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1146 (1994) (objecting to the economic component of the sustainable development message); see generally Gary D. Meyers and Simone C. Muller, The Ethical Implications, Political Ramifications and Practical Limitations of Adopting Sustainable Development as National and International Policy, 4 BUFF. ENVTL. L. J. 1, 3 (1996) (discussing the debate focusing on various proposed sustainable development definitions); J. William Futrell, The Transition to Sustainable Development Law, ENVTL. L. INST., Research Br. No. 3, Apr. 1994, at 5 ("some American environmentalists see the sustainable development movement as a threat undermining the environmental protection efforts of the last generation").
26. See, e.g., John F. Potter, Sustainable Development: Are We Being Conned?, 17 THE ENVIRONMENTALIST 147, 147 (1997) ("[t]he glib and frequent use of the political phrase 'sustainable development' leaves most of us currently being conned"); Bill Willers, Sustainable Development: A New World Deception, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1146 (1994) (objecting to the economic component of the sustainable development message); see generally Gary D. Meyers and Simone C. Muller, The Ethical Implications, Political Ramifications and Practical Limitations of Adopting Sustainable Development as National and International Policy, 4 BUFF. ENVTL. L. J. 1, 3 (1996) (discussing the debate focusing on various proposed sustainable development definitions); J. William Futrell, The Transition to Sustainable Development Law, ENVTL. L. INST., Research Br. No. 3, Apr. 1994, at 5 ("some American environmentalists see the sustainable development movement as a threat undermining the environmental protection efforts of the last generation").
27. See, e.g., John F. Potter, Sustainable Development: Are We Being Conned?, 17 THE ENVIRONMENTALIST 147, 147 (1997) ("[t]he glib and frequent use of the political phrase 'sustainable development' leaves most of us currently being conned"); Bill Willers, Sustainable Development: A New World Deception, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1146 (1994) (objecting to the economic component of the sustainable development message); see generally Gary D. Meyers and Simone C. Muller, The Ethical Implications, Political Ramifications and Practical Limitations of Adopting Sustainable Development as National and International Policy, 4 BUFF. ENVTL. L. J. 1, 3 (1996) (discussing the debate focusing on various proposed sustainable development definitions); J. William Futrell, The Transition to Sustainable Development Law, ENVTL. L. INST., Research Br. No. 3, Apr. 1994, at 5 ("some American environmentalists see the sustainable development movement as a threat undermining the environmental protection efforts of the last generation").
28. See, e.g., John F. Potter, Sustainable Development: Are We Being Conned?, 17 THE ENVIRONMENTALIST 147, 147 (1997) ("[t]he glib and frequent use of the political phrase 'sustainable development' leaves most of us currently being conned"); Bill Willers, Sustainable Development: A New World Deception, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1146 (1994) (objecting to the economic component of the sustainable development message); see generally Gary D. Meyers and Simone C. Muller, The Ethical Implications, Political Ramifications and Practical Limitations of Adopting Sustainable Development as National and International Policy, 4 BUFF. ENVTL. L. J. 1, 3 (1996) (discussing the debate focusing on various proposed sustainable development definitions); J. William Futrell, The Transition to Sustainable Development Law, ENVTL. L. INST., Research Br. No. 3, Apr. 1994, at 5 ("some American environmentalists see the sustainable development movement as a threat undermining the environmental protection efforts of the last generation").
29. President Clinton commissioned the PCSD by executive order on June 29, 1993, to "develop and recommend to the president a national sustainable development action strategy that will foster economic vitality." Exec. Order No. 12,852, 58 Fed. Reg. 35,841 (1993). The PCSD issued its report in February 1997. See THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, SUSTAINABLE AMERICA: A NEW CONSENSUS (1997) [hereinafter SUSTAINABLE AMERICA]. For further background and description of the PCSD's work and its place in the emerging domestic sustainable development policy, see Brown, supra note 8, at 202-03; Dernbach et al., supra note 10, at 10507-08; Lash, supra note 1, at 83; see also infra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
30. SUSTAINABLE AMERICA, supra note 14, at iv.
31. As Carol Dinkins, current Chair of the ABA Section on Natural Resources, Energy, and Environmental Law, put it, "[c]laims of environmental racism or inequity will continue to be made both in litigation and in complaints to government agencies; companies, therefore, will be compelled to address this issue." Carol Dinkins, Impact of the Environmental Justice Movement on American Industry and Local Government, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 337, 352 (1995).
32. See, e.g., Bean v. Southwestern Waste, 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (unsuccessful civil rights challenge to siting of a waste disposal facility), aff'd without op., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986). Civil rights claims generally have not been successful foundations for environmental justice claims even in more recent cases. See, e.g., East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon Bibb Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1990); see generally, Luke Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David's Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523 (1994); Olga Moya, Adopting An Environmental Justice Ethic, 5 DICKINSON J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 217 (1996); Kathy Seward Norther, Battery and Beyond: A Tort Law Response to Environmental Racism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 485 (1997).
33. See, e.g., Bean v. Southwestern Waste, 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (unsuccessful civil rights challenge to siting of a waste disposal facility), aff'd without op., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986). Civil rights claims generally have not been successful foundations for environmental justice claims even in more recent cases. See, e.g., East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon Bibb Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1990); see generally, Luke Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David's Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523 (1994); Olga Moya, Adopting An Environmental Justice Ethic, 5 DICKINSON J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 217 (1996); Kathy Seward Norther, Battery and Beyond: A Tort Law Response to Environmental Racism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 485 (1997).
34. See, e.g., Bean v. Southwestern Waste, 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (unsuccessful civil rights challenge to siting of a waste disposal facility), aff'd without op., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986). Civil rights claims generally have not been successful foundations for environmental justice claims even in more recent cases. See, e.g., East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon Bibb Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1990); see generally, Luke Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David's Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523 (1994); Olga Moya, Adopting An Environmental Justice Ethic, 5 DICKINSON J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 217 (1996); Kathy Seward Norther, Battery and Beyond: A Tort Law Response to Environmental Racism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 485 (1997).
35. See, e.g., Bean v. Southwestern Waste, 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (unsuccessful civil rights challenge to siting of a waste disposal facility), aff'd without op., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986). Civil rights claims generally have not been successful foundations for environmental justice claims even in more recent cases. See, e.g., East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon Bibb Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1990); see generally, Luke Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David's Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523 (1994); Olga Moya, Adopting An Environmental Justice Ethic, 5 DICKINSON J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 217 (1996); Kathy Seward Norther, Battery and Beyond: A Tort Law Response to Environmental Racism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 485 (1997).
36. This has been the result in some environmental justice cases. See, e.g., In re Chemical Waste Management of Indiana, Inc., 1995 WL 395962, at *5 (EPA Env. App. Bd. June 29, 1995) ("[I]f a permit applicant meets the requirements of [the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act] and its implementing regulations, the Agency must issue the permit, regardless of the racial or socio-economic composition of the surrounding community."); In re Genesee Power Station Limited Partnership Permittee, U.S. EPA, PSD Appeal Nos. 93-1 through 93-7, (EPA Envtl. App. Bd. Sept. 8, 1993), reprinted in ELIZABETH GLASS GELTMAN, MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 27 (1997). In its original Genesee Power opinion, the EPA Appeals Board held that an air pollution permit application that complies with applicable regulations cannot be denied on grounds of local land use impacts, including charges of environmental racism. See GELTMAN, supra, at 32. The EPA Environmental Appeals Board's original decision also found that there was no evidence in the record of discriminatory intent. See id. at 32-33. After the original decision was issued, EPA's Office of General Counsel moved to modify the opinion by excising the language suggesting that the permit review process could not consider environmental justice issues. See In re Genesee Power Station Limited Partnership, U.S. EPA, PSD Appeal Nos. 93-1 through 93-7, 1993 WL 473846 (EPA Envtl. App. Bd. Oct. 22, 1993) (order on motion for clarification). With the applicant's concurrence in that motion the Appeals Board later issued such a revised opinion. See In re Genesee Power Station Limited Partnership Permittee, U.S. EPA, PSD Appeal Nos. 93-1 through 93-7, 1993 WL 484880, at *6 (EPA Envtl. App. Bd. Oct. 22, 1993). Without this turn of events the progression of environmental justice into higher degrees of relevance may have been impeded. See MANASTER, supra note 5, at 213-17. Litigation over the project also took place in state court, where environmental justice claims failed but environmental impact review procedures were imposed on state environmental permitting programs. See NAACP v. Engler, No. 95-38228-CV (Cir. Ct. County of Genesee, May 29, 1997) (transcript of decision from bench); see generally, Michael B. Gerrard & Monica Jahan Bose, The Emerging Law of Environmental Justice, 34 Chem. Waste Lit. Rep. (BNA) 587, 589 (1997).
37. This has been the result in some environmental justice cases. See, e.g., In re Chemical Waste Management of Indiana, Inc., 1995 WL 395962, at *5 (EPA Env. App. Bd. June 29, 1995) ("[I]f a permit applicant meets the requirements of [the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act] and its implementing regulations, the Agency must issue the permit, regardless of the racial or socio-economic composition of the surrounding community."); In re Genesee Power Station Limited Partnership Permittee, U.S. EPA, PSD Appeal Nos. 93-1 through 93-7, (EPA Envtl. App. Bd. Sept. 8, 1993), reprinted in ELIZABETH GLASS GELTMAN, MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 27 (1997). In its original Genesee Power opinion, the EPA Appeals Board held that an air pollution permit application that complies with applicable regulations cannot be denied on grounds of local land use impacts, including charges of environmental racism. See GELTMAN, supra, at 32. The EPA Environmental Appeals Board's original decision also found that there was no evidence in the record of discriminatory intent. See id. at 32-33. After the original decision was issued, EPA's Office of General Counsel moved to modify the opinion by excising the language suggesting that the permit review process could not consider environmental justice issues. See In re Genesee Power Station Limited Partnership, U.S. EPA, PSD Appeal Nos. 93-1 through 93-7, 1993 WL 473846 (EPA Envtl. App. Bd. Oct. 22, 1993) (order on motion for clarification). With the applicant's concurrence in that motion the Appeals Board later issued such a revised opinion. See In re Genesee Power Station Limited Partnership Permittee, U.S. EPA, PSD Appeal Nos. 93-1 through 93-7, 1993 WL 484880, at *6 (EPA Envtl. App. Bd. Oct. 22, 1993). Without this turn of events the progression of environmental justice into higher degrees of relevance may have been impeded. See MANASTER, supra note 5, at 213-17. Litigation over the project also took place in state court, where environmental justice claims failed but environmental impact review procedures were imposed on state environmental permitting programs. See NAACP v. Engler, No. 95-38228-CV (Cir. Ct. County of Genesee, May 29, 1997) (transcript of decision from bench); see generally, Michael B. Gerrard & Monica Jahan Bose, The Emerging Law of Environmental Justice, 34 Chem. Waste Lit. Rep. (BNA) 587, 589 (1997).
38. See Michael B. Gerrard, Building Environmentally Just Projects, N.Y. ENVTL. L., May 1996, at 1, 1-2 (discussing this and other proactive measures project developers make affirmatively to portray their projects as environmentally just); Dinkins, supra note 16, at 352 ("With the environmental equity movement gaining increased publicity and momentum, it is important for companies to anticipate the possible legal and political consequences of their activities and resolve, or better yet, prevent, any claims of environmental racism or environmental injustice.").
39. Joan Magretta, Growth through Global Sustainability: An Interview with Monsanto's CEO, Robert B. Shapiro, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. - Feb. 1997, at 79, 81. Even many strident environmentalists not normally aligned with "big business" interests are espousing the view that market dynamics and business profit motives may provide important foundations from which sustainable development policy can be infused into broader social agendas. See, e.g., Paul Hawken, Natural Capitalism, MOTHER JONES, Mar. - Apr. 1997, at 40.
40. Joan Magretta, Growth through Global Sustainability: An Interview with Monsanto's CEO, Robert B. Shapiro, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. - Feb. 1997, at 79, 81. Even many strident environmentalists not normally aligned with "big business" interests are espousing the view that market dynamics and business profit motives may provide important foundations from which sustainable development policy can be infused into broader social agendas. See, e.g., Paul Hawken, Natural Capitalism, MOTHER JONES, Mar. - Apr. 1997, at 40.
41. See Stuart A. Hart, Strategies for a Sustainable World, HARV BUS. REV., Jan. - Feb. 1997, at 67. The Management Institute for Environment and Business, a program of the World Resources Institute, provides extensive training materials for business schools and businesses designed to demonstrate and communicate to the business community the opportunities of sustainable development. See World Resources Institute, (visited Mar. 17, 1998) . A recent Institute survey found that over half of the 67 "top" business schools offer courses and activities on business and the environment. MBA Programs at the Cutting Edge, ENVIROLINK, Winter 1998, at 1.
42. See Stuart A. Hart, Strategies for a Sustainable World, HARV BUS. REV., Jan. - Feb. 1997, at 67. The Management Institute for Environment and Business, a program of the World Resources Institute, provides extensive training materials for business schools and businesses designed to demonstrate and communicate to the business community the opportunities of sustainable development. See World Resources Institute, (visited Mar. 17, 1998) . A recent Institute survey found that over half of the 67 "top" business schools offer courses and activities on business and the environment. MBA Programs at the Cutting Edge, ENVIROLINK, Winter 1998, at 1.
43. See Stuart A. Hart, Strategies for a Sustainable World, HARV BUS. REV., Jan. - Feb. 1997, at 67. The Management Institute for Environment and Business, a program of the World Resources Institute, provides extensive training materials for business schools and businesses designed to demonstrate and communicate to the business community the opportunities of sustainable development. See World Resources Institute, (visited Mar. 17, 1998) . A recent Institute survey found that over half of the 67 "top" business schools offer courses and activities on business and the environment. MBA Programs at the Cutting Edge, ENVIROLINK, Winter 1998, at 1.
44. See SUSTAINABLE AMERICA, supra note 14, at 177-84.
45. See Earle Eldridge & Traci Wilson, Carmakers Lobby Against Global Warming Treaty, USA TODAY, Oct. 3, 1997, at B1 (automakers mount $13 million advertising campaign against proposed treaty requiring mandatory domestic carbon emission reductions).
46. See Symposium, Sustainable Development, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 83 (1997). The Editorial Board of the journal, of which I was Executive Editor from 1993-97, had rejected the sustainable development symposium topic several times before approving it in 1996, on the ground that the topic was too esoteric and not of sufficient interest to practicing environmental attorneys. Needless to say, I was on the losing side of those votes.
47. See AM. BAR ASS'N, SEC. OF NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY, AND ENVTL. L., SPECIAL COMM. ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, WHITE PAPER ON CLIMATE CHANGE (1996) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER].
48. There are now a number of governmental programs designed to identify and address instances of alleged environmental injustice. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (1994) (directing executive agencies to develop strategies for identifying and addressing instances of environmental injustice); U.S. EPA, Environmental Justice Strategy: Executive Order 12898, EPA/200-R-95-002 (1995) (report of the EPA Office of Environmental Justice on implementation of Executive Order 12898); 40 C.F.R. § 7.35 (1997) (EPA rules to implement Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in connection with environmental justice claims); Environmental Justice in EPA's NEPA Compliance Analysis, 61 Fed. Reg. 36,727 (1996) (EPA draft guidance on the integration of environmental justice analysis into environmental impact analysis documents). For a concise history of the significant developments of the early 1990's leading to entrenchment of environmental justice as a focal point of governmental programs, see Dinkins, supra note 16, at 338-41. Current information on government programs aimed at environmental justice issues changes rapidly and updates are available at the Environmental Protection Agency's web page on the topic. See U.S. EPA, (visited Mar. 17, 1998) .
49. There are now a number of governmental programs designed to identify and address instances of alleged environmental injustice. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (1994) (directing executive agencies to develop strategies for identifying and addressing instances of environmental injustice); U.S. EPA, Environmental Justice Strategy: Executive Order 12898, EPA/200-R-95-002 (1995) (report of the EPA Office of Environmental Justice on implementation of Executive Order 12898); 40 C.F.R. § 7.35 (1997) (EPA rules to implement Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in connection with environmental justice claims); Environmental Justice in EPA's NEPA Compliance Analysis, 61 Fed. Reg. 36,727 (1996) (EPA draft guidance on the integration of environmental justice analysis into environmental impact analysis documents). For a concise history of the significant developments of the early 1990's leading to entrenchment of environmental justice as a focal point of governmental programs, see Dinkins, supra note 16, at 338-41. Current information on government programs aimed at environmental justice issues changes rapidly and updates are available at the Environmental Protection Agency's web page on the topic. See U.S. EPA, (visited Mar. 17, 1998) .
50. See supra note 14.
51. See SUSTAINABLE AMERICA, supra note 14, at 177-84 (members included nine corporate representatives, seven government agency representatives, seven conservation group representatives, and several other nongovernmental organization representatives).
52. The first three of the PCSD's ten stated national goals relate to the environment, the economy, and equity, respectively, such that all Americans are ensured "the opportunity to achieve economic, environmental, and social well-being." See id. at 12-13. In its even more platitudinal "we believe" statement, the PCSD contends that "[e]conomic growth, environmental protection, and social equity are linked. We need to develop integrated policies to achieve these national goals." Id. at vi.
53. The report includes a "vision statement," a "we believe statement," and an introductory chapter devoted mainly to elaborating on those themes. See id. at iv, v-vi, 1-9.
54. Id. at 40.
55. See id. at 42. For a description of "take back" and other sustainable development approaches focusing on product life cycles, many of which have already taken hold in other countries as concrete law to apply, see Gary A. Davis et al., Extended Product Responsibility: A Tool for a Sustainable Economy, ENV'T, Sept. 1997, at 10.
56. See id. at 42. For a description of "take back" and other sustainable development approaches focusing on product life cycles, many of which have already taken hold in other countries as concrete law to apply, see Gary A. Davis et al., Extended Product Responsibility: A Tool for a Sustainable Economy, ENV'T, Sept. 1997, at 10.
57. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, BUILDING ON CONSENSUS: A PROGRESS REPORT ON SUSTAINABLE AMERICA (1997).
58. The PCSD has been authorized "to continue its work by continuing to forge consensus on policy, demonstrating implementation, getting the word out about sustainable development, and evaluating progress." 62 Fed. Reg. 45,283, 45,283 (1997).
59. See, e.g., SUSTAINABLE AMERICA: AMERICA'S ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Daniel Sitarz ed., 1998).
60. See 62 Fed. Reg. 52,720 (1997) (announcing availability of funding assistance for "brownfields" redevelopment projects that promote local sustainable development programs).
61. See New England Fishery Management Council, 62 Fed. Reg. 17,576 (1997) (announcing meeting at which agency's Director of Sustainable Development will discuss financial assistance for communities with latent fishing capacity).
62. See Robert Myers et al., Developing an Enduring American Agriculture, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 110 (1997) (describing the work of the Department's Director of Sustainable Development).
63. See Economic Development Assistance Programs, 61 Fed. Reg. 67,434 (1996) (announcing availability of Department of Commerce funding for, among other things, economic development projects consistent with the PCSD's sustainable development vision).
64. See Center of Excellence for Sustainable Development, 62 Fed. Reg. 29,722 (1997) (announcing availability of funding through the Department's Center of Excellence for Sustainable Development, for projects promoting sustainable community development); Notice of Solicitation Availability, 62 Fed. Reg. 32,313 (1997) (announcing funding available for projects that promote sustainable development in developing nations).
65. See American Heritage Rivers Initiative, 62 Fed. Reg. 33,647, 33,650 (1997) (describing promotion of local community sustainable development as one of the criteria for special designation of ten American Heritage Rivers)
66. See College and University Affiliations Program, 62 Fed. Reg. 51,721 (1997) (announcing funding for international exchange programs that support sustainable development).
67. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 929-B (West 1997) (requiring a state economic development council to develop "[a] plan for the State's economy based on economic opportunity for all citizens and a shared commitment to sustainable development"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116C.693 (West 1997) (declaring it to be the policy of the state to locate wind energy conversion systems "in an orderly manner compatible with . . . sustainable development "); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 88.604 (West Supp. 1998) (establishing a center to study the "roles of marine and intermodal transportation for sustainable development"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 2222 (Supp. 1997) ("It is the policy of the state of Vermont to encourage sustainable development . . . ."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.61.040 (West Supp. 1998) (requiring that the state land use study commission identify land use law reforms needed to "achieve economically and environmentally sustainable development").
68. See, e.g., In re Louisiana Energy Services, L.P., 45 N.R.C. 367, 1997 WL 458771 (May 1, 1997). In Louisiana Energy Services, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board concluded that the Executive Order on environmental injustice, see supra note 26, requires the agency to consider environmental justice impacts as a substantive licensing criterion and thus remanded a nuclear material license to agency staff review on the ground that substantial evidence of environmental injustice was present in the record but not adequately taken into account at the staff level. See id. at 412. Significantly, the Board thoroughly reviewed the evidence presented which, in the Board's opinion, tended to show that the project site may have been selected with race in mind. See id. at 391; see generally Gerrard & Bose, supra note 18, at 588-89. In other cases, most notably the Shintech, Inc. chemical plant matter in Louisiana, permits have been seriously delayed and complicated based on environmental justice concerns, although in some instances the ostensible grounds given for the administrative outcome have involved other legal bases. See, e.g., Paul Hoversten, EPA Puts Plant on Hold in Racism Case, USA TODAY, Sept. 11, 1997, at 3A (describing decision of EPA, following intense opposition on environmental justice grounds, to deny a permit application for the Shintech chemical plant construction based on finding that proposed emissions would exceed federal standards). For a discussion of the contentious debate surrounding the Shintech matter, see Terry Carter, EPA Steps In to Clear the Air, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1997, at 32 (for example, a state economic development official charged the law students in the legal clinic that opposed the plant as having engaged in "environmental dilettantism" and "elitist social engineering").
69. See, e.g., In re Louisiana Energy Services, L.P., 45 N.R.C. 367, 1997 WL 458771 (May 1, 1997). In Louisiana Energy Services, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board concluded that the Executive Order on environmental injustice, see supra note 26, requires the agency to consider environmental justice impacts as a substantive licensing criterion and thus remanded a nuclear material license to agency staff review on the ground that substantial evidence of environmental injustice was present in the record but not adequately taken into account at the staff level. See id. at 412. Significantly, the Board thoroughly reviewed the evidence presented which, in the Board's opinion, tended to show that the project site may have been selected with race in mind. See id. at 391; see generally Gerrard & Bose, supra note 18, at 588-89. In other cases, most notably the Shintech, Inc. chemical plant matter in Louisiana, permits have been seriously delayed and complicated based on environmental justice concerns, although in some instances the ostensible grounds given for the administrative outcome have involved other legal bases. See, e.g., Paul Hoversten, EPA Puts Plant on Hold in Racism Case, USA TODAY, Sept. 11, 1997, at 3A (describing decision of EPA, following intense opposition on environmental justice grounds, to deny a permit application for the Shintech chemical plant construction based on finding that proposed emissions would exceed federal standards). For a discussion of the contentious debate surrounding the Shintech matter, see Terry Carter, EPA Steps In to Clear the Air, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1997, at 32 (for example, a state economic development official charged the law students in the legal clinic that opposed the plant as having engaged in "environmental dilettantism" and "elitist social engineering").
70. See, e.g., In re Louisiana Energy Services, L.P., 45 N.R.C. 367, 1997 WL 458771 (May 1, 1997). In Louisiana Energy Services, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board concluded that the Executive Order on environmental injustice, see supra note 26, requires the agency to consider environmental justice impacts as a substantive licensing criterion and thus remanded a nuclear material license to agency staff review on the ground that substantial evidence of environmental injustice was present in the record but not adequately taken into account at the staff level. See id. at 412. Significantly, the Board thoroughly reviewed the evidence presented which, in the Board's opinion, tended to show that the project site may have been selected with race in mind. See id. at 391; see generally Gerrard & Bose, supra note 18, at 588-89. In other cases, most notably the Shintech, Inc. chemical plant matter in Louisiana, permits have been seriously delayed and complicated based on environmental justice concerns, although in some instances the ostensible grounds given for the administrative outcome have involved other legal bases. See, e.g., Paul Hoversten, EPA Puts Plant on Hold in Racism Case, USA TODAY, Sept. 11, 1997, at 3A (describing decision of EPA, following intense opposition on environmental justice grounds, to deny a permit application for the Shintech chemical plant construction based on finding that proposed emissions would exceed federal standards). For a discussion of the contentious debate surrounding the Shintech matter, see Terry Carter, EPA Steps In to Clear the Air, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1997, at 32 (for example, a state economic development official charged the law students in the legal clinic that opposed the plant as having engaged in "environmental dilettantism" and "elitist social engineering").
71. See Gerard, supra note 19; Dinkins, supra note 16.
72. A distinction must be drawn between recently enacted environmental
73. A distinction must be drawn between recently enacted environmental protection laws on which Congress has slapped the "sustainable" label in their title and laws which substantively integrate the trilogy of sustainable development principles. For example, the Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-297, amended the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1883 (West 1985 & Supp. 1998), to require federal agencies to review the consequences of their actions in or affecting a new regime of protected areas known as "essential fish habitat." See 62 Fed. Reg. 19,723 (1997) (proposed regulations of National Marine Fisheries Service for delineating essential fish habitat). Although this new program may advance the environmental sustainability component of sustainable development, there is scant evidence in the amendatory law of a conscious effort to craft an integrated sustainable development approach. Similarly, although judicial expansions of environmental protection requirements under existing environmental laws may be touted as sustainable development success stories, ultimately a comprehensive body of sustainable development law cannot be brought about through that route either. In short, domestic environmental law is not the only component of sustainable development, and thus expanding the reach and impact of environmental protection laws through incremental legislative amendment and judicial interpretation may be a necessary, but is surely not a sufficient, means of achieving an integrated sustainable development law. See Nicholas A. Robinson, Comparative Environmental Law: Evaluating How Legal Systems Address "Sustainable Development," 27 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 338 (1997) (describing environmental law as "one of the primary pillars supporting each nation's patterns of 'sustainable development'" and discussing how environmental law can contribute toward that agenda).
74. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 4A.07 (West 1997) (requiring a state planning agency to prepare a model land use ordinance "to guide sustainable development," though adoption by local governments remains optional); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 57-0121(6) (McKinney 1997) (among the duties established for a land use council with regulatory jurisdiction over the Long Island Pine Barrens is the development of a "sustainable development plan" to eventually guide regulatory decisions).
75. Many sustainable development scholars believe that, notwithstanding the global dimensions of many issues dealt with under the umbrella of sustainable development, "in the United States in particular, state and local governments are an indispensable factor in achieving a sustainable future." See Brown, supra note 8, at 203.
76. See, e.g., Steven A. Herman, Enforcement Helps Realize EPA's Commitment to Environmental Justice to Improve People's Lives, NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., Oct. 1997, at 9 (discussing EPA's "environmental justice" criminal and civil docket, which in reality consists of cases in which existing authorities were focused on matters that had some overtone of environmental justice concerns).
77. For example, the EPA has promulgated regulations to implement Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, see 40 C.F.R. pt. 7 (1997), and recently outlined the procedures it will use under those regulations to investigate claims that issuance of environmental permits causes environmental injustice. See U.S. EPA, Interim Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits (visited Feb. 19, 1998) . A court recently held that environmental justice claimants have a private right of action under EPA's Title VI regulations to challenge issuance of a hazardous waste permit that allegedly will disproportionately affect minority neighborhoods. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997).
78. For example, the EPA has promulgated regulations to implement Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, see 40 C.F.R. pt. 7 (1997), and recently outlined the procedures it will use under those regulations to investigate claims that issuance of environmental permits causes environmental injustice. See U.S. EPA, Interim Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits (visited Feb. 19, 1998) . A court recently held that environmental justice claimants have a private right of action under EPA's Title VI regulations to challenge issuance of a hazardous waste permit that allegedly will disproportionately affect minority neighborhoods. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997).
79. For example, will a project survive environmental justice scrutiny by showing that its site selection process was conducted on a purely color-blind basis, or will proof of no disparate racial or income impact also be required? See Gerard, supra note 18, at 589-90. To what extent will proof of discriminatory intent be required of opponents to a project? See Wesley D. Few, The Wake of Discriminatory Intent and the Rise of Title VI in Environmental Justice Lawsuits, 6 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 108 (1997).
80. See John C. Dernbach, Pollution Control and Sustainable Industry, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 101, 101 (1997) (achieving sustainable development will "require massive changes in the industrial sector" and "a dramatic reduction in three things: pollution, materials consumption, and energy consumption"). It is quite possible, however, that the law of sustainable development will eventually catch up with and then subsume the law of environmental justice, as social equity is the important third leg of sustainable development policy.
81. The United Nations channels its work on sustainable development through the Commission on Sustainable Development, which is serviced by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs' Division for Sustainable Development. Their work is covered in the journal ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW, and can be monitored through the Division's web page found at (visited Mar. 17, 1998). In general, although many international law scholars are hopeful that the United Nations and other international regimes will contribute to the translation of sustainable development ideology into a practical body of law, most agree that at present "[t]he international legal system does not yet have the legal tools nor the institutional capacity to deal with the challenge." See Susan H. Bragdon, The Evolution and Future of the Law of Sustainable Development: Lessons from the Convention on Biological Diversity, 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 426 (1996). Indeed, even in the international law realm it would be premature to say that sustainable development has progressed past the Fifth Degree of relevance. Recently, for example, the International Court of Justice, in adjudicating the dispute between the Republic of Hungary and the Slovak Republic over the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam project on the Danube River, refused to apply the concept of sustainable development with any legal force in resolving the dispute. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Rep. Hungary v. Slovak Rep.), 1997 I.C.J. (Sept. 25) (visited Feb. 17, 1998) , reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 168 (1998). The court recognized that the "need to reconcile economic development with protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development," but left it to the parties to negotiate that reconciliation. See 37 I.L.M. 168, 200 (1998). The majority thus declined to adopt the vision of the court's Vice President Weeramantry, that the "principle of sustainable development is . . . a part of modern international law by reason not only of its inescapable logical necessity, but also by reason of its wide and general acceptance by the global community." Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Rep. Hungary v. Slovak Rep.) (visited Mar. 17, 1998) (separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 204, 207 (1998).
82. The United Nations channels its work on sustainable development through the Commission on Sustainable Development, which is serviced by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs' Division for Sustainable Development. Their work is covered in the journal ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW, and can be monitored through the Division's web page found at (visited Mar. 17, 1998). In general, although many international law scholars are hopeful that the United Nations and other international regimes will contribute to the translation of sustainable development ideology into a practical body of law, most agree that at present "[t]he international legal system does not yet have the legal tools nor the institutional capacity to deal with the challenge." See Susan H. Bragdon, The Evolution and Future of the Law of Sustainable Development: Lessons from the Convention on Biological Diversity, 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 426 (1996). Indeed, even in the international law realm it would be premature to say that sustainable development has progressed past the Fifth Degree of relevance. Recently, for example, the International Court of Justice, in adjudicating the dispute between the Republic of Hungary and the Slovak Republic over the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam project on the Danube River, refused to apply the concept of sustainable development with any legal force in resolving the dispute. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Rep. Hungary v. Slovak Rep.), 1997 I.C.J. (Sept. 25) (visited Feb. 17, 1998) , reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 168 (1998). The court recognized that the "need to reconcile economic development with protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development," but left it to the parties to negotiate that reconciliation. See 37 I.L.M. 168, 200 (1998). The majority thus declined to adopt the vision of the court's Vice President Weeramantry, that the "principle of sustainable development is . . . a part of modern international law by reason not only of its inescapable logical necessity, but also by reason of its wide and general acceptance by the global community." Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Rep. Hungary v. Slovak Rep.) (visited Mar. 17, 1998) (separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 204, 207 (1998).
83. The United Nations channels its work on sustainable development through the Commission on Sustainable Development, which is serviced by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs' Division for Sustainable Development. Their work is covered in the journal ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW, and can be monitored through the Division's web page found at (visited Mar. 17, 1998). In general, although many international law scholars are hopeful that the United Nations and other international regimes will contribute to the translation of sustainable development ideology into a practical body of law, most agree that at present "[t]he international legal system does not yet have the legal tools nor the institutional capacity to deal with the challenge." See Susan H. Bragdon, The Evolution and Future of the Law of Sustainable Development: Lessons from the Convention on Biological Diversity, 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 426 (1996). Indeed, even in the international law realm it would be premature to say that sustainable development has progressed past the Fifth Degree of relevance. Recently, for example, the International Court of Justice, in adjudicating the dispute between the Republic of Hungary and the Slovak Republic over the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam project on the Danube River, refused to apply the concept of sustainable development with any legal force in resolving the dispute. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Rep. Hungary v. Slovak Rep.), 1997 I.C.J. (Sept. 25) (visited Feb. 17, 1998) , reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 168 (1998). The court recognized that the "need to reconcile economic development with protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development," but left it to the parties to negotiate that reconciliation. See 37 I.L.M. 168, 200 (1998). The majority thus declined to adopt the vision of the court's Vice President Weeramantry, that the "principle of sustainable development is . . . a part of modern international law by reason not only of its inescapable logical necessity, but also by reason of its wide and general acceptance by the global community." Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Rep. Hungary v. Slovak Rep.) (visited Mar. 17, 1998) (separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 204, 207 (1998).
84. The United Nations channels its work on sustainable development through the Commission on Sustainable Development, which is serviced by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs' Division for Sustainable Development. Their work is covered in the journal ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW, and can be monitored through the Division's web page found at (visited Mar. 17, 1998). In general, although many international law scholars are hopeful that the United Nations and other international regimes will contribute to the translation of sustainable development ideology into a practical body of law, most agree that at present "[t]he international legal system does not yet have the legal tools nor the institutional capacity to deal with the challenge." See Susan H. Bragdon, The Evolution and Future of the Law of Sustainable Development: Lessons from the Convention on Biological Diversity, 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 426 (1996). Indeed, even in the international law realm it would be premature to say that sustainable development has progressed past the Fifth Degree of relevance. Recently, for example, the International Court of Justice, in adjudicating the dispute between the Republic of Hungary and the Slovak Republic over the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam project on the Danube River, refused to apply the concept of sustainable development with any legal force in resolving the dispute. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Rep. Hungary v. Slovak Rep.), 1997 I.C.J. (Sept. 25) (visited Feb. 17, 1998) , reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 168 (1998). The court recognized that the "need to reconcile economic development with protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development," but left it to the parties to negotiate that reconciliation. See 37 I.L.M. 168, 200 (1998). The majority thus declined to adopt the vision of the court's Vice President Weeramantry, that the "principle of sustainable development is . . . a part of modern international law by reason not only of its inescapable logical necessity, but also by reason of its wide and general acceptance by the global community." Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Rep. Hungary v. Slovak Rep.) (visited Mar. 17, 1998) (separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 204, 207 (1998).
85. The United Nations channels its work on sustainable development through the Commission on Sustainable Development, which is serviced by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs' Division for Sustainable Development. Their work is covered in the journal ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW, and can be monitored through the Division's web page found at (visited Mar. 17, 1998). In general, although many international law scholars are hopeful that the United Nations and other international regimes will contribute to the translation of sustainable development ideology into a practical body of law, most agree that at present "[t]he international legal system does not yet have the legal tools nor the institutional capacity to deal with the challenge." See Susan H. Bragdon, The Evolution and Future of the Law of Sustainable Development: Lessons from the Convention on Biological Diversity, 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 426 (1996). Indeed, even in the international law realm it would be premature to say that sustainable development has progressed past the Fifth Degree of relevance. Recently, for example, the International Court of Justice, in adjudicating the dispute between the Republic of Hungary and the Slovak Republic over the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam project on the Danube River, refused to apply the concept of sustainable development with any legal force in resolving the dispute. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Rep. Hungary v. Slovak Rep.), 1997 I.C.J. (Sept. 25) (visited Feb. 17, 1998) , reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 168 (1998). The court recognized that the "need to reconcile economic development with protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development," but left it to the parties to negotiate that reconciliation. See 37 I.L.M. 168, 200 (1998). The majority thus declined to adopt the vision of the court's Vice President Weeramantry, that the "principle of sustainable development is . . . a part of modern international law by reason not only of its inescapable logical necessity, but also by reason of its wide and general acceptance by the global community." Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Rep. Hungary v. Slovak Rep.) (visited Mar. 17, 1998) (separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 204, 207 (1998).
86. The United Nations channels its work on sustainable development through the Commission on Sustainable Development, which is serviced by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs' Division for Sustainable Development. Their work is covered in the journal ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW, and can be monitored through the Division's web page found at (visited Mar. 17, 1998). In general, although many international law scholars are hopeful that the United Nations and other international regimes will contribute to the translation of sustainable development ideology into a practical body of law, most agree that at present "[t]he international legal system does not yet have the legal tools nor the institutional capacity to deal with the challenge." See Susan H. Bragdon, The Evolution and Future of the Law of Sustainable Development: Lessons from the Convention on Biological Diversity, 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 426 (1996). Indeed, even in the international law realm it would be premature to say that sustainable development has progressed past the Fifth Degree of relevance. Recently, for example, the International Court of Justice, in adjudicating the dispute between the Republic of Hungary and the Slovak Republic over the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam project on the Danube River, refused to apply the concept of sustainable development with any legal force in resolving the dispute. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Rep. Hungary v. Slovak Rep.), 1997 I.C.J. (Sept. 25) (visited Feb. 17, 1998) , reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 168 (1998). The court recognized that the "need to reconcile economic development with protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development," but left it to the parties to negotiate that reconciliation. See 37 I.L.M. 168, 200 (1998). The majority thus declined to adopt the vision of the court's Vice President Weeramantry, that the "principle of sustainable development is . . . a part of modern international law by reason not only of its inescapable logical necessity, but also by reason of its wide and general acceptance by the global community." Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Rep. Hungary v. Slovak Rep.) (visited Mar. 17, 1998) (separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 204, 207 (1998).
87. The greatest contribution the United Nations has made to the process of translating the international rhetoric into domestic policy is its "Agenda 21" document, which purports to outline the actions necessary at domestic levels to achieve global sustainable development. See U.N. CONF. ON ENV'T & DEV., AGENDA 21, U.N. Doc. E.92-38352, A/CONF. 151/26 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 881 (1992). In its June 1997 Special Session, the United Nations General Assembly issued a statement outlining the central policy objectives of sustainable development with respect to specific issues of trade, water quality, energy policy, toxic chemicals, and so on. See U.N. GASS, PROGRAMME FOR THE FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF AGENDA 21, A/S-19/33 (1997), reprinted in 27 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 423 (1997). For a thorough discussion of Agenda 21 and how far the process has yet to go in the United States, see Dernbach et al., supra note 10; Brown, supra note 8, at 198-202.
88. The greatest contribution the United Nations has made to the process of translating the international rhetoric into domestic policy is its "Agenda 21" document, which purports to outline the actions necessary at domestic levels to achieve global sustainable development. See U.N. CONF. ON ENV'T & DEV., AGENDA 21, U.N. Doc. E.92-38352, A/CONF. 151/26 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 881 (1992). In its June 1997 Special Session, the United Nations General Assembly issued a statement outlining the central policy objectives of sustainable development with respect to specific issues of trade, water quality, energy policy, toxic chemicals, and so on. See U.N. GASS, PROGRAMME FOR THE FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF AGENDA 21, A/S-19/33 (1997), reprinted in 27 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 423 (1997). For a thorough discussion of Agenda 21 and how far the process has yet to go in the United States, see Dernbach et al., supra note 10; Brown, supra note 8, at 198-202.
89. The greatest contribution the United Nations has made to the process of translating the international rhetoric into domestic policy is its "Agenda 21" document, which purports to outline the actions necessary at domestic levels to achieve global sustainable development. See U.N. CONF. ON ENV'T & DEV., AGENDA 21, U.N. Doc. E.92-38352, A/CONF. 151/26 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 881 (1992). In its June 1997 Special Session, the United Nations General Assembly issued a statement outlining the central policy objectives of sustainable development with respect to specific issues of trade, water quality, energy policy, toxic chemicals, and so on. See U.N. GASS, PROGRAMME FOR THE FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF AGENDA 21, A/S-19/33 (1997), reprinted in 27 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 423 (1997). For a thorough discussion of Agenda 21 and how far the process has yet to go in the United States, see Dernbach et al., supra note 10; Brown, supra note 8, at 198-202.
90. The greatest contribution the United Nations has made to the process of translating the international rhetoric into domestic policy is its "Agenda 21" document, which purports to outline the actions necessary at domestic levels to achieve global sustainable development. See U.N. CONF. ON ENV'T & DEV., AGENDA 21, U.N. Doc. E.92-38352, A/CONF. 151/26 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 881 (1992). In its June 1997 Special Session, the United Nations General Assembly issued a statement outlining the central policy objectives of sustainable development with respect to specific issues of trade, water quality, energy policy, toxic chemicals, and so on. See U.N. GASS, PROGRAMME FOR THE FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF AGENDA 21, A/S-19/33 (1997), reprinted in 27 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 423 (1997). For a thorough discussion of Agenda 21 and how far the process has yet to go in the United States, see Dernbach et al., supra note 10; Brown, supra note 8, at 198-202.
91. For example, following the expression of global carbon emission reduction goals in the 1992 Climate Change Convention, see United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994), international debate focused on whether countries will use voluntary or internationally enforceable mandatory domestic constraints to meet the goals. See William C. Burns, Global Warming - The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Future of Small Island States, 6 DICKINSON J. ENVTL. L & POL'Y 147 (1997); David Hodas, The Climate Change Convention and Evolving Legal Models of Sustainable Development, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 75 (1995) (providing a history of the Climate Change Convention and its emergence from a series of international measures relating to sustainable development). Going into the negotiations held on that issue in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, authorities in the United States were divided on the position to take with respect to an international agreement that would impose mandatory domestic controls on carbon and other "greenhouse gas" emissions. See, e.g., S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (advocating opposition to mandatory measures unless also imposed on developing nations); see generally John Lanchberry, What to Expect from Kyoto, ENV'T, Nov. 1997, at 5; Jonathan Martel & Elizabeth Stringer, Kyoto Summit Reflects Government Commitment to Advancing Framework for Climate Protection, 28 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1185 (Oct. 10, 1997); Kyoto and the U.S. Economy, ENVTL. F., Nov. - Dec. 1997, at 40. The negotiations concluded with an agreement to require developed nations to reduce total emissions to prescribed levels, but with opportunities for "carbon sink" credits and emissions trading with developing nations that will effectively reduce the actual required reductions. See Joseph Romm et al., A Road Map for U.S. Carbon Reductions, 279 SCIENCE 669 (1998). Debate is now even more rancorous as to whether the United States should ratify the agreement. See Bud Ward, Kyoto: The Mother of E-Law Battles, ENVTL. F., Jan. - Feb. 1998, at 4. Clearly, if the United States ratifies the agreement, it will require immediate implementation of some form of "hard law" at the domestic level, thus propelling sustainable development further along my degrees of relevance model. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 25, at 53 ("imposition of legally-binding emission limitations, even if relatively modest, will have profound implications for a broad range of legal practices"). The entire Kyoto agreement is available with cross-references and links to related materials at Pace Energy Project, Global Warming Central, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/197/L.7/Add.1 (1997) reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). See also Pace Engergy Project (visited Mar. 17, 1998) .
92. For example, following the expression of global carbon emission reduction goals in the 1992 Climate Change Convention, see United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994), international debate focused on whether countries will use voluntary or internationally enforceable mandatory domestic constraints to meet the goals. See William C. Burns, Global Warming - The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Future of Small Island States, 6 DICKINSON J. ENVTL. L & POL'Y 147 (1997); David Hodas, The Climate Change Convention and Evolving Legal Models of Sustainable Development, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 75 (1995) (providing a history of the Climate Change Convention and its emergence from a series of international measures relating to sustainable development). Going into the negotiations held on that issue in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, authorities in the United States were divided on the position to take with respect to an international agreement that would impose mandatory domestic controls on carbon and other "greenhouse gas" emissions. See, e.g., S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (advocating opposition to mandatory measures unless also imposed on developing nations); see generally John Lanchberry, What to Expect from Kyoto, ENV'T, Nov. 1997, at 5; Jonathan Martel & Elizabeth Stringer, Kyoto Summit Reflects Government Commitment to Advancing Framework for Climate Protection, 28 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1185 (Oct. 10, 1997); Kyoto and the U.S. Economy, ENVTL. F., Nov. - Dec. 1997, at 40. The negotiations concluded with an agreement to require developed nations to reduce total emissions to prescribed levels, but with opportunities for "carbon sink" credits and emissions trading with developing nations that will effectively reduce the actual required reductions. See Joseph Romm et al., A Road Map for U.S. Carbon Reductions, 279 SCIENCE 669 (1998). Debate is now even more rancorous as to whether the United States should ratify the agreement. See Bud Ward, Kyoto: The Mother of E-Law Battles, ENVTL. F., Jan. - Feb. 1998, at 4. Clearly, if the United States ratifies the agreement, it will require immediate implementation of some form of "hard law" at the domestic level, thus propelling sustainable development further along my degrees of relevance model. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 25, at 53 ("imposition of legally-binding emission limitations, even if relatively modest, will have profound implications for a broad range of legal practices"). The entire Kyoto agreement is available with cross-references and links to related materials at Pace Energy Project, Global Warming Central, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/197/L.7/Add.1 (1997) reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). See also Pace Engergy Project (visited Mar. 17, 1998) .
93. For example, following the expression of global carbon emission reduction goals in the 1992 Climate Change Convention, see United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994), international debate focused on whether countries will use voluntary or internationally enforceable mandatory domestic constraints to meet the goals. See William C. Burns, Global Warming - The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Future of Small Island States, 6 DICKINSON J. ENVTL. L & POL'Y 147 (1997); David Hodas, The Climate Change Convention and Evolving Legal Models of Sustainable Development, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 75 (1995) (providing a history of the Climate Change Convention and its emergence from a series of international measures relating to sustainable development). Going into the negotiations held on that issue in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, authorities in the United States were divided on the position to take with respect to an international agreement that would impose mandatory domestic controls on carbon and other "greenhouse gas" emissions. See, e.g., S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (advocating opposition to mandatory measures unless also imposed on developing nations); see generally John Lanchberry, What to Expect from Kyoto, ENV'T, Nov. 1997, at 5; Jonathan Martel & Elizabeth Stringer, Kyoto Summit Reflects Government Commitment to Advancing Framework for Climate Protection, 28 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1185 (Oct. 10, 1997); Kyoto and the U.S. Economy, ENVTL. F., Nov. - Dec. 1997, at 40. The negotiations concluded with an agreement to require developed nations to reduce total emissions to prescribed levels, but with opportunities for "carbon sink" credits and emissions trading with developing nations that will effectively reduce the actual required reductions. See Joseph Romm et al., A Road Map for U.S. Carbon Reductions, 279 SCIENCE 669 (1998). Debate is now even more rancorous as to whether the United States should ratify the agreement. See Bud Ward, Kyoto: The Mother of E-Law Battles, ENVTL. F., Jan. - Feb. 1998, at 4. Clearly, if the United States ratifies the agreement, it will require immediate implementation of some form of "hard law" at the domestic level, thus propelling sustainable development further along my degrees of relevance model. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 25, at 53 ("imposition of legally-binding emission limitations, even if relatively modest, will have profound implications for a broad range of legal practices"). The entire Kyoto agreement is available with cross-references and links to related materials at Pace Energy Project, Global Warming Central, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/197/L.7/Add.1 (1997) reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). See also Pace Engergy Project (visited Mar. 17, 1998) .
94. For example, following the expression of global carbon emission reduction goals in the 1992 Climate Change Convention, see United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994), international debate focused on whether countries will use voluntary or internationally enforceable mandatory domestic constraints to meet the goals. See William C. Burns, Global Warming - The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Future of Small Island States, 6 DICKINSON J. ENVTL. L & POL'Y 147 (1997); David Hodas, The Climate Change Convention and Evolving Legal Models of Sustainable Development, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 75 (1995) (providing a history of the Climate Change Convention and its emergence from a series of international measures relating to sustainable development). Going into the negotiations held on that issue in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, authorities in the United States were divided on the position to take with respect to an international agreement that would impose mandatory domestic controls on carbon and other "greenhouse gas" emissions. See, e.g., S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (advocating opposition to mandatory measures unless also imposed on developing nations); see generally John Lanchberry, What to Expect from Kyoto, ENV'T, Nov. 1997, at 5; Jonathan Martel & Elizabeth Stringer, Kyoto Summit Reflects Government Commitment to Advancing Framework for Climate Protection, 28 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1185 (Oct. 10, 1997); Kyoto and the U.S. Economy, ENVTL. F., Nov. - Dec. 1997, at 40. The negotiations concluded with an agreement to require developed nations to reduce total emissions to prescribed levels, but with opportunities for "carbon sink" credits and emissions trading with developing nations that will effectively reduce the actual required reductions. See Joseph Romm et al., A Road Map for U.S. Carbon Reductions, 279 SCIENCE 669 (1998). Debate is now even more rancorous as to whether the United States should ratify the agreement. See Bud Ward, Kyoto: The Mother of E-Law Battles, ENVTL. F., Jan. - Feb. 1998, at 4. Clearly, if the United States ratifies the agreement, it will require immediate implementation of some form of "hard law" at the domestic level, thus propelling sustainable development further along my degrees of relevance model. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 25, at 53 ("imposition of legally-binding emission limitations, even if relatively modest, will have profound implications for a broad range of legal practices"). The entire Kyoto agreement is available with cross-references and links to related materials at Pace Energy Project, Global Warming Central, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/197/L.7/Add.1 (1997) reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). See also Pace Engergy Project (visited Mar. 17, 1998) .
95. For example, following the expression of global carbon emission reduction goals in the 1992 Climate Change Convention, see United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994), international debate focused on whether countries will use voluntary or internationally enforceable mandatory domestic constraints to meet the goals. See William C. Burns, Global Warming - The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Future of Small Island States, 6 DICKINSON J. ENVTL. L & POL'Y 147 (1997); David Hodas, The Climate Change Convention and Evolving Legal Models of Sustainable Development, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 75 (1995) (providing a history of the Climate Change Convention and its emergence from a series of international measures relating to sustainable development). Going into the negotiations held on that issue in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, authorities in the United States were divided on the position to take with respect to an international agreement that would impose mandatory domestic controls on carbon and other "greenhouse gas" emissions. See, e.g., S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (advocating opposition to mandatory measures unless also imposed on developing nations); see generally John Lanchberry, What to Expect from Kyoto, ENV'T, Nov. 1997, at 5; Jonathan Martel & Elizabeth Stringer, Kyoto Summit Reflects Government Commitment to Advancing Framework for Climate Protection, 28 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1185 (Oct. 10, 1997); Kyoto and the U.S. Economy, ENVTL. F., Nov. - Dec. 1997, at 40. The negotiations concluded with an agreement to require developed nations to reduce total emissions to prescribed levels, but with opportunities for "carbon sink" credits and emissions trading with developing nations that will effectively reduce the actual required reductions. See Joseph Romm et al., A Road Map for U.S. Carbon Reductions, 279 SCIENCE 669 (1998). Debate is now even more rancorous as to whether the United States should ratify the agreement. See Bud Ward, Kyoto: The Mother of E-Law Battles, ENVTL. F., Jan. - Feb. 1998, at 4. Clearly, if the United States ratifies the agreement, it will require immediate implementation of some form of "hard law" at the domestic level, thus propelling sustainable development further along my degrees of relevance model. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 25, at 53 ("imposition of legally-binding emission limitations, even if relatively modest, will have profound implications for a broad range of legal practices"). The entire Kyoto agreement is available with cross-references and links to related materials at Pace Energy Project, Global Warming Central, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/197/L.7/Add.1 (1997) reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). See also Pace Engergy Project (visited Mar. 17, 1998) .
96. For example, following the expression of global carbon emission reduction goals in the 1992 Climate Change Convention, see United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994), international debate focused on whether countries will use voluntary or internationally enforceable mandatory domestic constraints to meet the goals. See William C. Burns, Global Warming - The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Future of Small Island States, 6 DICKINSON J. ENVTL. L & POL'Y 147 (1997); David Hodas, The Climate Change Convention and Evolving Legal Models of Sustainable Development, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 75 (1995) (providing a history of the Climate Change Convention and its emergence from a series of international measures relating to sustainable development). Going into the negotiations held on that issue in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, authorities in the United States were divided on the position to take with respect to an international agreement that would impose mandatory domestic controls on carbon and other "greenhouse gas" emissions. See, e.g., S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (advocating opposition to mandatory measures unless also imposed on developing nations); see generally John Lanchberry, What to Expect from Kyoto, ENV'T, Nov. 1997, at 5; Jonathan Martel & Elizabeth Stringer, Kyoto Summit Reflects Government Commitment to Advancing Framework for Climate Protection, 28 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1185 (Oct. 10, 1997); Kyoto and the U.S. Economy, ENVTL. F., Nov. - Dec. 1997, at 40. The negotiations concluded with an agreement to require developed nations to reduce total emissions to prescribed levels, but with opportunities for "carbon sink" credits and emissions trading with developing nations that will effectively reduce the actual required reductions. See Joseph Romm et al., A Road Map for U.S. Carbon Reductions, 279 SCIENCE 669 (1998). Debate is now even more rancorous as to whether the United States should ratify the agreement. See Bud Ward, Kyoto: The Mother of E-Law Battles, ENVTL. F., Jan. - Feb. 1998, at 4. Clearly, if the United States ratifies the agreement, it will require immediate implementation of some form of "hard law" at the domestic level, thus propelling sustainable development further along my degrees of relevance model. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 25, at 53 ("imposition of legally-binding emission limitations, even if relatively modest, will have profound implications for a broad range of legal practices"). The entire Kyoto agreement is available with cross-references and links to related materials at Pace Energy Project, Global Warming Central, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/197/L.7/Add.1 (1997) reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). See also Pace Engergy Project (visited Mar. 17, 1998) .
97. For example, following the expression of global carbon emission reduction goals in the 1992 Climate Change Convention, see United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994), international debate focused on whether countries will use voluntary or internationally enforceable mandatory domestic constraints to meet the goals. See William C. Burns, Global Warming - The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Future of Small Island States, 6 DICKINSON J. ENVTL. L & POL'Y 147 (1997); David Hodas, The Climate Change Convention and Evolving Legal Models of Sustainable Development, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 75 (1995) (providing a history of the Climate Change Convention and its emergence from a series of international measures relating to sustainable development). Going into the negotiations held on that issue in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, authorities in the United States were divided on the position to take with respect to an international agreement that would impose mandatory domestic controls on carbon and other "greenhouse gas" emissions. See, e.g., S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (advocating opposition to mandatory measures unless also imposed on developing nations); see generally John Lanchberry, What to Expect from Kyoto, ENV'T, Nov. 1997, at 5; Jonathan Martel & Elizabeth Stringer, Kyoto Summit Reflects Government Commitment to Advancing Framework for Climate Protection, 28 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1185 (Oct. 10, 1997); Kyoto and the U.S. Economy, ENVTL. F., Nov. - Dec. 1997, at 40. The negotiations concluded with an agreement to require developed nations to reduce total emissions to prescribed levels, but with opportunities for "carbon sink" credits and emissions trading with developing nations that will effectively reduce the actual required reductions. See Joseph Romm et al., A Road Map for U.S. Carbon Reductions, 279 SCIENCE 669 (1998). Debate is now even more rancorous as to whether the United States should ratify the agreement. See Bud Ward, Kyoto: The Mother of E-Law Battles, ENVTL. F., Jan. - Feb. 1998, at 4. Clearly, if the United States ratifies the agreement, it will require immediate implementation of some form of "hard law" at the domestic level, thus propelling sustainable development further along my degrees of relevance model. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 25, at 53 ("imposition of legally-binding emission limitations, even if relatively modest, will have profound implications for a broad range of legal practices"). The entire Kyoto agreement is available with cross-references and links to related materials at Pace Energy Project, Global Warming Central, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/197/L.7/Add.1 (1997) reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). See also Pace Engergy Project (visited Mar. 17, 1998) .
98. For example, following the expression of global carbon emission reduction goals in the 1992 Climate Change Convention, see United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994), international debate focused on whether countries will use voluntary or internationally enforceable mandatory domestic constraints to meet the goals. See William C. Burns, Global Warming - The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Future of Small Island States, 6 DICKINSON J. ENVTL. L & POL'Y 147 (1997); David Hodas, The Climate Change Convention and Evolving Legal Models of Sustainable Development, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 75 (1995) (providing a history of the Climate Change Convention and its emergence from a series of international measures relating to sustainable development). Going into the negotiations held on that issue in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, authorities in the United States were divided on the position to take with respect to an international agreement that would impose mandatory domestic controls on carbon and other "greenhouse gas" emissions. See, e.g., S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (advocating opposition to mandatory measures unless also imposed on developing nations); see generally John Lanchberry, What to Expect from Kyoto, ENV'T, Nov. 1997, at 5; Jonathan Martel & Elizabeth Stringer, Kyoto Summit Reflects Government Commitment to Advancing Framework for Climate Protection, 28 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1185 (Oct. 10, 1997); Kyoto and the U.S. Economy, ENVTL. F., Nov. - Dec. 1997, at 40. The negotiations concluded with an agreement to require developed nations to reduce total emissions to prescribed levels, but with opportunities for "carbon sink" credits and emissions trading with developing nations that will effectively reduce the actual required reductions. See Joseph Romm et al., A Road Map for U.S. Carbon Reductions, 279 SCIENCE 669 (1998). Debate is now even more rancorous as to whether the United States should ratify the agreement. See Bud Ward, Kyoto: The Mother of E-Law Battles, ENVTL. F., Jan. - Feb. 1998, at 4. Clearly, if the United States ratifies the agreement, it will require immediate implementation of some form of "hard law" at the domestic level, thus propelling sustainable development further along my degrees of relevance model. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 25, at 53 ("imposition of legally-binding emission limitations, even if relatively modest, will have profound implications for a broad range of legal practices"). The entire Kyoto agreement is available with cross-references and links to related materials at Pace Energy Project, Global Warming Central, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/197/L.7/Add.1 (1997) reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). See also Pace Engergy Project (visited Mar. 17, 1998) .
99. For example, following the expression of global carbon emission reduction goals in the 1992 Climate Change Convention, see United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994), international debate focused on whether countries will use voluntary or internationally enforceable mandatory domestic constraints to meet the goals. See William C. Burns, Global Warming - The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Future of Small Island States, 6 DICKINSON J. ENVTL. L & POL'Y 147 (1997); David Hodas, The Climate Change Convention and Evolving Legal Models of Sustainable Development, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 75 (1995) (providing a history of the Climate Change Convention and its emergence from a series of international measures relating to sustainable development). Going into the negotiations held on that issue in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, authorities in the United States were divided on the position to take with respect to an international agreement that would impose mandatory domestic controls on carbon and other "greenhouse gas" emissions. See, e.g., S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (advocating opposition to mandatory measures unless also imposed on developing nations); see generally John Lanchberry, What to Expect from Kyoto, ENV'T, Nov. 1997, at 5; Jonathan Martel & Elizabeth Stringer, Kyoto Summit Reflects Government Commitment to Advancing Framework for Climate Protection, 28 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1185 (Oct. 10, 1997); Kyoto and the U.S. Economy, ENVTL. F., Nov. - Dec. 1997, at 40. The negotiations concluded with an agreement to require developed nations to reduce total emissions to prescribed levels, but with opportunities for "carbon sink" credits and emissions trading with developing nations that will effectively reduce the actual required reductions. See Joseph Romm et al., A Road Map for U.S. Carbon Reductions, 279 SCIENCE 669 (1998). Debate is now even more rancorous as to whether the United States should ratify the agreement. See Bud Ward, Kyoto: The Mother of E-Law Battles, ENVTL. F., Jan. - Feb. 1998, at 4. Clearly, if the United States ratifies the agreement, it will require immediate implementation of some form of "hard law" at the domestic level, thus propelling sustainable development further along my degrees of relevance model. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 25, at 53 ("imposition of legally-binding emission limitations, even if relatively modest, will have profound implications for a broad range of legal practices"). The entire Kyoto agreement is available with cross-references and links to related materials at Pace Energy Project, Global Warming Central, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/197/L.7/Add.1 (1997) reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). See also Pace Engergy Project (visited Mar. 17, 1998) .
100. For example, following the expression of global carbon emission reduction goals in the 1992 Climate Change Convention, see United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994), international debate focused on whether countries will use voluntary or internationally enforceable mandatory domestic constraints to meet the goals. See William C. Burns, Global Warming - The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Future of Small Island States, 6 DICKINSON J. ENVTL. L & POL'Y 147 (1997); David Hodas, The Climate Change Convention and Evolving Legal Models of Sustainable Development, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 75 (1995) (providing a history of the Climate Change Convention and its emergence from a series of international measures relating to sustainable development). Going into the negotiations held on that issue in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, authorities in the United States were divided on the position to take with respect to an international agreement that would impose mandatory domestic controls on carbon and other "greenhouse gas" emissions. See, e.g., S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (advocating opposition to mandatory measures unless also imposed on developing nations); see generally John Lanchberry, What to Expect from Kyoto, ENV'T, Nov. 1997, at 5; Jonathan Martel & Elizabeth Stringer, Kyoto Summit Reflects Government Commitment to Advancing Framework for Climate Protection, 28 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1185 (Oct. 10, 1997); Kyoto and the U.S. Economy, ENVTL. F., Nov. - Dec. 1997, at 40. The negotiations concluded with an agreement to require developed nations to reduce total emissions to prescribed levels, but with opportunities for "carbon sink" credits and emissions trading with developing nations that will effectively reduce the actual required reductions. See Joseph Romm et al., A Road Map for U.S. Carbon Reductions, 279 SCIENCE 669 (1998). Debate is now even more rancorous as to whether the United States should ratify the agreement. See Bud Ward, Kyoto: The Mother of E-Law Battles, ENVTL. F., Jan. - Feb. 1998, at 4. Clearly, if the United States ratifies the agreement, it will require immediate implementation of some form of "hard law" at the domestic level, thus propelling sustainable development further along my degrees of relevance model. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 25, at 53 ("imposition of legally-binding emission limitations, even if relatively modest, will have profound implications for a broad range of legal practices"). The entire Kyoto agreement is available with cross-references and links to related materials at Pace Energy Project, Global Warming Central, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/197/L.7/Add.1 (1997) reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). See also Pace Engergy Project (visited Mar. 17, 1998) .
101. Dernbach et al., supra note 10, at 10507-19.
102. I use the term nonlinearity to capture the sense that the law of sustainable development is unpredictable, not capable of being extrapolated from current trends, and subject to potentially large alterations in the direction of its evolution as a result of seemingly small events. For a discussion of the property of nonlinearity and how legal systems often experience nonlinearity in this sense, see J. B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996). For an excellent historical discussion of how one lawyer's work, in this case the publication of a practice tips treatise, can have such a nonlinear influence on legal evolution, see Jeff L. Lewin, The Genesis and Evolution of Legal Uncertainty About "Reasonable Medical Certainty," _ MD. L. REV. _ (forthcoming 1998).
103. I use the term nonlinearity to capture the sense that the law of sustainable development is unpredictable, not capable of being extrapolated from current trends, and subject to potentially large alterations in the direction of its evolution as a result of seemingly small events. For a discussion of the property of nonlinearity and how legal systems often experience nonlinearity in this sense, see J. B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996). For an excellent historical discussion of how one lawyer's work, in this case the publication of a practice tips treatise, can have such a nonlinear influence on legal evolution, see Jeff L. Lewin, The Genesis and Evolution of Legal Uncertainty About "Reasonable Medical Certainty," _ MD. L. REV. _ (forthcoming 1998).