Politics, capital and the state in sub-saharan africa

Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics

Volumn 36, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 108-122

  Tangri, Roger ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CIVIL SOCIETY; POLITICAL ECONOMY; PRIVATE SECTOR; STATE-BUSINESS RELATIONS;

AFRICA, (SUB-SAHARA);

EID: 0031793250     PISSN: 03063631     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/14662049808447769     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. for this specific argument, see, for instance, Gary Hansen, 'Constituencies for Reform: Strategic Approaches for Donor-Supported Civic Advocacy Programs' (USAID Programs and Operations Assessment Report, No. 12, Washington, DC, 1996).
2. Tom Forrest, The Advance of African Capital: The Growth of Nigerian Private Enterprise (Edinburgh, 1994), 249. By the private sector we refer to the formal, profit-making segment of the overall private enterprise system in African countries. A significant portion of Africa's private sector comprises small-scale peasants, informal sector businesses and petty traders; these are excluded from consideration here.
3. for a discussion of African entrepreneurship being impeded during the colonial period, see Paul Kennedy, African Capitalism: The Struggle for Ascendancy (Cambridge, 1988), Chaps. 2-3.
4. for a discussion of the concerns of local entrepreneurs just before and after independence in Nigeria, see Thomas J. Biersteker, Multinationals, the State, and Control of the Nigerian Economy (Princeton, NJ, 1987), 52-69
5. Kennedy, African Capitalism, 95, 96, and 97.
6. Kwame Nkrumah feared that the emergence of a strong indigenous class of capital would
7. undermine his own pre-eminence in Ghana. He once remarked to a cabinet minister: 'Any Ghanaian with a lot of money has a lot of influence; any Ghanaian with a lot of influence is a threat to me'. This is quoted in John D. Esseks, 'Political Independence and Economic Décolonisation: The Case of Ghana under NkrurriaV, Western Political Quarterly, 24, 1 (1971), 61.
8. See Catherine Boone, Merchant Capital and the Roots of Power in Senegal 1930-1985 (Cambridge, 1992), for a discussion of how the scope for private sector competition with state-owned enterprises in many key sectors - export crop sector and domestic commerce was restricted.
9. See Kennedy, African Capitalism, 70-71. See also Africa Confidential, 24 June 1987 (London), for a discussion of how the Moi government sought to use Asian capital to undermine Kikuyu capital in Kenya in the late 1980s.
10. for this argument see Nicola Svvainson, Tlie Development of Corporate Capitalism in Kenya 1918-77 (London, 1980); John Rapley, Ivoirien Capitalism, African Entrepreneurs in Cote d'Ivoire (Boulder, CO, 1992); and Balefi Tsie, 'The Political Context of Botswana's Development Performance", Journal of Southern African Studies, 22, 4 (1996).
11. David Himbara, 'The Failed Africanisation of Commerce and Industry in Kenya', World Development, 22, 3 (1994), 470.
12. Boone argues - contrary to Rapley - that the economic expansion of capitalists, especially in the commercial trading sector, was held back by the Ivoirian government. See Catherine Boone, 'Commerce in Cote d'Ivoire: Ivoirianisation without Ivoirian Traders', Journal of Modem African Studies, 31, 1 (1993).
13. Various examples could be provided but we cite here the case of government-backed 'indigenisation' schemes in Zimbabwe. As one experienced journalist wrote, 'The preferential treatment of black enterprises is open to abuse, particularly as preference appeared to be given to companies with good connections with the ZANU-PF party'. For example, 'the indigenisation of the construction industry meant that contracts had gone to firms with the best relations with the ruling party, not those that were best qualified'. Andrew Meldrum, 'Zimbabwe: The Last Scandal', Africa Report (JanTFeb. 1995), 30. In 1997, . allegations were made in Zimbabwe that government tenders were being awarded mainly to relatives of President Robert Mugabe (his nephew had won three multi-million dollar contracts in a row), some close political associates (including a former army commander), and his tribesmen. See Reuters News Agency, 'Scandal hits Mugabe', 12 March 1997.
14. for a discussion of government attempts to control and regulate business organisations in Senegal between 1968 and the early 1970s, see Boone, Merchant Capital, 172, 183-5. The Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry was reported as, until recently, being 'under the patronage of the president and in effect served as a mouthpiece for government policies'. See Hansen, 'Constituencies for Reform", 35.
15. There were also farmers' unions in Zimbabwe as well as Kenya which represented smallholders and which lobbied on a range of issues and exerted influence on government policies. Their political influence may not be as strong as that reported by Stephen F. Burgess, 'Smallholder Voice and Rural Transformation: Zimbabwe and Kenya Compared', Comparative Politics (1997), 127-49, and it has certainly waned in the past decade as a result of governmental manipulation and control.
16. Ladi Hamalai argues that Nigerian business associations in the 1970s had very limited input into economic policy fomulation, including the second indigenisation decree. He also argues that business entrepreneurs relied much more on personal contacts than on their organisations to achieve business objectives. See 'Government-Business Relations and Economic Liberalisation in Nigeria(D.Phil, thesis, Universisty of Sussex, 1993), 101.
17. Interview with the chairman of the Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Agriculture, David Mwaibula in The East African (Nairobi), 15 April 1996, 11.
18. for a detailed discussion of this argument in regard to Ghana in the late 1980s and early 1990s, see Elizabeth I. Hart, 'Liberal Reforms in the Balance: The Private Sector and the State in Ghana, 1983-1995' (Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, 1996), Chap. 4.
19. I am grateful to Dr E. Gyimah-Boadi of the University of Ghana at Legon for providing me with this information.
20. Boone, Merchant Capital.
21. Andrew A. Beveridge and Anthony R. Oberschall, African Businessmen and Development in Zambia (Princeton, NJ, 1979).
22. See People's Daily Graphic (Accra), 19 June D93.
23. Hart, 'Liberal Reforms', Chap. 3.
24. The 'relatively high degree of overt interassociational conflict' in Nigeria's business relations is considered in Mick Moore and Ladi Hamalai, 'Economic Liberalisation, Political Pluralism and Business Associations in Developing Countries', World Development, 21, 12 (1993), 1903-5.
25. Moore and Hamalai,'Economic Liberalisation', 1905.
26. These views on the PSF are based on private interviews in Uganda in 1996 and 1997.
27. Hansen, 'Constituencies for Reform', 34.
28. Deputy trade minister, Dan Abodakpi, cited in IPS, 'Businessmen in Ghana Split over Candidates', 9 December 1996.
29. See Barrington Moore, Jr, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (London, 1966).