Electoral politics in Poland: the parliamentary elections of 1997

Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics

Volumn 14, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 58-83

  Szczerbiak, Aleks ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRATIZATION; ELECTION; PARLIMENTARY ELECTION; PARTY POLITICS; POST-COMMUNISM;

POLAND;

EID: 0031769007     PISSN: 13523279     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13523279808415382     Document Type: Article

References (68)

1. The term 'grouping' is used in this article to denote the fact that many Polish parties compete in elections as broad coalitions and alliances and that these, in turn, encompass organizations that are not political parties sensu stricto, such as trade unions and other interest groups.
2. See, for example, Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, 'Identifying the Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe', British Journal of Political Science, Vol.XXIII, No.4 (1993), pp.521-48.
3. Although it is higher in presidential elections where voters may find the choice between personalities rather than parties more understandable, reaching a peak of 68.23 per cent in the second round of the 1995 contest.
4. On the 1995 campaign, see Frances Millard, 'The 1995 Polish Presidential Election', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.12, No.1 (March 1996), pp. 101-9.
5. Poland is divided into 52 electoral districts (lokalne okrȩgi wyborcze) based on the country's 49 administrative provinces (województwa) with the two largest, Warsaw and Katowice, subdivided into two and three districts respectively. If a party or electoral coalition succeeds in collecting the required number of signatures to register a list of candidates in at least half of these districts, then its lists are automatically registered in the remainder.
6. The new law also contained a number of other provisions which gave a 'premium' to larger parties in order to discourage party fragmentation, including: an increase in the number of electoral districts from 37 to 52; the adoption of the d'Hondt rather than the Saint-Lague counting system for determining the distribution of seats; and the introduction of a seven per cent threshold for the distribution of an additional 69 seats elected from parties' 'national lists'.
7. Ethnic minority parties were excluded from the five per cent threshold provision and these figures do not include the four and two deputies elected to represent German minority parties in 1993 and 1997 respectively.
8. For a fuller analysis of the first phase of Polish party system development, see Frances Millard, 'The Shaping of the Polish Party System 1989-93', East European Politics and Society, Vol.8, No.3 (Fall 1994), pp.467-94.
9. At one stage in mid-1997 it appeared that the National Party of Retirees and Pensioners (Krajowa Partia Emerytów i Rencistów: KPEiR) might join this cartel. The KPEiR, however, failed to live up to this earlier promise and finished well behind the top six. This was due, partly, to the confusion caused by the emergence of a rival pensioners' party (an AWS-inspired spoiler with a similar name and acronym) although even these two groupings' combined votes fell well short of the five per cent threshold.
10. Each of Poland's 49 provinces elects two Senators except for Warsaw and Katowice which each elect three.
11. In the Warsaw district there was even a de facto three-way non-aggression pact involving AWS, the ROP and the UW which ensured that only three candidates from these 'post-Solidarity' parties contested the available Senate seats.
12. There is a continuing debate about what exactly constitutes being on the 'right' and 'centre-right' of Polish politics in post-communist Poland (and, indeed, on the left and in the centre). For the purposes of this article I have adopted the common Polish approach that a party or grouping is considered to be on the 'right' if it chooses to identify itself as such.
13. See, for example, Louisa Vinton, '"Outsider" Parties and the Political Process in Poland', RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.III, No.3 (1994), pp.13-22 (p.21).
14. Olszewski had led an unstable right-wing government between December 1991 and June 1992.
15. For a good account of the activities of the Polish right during this period, see Artur Domosławski, 'W Okopach Sw. Katarzyny', Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 Sept. 1997.
16. See Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, 'Local Elections Redress Political Balance in Poland', RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. III, No. 27 (1994), pp.1-8.
17. See 'Notowania przedwyborcze CBOS: ROP tuz za SLD', Rzeczpospolita, 22-23 June 1996.
18. For an earlier, pre-election analysis of AWS, see Aleks Szczerbiak, 'Harmonizing the Discordant Right', Transition, Vol.III, No.6 (4 April 1997), pp.44-7.
19. See Czas na Akcje: Marian Krzaklewski w rozmowie z Maciejem łȩtowskim i Piotrem Zaremba̧ (Warsaw: Tysol, 1997), p.220.
20. See Krzysztof Grabowski, 'Dyktator', Wprost, 27 Oct. 1996.
21. See, for example: 'Jednosc, rodzina i wolne soboty', Rzeczpospolita, 30 June 1997.
22. Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnosc: Wspólny Program czy Pragmatyzm (Warsaw: CBOS, Nov. 1996).
23. See 'Wydatki i podatki AWS', Gazeta Wyborcza, 23 May 1997.
24. See, for example, '21 zadań dla Polski', Rzeczpospolita, 1 Sept. 1997; 'Wielke Obietnice', Gazeta Wyborcza, 1 Sept. 1997; and Marian Krzaklewski, '21 punktów w XXI wiek', Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 Sept. 1997.
25. See, for example, '21 zadań dla Polski', Rzeczpospolita, 1 Sept. 1997; 'Wielke Obietnice', Gazeta Wyborcza, 1 Sept. 1997; and Marian Krzaklewski, '21 punktów w XXI wiek', Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 Sept. 1997.
26. See, for example, '21 zadań dla Polski', Rzeczpospolita, 1 Sept. 1997; 'Wielke Obietnice', Gazeta Wyborcza, 1 Sept. 1997; and Marian Krzaklewski, '21 punktów w XXI wiek', Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 Sept. 1997.
27. See 'Moczulski w potrzasku?', Gazeta Wyborcza, 9 July 1997; and Marcin Dominik Zdort, 'Umacniona Koalicja', Rzeczpospolita, 23 July 1997.
28. See 'Moczulski w potrzasku?', Gazeta Wyborcza, 9 July 1997; and Marcin Dominik Zdort, 'Umacniona Koalicja', Rzeczpospolita, 23 July 1997.
29. See Marcin Dominik Zdort, 'AWS trudno do zintegrowania', Rzeczpospolita, 3 June 1997.
30. See Janina Paradowska, 'Komu Sejm?', Polityka, 20 Sept. 1997.
31. Author interview with Andrzej Anusz, AWS National Election Campaign Committee Secretary, Nov. 1997.
32. See 'Gwiazdy kampanii AWS', Gazeta Wyborcza, 6-7 Sept. 1997.
33. Kwasniewski's slogan in the first round of the presidential campaign, for example, was 'Choose the Future!' (Wybierz Przyszlość!).
34. See 'Apel o rezygancje z startu', Rzeczpospolita, 1 Sept. 1997.
35. See 'Moczulski wycofuje siȩ', Gazeta Wyborcza, 16 Sept. 1997.
36. The UPR's main components were Janusz Korwin-Mikke's radical liberal-conservative Union of Real Politics (Unia Polityki Realnej: also UPR) and the BBWR breakaway, the Party of Republicans (Partia 'Republikanie': PR). The ChD-BdP was based on the anti- Walesa rump of the BBWR, together with a number of small Catholic nationalist and peasant parties.
37. The UPR's main components were Janusz Korwin-Mikke's radical liberal-conservative Union of Real Politics (Unia Polityki Realnej: also UPR) and the BBWR breakaway, the Party of Republicans (Partia 'Republikanie': PR). The ChD-BdP was based on the anti-Walesa rump of the BBWR, together with a number of small Catholic nationalist and peasant parties.
38. See Ewa Milewicz, 'Na Dwoje Akcja Wrózyła', Gazeta Wyborcza, 8-9 March 1997.
39. See Radoslaw Markowski and Gabor Toka, 'Zwrot na lewo w Polsce i na Wegrzech piec lat po upadku komunizmu', in Stanislaw Gebethner (ed.), Wybory Parlamentarne 1991 i 1993 (Warsaw: Kancleria Sejmu and Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, 1995), pp.193-218.
40. See: 'Kosciół nie jest zwia̧zany z źanda̧ partia̧', Rzeczpospolita, 28 Aug. 1997; and Ewa K. Czaczkowska, 'Oceny zamiast wskazan', Rzeczpospolita, 5 Sept. 1997.
41. See: 'Kosciół nie jest zwia̧zany z źanda̧ partia̧', Rzeczpospolita, 28 Aug. 1997; and Ewa K. Czaczkowska, 'Oceny zamiast wskazan', Rzeczpospolita, 5 Sept. 1997.
42. Having unwisely produced a special AWS poster to greet the Pope during his pilgrimage to Poland earlier that year.
43. In Warsaw constituency, for example, a Radio Maryja-backed candidate, Maria Smerczynska, won a parliamentary seat with 24,637 votes, finishing ahead of much better-known leading 'liberal-conservatives' Czesław Bielecki and Bronislaw Komorowski, in spite of being second last on the Warsaw AWS candidates list: see Kazimierz Groblewski, 'Nie tylko pewniacy', Rzeczpospolita, 1 Oct. 1997.
44. SdRP was formed in January 1990 at the final Congress of the communist Polish United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza: PZPR) as its direct organizational successor.
45. Such as when, for example, he cited security service intelligence reports to support a claim that Western investors were fearful of an AWS victory: see 'Co wywiad wie o obawach Zachodu', Rzeczpospolita, 18 Sept. 1997.
46. See Boguslaw Mazur, 'Premier pod woda̧', Wprost, 17 Aug. 1997.
47. I am grateful to Professor Tomasz Zukowski for this point: author interview, Nov. 1997.
48. The UW was formed in April 1994 following a merger of the UD and KLD, two parties which emerged from within the Solidarity movement and which dominated the 1989-93 governments, supplying, between them, three of Poland's first five post-communist prime ministers: Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Krzysztof Bielecki and Hanna Suchocka.
49. See Wybory Parlamentarne '97: Preferencje w Styczniu (Warsaw: CBOS, Jan. 1997).
50. See 'Siedem kluczy: Drugi plan Balcerowicza', Rzeczpospolita, 10 Sept. 1997.
51. Author interviews with Paweł Piskorski, UW Election Campaign Organizer and Andzrzej Potocki, UW Press Spokesman, Nov. 1997.
52. See 'Najchetniej widzimy koalicje Polski posierpnowej', Rzeczpospolita, 18 Sept. 1997.
53. Although, for example, a CBOS poll in March 1997 showed that 14 per cent of AWS and 12 per cent of SLD voters had the UW as their second preference, the party felt that potential SLD switchers were more difficult to win over, given their general satisfaction with the government and the fact that this was felt to be a strongly 'anti-clerical electorate' which viewed the former communists as more effective and determined opponents of the Church hierarchy than the UW. At the same time, CBOS showed 30 per cent of UW voters had AWS as their second choice compared with only six per cent who chose SLD: see Elektoraty partii politycznych i możliwośći przepływu miȩdzy nimi (CBOS: Warsaw, March 1997).
54. By its own admission, in a very 'traditional' style focusing heavily on local campaigning activities: see 'Kampania lokalna', Rzeczpospolita, 11 July 1997.
55. Formed in May 1990, the PSL was largely the organizational successor to the communist satellite United Peasant Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe: ZSL), although it subsequently sought to portray itself as the sole contemporary representative of Poland's hundred-year-old peasant movement tradition.
56. See Ewa K. Czaczkowska, 'Pȩknieto spoiwo', Rzeczpospolita, 23 Sept. 1997.
57. For 1993 figures, see Tomasz Żukowski, 'Wybory '93: Kto na kogo głosował', Przegla̧d Spoleczny, Vol. XX (Jan.-Feb. 1994), pp.3-32.
58. Ibid.
59. The UP was formed in June 1992 by representatives of smaller groupings which had emerged from Solidarity's social democratic wing and some of the most reform-minded ex-PZPR members for whom SdRP did not represent a clear enough break from the communist past.
60. See 'Zawirowania z listami wyborczymi', Rzeczpospolita, 13 Aug. 1997.
61. See Pawel Smoleński, 'Rytualne szukanie winnych po klesce', Gazeta Wyborcza, 29 Sept. 1997.
62. Compare Tomasz Nałȩcz, 'Dlaczego Warto Głosować na Uniȩ Pracy?', Gazeta Wyborcza, 19 Aug. 1997; and Ryszard Bugaj, 'Czas dla Partii Srodka', Gazeta Wyborcza, 18 Sept. 1997.
63. Compare Tomasz Nałȩcz, 'Dlaczego Warto Głosować na Uniȩ Pracy?', Gazeta Wyborcza, 19 Aug. 1997; and Ryszard Bugaj, 'Czas dla Partii Srodka', Gazeta Wyborcza, 18 Sept. 1997.
64. See 'Mapa polityczna Akcji', Rzeczpospolita, 27-8 Sept. 1997, and 'Ma porza̧dkować, nie rozbijac', Rzeczpospolita, 13 Nov. 1997.
65. See 'Mapa polityczna Akcji', Rzeczpospolita, 27-8 Sept. 1997, and 'Ma porza̧dkować, nie rozbijac', Rzeczpospolita, 13 Nov. 1997.
66. For example, as well as securing the position of finance minister and deputy premier for Balcerowicz, UW nominees also occupied the posts of foreign minister and defence minister.
67. Although it fell short of the 60 per cent required to override a presidential veto, Kwaśniewski indicated that (unlike his predecessor) he would use the veto sparingly.
68. See Janusz Majcherek, 'Zgodnie z naturalnym porza̧dkiem', Rzeczpospolita, 26 Sept. 1997.