Understanding Morocco's 'sanitisation campaign' (December 1995 to May 1996)

Journal of North African Studies

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 101-131

  Denoeux, Guilain ^a  

^a Health Services and Department of Biology   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BLACK MARKET; CIVIL SOCIETY; CORRUPTION; POLICY APPROACH; POLITICAL PROCESS;

MOROCCO;

EID: 0031742820     PISSN: 13629387     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13629389808718311     Document Type: Article

References (47)

1. For a full account and analysis of 'L'Affaire Benabderrazik', see Michel Laurent and Guilain Denoeux, 'Campagne d'assainissement au Maroc: Immunisation du politique et contamination de la justice', Maghreb-Machrek No.154 (Paris: La Documentation Française October-December 1996), pp.125-35.
2. See for instance Amale Samie, 'Le haschisch et le bâton', Maroc-Hebdo International No.224 (4-10 May 1996), pp.22-3.
3. Zahraoui had been elected to the communal council of Ouled Frej in October 1992, as a member of the Constitutional Union (UC). However, when he decided to run for Parliament in 1993, the UC refused to endorse his candidacy. Thus, Zahraoui ran in September 1993 (when one-third of the house was elected indirectly by members of local councils and representatives of wage-earning and professional groups) as a member of the small Party of Independence and Shura (Parti de l Indépendance et de la Choura). Once in the Chamber, however, he joined the UC parliamentary group.
4. The shipment had arrived in the port of Casablanca on 20 January 1995. At that point, the expiration date on the bottles was March 1995. It was clear, however, that such a large quantity of beer could not be commercialised that quickly. To go around this problem, Zahraoui had also imported approximately one million labels of the same brand of beer, with no expiration date. He then replaced the old labels with the new ones, after writing a new date on each label.
5. Throughout this paper, the word Makhzan refers to the centuries-old apparatus of government and political influence that is under the exclusive control of the Palace, and through which the monarchy still exercises much of its authority. It consists of a nation-wide network of influential individuals and families that share three main attributes: their influence at the local level or within a particular segment of the Moroccan population, their intimate knowledge of their own sphere of influence, and their allegiance to the throne. Unlike the institutions around which the formal political system is built (the monarchy, the cabinet, the legislature, the judiciary, and local government), the Makhzan and its prerogatives are not discussed in the constitution. Moreover, unlike the modern state - with its clearly visible pyramid of government bureaucracies and elected bodies that reach from the local to the national level - the Makhzan operates under the surface, and is run directly from the Palace by King Hassan II and his inner circle.
6. The original report, issued in February 1994, was entitled 'Rapport d'enquête sur les enjeux politiques, économiques et sociaux de la production et du trafic des drogues au Maroc.' Some of the material included in this report made its way into Etat des drogues, drogues des Etats (Paris: La Découverte, 1994). One should also consult (also by the Geopolitical Observatory of Drugs) Géopolitique des drogues (Paris: La Découverte 1995).
7. See for instance Marie-Amélie Lombard, 'Drogue: la piste marocaine', Le Figaro (Paris: 27 May 1994).
8. Marlise Simons, 'King's Ire Brings Hashish Down from its High', The New York Times, 16 August 1996, p.A.10.
9. Morocco's economic dependence on Europe actually increased very significantly between the early 1980s and the mid-1990s. Between 1981 and 1994, the percentage of Morocco's exports bound for the European Union increased from 48 per cent to 64 per cent. Meanwhile, the share of the European Union in Morocco's imports increased from 41 per cent to 54 per cent.
10. After the Moroccan authorities made conciliatory gestures, the aid package was subsequently approved by the European Parliament by a three-quarter majority in October 1992.
11. His exact words in French were: 'Nous ne pouvons pas jouer dans la cour des grands tant que nous faisons les petits'. See Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb, 3 May 1996, p.2.
12. See Driss Basri's interview in La Vie Economique, 19 January 1996, p.3.
13. See 'Les 'ordres du jour' de la lutte anti-contrebande,' La Vie Economique, 19 January 1996, p.4.
14. See Béatrice Hibou, 'Les enjeux de l'ouverture au Maroc: Dissidence économique et contrôle politique', Etudes du CERI, No.15 (Paris: Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, Centre d'études et de recherches internationales April 1996).
15. See Simons, 'King's Ire Brings Hashish Down from its High', The New York Times, op. cit.
16. Hibou (note 14), p.33.
17. See for instance Assou Massou, 'Nettoyage d'hiver', Jeune Afrique, No.1834 (28 February -5 March 1996), pp. 44-5;
18. Hibou, Jeune Afrique, op. cit., p.29.
19. Rémy Leveau, Le Sabre et le Turban (Paris: Editions François Bourin 1993) p.72.
20. See for example Daniel J. Schroeter, Merchants of Essaouira: Urban Society and Imperialism in Southwestern Morocco, 1844-1866 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988).
21. 'Nul n'est plus au-dessus des lois', Maroc Hebdo International, No.229 (8-14 June 1996) p.15.
22. See for instance the 5 May 1995 issue of Maroc Hebdo International.
23. See for instance the power struggles between Mohamed El-Yazghi and Abderrahmane Youssefi in the USFP; between Ali Yata and Thami Khyari in the PPS; between Mohamed Bensaid and Tali in the OADP; and between Mahjoubi Aherdan and Mahmoud Archane in the MNP. In June 1996, this latter rivalry even resulted in Archane's decision to break away from the MNP and create a new party, the Mouvement National Démocratique et Social.
24. On this phenomenon, consult John Waterbury, The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite - A Study in Segmented Politics (New York: Columbia University Press 1970).
25. See Amalou's interview in Maroc Hebdo International No.228, 1-7 June 1996. Amalou's statements became a major source of controversy within the cabinet. Minister of Finance Mohamed Kabbaj strongly objected to them, on the ground that they represented an interference in an area (the budget and public finances) that was clearly part of his prerogatives, not among those of the Minister of Justice.
26. See for instance Abdellatif Mansour, 'Le juriste, l'argentier et le patron', Maroc Hebdo International (1-7 June 1996) pp.10-11.
27. See Allai El Maleh, 'La contrebande représente 18 per cent du PIB industriel', La Vie Economique (19 January 1996) p. 5; Hibou (note 14) p.26.
28. Significantly, the imports benefiting from that system rose from 9 per cent of total imports in 1983 (at the onset of the structural adjustment program) to close to 25 per cent in 1991. Their volume increased again by 50 per cent between 1991 and 1995. See 'L'admission temporaire est devenue le principal canal de la grande contrebande', La Vie Economique (16 February 1996) p.5.
29. See Hibou (note 14) pp. 34-6.
30. See Jamal Berraoui, 'La paix sociale financée par l'assainissement', La Vie Economique (9 August 1996) p.5.
31. Ziane resigned on the ground that the way in which the campaign was being conducted was compromising the independence of the judiciary, violating several provisions of the constitution, and resulting in human rights abuses.
32. See Mokhtar Ghailani, 'Le barreau s'inquiète de la situation de la justice: Trop, c'est trop, disent les avocats', Libération (10-11 February, 1996).
33. Customs officials would often fail to release imported food items until laboratory analyses of them - for which importers were all of a sudden asked to pay - had confirmed that these products were safe to consume. As a result, many loads of imported food went bad as they were under the custody of the customs.
34. For details, see Laurent and Denoeux, 'Campagne d'assainissement au Maroc' (note 1).
35. See Alami's interview in Maroc Hebdo International No.219 (30 March-5 April 1996) pp.12-15.
36. See for instance Noureddine Jouhari, 'Tirs Croisés', Maroc Hebdo International No.220 (6-12 April 1996) p.14.
37. For details see Laurent and Denoeux, 'Campagne d'assainissement au Maroc' (note 1).
38. See for instance Khalid Jamaï, 'Makhzan et Etat de droit: une rupture incontournable', La Vie Economique (24 May 1996) p.10.
39. This was true, but was due to the repeated refusals of the wilaya to provide authorisation, despite numerous requests by the founders of TM. As a result, the meeting was held in a private setting, which is allowed by the Codes des Libertés Publiques (adopted in 1958 and amended in 1973), which regulates the creation and operation of associations.
40. See Ahmed R. Benchemsi, 'Lutte anti-corruption: un monopole d'Etat', La Vie Economique (18 February 1996) p.10.
41. The Moroccan authorities can deny legal status to an NGO merely by sitting on its application. Moreover, the government can suspend or dissolve an association simply by issuing a decree to that effect. It also can enhance the prospects of an association by declaring it to be an 'association of public utility'. The granting of the 'public utility' status confers tremendous advantages (fiscal exemptions, the right to receive private contributions and raise funds, the right to own property, and easy access to public officials and international organisations).
42. For details, see Laurent and Denoeux, 'Campagne d'assainissement au Maroc' (note 1).
43. See Khalil Hachimi Idrissi, 'L'Espagne nous refile son SIDA', Maroc Hebdo International (2-8 February 1996) p.7.
44. See for example Ghailani, 'Le barreau s'inquiète de la situation de la justice' (note 30).
45. See Dale F. Eickelman, 'Re-Imagining Religion and Politics: Moroccan Elections in the 1990s', in John Ruedy (ed.), Islamism and Secularism in North Africa (New York: St. Martin's Press 1994) pp.253-73.
46. See Hibou (note 14).
47. John Waterbury, The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite - A Study in Segmented Politics (New York: Columbia University Press 1970) p.155.