Incentives for cooperation in quality improvement among hospitals - The impact of the reimbursement system

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 17, Issue 6, 1998, Pages 701-728

  Kesteloot, K ^a   Voet, N ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Prospective reimbursement; Quality of care; Retrospective

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; COST CONTROL; HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY; HEALTH CARE QUALITY; HOSPITAL CARE; HOSPITAL FINANCE; INTERHOSPITAL COOPERATION; PROFIT; PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT; REIMBURSEMENT; REVIEW;

EID: 0031737455     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-6296(98)00026-5     Document Type: Article

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