Suharto's Armed Forces - Building a Power Base in New Order Indonesia, 1966-1998

Asian Survey

Volumn 38, Issue 6, 1998, Pages 535-552

  Said, Salim ^a  

^a Banking Reform and Reconstr Corp   (Indonesia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

MILITARY GOVERNMENT; POLITICAL POWER; POWER RELATIONS;

INDONESIA;

EID: 0031736683     PISSN: 00044687     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2645838     Document Type: Review

References (61)

1. This article was completed in March 1998, before Suharto's resignation as president of the Republic of Indonesia on May 21, 1998. I have decided to leave the text largely intact to indicate the state of affairs in Indonesian politics, as I observed them, in the period immediately before Suharto's resignation. While this is not the place to develop an argument about the causes and consequences of Suharto's departure, it remains my view that the president was in control of the armed forces up to his final days in office.
2. On the role of Ali Murtopo, the president says in his memoir: "Some people thought that Ali Murtopo was the man who decided everything. Why? Perhaps because he was a good speaker, courageous, and as my special assistant, he was supposedly close to me and they thought that everything depended on him. . . . That just wasn't true." Soeharto, My Thoughts, Words and Deeds (Jakarta: PT., Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1992), p. 378. See also Heru Cahyono, Pangkopkamtib Jenderal Soemitro dan Peristiwa 15 Januari '74 (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1998).
3. On the role of Ali Murtopo, the president says in his memoir: "Some people thought that Ali Murtopo was the man who decided everything. Why? Perhaps because he was a good speaker, courageous, and as my special assistant, he was supposedly close to me and they thought that everything depended on him. . . . That just wasn't true." Soeharto, My Thoughts, Words and Deeds (Jakarta: PT., Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1992), p. 378. See also Heru Cahyono, Pangkopkamtib Jenderal Soemitro dan Peristiwa 15 Januari '74 (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1998).
4. Confidential interviews, Jakarta, 1994-95.
5. David Jenkins, "The Distinguished Dissident," Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), August 22, 1980, p. 22.
6. L. B. Murdani interview, Jakarta, November 13, 1984.
7. "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite," Indonesia 36 (October 1983), p. 111. On the dominance of intelligence over the operational branch, see David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1984), pp. 24-25; and Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo's interview in Editor, July 10, 1993, p. 76.
8. "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite," Indonesia 36 (October 1983), p. 111. On the dominance of intelligence over the operational branch, see David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1984), pp. 24-25; and Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo's interview in Editor, July 10, 1993, p. 76.
9. "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite," Indonesia 36 (October 1983), p. 111. On the dominance of intelligence over the operational branch, see David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1984), pp. 24-25; and Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo's interview in Editor, July 10, 1993, p. 76.
10. Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: Order, Development, and Pressure for Change (New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 80.
11. Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting (St. Leonard, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1996), p. 288.
12. Ibid., p. 285. From a retired general who was close to Murdani, the author learned that it was President Suharto who first asked Murdani to protect his children. Apparently, Murdani was not successful in fulfilling Suharto's request. Murdani reported back to the president and asked him to protect his own children. Suharto felt offended, and Murdani started telling the people around him that the greed of the first family was uncontrollable. Apparently, Suharto received a report about Murdani's behavior and became even angrier with him. Confidential interview, Jakarta, August 15, 1997.
13. Ibid., p. 285. From a retired general who was close to Murdani, the author learned that it was President Suharto who first asked Murdani to protect his children. Apparently, Murdani was not successful in fulfilling Suharto's request. Murdani reported back to the president and asked him to protect his own children. Suharto felt offended, and Murdani started telling the people around him that the greed of the first family was uncontrollable. Apparently, Suharto received a report about Murdani's behavior and became even angrier with him. Confidential interview, Jakarta, August 15, 1997.
14. Murdani interview, Jakarta, February 18, 1997. On ABRI's support for the Indonesian Democracy Party, see Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics, pp. 77-78.
15. On the Ibrahim Saleh incident, see Tempo, March 10, 1988, p. 24. On Murdani as the military's most likely candidate for vice-president at that time, see Adian Husaini, Soeharto 1988 (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996), p. 30. ABRI's floor leader during the 1988 Assembly session, Lt. General Harsudiono Hartas, denies any knowledge, let alone involvement in the incident: "I did not know anything about the role and the interruption of Ibrahim Saleh," Hartas interview in Jakarta, January 14, 1997. According to a confidential source, Ibrahim Saleh took direction not only from Lieutenant General Hartas but also from a certain officer known to be very close to General Murdani, at that time still Kopkamtib commander, though not armed forces commander anymore. Murdani, however, strongly denies any involvement in Saleh's activities. Murdani explained to the author that as commander of Kopkamtib he had already signed the required security clearance for Sudharmono to become vice-president before Saleh's interruption. Murdani interview, Jakarta, May 12, 1997. In an interview with the author, Jakarta, January 1997. Ibrahim Saleh disputed the statement of Harsudiono Hartas. Saleh insisted that he reported all his activities in the Assembly to Hartas and indirectly - through a contact person - to Murdani. Saleh was also very confident that Sudharmono had been associated with the communist party before 1965, and stated that that was the reason he was opposed to the election of Sudharmono as vice-president.
16. On the Ibrahim Saleh incident, see Tempo, March 10, 1988, p. 24. On Murdani as the military's most likely candidate for vice-president at that time, see Adian Husaini, Soeharto 1988 (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996), p. 30. ABRI's floor leader during the 1988 Assembly session, Lt. General Harsudiono Hartas, denies any knowledge, let alone involvement in the incident: "I did not know anything about the role and the interruption of Ibrahim Saleh," Hartas interview in Jakarta, January 14, 1997. According to a confidential source, Ibrahim Saleh took direction not only from Lieutenant General Hartas but also from a certain officer known to be very close to General Murdani, at that time still Kopkamtib commander, though not armed forces commander anymore. Murdani, however, strongly denies any involvement in Saleh's activities. Murdani explained to the author that as commander of Kopkamtib he had already signed the required security clearance for Sudharmono to become vice-president before Saleh's interruption. Murdani interview, Jakarta, May 12, 1997. In an interview with the author, Jakarta, January 1997. Ibrahim Saleh disputed the statement of Harsudiono Hartas. Saleh insisted that he reported all his activities in the Assembly to Hartas and indirectly - through a contact person - to Murdani. Saleh was also very confident that Sudharmono had been associated with the communist party before 1965, and stated that that was the reason he was opposed to the election of Sudharmono as vice-president.
17. President Suharto was very upset with Naro and devoted three pages in his memoir to the Naro incident. (In contrast, the president does not discuss the Ibrahim Saleh incident.) See Soeharto, My Thoughts, pp. 469-72. See also H. Hartono Mardjono, SH, Politik Indonesia (1996-2003) (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996), pp. 39-46. Murdani denied any involvement in Naro's effort to become vice-president. "Cilangkap [the location of armed forces headquarters] never supported Naro or anybody else [outside ABRI] as a candidate for vice-president. At that time we were of the opinion that our best officers should be nominated. And I myself supported Try Sutrisno [then ABRI commander]." Murdani interview, Jakarta, May 12, 1997.
18. President Suharto was very upset with Naro and devoted three pages in his memoir to the Naro incident. (In contrast, the president does not discuss the Ibrahim Saleh incident.) See Soeharto, My Thoughts, pp. 469-72. See also H. Hartono Mardjono, SH, Politik Indonesia (1996-2003) (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996), pp. 39-46. Murdani denied any involvement in Naro's effort to become vice-president. "Cilangkap [the location of armed forces headquarters] never supported Naro or anybody else [outside ABRI] as a candidate for vice-president. At that time we were of the opinion that our best officers should be nominated. And I myself supported Try Sutrisno [then ABRI commander]." Murdani interview, Jakarta, May 12, 1997.
19. President Suharto was very upset with Naro and devoted three pages in his memoir to the Naro incident. (In contrast, the president does not discuss the Ibrahim Saleh incident.) See Soeharto, My Thoughts, pp. 469-72. See also H. Hartono Mardjono, SH, Politik Indonesia (1996-2003) (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996), pp. 39-46. Murdani denied any involvement in Naro's effort to become vice-president. "Cilangkap [the location of armed forces headquarters] never supported Naro or anybody else [outside ABRI] as a candidate for vice-president. At that time we were of the opinion that our best officers should be nominated. And I myself supported Try Sutrisno [then ABRI commander]." Murdani interview, Jakarta, May 12, 1997.
20. Lieutenant General Harsudiono Hartas interview, Jakarta, January 14, 1997.
21. According to Schwarz, Suharto "had his doubts about Sutrisno, both because of the officer's political inexperience and because he is close to Murdani, whom he succeeded as ABRI Commander." On Sutrisno himself: "An amiable man with good Islamic credentials, he is seemingly bereft of a political vision and his public utterances are often cliche-filled and at times downright silly. In his favor, however, is that he is not Habibie, he is not Sudharmono, he is a military man, and he provides ABRI with some insurance should Suharto die or become incapacitated before 1998." Schwarz, A Nation, p. 286. President Suharto never trusted Sutrisno to represent him abroad. When for instance Suharto had to rest following a long journey abroad at the end of 1997, he was represented at the Teheran Islamic conference and at the Kuala Lumpur ASEAN summit conference by Foreign Minister Ali Alatas. Jakarta observers saw this as a clear sign of Suharto's disdain toward his vice-president. See further Jakarta Post, December 13, 1997.
22. According to Schwarz, Suharto "had his doubts about Sutrisno, both because of the officer's political inexperience and because he is close to Murdani, whom he succeeded as ABRI Commander." On Sutrisno himself: "An amiable man with good Islamic credentials, he is seemingly bereft of a political vision and his public utterances are often cliche-filled and at times downright silly. In his favor, however, is that he is not Habibie, he is not Sudharmono, he is a military man, and he provides ABRI with some insurance should Suharto die or become incapacitated before 1998." Schwarz, A Nation, p. 286. President Suharto never trusted Sutrisno to represent him abroad. When for instance Suharto had to rest following a long journey abroad at the end of 1997, he was represented at the Teheran Islamic conference and at the Kuala Lumpur ASEAN summit conference by Foreign Minister Ali Alatas. Jakarta observers saw this as a clear sign of Suharto's disdain toward his vice-president. See further Jakarta Post, December 13, 1997.
23. From an interview with a retired general once close to Murdani, this author learned that it was Admiral Sudomo who persuaded President Suharto to give Murdani a chair in the cabinet. Confidential interview, Jakarta, August 15, 1997.
24. Murdani interview, Jakarta, November 17, 1994.
25. Confidential interview, Jakarta, February 26, 1994.
26. Asiaweek (Jakarta), February 20, 1998, p. 25.
27. Republika (Jakarta), January 3, 1997. According to Robert Lowry, former assistant defence attache in the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, "In practice, most of the more devout Muslims, termed santri, are screened out at the point of recruiting." Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, p. 199. According to R. William Liddle, when Murdani was armed forces commander, he "surrounded himself with officers from abangan [syncretic Muslim], Christian, and religious minority backgrounds. Under his leadership, many santri [pious Muslims] inside the army came to believe that they were unlikely to rise to top positions." R. William Liddle, "The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation," Journal of Asian Studies 55:3 (August 1996), p. 629.
28. Republika (Jakarta), January 3, 1997. According to Robert Lowry, former assistant defence attache in the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, "In practice, most of the more devout Muslims, termed santri, are screened out at the point of recruiting." Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, p. 199. According to R. William Liddle, when Murdani was armed forces commander, he "surrounded himself with officers from abangan [syncretic Muslim], Christian, and religious minority backgrounds. Under his leadership, many santri [pious Muslims] inside the army came to believe that they were unlikely to rise to top positions." R. William Liddle, "The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation," Journal of Asian Studies 55:3 (August 1996), p. 629.
29. Republika (Jakarta), January 3, 1997. According to Robert Lowry, former assistant defence attache in the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, "In practice, most of the more devout Muslims, termed santri, are screened out at the point of recruiting." Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, p. 199. According to R. William Liddle, when Murdani was armed forces commander, he "surrounded himself with officers from abangan [syncretic Muslim], Christian, and religious minority backgrounds. Under his leadership, many santri [pious Muslims] inside the army came to believe that they were unlikely to rise to top positions." R. William Liddle, "The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation," Journal of Asian Studies 55:3 (August 1996), p. 629.
30. "Officers who are close to me can not get promotions, are transferred to less important positions, or do not get positions previously promised to them. So intense is the campaign that now I play golf on far-away courses so that no one will be seen with me, otherwise they will also be the victims of the purge." Murdani interview, Jakarta, May 12, 1997.
31. It is not clear to me who really was responsible for keeping Feisal Tanjung in the staff and command school beyond a normal tour of duty of two to three years, before being returned to Jakarta in 1992 to occupy the position of chief of the general staff of the armed forces prior to his appointment as armed forces commander in 1993. General Tanjung himself does not understand why he had to stay so long in Bandung and why he stayed in the rank of major general for seven years before being promoted to lieutenant general when he assumed the position of chief of the general staff of the armed forces. General Feisal Tanjung interview, August 6, 1997.
32. From confidential sources, I learned that Hartono was "exiled" to Bandung in 1993 by General Try Sutrisno, then armed forces commander, because Hartono did not implement Sutrisno's order to prevent the establishment of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals in Malang, East Java, in 1990. Confidential interviews, Jakarta, 1995 and 1996. General Hartono told the author that he had no choice but to support the establishment of the Association because "I was afraid President Suharto would fire me if I refused to carry out his order." General R. Hartono interview, Jakarta, January 28, 1996.
33. See the cover story of Editor, January 27, 1994. On the armed forces' denial that there is such a thing as ABRI "merah putih" and ABRI "hijau," see the statement of armed forces' spokesman Syarwan Hamid in Kompas (Jakarta), June 1, 1994, and Republika, October 27, 1994. For an argument that "merah putih versus hijau" is still an issue in 1998, see Asiaweek, February 20, 1998, p. 25.
34. See the cover story of Editor, January 27, 1994. On the armed forces' denial that there is such a thing as ABRI "merah putih" and ABRI "hijau," see the statement of armed forces' spokesman Syarwan Hamid in Kompas (Jakarta), June 1, 1994, and Republika, October 27, 1994. For an argument that "merah putih versus hijau" is still an issue in 1998, see Asiaweek, February 20, 1998, p. 25.
35. See the cover story of Editor, January 27, 1994. On the armed forces' denial that there is such a thing as ABRI "merah putih" and ABRI "hijau," see the statement of armed forces' spokesman Syarwan Hamid in Kompas (Jakarta), June 1, 1994, and Republika, October 27, 1994. For an argument that "merah putih versus hijau" is still an issue in 1998, see Asiaweek, February 20, 1998, p. 25.
36. See the cover story of Editor, January 27, 1994. On the armed forces' denial that there is such a thing as ABRI "merah putih" and ABRI "hijau," see the statement of armed forces' spokesman Syarwan Hamid in Kompas (Jakarta), June 1, 1994, and Republika, October 27, 1994. For an argument that "merah putih versus hijau" is still an issue in 1998, see Asiaweek, February 20, 1998, p. 25.
37. From a confidential source, Jakarta, 1997, the author learned that when General Hartono reported his promotion to army chief of staff to Defense Minister Edi Sudradjat, Sudradjat strongly warned Hartono that he should know that he is a general of the Indonesian army and not of the Indonesian Islamic Army, which had rebelled against the republic in the early 1950s.
38. Schwarz, A Nation, pp. 273-74. The most vocal officers from this group were police Brigadier General Rukmini and army Major General Sjamsuddin.
39. FEER, November 25, 1993, p. 5.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., April 22, 1993, p. 15.
42. Ibid., May 18, 1955, p. 52.
43. On the academics' statement in Parliament which led to the presidential decision to decrease the number of ABRI seats, see Tempo, July 18, 1992, p. 16. On the reaction of Armed Forces Commander General Try Sutrisno to the academics, see Kompas, July 24, 1992.
44. On the academics' statement in Parliament which led to the presidential decision to decrease the number of ABRI seats, see Tempo, July 18, 1992, p. 16. On the reaction of Armed Forces Commander General Try Sutrisno to the academics, see Kompas, July 24, 1992.
45. Merdeka (Freedom), August 1992. See also the editorial of the official armed forces newspaper, Angkatan Bersenjata (Armed forces), August 11, 1992.
46. Merdeka (Freedom), August 1992. See also the editorial of the official armed forces newspaper, Angkatan Bersenjata (Armed forces), August 11, 1992.
47. J. A. C. Mackie and Andrew MacIntyre, "Politics," in Indonesia's New Order, ed. Hal Hill (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1994), p. 25.
48. R. William Liddle, "Soeharto's Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions," Pacific Affairs 58:1 (Spring 1985), p. 85.
49. Ulf Sundhaussen, "The Military: Structure, Procedures, and Effects on Indonesian Society," in Political Power and Communications in Indonesia, ed. Karl Jackson and Lucian Pye (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) p. 75.
50. Bahtiar Effendy, "Islam and the State: The Transformation of Islamic Political Ideas and Practices in Indonesia" (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1994), pp. 351-52.
51. Murdani interview, Jakarta, November 14, 1995.
52. FEER, May 18, 1995, pp. 48-49.
53. From a confidential source, I learned that President Suharto kept a complete list of military academy graduates, which he consulted each time he needed to make a tour of duty reassignment in the military. This shows how much he was in control of military appointments and promotions. Confidential interview, Jakarta, December 15, 1996.
54. On Suharto's intent to transfer General Wiranto "to the relatively toothless post of defence minister," see Time, February 23, 1998.
55. On Prabowo versus Wiranto, see John McBeth, "Chain of Command," FEER, December 25, 1997/January 1, 1998, p. 20. "Unlike his predecessors, Wiranto has the authority to 'put Prabowo back in his box,' as one source put it. Prabowo is the son of Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, a former presidential adviser who has become increasingly critical of the way the Indonesian government is managing the economy." Asiaweek saw the estrangement as based on coalitional rather than personal considerations. Quoting an intelligence source in Jakarta, Asiaweek described Prabowo as "part of a faction that includes Wiranto's predecessor, General Feisal Tanjung, and Vice-President B. J. Habibie. Other likely allies include Jakarta commander Sjafri Sjamsuddin and former comrades at Kopassus [Special Forces Command]. Prabowo has also been meeting with Muslim leader Amien Rais." This suggested to Asiaweek that Prabowo is a part of the "green" or Islamic group in ABRI. Does this mean that Wiranto belongs to the "red and white" group? Asiaweek does not go that far, but many observers in Jakarta drew this conclusion. Asiaweek, March 20, 1998, p. 21.
56. On Prabowo versus Wiranto, see John McBeth, "Chain of Command," FEER, December 25, 1997/January 1, 1998, p. 20. "Unlike his predecessors, Wiranto has the authority to 'put Prabowo back in his box,' as one source put it. Prabowo is the son of Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, a former presidential adviser who has become increasingly critical of the way the Indonesian government is managing the economy." Asiaweek saw the estrangement as based on coalitional rather than personal considerations. Quoting an intelligence source in Jakarta, Asiaweek described Prabowo as "part of a faction that includes Wiranto's predecessor, General Feisal Tanjung, and Vice-President B. J. Habibie. Other likely allies include Jakarta commander Sjafri Sjamsuddin and former comrades at Kopassus [Special Forces Command]. Prabowo has also been meeting with Muslim leader Amien Rais." This suggested to Asiaweek that Prabowo is a part of the "green" or Islamic group in ABRI. Does this mean that Wiranto belongs to the "red and white" group? Asiaweek does not go that far, but many observers in Jakarta drew this conclusion. Asiaweek, March 20, 1998, p. 21.
57. Confidential interviews with high ranking military officers, Jakarta, March 1998.
58. Harold Crouch, "Indonesia: The Rise and Fall of Suharto's Generals," Third World Quarterly 10:1 (January 1988), p. 160.
59. Harold W. Maynard, "The Role of the Indonesian Armed Forces," in The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies, ed. Edward A. Olsen and Stephen Jurika, Jr. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), p. 212.
60. See Salim Said, "Aktualisasi Nilai Kejuangan Bangsa Melalui Kepemimpinan untuk Mewujudkan Bangsa Indonesia yang Maju dan Mandiri" [Actualization of the value of the nation's struggle through leadership to realize an advanced and autonomous Indonesian nation.] Paper delivered at the Armed Forces Staff and Command School, Bandung, September 8, 1995, pp. 17-19. See also E. Aspinall, "Students and the Military: Regime Friction and Civilian Dissent in the Late Suharto Period," Indonesia 59 (April 1995), pp. 21-44.
61. See Salim Said, "Aktualisasi Nilai Kejuangan Bangsa Melalui Kepemimpinan untuk Mewujudkan Bangsa Indonesia yang Maju dan Mandiri" [Actualization of the value of the nation's struggle through leadership to realize an advanced and autonomous Indonesian nation.] Paper delivered at the Armed Forces Staff and Command School, Bandung, September 8, 1995, pp. 17-19. See also E. Aspinall, "Students and the Military: Regime Friction and Civilian Dissent in the Late Suharto Period," Indonesia 59 (April 1995), pp. 21-44.