ASEAN and the management of regional security

Pacific Affairs

Volumn 71, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 195-214

  Narine, Shaun ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

REGIONAL POLITICS; REGIONAL SECURITY;

(SOUTHEAST); ASIA;

EID: 0031726874     PISSN: 0030851X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2760976     Document Type: Article

References (45)

1. The founding members of ASEAN are: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore. Brunei joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, and Burma and Laos in 1997.
2. Tim Huxley, "ASEAN Security Cooperation - Past, Present and Future," in Alison Broinowski, ed., ASEAN into the 1990s (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 85-95.
3. The ASEAN Declaration, Bangkok, August 8, 1967. Preamble.
4. Heiner Hanggi, ASEAN and the ZOPFAN Concept (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), p. 12; Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 52-56.
5. Heiner Hanggi, ASEAN and the ZOPFAN Concept (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), p. 12; Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 52-56.
6. In May 1969, Malaysia had to contend with racial riots between ethnic Malays and Chinese. Domestic reconciliation was a pressing political need. By reaching out to Communist China, the Malaysian government hoped to alleviate tensions with its own Chinese minority and undermine the ethnic Chinese-dominated Malayan Communist Party (MCP) at the same time. Malaysia believed that neutralization would help to create a peaceful environment that would allow it to focus on its own economic development and avoid having to take on an onerous defence burden. See Hanggi, ASEAN, pp. 13-14.
7. Muthiah Alagappa, "Regional Arrangements and International Security in Southeast Asia: Going Beyond ZOPFAN," Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 12, no. 4 (March 1991), pp. 272-75; Leifer, ASEAN, pp. 52-60; Hanggi, ASEAN, pp. 12-20.
8. Muthiah Alagappa, "Regional Arrangements and International Security in Southeast Asia: Going Beyond ZOPFAN," Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 12, no. 4 (March 1991), pp. 272-75; Leifer, ASEAN, pp. 52-60; Hanggi, ASEAN, pp. 12-20.
9. Muthiah Alagappa, "Regional Arrangements and International Security in Southeast Asia: Going Beyond ZOPFAN," Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 12, no. 4 (March 1991), pp. 272-75; Leifer, ASEAN, pp. 52-60; Hanggi, ASEAN, pp. 12-20.
10. Leifer, ASEAN, p. 58.
11. Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration, Kuala Lumpur, 27 November, 1971.
12. Leifer, ASEAN, p. 59.
13. Alagappa, "Regional Arrangements," p. 274.
14. Chapter I, Article 1, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.
15. Frank Frost, "Introduction: ASEAN since 1967 - Origins, Evolution and Recent Developments," in Broinowski, ed., ASEAN into the 1990s, p. 9.
16. Chapter I, Article 2) a, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.
17. In 1967, intra-ASEAN trade was 20.9 percent of ASEAN total exports; in 1994, the figure was 20.8 percent. This represented a slight upturn in intra-ASEAN trade after a slight decline for several years. See John Ravenhill, "Economic Cooperation in Southeast Asia: Changing Incentives," Asian Survey, vol. 35, no. 9 (September, 1995), pp. 850-66. The figures cited above are on p. 350.
18. Kusuma Snitwongse, "ASEAN's Security Cooperation: Searching for a Regional Order," The Pacific Review, vol. 8, no. 3 (1995), p. 520.
19. Michael Antolik, ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1990), pp. 8-10, 156-57; Arnfinn Jorgenson-Dahl, Regional Organisation and Order in Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 165-69.
20. Michael Antolik, ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1990), pp. 8- 10, 156-57; Arnfinn Jorgenson-Dahl, Regional Organisation and Order in Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 165-69.
21. Amitav Acharya, "A Regional Security Community in Southeast Asia?" Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 18, no. 3 (September 1995), p. 180.
22. Amitav Acharya, A New Regional Order in South-East Asia: ASEAN in the Post-Cold War Era, Adelphi Paper No. 279 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993); Amitav Acharya, An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia? Prospects for Control (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994); Panitan Wattanayagorn and Desmond Ball, "A Regional Arms Race?" Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 18, no. 3 (September 1995), pp. 145-74.
23. Amitav Acharya, A New Regional Order in South-East Asia: ASEAN in the Post-Cold War Era, Adelphi Paper No. 279 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993); Amitav Acharya, An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia? Prospects for Control (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994); Panitan Wattanayagorn and Desmond Ball, "A Regional Arms Race?" Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 18, no. 3 (September 1995), pp. 145-74.
24. Amitav Acharya, A New Regional Order in South-East Asia: ASEAN in the Post-Cold War Era, Adelphi Paper No. 279 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993); Amitav Acharya, An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia? Prospects for Control (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994); Panitan Wattanayagorn and Desmond Ball, "A Regional Arms Race?" Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 18, no. 3 (September 1995), pp. 145-74.
25. Shaun Narine, "ASEAN and the ARF: The Limits of the 'ASEAN Way,'" Asian Survey, vol. 37, no. 10 (October 1997), pp. 961-78.
26. In 1995 Malaysia and Singapore agreed to send their dispute over the island of Pedra Branca to the International Court of Justice for resolution. In 1996, Malaysia and Indonesia also agreed to refer their dispute over the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan to the ICJ. After more than thirty years, Malaysia and the Philippines seem to have put aside their differences over Sabah. These may be signs that the ASEAN states are moving toward more accommodative postures regarding their territorial disputes. However, the Sabah conflict is still unresolved, and it may be significant that the Pedra Branca and Sipadan/Ligitan disputes could not be settled within ASEAN.
27. Muthiah Alagappa, "Regionalism and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict," Journal of International Affairs, vol. 46, no. 2 (Winter 1993), pp. 439-67; William S. Turley, "'More Friends, Fewer Enemies': Vietnam's Policy toward Indochina-ASEAN Reconciliation," in Sheldon W. Simon, ed., East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 167-93; Carlyle A. Thayer, "ASEAN and Indochina: The Dialogue," in Broinowski, ed., ASEAN Into the 1990s, pp. 138-61.
28. Muthiah Alagappa, "Regionalism and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict," Journal of International Affairs, vol. 46, no. 2 (Winter 1993), pp. 439-67; William S. Turley, "'More Friends, Fewer Enemies': Vietnam's Policy toward Indochina-ASEAN Reconciliation," in Sheldon W. Simon, ed., East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 167-93; Carlyle A. Thayer, "ASEAN and Indochina: The Dialogue," in Broinowski, ed., ASEAN Into the 1990s, pp. 138-61.
29. Muthiah Alagappa, "Regionalism and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict," Journal of International Affairs, vol. 46, no. 2 (Winter 1993), pp. 439-67; William S. Turley, "'More Friends, Fewer Enemies': Vietnam's Policy toward Indochina-ASEAN Reconciliation," in Sheldon W. Simon, ed., East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 167-93; Carlyle A. Thayer, "ASEAN and Indochina: The Dialogue," in Broinowski, ed., ASEAN Into the 1990s, pp. 138-61.
30. The previous Thai prime minister, General Prem Tinsulanond, visited the Soviet Union in 1987 and 1988 and became convinced that it was genuinely trying to resolve the Cambodian conflict. At this time, General Chaovalit Yongchiyudh, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, made diplomatic overtures to the Soviet Union and Vietnam. Chatichai came to power supporting Chaovalit's initiatives, which were opposed by the Thai foreign ministry. See Grant Evans and Kevin Rowley, Red Brotherhood at War: Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos Since 1975 (London: Verso, 1990), pp. 264-65; Khatharya Um, "Thailand and the Dynamics of Economic and Security Complex in Mainland Southeast Asia," Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 13, no. 3 (December 1991), pp. 245-70.
31. The previous Thai prime minister, General Prem Tinsulanond, visited the Soviet Union in 1987 and 1988 and became convinced that it was genuinely trying to resolve the Cambodian conflict. At this time, General Chaovalit Yongchiyudh, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, made diplomatic overtures to the Soviet Union and Vietnam. Chatichai came to power supporting Chaovalit's initiatives, which were opposed by the Thai foreign ministry. See Grant Evans and Kevin Rowley, Red Brotherhood at War: Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos Since 1975 (London: Verso, 1990), pp. 264-65; Khatharya Um, "Thailand and the Dynamics of Economic and Security Complex in Mainland Southeast Asia," Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 13, no. 3 (December 1991), pp. 245-70.
32. Confidential interview with an academic observer in Thailand, January 25, 1995.
33. Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum. Adelphi Paper No. 302 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996).
34. On December 15, 1995, ASEAN leaders signed the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty. The SEANWFZ idea has long been part of ZOPFAN and may be an indication that the concept is not as moribund as it appears. However, the SEANWFZ has little real substance and remains symbolic. None of the five declared nuclear weapons states have agreed to sign and are unlikely to do so. See "Hang On Tight," Far Eastern Economic Review, December 28, 1995 - January 4, 1996, pp. 14-15; Tariq Rauf, "The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone," Cancaps Bulletin, No. 8 (March 1996), pp. 8-9.
35. On December 15, 1995, ASEAN leaders signed the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty. The SEANWFZ idea has long been part of ZOPFAN and may be an indication that the concept is not as moribund as it appears. However, the SEANWFZ has little real substance and remains symbolic. None of the five declared nuclear weapons states have agreed to sign and are unlikely to do so. See "Hang On Tight," Far Eastern Economic Review, December 28, 1995 - January 4, 1996, pp. 14-15; Tariq Rauf, "The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone," Cancaps Bulletin, No. 8 (March 1996), pp. 8-9.
36. Acharya, A New Regional Order, pp. 54-59.
37. Paul H. Kreisberg, Daniel Y. Chiu and Jerome H. Kahan, Threat Perceptions in Asia and the Role of the Major Powers (Honolulu: Center for Naval Analyses, 1993); Martin L. Lasater, The New Pacific Community: U.S. Strategic Options in Asia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996); Jonathan D. Pollack, "The United States and Asia in 1995," Asian Survey, vol. 36, no. 1 (January 1996), pp. 1-12.
38. Paul H. Kreisberg, Daniel Y. Chiu and Jerome H. Kahan, Threat Perceptions in Asia and the Role of the Major Powers (Honolulu: Center for Naval Analyses, 1993); Martin L. Lasater, The New Pacific Community: U.S. Strategic Options in Asia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996); Jonathan D. Pollack, "The United States and Asia in 1995," Asian Survey, vol. 36, no. 1 (January 1996), pp. 1-12.
39. Paul H. Kreisberg, Daniel Y. Chiu and Jerome H. Kahan, Threat Perceptions in Asia and the Role of the Major Powers (Honolulu: Center for Naval Analyses, 1993); Martin L. Lasater, The New Pacific Community: U.S. Strategic Options in Asia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996); Jonathan D. Pollack, "The United States and Asia in 1995," Asian Survey, vol. 36, no. 1 (January 1996), pp. 1-12.
40. Paul Dibb, Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia, Adelphi Paper No. 295 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995).
41. "Fly in the Ointment," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 12, 1997, p. 15. Ironically, one of the reasons that ASEAN rushed to incorporate Burma was to reduce its dependence on China.
42. This discussion is based upon "Law of the Gun," Far Eastern Economic Review, July 17, 1997, pp. 14-15; "Conflict of Interests," FEER, July 24, 1997, pp. 18-19 ; Jusuf Wanandi, "A Lesson for ASEAN," FEER, July 24, 1997, p. 34; "All for One," FEER, August 7, 1997, p. 26.
43. This discussion is based upon "Law of the Gun," Far Eastern Economic Review, July 17, 1997, pp. 14- 15; "Conflict of Interests," FEER, July 24, 1997, pp. 18-19 ; Jusuf Wanandi, "A Lesson for ASEAN," FEER, July 24, 1997, p. 34; "All for One," FEER, August 7, 1997, p. 26.
44. This discussion is based upon "Law of the Gun," Far Eastern Economic Review, July 17, 1997, pp. 14- 15; "Conflict of Interests," FEER, July 24, 1997, pp. 18-19 ; Jusuf Wanandi, "A Lesson for ASEAN," FEER, July 24, 1997, p. 34; "All for One," FEER, August 7, 1997, p. 26.
45. This discussion is based upon "Law of the Gun," Far Eastern Economic Review, July 17, 1997, pp. 14- 15; "Conflict of Interests," FEER, July 24, 1997, pp. 18-19 ; Jusuf Wanandi, "A Lesson for ASEAN," FEER, July 24, 1997, p. 34; "All for One," FEER, August 7, 1997, p. 26.