Uncertain conditions in the Russian transition: the popular drive towards stability in a 'stateless' environment

Europe - Asia Studies

Volumn 50, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 415-443

  Alexander, James ^a  

^a NORTHEASTERN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC REFORM; NATIONAL IDENTITY; POLITICAL CHANGE;

RUSSIAN FEDERATION;

EID: 0031722775     PISSN: 09668136     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09668139808412546     Document Type: Article

References (68)

1. I would like to thank Paul Bolt, Carol Leff and Jeffrey Roberg for their perceptive comments.
2. Writing in a broadly analogous period of instability during the 'Glorious Revolution' in England during the 17th century, Thomas Hobbes explained that 'every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hopes of obtaining it'. From this 'fundamental law of nature', Hobbes was to construct his version of a stabilising political system. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing, 1994), p. 80.
3. Claus Offe, 'Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe', Social Research, 58, 4, Winter 1991, pp. 865-892.
4. For examples of macro-analysis, see Adam Przeworski, 'Economic Reforms, Public Opinion and Political Institutions: Poland in the East European Perspective', in Luis Carlos Bresser Pereira, Jose Maria Maravall & Adam Przeworski, Economic Reforms in New Democracies (London, Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 132-198. Also, see Joan M. Nelson, 'Linkages Between Politics and Economics', and Anders Aslund, 'The Case for Radical Reform', Journal of Democracy, 5, 4 October 1994, pp. 49-62 and 63-74, respectively.
5. For examples of macro-analysis, see Adam Przeworski, 'Economic Reforms, Public Opinion and Political Institutions: Poland in the East European Perspective', in Luis Carlos Bresser Pereira, Jose Maria Maravall & Adam Przeworski, Economic Reforms in New Democracies (London, Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 132-198. Also, see Joan M. Nelson, 'Linkages Between Politics and Economics', and Anders Aslund, 'The Case for Radical Reform', Journal of Democracy, 5, 4 October 1994, pp. 49-62 and 63-74, respectively.
6. For examples of macro-analysis, see Adam Przeworski, 'Economic Reforms, Public Opinion and Political Institutions: Poland in the East European Perspective', in Luis Carlos Bresser Pereira, Jose Maria Maravall & Adam Przeworski, Economic Reforms in New Democracies (London, Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 132-198. Also, see Joan M. Nelson, 'Linkages Between Politics and Economics', and Anders Aslund, 'The Case for Radical Reform', Journal of Democracy, 5, 4 October 1994, pp. 49-62 and 63-74, respectively.
7. Offe, 'Capitalism by Democratic Design?', p. 873.
8. Carol Leff, 'The Triple Transition in Eastern Europe', Swords and Ploughshares, VII, 2, Winter 1992-1993, pp. 6-10.
9. Max Weber, 'The Fundamental Concepts of Sociology', in Talcott Parsons (ed.), The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York, Free Press, 1964), p. 156.
10. J. P. Nettl, 'The State as a Conceptual Variable', World Politics, 20, 4, July 1968, pp. 559-592. Nettl briefly discusses Soviet state differences, while Tilly conceptualises the state as an autonomous organisation that is differentiated from other organisations in the same territory. See Charles Tilly, 'Reflections on the History of European Statemaking', in Charles Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1975).
11. J. P. Nettl, 'The State as a Conceptual Variable', World Politics, 20, 4, July 1968, pp. 559-592. Nettl briefly discusses Soviet state differences, while Tilly conceptualises the state as an autonomous organisation that is differentiated from other organisations in the same territory. See Charles Tilly, 'Reflections on the History of European Statemaking', in Charles Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1975).
12. Robert C. Tucker, 'Swollen State, Spent Society: Stalin's Legacy to Brezhnev's Russia', Foreign Affairs, 60, 2, Winter 1981-1982, pp. 414-435.
13. James Gibson, 'The Resilience of Mass Support for Democratic Institutions and Processes in the Nascent Russian and Ukrainian Democracies', in Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.), Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 53-111.
14. Theda Skocpol, 'Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research', in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 20-21.
15. It should be noted, however, that this is not an explicit element in comparison of the two cities, although mentioned where necessary.
16. While I have been able to disaggregate the electoral results for Syktyvkar for all these elections, the data I possess for Kirov only allow me to disaggregate Kirov city statistics for the 1995 parliamentary election. For ease of comparison, I employ the regional statistics here.
17. The conclusion for Kirov is drawn from comparing regional data with city data for the party list voting in the 1995 parliamentary election. See Svetlana Isaichenko, 'Nad Vyatskoi - Sokoly Zhirinovskogo', Vyatskii nablyudatel', 22-29 December 1995.
18. 'Kirov Oblast', OMRI Russian Regional Report (http://www.omri.cz/Elections/Russia/ Regions/About/Kirov.html), 1997.
19. For more information on the electoral results for Syktyvkar and Kirov, see James Alexander, Political Culture in Flux: Formlessness and Recreation in the Trauma of the Russian Transition (PhD dissertation, 1996).
20. Barney G. Glaser & Anselm L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory (Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company, 1967).
21. Richard Sakwa, 'Subjectivity in Russian Political Evolution', Slavic Review, 54, 4, Winter 1995, pp. 943-964.
22. Gabriel Almond & Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963).
23. James Alexander, 'Surveying Attitudes in Russia: A Representation of Formlessness', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 30, 2, 1997, pp. 107-127; Robert J. Brym, 'Re-evaluating Mass Support for Political and Economic Change in Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 5, 1996, pp. 751-766.
24. James Alexander, 'Surveying Attitudes in Russia: A Representation of Formlessness', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 30, 2, 1997, pp. 107-127; Robert J. Brym, 'Re-evaluating Mass Support for Political and Economic Change in Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 5, 1996, pp. 751-766.
25. The initial parts of the approach draw from H. Russell Bernard, Research Methods in Cultural Anthropology (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1988).
26. Glaser & Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory, pp. 101-115.
27. Edward W. Walker, 'Post-Sovietology, Area Studies, and the Social Sciences', The Harriman Institute Forum, 6, 6-7, February-March 1993, pp. 24-28.
28. In another work, each of the categories are further divided into two sub-categories. The limitations of the article format preclude their inclusion here.
29. This perspective is in line with broad interpretations of the Russian popular aversion to uncertainty throughout Soviet and Imperial history. See Carol Barner-Barry & Cynthia A. Hody, The Politics of Change: The Transformation of the Soviet Union (New York, St Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 36-52.
30. For further discussion of civil society development in these two regions, see Alexander, Political Culture in Flux.
31. The information in parentheses after quotes and attributions identifies the city in which the interview took place as well as the particular respondent. In this case, the quote is from the sixteenth respondent in Syktyvkar. See Appendix B for more complete information on respondents.
32. Furman argues that communist era propaganda portraying the evils of capitalism underlies aspects of the corruption in the system now that capitalism has arrived in Russia. See Dmitrii Furman, 'Historical Materialism Turned Upside Down?', Russian Social Science Review, 37. 3, May/June 1996, pp. 3-22.
33. Often for personal (or family) use, the flats that businesses acquired were also used to house employees or as a location for the business operation itself.
34. Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 172-189. See also Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
35. Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 172-189. See also Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
36. In fact, Sergei Mavrodi was able to use a special election to the Duma in autumn 1994 to remove himself from potential prosecution for fraudulent investment practices in the MMM pyramid scandal.
37. The national leaders respondents were discussing included Boris El'tsin, Egor Gaidar, Grigorii Yavlinsky, Viktor Chernomyrdin, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Nikolai Travkin, Genadii Zyuganov and Aleksandr Rutskoi (only for Kirov; he was still in prison following the events of October when most of the Syktyvkar interviews took place).
38. Only in summer 1995 did Chernomyrdin gain independent recognition through his role in widely publicised hostage negotiations in the southern Russian city of Budennovsk.
39. The most recognised names were those of Komi's two most powerful politicians, Supreme Soviet Chairman Yurii Spiridonov and Council of Ministers Chairman Vyacheslav Khudyaev. The two main names mentioned in Kirov were Governor Vasilii Desyatnikov and Mayor Anzhelii Mikheev.
40. This was certainly El'tsin's objective in appointing presidential representatives as governors in 1991 to oversee provincial matters.
41. This was more true of Kirov than of Syktyvkar. These contentions are underlined by the thoughts of a respondent in Kirov who argued that local resources were generally controlled by the heads of factories, large enterprises, banks and, clandestinely, the mafia.
42. For further discussion, see Vladimir Mikhalev, 'Social Security in Russia under Economic Transformation', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 1, 1996, pp. 5-25; Larisa B. Kosova, 'Satisfaction with Life and the Intensity of the Reforms', Russian Social Science Review, 37, 1, January-February 1996, pp. 37-42.
43. For further discussion, see Vladimir Mikhalev, 'Social Security in Russia under Economic Transformation', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 1, 1996, pp. 5-25; Larisa B. Kosova, 'Satisfaction with Life and the Intensity of the Reforms', Russian Social Science Review, 37, 1, January-February 1996, pp. 37-42.
44. Alexander, Political Culture in Flux.
45. Because of the differing conditions in each city, early interviews in Kirov suggested further investigation into the topic, while the same was not the case in Syktyvkar. As a result, the structured interview in Kirov included a question that specifically probed for opinions about the speed of reform. In fact, the results of the unstructured interviews in Kirov led to a section in the structured interviews that specifically focused on economic reforms. Although some questions that dealt with economic reform were included in the Syktyvkar interview, such a section was not developed in Syktyvkar. 40 Dissatisfaction was widespread, with respondents almost universally critical of reforms, whether fast or slow.
46. For a similar description see Furman, 'Historical Materialism', p. 12.
47. Environmental issues have become particularly acute in the Komi oil industry, dramatised by a huge oil spill in autumn 1994.
48. This position coincides with the contentions of Lev D. Gudkov, 'Dynamics of Ethnic Stereotypes', Russian Social Science Review, 37, 3, May/June 1996, pp. 54-65.
49. Mikhalev, 'Social Security in Russia'.
50. For analysis of views towards changes in specific social programmes, see Alexander, Political Culture in Flux.
51. Mikhalev, 'Social Security in Russia', p. 13.
52. Harry Eckstein, 'A Culturalist Theory of Political Change', American Political Science Review, 82, 3, October 1988, pp. 789-804.
53. E. M. Rybinskii, 'The Position of Children in Russia', Russian Social Science Review, 37, 2, March/April 1996, pp. 78-95.
54. Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1988).
55. Rybinskii notes a marked rise in dropout rates during recent years. See 'The Position of Children in Russia', p. 85. Furthermore, even as I left Russia in August 1994, Moscow was in the midst of a campaign to decrease the number of kiosks in the city.
56. Eckstein, 'A Culturalist Theory of Political Change'.
57. The retrospective question was added to the Kirov interview for purposes of comparison with contemporary views. Thus there are no comparative data for respondents from Syktyvkar. Given the variety and broadly generic nature of responses in Kirov, I have no reason to believe that responses would have been significantly different in Syktyvkar.
58. This is also noted by Furman, 'Historical Materialism', p. 11.
59. Eckstein, 'A Culturalist Theory', p. 801.
60. One particular 'orienting mark' for consumers in the inflationary economy was to compare the ruble's contemporary buying power with what it had been in the Soviet era of largely unchanging prices. For example, during winter 1993-94 people claimed that 1000 1994-rubles could then buy what one ruble would have bought in Soviet times. Of course, continued inflation requires that people change that evaluation. When I was last made aware of the 'exchange' rate in autumn 1995, it had risen to 5000:1.
61. For elaboration of this issue, see Aleksandr S. Akhiezer, 'The Values of Society and the Possibilities of Reform in Russia', Russian Social Science Review, 37, 1, January-February 1996, pp. 43-59. The collapse of Soviet ideology has led some to call for a new integrative ideology for Russia, including President El'tsin in spring 1996. For an example of this argument, see N. A. Kosolapov, 'An Integrative Ideology for Russia: The Intellectual and Political Challenge', Russian Social Science Review, 37, 1, January-February 1996, pp. 60-95.
62. For elaboration of this issue, see Aleksandr S. Akhiezer, 'The Values of Society and the Possibilities of Reform in Russia', Russian Social Science Review, 37, 1, January-February 1996, pp. 43-59. The collapse of Soviet ideology has led some to call for a new integrative ideology for Russia, including President El'tsin in spring 1996. For an example of this argument, see N. A. Kosolapov, 'An Integrative Ideology for Russia: The Intellectual and Political Challenge', Russian Social Science Review, 37, 1, January-February 1996, pp. 60-95.
63. Foreign proselytising groups that I witnessed included Baptists from the Southern United States, who asked for my help in contacting Syktyvkar's orphanage; fundamentalist Christians from the Eastern United States, who made elaborate presentations in front of large, mesmerised audiences in the union halls of Kirov; street-side Christian evangelists preaching against sin and alcoholism in Vladimir; and the radio broadcasts of the Japanese 'evangelical' organisation Aum.
64. In conversations with a friend who was closely affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church, I came to understand the threat foreign religious orders posed for the indigenous religion. Flush with money, these organisations were powerful competitors for the poverty-stricken Russian religious order. In conjunction with the rising materialist values, these orders offered the unity, if nothing else symbolically, of faith and change that the Russian church could not. While older Russians are likely to look to the tradition in Russian Orthodoxy, the young may be more attracted to the excitement and pageantry of non-indigenous religions.
65. Linz & Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, p. 79.
66. For more discussion on this topic, see Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub & Fernando Limongi, 'What Makes Democracies Endure?', Journal of Democracy, 7, 1, January 1996, pp. 39-55.
67. Of course, such an electoral outcome need not result in the collapse of democratic processes. Instead, it is also possible that existing institutional structures and practices may be sufficient to sustain a democratic regime despite the election of a potentially authoritarian president. For discussion of the roles of institutions in driving political processes, see James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York, Free Press, 1989).
68. Daniel Treisman, 'Why Yeltsin Won', Foreign Affairs, 75, 5, September/October 1996, pp. 65-77.