International pollution problems: Unilateral initiatives by environmental groups in one country

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 46-69

  Zagonari, Fabio ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031713207     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeem.1998.1037     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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