Animal contests as evolutionary games

American Scientist

Volumn 86, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 334-341

  Mesterton Gibbons, Michael ^a   Adams, Eldridge S ^b  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIOURAL ECOLOGY; EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGY; GAME THEORY;

EID: 0031709002     PISSN: 00030996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Trade Journal    
DOI: 10.1511/1998.31.814     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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