Innovative contractual structures for interorganizational systems

International Journal of Technology Management

Volumn 16, Issue 1-3, 1998, Pages 193-206

  Floricel, Serghei ^a,c,d   Lampel, Joseph ^b,e  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS   (United Kingdom)

^c North American Power Plant Projects   (United States)

^d Mgmt of Eng and Construction   (United States)

^e UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Contract; EPC; Large scale engineering projects; Principal agent theory; Turnkey

Indexed keywords

CONTRACTS; DECISION THEORY;

INNOVATIVE CONTRACTUAL STRUCTURES; INTERORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS; LARGE SCALE ENGINEERING PROJECTS; PRINCIPAL AGENT THEORY;

PROJECT MANAGEMENT;

EID: 0031703340     PISSN: 02675730     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1504/ijtm.1998.002648     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. Lampel, J., Miller, R., and Floricel, S. (1996). 'Information asymmetries and technological innovation in large engineering construction projects'. R&D Management, 26: pp.357-69.
2. Baiman, S. (1982). 'Agency research in managerial accounting'. Journal of Accounting Literature, 1: pp.154-213.
3. Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989) 'Agency theory: An assessment and review'. Academy of Management Review, 14: pp.57-74.
4. Holmstrom, B. (1979). 'Moral hazard and observability'. Bell Journal of Economics, 10: pp.74-91.
5. Shavell, S. (1979). 'Risk sharing and incentives in the principal and agent relationship'. The Bell Journal of Economics, 10: pp.55-73.
6. Arrow, K.J. (1985). 'The economics of agency'. In J. W. Pratt and R. J. Zekhauser (Eds.), Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business: pp.37-54. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
7. Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. (1976). 'Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency costs, and ownership structure'. Journal of Financial Economics, 11: pp.5-50.
8. Wolfson, M.A. (1985). 'Empirical evidence of incentive problems and their mitigation in oil and gas shelter programs'. In J.W. Pratt, and R. J. Zekhauser (Eds.), Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business: pp. 101-126. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
9. Laffont, J.-J. and Tirole, J. (1993). A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
10. Chapman, C.B. and Ward, S.C. (1994). 'The efficient allocation of risk in contracts'. Omega, International Journal of Management Science, 22: pp.537-552.
11. Merrow, E.W. (1988). Understanding the Outcomes of Megaprojects. Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand.
12. Roth, K. and O'Donnel, S. (1996). 'Foreign subsidiary compensation strategy: An agency theory perspective'. Academy of Management Journal, 39: pp.678-703.
13. Berg, J.E., Daley L.A., Dickhaut, J.W., and O'Brien, J. (1992). 'Moral hazard and risk sharing experimental evidence'. Research in Experimental Economics, 5: pp. 1-34.
14. Kawasaki, S. and McMillan, J. (1987). 'The design of contracts: Evidence from Japanese subcontracting'. Journal of Japanese and International Economies, 1: pp. 1327-49.
15. Asanuma, B. and Kikutani, T. (1991). 'Risk absorption in Japanese subcontracting: A microeconometric study on the automobile industry'. Journal of Japanese and International Economies.
16. Milgrom, P. and Roberts J. (1992). Economics, Organization and Management. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
17. Beidleman, C.R., Fletcher, D. and Veshosky, D. (1990). On allocating risk: The essence of project finance'. Sloan Management Review, Spring: pp.47-55.
18. Hannan, M.T. and Freeman, J. (1984). 'Structural inertia and organizational change'. American Sociological Review, 49: pp.149-164.