Mobilization, social networks, and turnout: Evidence from Japan

World Politics

Volumn 50, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 447-474

  Cox, Gary W ^a   Rosenbluth, Frances M ^a   Thies, Michael F ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY; NATIONAL POLITICS; POLITICAL MOBILISATION; VOTING BEHAVIOUR;

JAPAN;

EID: 0031693068     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0043887100012879     Document Type: Article

References (76)

1. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Knopf, 1949).
2. For a review of research that finds a closeness-turnout correlation, see John Matsusaka and Filip Palda, "The Downsian Voter Meets the Ecological Fallacy," Public Choice 77 (December 1993).
3. Steven J. Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America (New York: Macmillan, 1993).
4. Ibid.
5. William Riker and Peter Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," American Political Science Review 62 (March 1968). Of course, doubts about the theoretical standing and empirical success of the pivotal voter have been expressed by, for example, Cox and Munger (fn. 6); Matsusaka (fn. 6); and Robert A. Jackson, "The Mobilization of Congressional Electorates," Legislative Studies Quarterly 21 (August 1996).
6. William Riker and Peter Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," American Political Science Review 62 (March 1968). Of course, doubts about the theoretical standing and empirical success of the pivotal voter have been expressed by, for example, Cox and Munger (fn. 6); Matsusaka (fn. 6); and Robert A. Jackson, "The Mobilization of Congressional Electorates," Legislative Studies Quarterly 21 (August 1996).
7. Elites might engage in both mobilization and demobilization (and persuasion). As long as the total turnout boost from mobilization exceeds the total turnout decline from demobilization (and perhaps from persuasion via negative advertising), turnout and closeness will covary positively, ceteris paribus.
8. Rosenstone and Hansen (fn. 3).
9. Ibid., 164-65.
10. Ibid., 171.
11. We use "social density" as a synonym for social capital at the aggregate level. Social capital has two components (at the individual level): social connectedness (being plugged into social networks, having many contacts with whom repeated interactions occur) and interpersonal trust (reflecting low transaction costs within the networks or a "cooperative disposition" fostering a sense of mutual obligation). See Rosenstone and Hansen (in. 3); John Brehm and Wendy M. Rahn, "Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital," American Journal of Political Science (forthcoming). The text below provides one way to formalize these notions.
12. j correlates positively with pjkτkj (the focal candidate is more likely to contact those who produce more secondary bang for the buck), then the lower bound stated in the text holds.
13. We assume that higher values of y are dominated by the secondary mobilization terms rather than by the primary mobilization term. Rosenstone and Hansen (fn. 3) and Robert Huckfeldt and John Sprague argue that secondary mobilization effects dominate even in the U.S., a largely untraditional "mass" society. See Huckfeldt and Sprague, "Political Parties and Electoral Mobilization: Political Structure, Social Structure, and the Party Canvass," American Political Science Review 86 (March 1992).
14. Note that we focus on the simplest case in which the vote yield of k contacts is known with certainty: it is just ky. Allowing for risky returns to contacting does not change anything essential.
15. T/B. A little algebra then yields the formulation in the text.
16. S = 0.
17. Rosenstone and Hansen (fn. 3).
18. Note that the pivotal voter model, which posits direct effects of closeness on voter behavior (unmediated by elite mobilizing efforts), does not predict these results.
19. David Denver and Gordon Hands, "Marginality and Turnout in British General Elections," British Journal of Political Science 4 (January 1974); idem, "Marginality and Turnout in General Elections in the 1970s," British Journal of Political Science 15 (July 1985); Neil Berch, "Another Look at Closeness and Turnout: The Case of the 1979 and 1980 Canadian Elections," Political Research Quarterly 46 (June 1993); Matsusaka and Palda (fn. 2).
20. David Denver and Gordon Hands, "Marginality and Turnout in British General Elections," British Journal of Political Science 4 (January 1974); idem, "Marginality and Turnout in General Elections in the 1970s," British Journal of Political Science 15 (July 1985); Neil Berch, "Another Look at Closeness and Turnout: The Case of the 1979 and 1980 Canadian Elections," Political Research Quarterly 46 (June 1993); Matsusaka and Palda (fn. 2).
21. David Denver and Gordon Hands, "Marginality and Turnout in British General Elections," British Journal of Political Science 4 (January 1974); idem, "Marginality and Turnout in General Elections in the 1970s," British Journal of Political Science 15 (July 1985); Neil Berch, "Another Look at Closeness and Turnout: The Case of the 1979 and 1980 Canadian Elections," Political Research Quarterly 46 (June 1993); Matsusaka and Palda (fn. 2).
22. David Denver and Gordon Hands, "Marginality and Turnout in British General Elections," British Journal of Political Science 4 (January 1974); idem, "Marginality and Turnout in General Elections in the 1970s," British Journal of Political Science 15 (July 1985); Neil Berch, "Another Look at Closeness and Turnout: The Case of the 1979 and 1980 Canadian Elections," Political Research Quarterly 46 (June 1993); Matsusaka and Palda (fn. 2).
23. Joji Watanuki, "Patterns of Politics in Present-day Japan," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: Free Press, 1967); Gerald L. Curtis, Election Campaigning Japanese Style (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); Scott C. Flanagan and Bradley M. Richardson, Japanese Electoral Behavior: Social Cleavages, Social Networks, and Partisanship (London: Sage, 1977); Anson Shupe, "Social Participation and Voting Turnout: The Case of Japan," Comparative Political Studies 12 (July 1979).
24. Joji Watanuki, "Patterns of Politics in Present-day Japan," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: Free Press, 1967); Gerald L. Curtis, Election Campaigning Japanese Style (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); Scott C. Flanagan and Bradley M. Richardson, Japanese Electoral Behavior: Social Cleavages, Social Networks, and Partisanship (London: Sage, 1977); Anson Shupe, "Social Participation and Voting Turnout: The Case of Japan," Comparative Political Studies 12 (July 1979).
25. Joji Watanuki, "Patterns of Politics in Present-day Japan," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: Free Press, 1967); Gerald L. Curtis, Election Campaigning Japanese Style (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); Scott C. Flanagan and Bradley M. Richardson, Japanese Electoral Behavior: Social Cleavages, Social Networks, and Partisanship (London: Sage, 1977); Anson Shupe, "Social Participation and Voting Turnout: The Case of Japan," Comparative Political Studies 12 (July 1979).
26. Joji Watanuki, "Patterns of Politics in Present-day Japan," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: Free Press, 1967); Gerald L. Curtis, Election Campaigning Japanese Style (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); Scott C. Flanagan and Bradley M. Richardson, Japanese Electoral Behavior: Social Cleavages, Social Networks, and Partisanship (London: Sage, 1977); Anson Shupe, "Social Participation and Voting Turnout: The Case of Japan," Comparative Political Studies 12 (July 1979).
27. Hiroto Sasago, Kazuyoshi Abe, and Katsuya Muraoka, Seiji kenkin no kozu (The structure of political finances) (Tokyo: JICC shuppan kai, 1990), 59-60; Masumi Ishikawa and Michisada Hirose, Jiminto: choti shihai no kozo (The LDP: The structure of long-term dominance) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1989); J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances Rosenbluth, Japan's Political Marketplace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
28. Hiroto Sasago, Kazuyoshi Abe, and Katsuya Muraoka, Seiji kenkin no kozu (The structure of political finances) (Tokyo: JICC shuppan kai, 1990), 59-60; Masumi Ishikawa and Michisada Hirose, Jiminto: choti shihai no kozo (The LDP: The structure of long-term dominance) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1989); J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances Rosenbluth, Japan's Political Marketplace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
29. Hiroto Sasago, Kazuyoshi Abe, and Katsuya Muraoka, Seiji kenkin no kozu (The structure of political finances) (Tokyo: JICC shuppan kai, 1990), 59-60; Masumi Ishikawa and Michisada Hirose, Jiminto: choti shihai no kozo (The LDP: The structure of long-term dominance) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1989); J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances Rosenbluth, Japan's Political Marketplace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
30. Akira Tsujimura, "Shimbun ga moteasobu 'senkyo yosoku,' I" (Newspapers trifle with "election forecasts," part I), Shokun 18 (September 1986). One often hears the laments of the candidates slotted in first place. A politician complained to a newspaper reporter after an election, "My vote total went down by ten thousand votes because you said I was a shoo-in." Ikuo Kabashima, Seiji Sanka (Political participation) (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1988), 172. As one campaign organizer explained, "The campaign effort falters as soon as news about your front-runner status gets out.... People in the lower reaches of our campaign organization do not think they have to work as hard, and people we are counting on to vote feel less obligation to show up." Akira Tsujimura, "Shimbun ga moteasobu 'senkyo yosoku,' II" (Newspapers trifle with "election forecasts," part II), Shokun 18 (October 1986), 188.
31. Akira Tsujimura, "Shimbun ga moteasobu 'senkyo yosoku,' I" (Newspapers trifle with "election forecasts," part I), Shokun 18 (September 1986). One often hears the laments of the candidates slotted in first place. A politician complained to a newspaper reporter after an election, "My vote total went down by ten thousand votes because you said I was a shoo-in." Ikuo Kabashima, Seiji Sanka (Political participation) (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1988), 172. As one campaign organizer explained, "The campaign effort falters as soon as news about your front-runner status gets out.... People in the lower reaches of our campaign organization do not think they have to work as hard, and people we are counting on to vote feel less obligation to show up." Akira Tsujimura, "Shimbun ga moteasobu 'senkyo yosoku,' II" (Newspapers trifle with "election forecasts," part II), Shokun 18 (October 1986), 188.
32. Akira Tsujimura, "Shimbun ga moteasobu 'senkyo yosoku,' I" (Newspapers trifle with "election forecasts," part I), Shokun 18 (September 1986). One often hears the laments of the candidates slotted in first place. A politician complained to a newspaper reporter after an election, "My vote total went down by ten thousand votes because you said I was a shoo-in." Ikuo Kabashima, Seiji Sanka (Political participation) (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1988), 172. As one campaign organizer explained, "The campaign effort falters as soon as news about your front-runner status gets out.... People in the lower reaches of our campaign organization do not think they have to work as hard, and people we are counting on to vote feel less obligation to show up." Akira Tsujimura, "Shimbun ga moteasobu 'senkyo yosoku,' II" (Newspapers trifle with "election forecasts," part II), Shokun 18 (October 1986), 188.
33. Scott C. Flanagan, "Mechanisms of Social Network Influence in Japanese Voting Behavior," in Scott C. Flanagan et al., eds., The Japanese Voter (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 453-57.
34. Bradley Richardson, "The Japanese Voter: Comparing the Explanatory Variables in Electoral Decisions," in Flanagan et al. (fn. 25), 383-84.
35. Kabashima (fn. 24) mentions in passing that competitiveness and turnout move together, the point is also made by Seizaburo Sato and Tetsuhisa Matsuzaki, Jiminto seiken (The LDP administration) (Tokyo: Chuo koron sha, 1986), 116-17.
36. Research into turnout has focused (1) on changes in national-level turnout over time - Kabashima (fn. 24), 171-80; Ichiro Miyake, Tohyo Kodo (Voting behavior) (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1989), 227; Kunio Arai, Senkyo, Joho, Yoron (Elections, information, public opinion) (Tokyo: NHK Books, 1988), 32-35; (2) on broad demographic effects - Arai, 84-92; Michael Blaker, Japan at the Polls (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976), 149; Flanagan (fn. 25), 174-78; Flanagan and Richardson (fn. 22), 37; Ronald J. Hrebenar, The Japanese Party System: From One-Party Rule to Coalition Government (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1986), 15-19; and (3) on anecdotal evidence that "nothing apparently draws the voters like a good conservative blood-letting." Nathaniel Thayer, How the Conservatives Rule Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 137.
37. Research into turnout has focused (1) on changes in national-level turnout over time - Kabashima (fn. 24), 171-80; Ichiro Miyake, Tohyo Kodo (Voting behavior) (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1989), 227; Kunio Arai, Senkyo, Joho, Yoron (Elections, information, public opinion) (Tokyo: NHK Books, 1988), 32-35; (2) on broad demographic effects - Arai, 84-92; Michael Blaker, Japan at the Polls (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976), 149; Flanagan (fn. 25), 174-78; Flanagan and Richardson (fn. 22), 37; Ronald J. Hrebenar, The Japanese Party System: From One-Party Rule to Coalition Government (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1986), 15-19; and (3) on anecdotal evidence that "nothing apparently draws the voters like a good conservative blood-letting." Nathaniel Thayer, How the Conservatives Rule Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 137.
38. Research into turnout has focused (1) on changes in national-level turnout over time - Kabashima (fn. 24), 171-80; Ichiro Miyake, Tohyo Kodo (Voting behavior) (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1989), 227; Kunio Arai, Senkyo, Joho, Yoron (Elections, information, public opinion) (Tokyo: NHK Books, 1988), 32-35; (2) on broad demographic effects - Arai, 84-92; Michael Blaker, Japan at the Polls (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976), 149; Flanagan (fn. 25), 174-78; Flanagan and Richardson (fn. 22), 37; Ronald J. Hrebenar, The Japanese Party System: From One-Party Rule to Coalition Government (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1986), 15-19; and (3) on anecdotal evidence that "nothing apparently draws the voters like a good conservative blood-letting." Nathaniel Thayer, How the Conservatives Rule Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 137.
39. Research into turnout has focused (1) on changes in national-level turnout over time - Kabashima (fn. 24), 171-80; Ichiro Miyake, Tohyo Kodo (Voting behavior) (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1989), 227; Kunio Arai, Senkyo, Joho, Yoron (Elections, information, public opinion) (Tokyo: NHK Books, 1988), 32-35; (2) on broad demographic effects - Arai, 84-92; Michael Blaker, Japan at the Polls (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976), 149; Flanagan (fn. 25), 174-78; Flanagan and Richardson (fn. 22), 37; Ronald J. Hrebenar, The Japanese Party System: From One-Party Rule to Coalition Government (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1986), 15-19; and (3) on anecdotal evidence that "nothing apparently draws the voters like a good conservative blood-letting." Nathaniel Thayer, How the Conservatives Rule Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 137.
40. Research into turnout has focused (1) on changes in national-level turnout over time - Kabashima (fn. 24), 171-80; Ichiro Miyake, Tohyo Kodo (Voting behavior) (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1989), 227; Kunio Arai, Senkyo, Joho, Yoron (Elections, information, public opinion) (Tokyo: NHK Books, 1988), 32-35; (2) on broad demographic effects - Arai, 84-92; Michael Blaker, Japan at the Polls (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976), 149; Flanagan (fn. 25), 174-78; Flanagan and Richardson (fn. 22), 37; Ronald J. Hrebenar, The Japanese Party System: From One-Party Rule to Coalition Government (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1986), 15-19; and (3) on anecdotal evidence that "nothing apparently draws the voters like a good conservative blood-letting." Nathaniel Thayer, How the Conservatives Rule Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 137.
41. Susan J. Pharr, Political Women in Japan: The Search for a Place in Political Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 25-26.
42. Ibid., 32.
43. Sumiko Iwao, The Japanese Woman: Traditional Image and Changing Reality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 234.
44. Flanagan (fn. 25), 158.
45. In 1975, 66.2 percent of women aged twenty to twenty-four were in the workplace, compared with only 43.9 percent of women aged thirty to thirty-four. In 1990 the corresponding figures were 75.1 percent and 51.7 percent, respectively. So while the number of young women in the workforce has increased over time, the number who quit their jobs when they marry or have children has increased as well. These women, along with those who never enter the workforce, are the "young mothers" to whom we refer, who are active in local social networks. See Iwao (fn. 31), 63. See also Anne E. Imamura, Urban Japanese Housewives: At Home and in the Community (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987). Imamura (pp. 116-20) points out that membership in the PTA and other groups related to children is typically automatic and that most women feel they have to take a turn as an officer. While many women return to work once their children are older, they tend to stay closer to home or work shorter hours. See also Mary C. Brinton, Women and the Economic Miracle: Gender and Work in Postwar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). Brinton reports (p. 176) that only 31 percent of working women aged forty to forty-four work full time, while 34 percent work part time or as temps, 16 percent are self-employed, 15 percent are family enterprise workers, and 4 percent do piecework. And see also Alice Lam, "Equal Employment Opportunities for Japanese Women: Changing Company Practice," in Janet Hunter, ed., Japanese Women Working (London: Routledge, 1993).
46. In 1975, 66.2 percent of women aged twenty to twenty-four were in the workplace, compared with only 43.9 percent of women aged thirty to thirty-four. In 1990 the corresponding figures were 75.1 percent and 51.7 percent, respectively. So while the number of young women in the workforce has increased over time, the number who quit their jobs when they marry or have children has increased as well. These women, along with those who never enter the workforce, are the "young mothers" to whom we refer, who are active in local social networks. See Iwao (fn. 31), 63. See also Anne E. Imamura, Urban Japanese Housewives: At Home and in the Community (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987). Imamura (pp. 116-20) points out that membership in the PTA and other groups related to children is typically automatic and that most women feel they have to take a turn as an officer. While many women return to work once their children are older, they tend to stay closer to home or work shorter hours. See also Mary C. Brinton, Women and the Economic Miracle: Gender and Work in Postwar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). Brinton reports (p. 176) that only 31 percent of working women aged forty to forty-four work full time, while 34 percent work part time or as temps, 16 percent are self-employed, 15 percent are family enterprise workers, and 4 percent do piecework. And see also Alice Lam, "Equal Employment Opportunities for Japanese Women: Changing Company Practice," in Janet Hunter, ed., Japanese Women Working (London: Routledge, 1993).
47. In 1975, 66.2 percent of women aged twenty to twenty-four were in the workplace, compared with only 43.9 percent of women aged thirty to thirty-four. In 1990 the corresponding figures were 75.1 percent and 51.7 percent, respectively. So while the number of young women in the workforce has increased over time, the number who quit their jobs when they marry or have children has increased as well. These women, along with those who never enter the workforce, are the "young mothers" to whom we refer, who are active in local social networks. See Iwao (fn. 31), 63. See also Anne E. Imamura, Urban Japanese Housewives: At Home and in the Community (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987). Imamura (pp. 116-20) points out that membership in the PTA and other groups related to children is typically automatic and that most women feel they have to take a turn as an officer. While many women return to work once their children are older, they tend to stay closer to home or work shorter hours. See also Mary C. Brinton, Women and the Economic Miracle: Gender and Work in Postwar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). Brinton reports (p. 176) that only 31 percent of working women aged forty to forty-four work full time, while 34 percent work part time or as temps, 16 percent are self-employed, 15 percent are family enterprise workers, and 4 percent do piecework. And see also Alice Lam, "Equal Employment Opportunities for Japanese Women: Changing Company Practice," in Janet Hunter, ed., Japanese Women Working (London: Routledge, 1993).
48. Theodore C. Bestor, Neighborhood Tokyo (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1989).
49. Iwao (fn. 31), 244.
50. Bradley Richardson, "Urbanization and Political Participation: The Case of Japan," American Political Science Review 67 (June 1973), 436; Nozumu Matsubara and Ikuo Kabashima, "Tanaka ha assho Jiminto taihai no kozu" (The logic of an overwhelming Tanaka Faction victory amidst an LDP defeat), Chuo koron 99 (February 1984).
51. Bradley Richardson, "Urbanization and Political Participation: The Case of Japan," American Political Science Review 67 (June 1973), 436; Nozumu Matsubara and Ikuo Kabashima, "Tanaka ha assho Jiminto taihai no kozu" (The logic of an overwhelming Tanaka Faction victory amidst an LDP defeat), Chuo koron 99 (February 1984).
52. Richardson (fn. 36), 437.
53. Flanagan (fn. 25), 154; Richardson (fn. 36), 438.
54. Richardson (fn. 36), 437-38.
55. Cox and Munger (fn. 6); Denver and Hands (fn. 21, 1974, 1985); Berch (fn. 21); Matsusaka and Palda (fn. 2).
56. The campaign period lasted twenty days for the 1958 through the 1980 elections, fifteen days for the 1983 through the 1990 elections, and fourteen days in 1993.
57. Tomoaki Iwai, Seiji shikin no kenkyu (Research on political financing) (Tokyo: Nihon keizai shimbun-sha, 1990), 66-67.
58. Personal communications with Home Affairs Ministry bureaucrats and Japanese journalists. For a discussion of the plausibility of campaign period spending reports, see also Gary W. Cox and Michael F. Thies. "The Cost of Intraparty Competition: SNTV and Money Politics in Japan," Comparative Political Studies 31 (June 1998).
59. Hrebenar (fn. 28), 48.
60. In various years there were also a couple of two-seat and six-seat districts and one one-seater. We drop them from the anlaysis for the sake of simplicity. In early 1994 Japan abandoned this electoral system (in use from 1925 through 1993, with a brief interruption in the 1940s) in favor of one combining single-member constituencies with large proportional representation districts.
61. Another well-known issue is whether ex post measures of closeness correlate highly with ex ante measures, the latter being the theoretically relevant ones. If the election has equilibrated - in the sense that (1) everyone shares the same expectations about who will finish where in the poll (and hence how close the race will be), (2) everyone is behaving optimally in light of those expectations; and (3) optimal behavior is consistent with the postulated expectations - then ex post measures of closeness will simply be realizations of a particular draw from an ex ante distribution. We follow a host of others in assuming that the ex post measure is acceptable if not ideal; see, e.g., most of the twenty-five studies cited in Matsusaka and Palda (fn. 2).
62. For our data, see http://dodgson.ucsd.edu//lij. For the Home Ministry data, see Jichisho senkyo kyoku. Shuugiin Giin Sosenkyo Saiko Saibansho Saibankan Kokumin shinsa: Kekkacho (The results of the elections to the House of Representatives and of the national referendum on Supreme Court justices) (Tokyo: Home Affairs Ministry Public Elections Bureau, various years).
63. For our data, see http://dodgson.ucsd.edu//lij. For the Home Ministry data, see Jichisho senkyo kyoku. Shuugiin Giin Sosenkyo Saiko Saibansho Saibankan Kokumin shinsa: Kekkacho (The results of the elections to the House of Representatives and of the national referendum on Supreme Court justices) (Tokyo: Home Affairs Ministry Public Elections Bureau, various years).
64. One reason for worrying about redistricting in the present analysis is that we include the lagged dependent variable in our estimations, and, obviously, this procedure would not make much sense if district number 31 in 1976 were substantially different from district number 31 in 1972. The reason that it does not make much practical difference whether we include redistricting years or not is that the Japanese redistrictings affected only a small minority of districts in any substantial way.
65. We prefer using the lagged dependent variable to using the Prais-Winsten (or other) GLS estimator for the reasons articulated in Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan N. Katz, "What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data," American Political Science Review 89 (September 1995), 634-47. Reestimating all our models using Prais-Winsten does not affect any of our conclusions. We report Huber cluster robust standard errors in Tables 1,2, and 3 (implemented through Stata's cluster and robust options in its "regress" procedure). These are similar to a restricted version of Beck and Katz's panel-corrected standard errors. Use of the latter is not indicated in our case because we have a relatively short time series (T = 8).
66. Arguably, a 1 percent gap by this measure means something different in districts of varying magnitude (M): 1 percent of the registered electorate is 2 percent of a Droop quota in a one-seat district, but 5 percent of a Droop quota in a four-seat district, for example. We correct for this by dividing by the Droop quota in each district or, equivalently, by multiplying by M + 1. This allows us to pool the observations from districts of varying magnitude and estimate a common slope.
67. c could be negative over the entire range of observations. And, as it turns out, it is: the squared term is never significant and not even consistently positive in our analyses.
68. In order to bring the magnitude of the coefficients on NCPER and NLDPPER into line with the others in the model, we use the number of candidates per hundred thousand electors, rather than just per elector. This of course affects only the placement of the decimal point in the coefficient estimate.
69. Hrebenar (fn. 28), 48.
70. This is calculated by dividing the coefficient on MARGIN by the Droop quota (equivalent to multiplying by M + 1 = 5 for a four-seat district), which gives us .191 × 5 = 0.956. Recall that we standardize the closeness measure so that the same measure can be used in districts of three, four, and five seats.
71. To investigate whether or not the increase in expenditures due to closeness is driven by the candidates actually on the margin, we reestimated equation 1 using the per elector expenditures by the two candidates on the cusp between winning and losing (the last winner and first loser) as the dependent variable. (This specification required some modification of the right-hand-side variables as well.) Our results (available on request) show that the two marginal candidates do indeed account for a disproportionate share of the overall effect.
72. The government's official measure of urbanness is the percentage of the population living in "densely inhabited districts," analogous to the "standard metropolitan statistical area" used in the United States.
73. We have also used variables tapping the occupational structure of districts as controls, but these turn out to be highly correlated with the urbanness of the district and so are excluded here.
74. Cox and Munger (fn. 6). The variability in total expenditures is larger in the U.S., because the variability in competition is larger. If one compares the impact of equal expenditures, a different comparison arises. Using an exchange rate of about 250 yen per dollar for the early 1980s, one more dollar (250 more yen) per voter would lead to an increase in turnout of .038 × 250 = 9.5 percent. This compares to a figure of 4.0 percent from Cox and Munger for the U.S. case.
75. Given the substantial changes over time in the percentage of women working, one might wonder whether the impact of the social indicators that we use might change over time. We have investigated this matter and found no systematic change in effect over time. For example, the effect of %pop < 15 does not vary significantly from year to year. This may be due in part to the fact, noted above, that employment change has been much greater among women without young children than among women with young children.
76. Riker and Ordeshook (fn. 8); Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).