Just-in-time inventories in old Detroit

Business History

Volumn 40, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 48-71

  Schwartz, Michael ^a   Fish, Andrew ^a  

^a STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INDUSTRIAL HISTORY; JUST IN TIME; MANUFACTURING; TWENTIETH CENTURY;

DETROIT; MICHIGAN; USA;

EID: 0031662943     PISSN: 00076791     EISSN: 17437938     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00076799800000220     Document Type: Article

References (162)

1. See, for example, W.J. Abernathy, K.B. Clark and A.M. Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance: Producing a Competitive Future for America (New York, 1983); M.A. Cusumano, The Japanese Automobile Industry (Cambridge, MA, 1985); R. Florida and M. Kenney. 'Transplanted Organizations: The Transfer of Japanese Industrial Organization to the U.S.', American Sociological Review, Vol.56 (1991), pp.381-98; M. Gerlach, Alliances and the Social Organization of Japanese Business (Berkeley, 1992); A. Goto, 'Business Groups in a Market Economy', European Economic Review, Vol.19 (1982), pp.53-70; R.W. Hall, Driving the Productivity Machine: Productivity and Control in Japan (Falls Church, VA, 1981); C. Rapoport, 'The Big Shift: Japan vs. the U.S.', Fortune (6 May 1991), pp.38-48; C. Rapoport, 'Why Japan Keeps Winning', Fortune (5 July 1991), pp.76-85; M. Schwartz, 'Japanese Enterprise Groups: Some American Parallels', Shaken Keizai, No.180 (1992), pp.123-32; M. Smitka, 'The Invisible Handshake: The Development of the Japanese Auto Parts Industry', Business and Economic History, Vol.19 (1990), pp.163-71; J.P. Womack, D.T. Jones and D. Roos, The Machine that Changed the World (New York, 1990). For a succinct description of the basic functioning of the keiretsu, see B. Harrison, The Ties that Bind: Production Networks and Economic Power in the Age of 'Flexibility' (New York, 1994), Ch.7.
2. See, for example, W.J. Abernathy, K.B. Clark and A.M. Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance: Producing a Competitive Future for America (New York, 1983); M.A. Cusumano, The Japanese Automobile Industry (Cambridge, MA, 1985); R. Florida and M. Kenney. 'Transplanted Organizations: The Transfer of Japanese Industrial Organization to the U.S.', American Sociological Review, Vol.56 (1991), pp.381-98; M. Gerlach, Alliances and the Social Organization of Japanese Business (Berkeley, 1992); A. Goto, 'Business Groups in a Market Economy', European Economic Review, Vol.19 (1982), pp.53-70; R.W. Hall, Driving the Productivity Machine: Productivity and Control in Japan (Falls Church, VA, 1981); C. Rapoport, 'The Big Shift: Japan vs. the U.S.', Fortune (6 May 1991), pp.38-48; C. Rapoport, 'Why Japan Keeps Winning', Fortune (5 July 1991), pp.76-85; M. Schwartz, 'Japanese Enterprise Groups: Some American Parallels', Shaken Keizai, No.180 (1992), pp.123-32; M. Smitka, 'The Invisible Handshake: The Development of the Japanese Auto Parts Industry', Business and Economic History, Vol.19 (1990), pp.163-71; J.P. Womack, D.T. Jones and D. Roos, The Machine that Changed the World (New York, 1990). For a succinct description of the basic functioning of the keiretsu, see B. Harrison, The Ties that Bind: Production Networks and Economic Power in the Age of 'Flexibility' (New York, 1994), Ch.7.
3. See, for example, W.J. Abernathy, K.B. Clark and A.M. Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance: Producing a Competitive Future for America (New York, 1983); M.A. Cusumano, The Japanese Automobile Industry (Cambridge, MA, 1985); R. Florida and M. Kenney. 'Transplanted Organizations: The Transfer of Japanese Industrial Organization to the U.S.', American Sociological Review, Vol.56 (1991), pp.381-98; M. Gerlach, Alliances and the Social Organization of Japanese Business (Berkeley, 1992); A. Goto, 'Business Groups in a Market Economy', European Economic Review, Vol.19 (1982), pp.53-70; R.W. Hall, Driving the Productivity Machine: Productivity and Control in Japan (Falls Church, VA, 1981); C. Rapoport, 'The Big Shift: Japan vs. the U.S.', Fortune (6 May 1991), pp.38-48; C. Rapoport, 'Why Japan Keeps Winning', Fortune (5 July 1991), pp.76-85; M. Schwartz, 'Japanese Enterprise Groups: Some American Parallels', Shaken Keizai, No.180 (1992), pp.123-32; M. Smitka, 'The Invisible Handshake: The Development of the Japanese Auto Parts Industry', Business and Economic History, Vol.19 (1990), pp.163-71; J.P. Womack, D.T. Jones and D. Roos, The Machine that Changed the World (New York, 1990). For a succinct description of the basic functioning of the keiretsu, see B. Harrison, The Ties that Bind: Production Networks and Economic Power in the Age of 'Flexibility' (New York, 1994), Ch.7.
4. See, for example, W.J. Abernathy, K.B. Clark and A.M. Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance: Producing a Competitive Future for America (New York, 1983); M.A. Cusumano, The Japanese Automobile Industry (Cambridge, MA, 1985); R. Florida and M. Kenney. 'Transplanted Organizations: The Transfer of Japanese Industrial Organization to the U.S.', American Sociological Review, Vol.56 (1991), pp.381-98; M. Gerlach, Alliances and the Social Organization of Japanese Business (Berkeley, 1992); A. Goto, 'Business Groups in a Market Economy', European Economic Review, Vol.19 (1982), pp.53-70; R.W. Hall, Driving the Productivity Machine: Productivity and Control in Japan (Falls Church, VA, 1981); C. Rapoport, 'The Big Shift: Japan vs. the U.S.', Fortune (6 May 1991), pp.38-48; C. Rapoport, 'Why Japan Keeps Winning', Fortune (5 July 1991), pp.76-85; M. Schwartz, 'Japanese Enterprise Groups: Some American Parallels', Shaken Keizai, No.180 (1992), pp.123-32; M. Smitka, 'The Invisible Handshake: The Development of the Japanese Auto Parts Industry', Business and Economic History, Vol.19 (1990), pp.163-71; J.P. Womack, D.T. Jones and D. Roos, The Machine that Changed the World (New York, 1990). For a succinct description of the basic functioning of the keiretsu, see B. Harrison, The Ties that Bind: Production Networks and Economic Power in the Age of 'Flexibility' (New York, 1994), Ch.7.
5. See, for example, W.J. Abernathy, K.B. Clark and A.M. Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance: Producing a Competitive Future for America (New York, 1983); M.A. Cusumano, The Japanese Automobile Industry (Cambridge, MA, 1985); R. Florida and M. Kenney. 'Transplanted Organizations: The Transfer of Japanese Industrial Organization to the U.S.', American Sociological Review, Vol.56 (1991), pp.381-98; M. Gerlach, Alliances and the Social Organization of Japanese Business (Berkeley, 1992); A. Goto, 'Business Groups in a Market Economy', European Economic Review, Vol.19 (1982), pp.53-70; R.W. Hall, Driving the Productivity Machine: Productivity and Control in Japan (Falls Church, VA, 1981); C. Rapoport, 'The Big Shift: Japan vs. the U.S.', Fortune (6 May 1991), pp.38-48; C. Rapoport, 'Why Japan Keeps Winning', Fortune (5 July 1991), pp.76-85; M. Schwartz, 'Japanese Enterprise Groups: Some American Parallels', Shaken Keizai, No.180 (1992), pp.123-32; M. Smitka, 'The Invisible Handshake: The Development of the Japanese Auto Parts Industry', Business and Economic History, Vol.19 (1990), pp.163-71; J.P. Womack, D.T. Jones and D. Roos, The Machine that Changed the World (New York, 1990). For a succinct description of the basic functioning of the keiretsu, see B. Harrison, The Ties that Bind: Production Networks and Economic Power in the Age of 'Flexibility' (New York, 1994), Ch.7.
6. See, for example, W.J. Abernathy, K.B. Clark and A.M. Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance: Producing a Competitive Future for America (New York, 1983); M.A. Cusumano, The Japanese Automobile Industry (Cambridge, MA, 1985); R. Florida and M. Kenney. 'Transplanted Organizations: The Transfer of Japanese Industrial Organization to the U.S.', American Sociological Review, Vol.56 (1991), pp.381-98; M. Gerlach, Alliances and the Social Organization of Japanese Business (Berkeley, 1992); A. Goto, 'Business Groups in a Market Economy', European Economic Review, Vol.19 (1982), pp.53-70; R.W. Hall, Driving the Productivity Machine: Productivity and Control in Japan (Falls Church, VA, 1981); C. Rapoport, 'The Big Shift: Japan vs. the U.S.', Fortune (6 May 1991), pp.38-48; C. Rapoport, 'Why Japan Keeps Winning', Fortune (5 July 1991), pp.76-85; M. Schwartz, 'Japanese Enterprise Groups: Some American Parallels', Shaken Keizai, No.180 (1992), pp.123-32; M. Smitka, 'The Invisible Handshake: The Development of the Japanese Auto Parts Industry', Business and Economic History, Vol.19 (1990), pp.163-71; J.P. Womack, D.T. Jones and D. Roos, The Machine that Changed the World (New York, 1990). For a succinct description of the basic functioning of the keiretsu, see B. Harrison, The Ties that Bind: Production Networks and Economic Power in the Age of 'Flexibility' (New York, 1994), Ch.7.
7. See, for example, W.J. Abernathy, K.B. Clark and A.M. Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance: Producing a Competitive Future for America (New York, 1983); M.A. Cusumano, The Japanese Automobile Industry (Cambridge, MA, 1985); R. Florida and M. Kenney. 'Transplanted Organizations: The Transfer of Japanese Industrial Organization to the U.S.', American Sociological Review, Vol.56 (1991), pp.381-98; M. Gerlach, Alliances and the Social Organization of Japanese Business (Berkeley, 1992); A. Goto, 'Business Groups in a Market Economy', European Economic Review, Vol.19 (1982), pp.53-70; R.W. Hall, Driving the Productivity Machine: Productivity and Control in Japan (Falls Church, VA, 1981); C. Rapoport, 'The Big Shift: Japan vs. the U.S.', Fortune (6 May 1991), pp.38-48; C. Rapoport, 'Why Japan Keeps Winning', Fortune (5 July 1991), pp.76-85; M. Schwartz, 'Japanese Enterprise Groups: Some American Parallels', Shaken Keizai, No.180 (1992), pp.123-32; M. Smitka, 'The Invisible Handshake: The Development of the Japanese Auto Parts Industry', Business and Economic History, Vol.19 (1990), pp.163-71; J.P. Womack, D.T. Jones and D. Roos, The Machine that Changed the World (New York, 1990). For a succinct description of the basic functioning of the keiretsu, see B. Harrison, The Ties that Bind: Production Networks and Economic Power in the Age of 'Flexibility' (New York, 1994), Ch.7.
8. See, for example, W.J. Abernathy, K.B. Clark and A.M. Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance: Producing a Competitive Future for America (New York, 1983); M.A. Cusumano, The Japanese Automobile Industry (Cambridge, MA, 1985); R. Florida and M. Kenney. 'Transplanted Organizations: The Transfer of Japanese Industrial Organization to the U.S.', American Sociological Review, Vol.56 (1991), pp.381-98; M. Gerlach, Alliances and the Social Organization of Japanese Business (Berkeley, 1992); A. Goto, 'Business Groups in a Market Economy', European Economic Review, Vol.19 (1982), pp.53-70; R.W. Hall, Driving the Productivity Machine: Productivity and Control in Japan (Falls Church, VA, 1981); C. Rapoport, 'The Big Shift: Japan vs. the U.S.', Fortune (6 May 1991), pp.38-48; C. Rapoport, 'Why Japan Keeps Winning', Fortune (5 July 1991), pp.76-85; M. Schwartz, 'Japanese Enterprise Groups: Some American Parallels', Shaken Keizai, No.180 (1992), pp.123-32; M. Smitka, 'The Invisible Handshake: The Development of the Japanese Auto Parts Industry', Business and Economic History, Vol.19 (1990), pp.163-71; J.P. Womack, D.T. Jones and D. Roos, The Machine that Changed the World (New York, 1990). For a succinct description of the basic functioning of the keiretsu, see B. Harrison, The Ties that Bind: Production Networks and Economic Power in the Age of 'Flexibility' (New York, 1994), Ch.7.
9. See, for example, W.J. Abernathy, K.B. Clark and A.M. Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance: Producing a Competitive Future for America (New York, 1983); M.A. Cusumano, The Japanese Automobile Industry (Cambridge, MA, 1985); R. Florida and M. Kenney. 'Transplanted Organizations: The Transfer of Japanese Industrial Organization to the U.S.', American Sociological Review, Vol.56 (1991), pp.381-98; M. Gerlach, Alliances and the Social Organization of Japanese Business (Berkeley, 1992); A. Goto, 'Business Groups in a Market Economy', European Economic Review, Vol.19 (1982), pp.53-70; R.W. Hall, Driving the Productivity Machine: Productivity and Control in Japan (Falls Church, VA, 1981); C. Rapoport, 'The Big Shift: Japan vs. the U.S.', Fortune (6 May 1991), pp.38-48; C. Rapoport, 'Why Japan Keeps Winning', Fortune (5 July 1991), pp.76-85; M. Schwartz, 'Japanese Enterprise Groups: Some American Parallels', Shaken Keizai, No.180 (1992), pp.123-32; M. Smitka, 'The Invisible Handshake: The Development of the Japanese Auto Parts Industry', Business and Economic History, Vol.19 (1990), pp.163-71; J.P. Womack, D.T. Jones and D. Roos, The Machine that Changed the World (New York, 1990). For a succinct description of the basic functioning of the keiretsu, see B. Harrison, The Ties that Bind: Production Networks and Economic Power in the Age of 'Flexibility' (New York, 1994), Ch.7.
10. See, for example, W.J. Abernathy, K.B. Clark and A.M. Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance: Producing a Competitive Future for America (New York, 1983); M.A. Cusumano, The Japanese Automobile Industry (Cambridge, MA, 1985); R. Florida and M. Kenney. 'Transplanted Organizations: The Transfer of Japanese Industrial Organization to the U.S.', American Sociological Review, Vol.56 (1991), pp.381-98; M. Gerlach, Alliances and the Social Organization of Japanese Business (Berkeley, 1992); A. Goto, 'Business Groups in a Market Economy', European Economic Review, Vol.19 (1982), pp.53-70; R.W. Hall, Driving the Productivity Machine: Productivity and Control in Japan (Falls Church, VA, 1981); C. Rapoport, 'The Big Shift: Japan vs. the U.S.', Fortune (6 May 1991), pp.38-48; C. Rapoport, 'Why Japan Keeps Winning', Fortune (5 July 1991), pp.76-85; M. Schwartz, 'Japanese Enterprise Groups: Some American Parallels', Shaken Keizai, No.180 (1992), pp.123-32; M. Smitka, 'The Invisible Handshake: The Development of the Japanese Auto Parts Industry', Business and Economic History, Vol.19 (1990), pp.163-71; J.P. Womack, D.T. Jones and D. Roos, The Machine that Changed the World (New York, 1990). For a succinct description of the basic functioning of the keiretsu, see B. Harrison, The Ties that Bind: Production Networks and Economic Power in the Age of 'Flexibility' (New York, 1994), Ch.7.
11. See, for example, W.J. Abernathy, K.B. Clark and A.M. Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance: Producing a Competitive Future for America (New York, 1983); M.A. Cusumano, The Japanese Automobile Industry (Cambridge, MA, 1985); R. Florida and M. Kenney. 'Transplanted Organizations: The Transfer of Japanese Industrial Organization to the U.S.', American Sociological Review, Vol.56 (1991), pp.381-98; M. Gerlach, Alliances and the Social Organization of Japanese Business (Berkeley, 1992); A. Goto, 'Business Groups in a Market Economy', European Economic Review, Vol.19 (1982), pp.53-70; R.W. Hall, Driving the Productivity Machine: Productivity and Control in Japan (Falls Church, VA, 1981); C. Rapoport, 'The Big Shift: Japan vs. the U.S.', Fortune (6 May 1991), pp.38-48; C. Rapoport, 'Why Japan Keeps Winning', Fortune (5 July 1991), pp.76-85; M. Schwartz, 'Japanese Enterprise Groups: Some American Parallels', Shaken Keizai, No.180 (1992), pp.123-32; M. Smitka, 'The Invisible Handshake: The Development of the Japanese Auto Parts Industry', Business and Economic History, Vol.19 (1990), pp.163-71; J.P. Womack, D.T. Jones and D. Roos, The Machine that Changed the World (New York, 1990). For a succinct description of the basic functioning of the keiretsu, see B. Harrison, The Ties that Bind: Production Networks and Economic Power in the Age of 'Flexibility' (New York, 1994), Ch.7.
12. See, for example, W.J. Abernathy, K.B. Clark and A.M. Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance: Producing a Competitive Future for America (New York, 1983); M.A. Cusumano, The Japanese Automobile Industry (Cambridge, MA, 1985); R. Florida and M. Kenney. 'Transplanted Organizations: The Transfer of Japanese Industrial Organization to the U.S.', American Sociological Review, Vol.56 (1991), pp.381-98; M. Gerlach, Alliances and the Social Organization of Japanese Business (Berkeley, 1992); A. Goto, 'Business Groups in a Market Economy', European Economic Review, Vol.19 (1982), pp.53-70; R.W. Hall, Driving the Productivity Machine: Productivity and Control in Japan (Falls Church, VA, 1981); C. Rapoport, 'The Big Shift: Japan vs. the U.S.', Fortune (6 May 1991), pp.38-48; C. Rapoport, 'Why Japan Keeps Winning', Fortune (5 July 1991), pp.76-85; M. Schwartz, 'Japanese Enterprise Groups: Some American Parallels', Shaken Keizai, No.180 (1992), pp.123-32; M. Smitka, 'The Invisible Handshake: The Development of the Japanese Auto Parts Industry', Business and Economic History, Vol.19 (1990), pp.163-71; J.P. Womack, D.T. Jones and D. Roos, The Machine that Changed the World (New York, 1990). For a succinct description of the basic functioning of the keiretsu, see B. Harrison, The Ties that Bind: Production Networks and Economic Power in the Age of 'Flexibility' (New York, 1994), Ch.7.
13. See M. Aoki, The Economic Analysis of Japanese Firms (Amsterdam, 1984), for an elegant expression of this viewpoint.
14. For persuasive statements of this view, see Goto, 'Business Groups'; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; S.R. Helper, 'Supplier Relations and Technical Change: Theory and Application to the U.S. Automobile Industry' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1987); S.R. Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations in the U.S. and Japanese Auto Industries: An Exit/Voice Approach', Business and Economic History, Vol.19 (1990), pp.153-62; S.R. Helper, 'An Exit-Voice Analysis of Supplier Relations', pp.355-72, in R.M. Coughlin (ed.), Morality, Rationality, and Efficiency: New Perspectives on Socio-Economies (New York, 1991); K. Clark, 'Project Scope and Project Performance: The Effect of Parts Strategy and Supplier Involvement on Product Development', Management Science, Vol.35 (Oct. 1989), pp.1247-62; Gerlach, Alliances; M. Kenney and R. Florida, Beyond Mass Production: The Japanese System and Its Transfer to the U.S. (New York, 1993).
15. For persuasive statements of this view, see Goto, 'Business Groups'; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; S.R. Helper, 'Supplier Relations and Technical Change: Theory and Application to the U.S. Automobile Industry' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1987); S.R. Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations in the U.S. and Japanese Auto Industries: An Exit/Voice Approach', Business and Economic History, Vol.19 (1990), pp.153-62; S.R. Helper, 'An Exit-Voice Analysis of Supplier Relations', pp.355-72, in R.M. Coughlin (ed.), Morality, Rationality, and Efficiency: New Perspectives on Socio-Economies (New York, 1991); K. Clark, 'Project Scope and Project Performance: The Effect of Parts Strategy and Supplier Involvement on Product Development', Management Science, Vol.35 (Oct. 1989), pp.1247-62; Gerlach, Alliances; M. Kenney and R. Florida, Beyond Mass Production: The Japanese System and Its Transfer to the U.S. (New York, 1993).
16. For persuasive statements of this view, see Goto, 'Business Groups'; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; S.R. Helper, 'Supplier Relations and Technical Change: Theory and Application to the U.S. Automobile Industry' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1987); S.R. Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations in the U.S. and Japanese Auto Industries: An Exit/Voice Approach', Business and Economic History, Vol.19 (1990), pp.153-62; S.R. Helper, 'An Exit-Voice Analysis of Supplier Relations', pp.355-72, in R.M. Coughlin (ed.), Morality, Rationality, and Efficiency: New Perspectives on Socio-Economies (New York, 1991); K. Clark, 'Project Scope and Project Performance: The Effect of Parts Strategy and Supplier Involvement on Product Development', Management Science, Vol.35 (Oct. 1989), pp.1247-62; Gerlach, Alliances; M. Kenney and R. Florida, Beyond Mass Production: The Japanese System and Its Transfer to the U.S. (New York, 1993).
17. For persuasive statements of this view, see Goto, 'Business Groups'; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; S.R. Helper, 'Supplier Relations and Technical Change: Theory and Application to the U.S. Automobile Industry' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1987); S.R. Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations in the U.S. and Japanese Auto Industries: An Exit/Voice Approach', Business and Economic History, Vol.19 (1990), pp.153-62; S.R. Helper, 'An Exit-Voice Analysis of Supplier Relations', pp.355-72, in R.M. Coughlin (ed.), Morality, Rationality, and Efficiency: New Perspectives on Socio-Economies (New York, 1991); K. Clark, 'Project Scope and Project Performance: The Effect of Parts Strategy and Supplier Involvement on Product Development', Management Science, Vol.35 (Oct. 1989), pp.1247-62; Gerlach, Alliances; M. Kenney and R. Florida, Beyond Mass Production: The Japanese System and Its Transfer to the U.S. (New York, 1993).
18. For persuasive statements of this view, see Goto, 'Business Groups'; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; S.R. Helper, 'Supplier Relations and Technical Change: Theory and Application to the U.S. Automobile Industry' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1987); S.R. Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations in the U.S. and Japanese Auto Industries: An Exit/Voice Approach', Business and Economic History, Vol.19 (1990), pp.153-62; S.R. Helper, 'An Exit-Voice Analysis of Supplier Relations', pp.355-72, in R.M. Coughlin (ed.), Morality, Rationality, and Efficiency: New Perspectives on Socio-Economies (New York, 1991); K. Clark, 'Project Scope and Project Performance: The Effect of Parts Strategy and Supplier Involvement on Product Development', Management Science, Vol.35 (Oct. 1989), pp.1247-62; Gerlach, Alliances; M. Kenney and R. Florida, Beyond Mass Production: The Japanese System and Its Transfer to the U.S. (New York, 1993).
19. For persuasive statements of this view, see Goto, 'Business Groups'; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; S.R. Helper, 'Supplier Relations and Technical Change: Theory and Application to the U.S. Automobile Industry' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1987); S.R. Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations in the U.S. and Japanese Auto Industries: An Exit/Voice Approach', Business and Economic History, Vol.19 (1990), pp.153-62; S.R. Helper, 'An Exit-Voice Analysis of Supplier Relations', pp.355-72, in R.M. Coughlin (ed.), Morality, Rationality, and Efficiency: New Perspectives on Socio-Economies (New York, 1991); K. Clark, 'Project Scope and Project Performance: The Effect of Parts Strategy and Supplier Involvement on Product Development', Management Science, Vol.35 (Oct. 1989), pp.1247-62; Gerlach, Alliances; M. Kenney and R. Florida, Beyond Mass Production: The Japanese System and Its Transfer to the U.S. (New York, 1993).
20. For persuasive statements of this view, see Goto, 'Business Groups'; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; S.R. Helper, 'Supplier Relations and Technical Change: Theory and Application to the U.S. Automobile Industry' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1987); S.R. Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations in the U.S. and Japanese Auto Industries: An Exit/Voice Approach', Business and Economic History, Vol.19 (1990), pp.153-62; S.R. Helper, 'An Exit-Voice Analysis of Supplier Relations', pp.355-72, in R.M. Coughlin (ed.), Morality, Rationality, and Efficiency: New Perspectives on Socio-Economies (New York, 1991); K. Clark, 'Project Scope and Project Performance: The Effect of Parts Strategy and Supplier Involvement on Product Development', Management Science, Vol.35 (Oct. 1989), pp.1247-62; Gerlach, Alliances; M. Kenney and R. Florida, Beyond Mass Production: The Japanese System and Its Transfer to the U.S. (New York, 1993).
21. For persuasive statements of this view, see Goto, 'Business Groups'; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; S.R. Helper, 'Supplier Relations and Technical Change: Theory and Application to the U.S. Automobile Industry' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1987); S.R. Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations in the U.S. and Japanese Auto Industries: An Exit/Voice Approach', Business and Economic History, Vol.19 (1990), pp.153-62; S.R. Helper, 'An Exit-Voice Analysis of Supplier Relations', pp.355-72, in R.M. Coughlin (ed.), Morality, Rationality, and Efficiency: New Perspectives on Socio-Economies (New York, 1991); K. Clark, 'Project Scope and Project Performance: The Effect of Parts Strategy and Supplier Involvement on Product Development', Management Science, Vol.35 (Oct. 1989), pp.1247-62; Gerlach, Alliances; M. Kenney and R. Florida, Beyond Mass Production: The Japanese System and Its Transfer to the U.S. (New York, 1993).
22. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion of the automobile keiretsus is based on the following sources: Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance; B. Asanuma, 'The Contractual Framework for Parts Supply in the Japanese Automotive Industry', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.13 (Summer 1985), pp.54-78; idem. 'The Organization of Parts Purchases in the Japanese Automotive Industry', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.13 (1985), pp.32-53; Clark, 'Project Scope'; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; K. Fujita and R.C. Hill, 'Toyota City: Industrial Organization and the Local State in Japan', in K. Fujita and R.C. Hill (eds.), Japanese Cities in the World Economy (Philadelphia, 1993); Helper, 'Supplier Relations'; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations'; Y. Monden, 'What Makes the Toyota Production System Really Tick', Industrial Engineering (Jan. 1981), pp.36-46; P. Sheard, 'Auto-Production Systems in Japan: Organizational and Locational Features', Australian Geographical Studies, Vol.21 (April 1983), pp.49-68; K. Shimokawa, 'Japan's Keiretsu System', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.19 (1985), pp.3-31; M. Smitka, Competitive Ties: Subcontracting in the Japanese Automotive Industry (New York, 1991).
23. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion of the automobile keiretsus is based on the following sources: Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance; B. Asanuma, 'The Contractual Framework for Parts Supply in the Japanese Automotive Industry', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.13 (Summer 1985), pp.54-78; idem. 'The Organization of Parts Purchases in the Japanese Automotive Industry', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.13 (1985), pp.32-53; Clark, 'Project Scope'; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; K. Fujita and R.C. Hill, 'Toyota City: Industrial Organization and the Local State in Japan', in K. Fujita and R.C. Hill (eds.), Japanese Cities in the World Economy (Philadelphia, 1993); Helper, 'Supplier Relations'; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations'; Y. Monden, 'What Makes the Toyota Production System Really Tick', Industrial Engineering (Jan. 1981), pp.36-46; P. Sheard, 'Auto-Production Systems in Japan: Organizational and Locational Features', Australian Geographical Studies, Vol.21 (April 1983), pp.49-68; K. Shimokawa, 'Japan's Keiretsu System', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.19 (1985), pp.3-31; M. Smitka, Competitive Ties: Subcontracting in the Japanese Automotive Industry (New York, 1991).
24. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion of the automobile keiretsus is based on the following sources: Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance; B. Asanuma, 'The Contractual Framework for Parts Supply in the Japanese Automotive Industry', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.13 (Summer 1985), pp.54-78; idem. 'The Organization of Parts Purchases in the Japanese Automotive Industry', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.13 (1985), pp.32-53; Clark, 'Project Scope'; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; K. Fujita and R.C. Hill, 'Toyota City: Industrial Organization and the Local State in Japan', in K. Fujita and R.C. Hill (eds.), Japanese Cities in the World Economy (Philadelphia, 1993); Helper, 'Supplier Relations'; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations'; Y. Monden, 'What Makes the Toyota Production System Really Tick', Industrial Engineering (Jan. 1981), pp.36-46; P. Sheard, 'Auto-Production Systems in Japan: Organizational and Locational Features', Australian Geographical Studies, Vol.21 (April 1983), pp.49-68; K. Shimokawa, 'Japan's Keiretsu System', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.19 (1985), pp.3-31; M. Smitka, Competitive Ties: Subcontracting in the Japanese Automotive Industry (New York, 1991).
25. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion of the automobile keiretsus is based on the following sources: Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance; B. Asanuma, 'The Contractual Framework for Parts Supply in the Japanese Automotive Industry', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.13 (Summer 1985), pp.54-78; idem. 'The Organization of Parts Purchases in the Japanese Automotive Industry', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.13 (1985), pp.32-53; Clark, 'Project Scope'; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; K. Fujita and R.C. Hill, 'Toyota City: Industrial Organization and the Local State in Japan', in K. Fujita and R.C. Hill (eds.), Japanese Cities in the World Economy (Philadelphia, 1993); Helper, 'Supplier Relations'; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations'; Y. Monden, 'What Makes the Toyota Production System Really Tick', Industrial Engineering (Jan. 1981), pp.36-46; P. Sheard, 'Auto-Production Systems in Japan: Organizational and Locational Features', Australian Geographical Studies, Vol.21 (April 1983), pp.49-68; K. Shimokawa, 'Japan's Keiretsu System', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.19 (1985), pp.3-31; M. Smitka, Competitive Ties: Subcontracting in the Japanese Automotive Industry (New York, 1991).
26. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion of the automobile keiretsus is based on the following sources: Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance; B. Asanuma, 'The Contractual Framework for Parts Supply in the Japanese Automotive Industry', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.13 (Summer 1985), pp.54-78; idem. 'The Organization of Parts Purchases in the Japanese Automotive Industry', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.13 (1985), pp.32-53; Clark, 'Project Scope'; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; K. Fujita and R.C. Hill, 'Toyota City: Industrial Organization and the Local State in Japan', in K. Fujita and R.C. Hill (eds.), Japanese Cities in the World Economy (Philadelphia, 1993); Helper, 'Supplier Relations'; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations'; Y. Monden, 'What Makes the Toyota Production System Really Tick', Industrial Engineering (Jan. 1981), pp.36-46; P. Sheard, 'Auto-Production Systems in Japan: Organizational and Locational Features', Australian Geographical Studies, Vol.21 (April 1983), pp.49-68; K. Shimokawa, 'Japan's Keiretsu System', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.19 (1985), pp.3-31; M. Smitka, Competitive Ties: Subcontracting in the Japanese Automotive Industry (New York, 1991).
27. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion of the automobile keiretsus is based on the following sources: Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance; B. Asanuma, 'The Contractual Framework for Parts Supply in the Japanese Automotive Industry', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.13 (Summer 1985), pp.54-78; idem. 'The Organization of Parts Purchases in the Japanese Automotive Industry', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.13 (1985), pp.32-53; Clark, 'Project Scope'; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; K. Fujita and R.C. Hill, 'Toyota City: Industrial Organization and the Local State in Japan', in K. Fujita and R.C. Hill (eds.), Japanese Cities in the World Economy (Philadelphia, 1993); Helper, 'Supplier Relations'; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations'; Y. Monden, 'What Makes the Toyota Production System Really Tick', Industrial Engineering (Jan. 1981), pp.36-46; P. Sheard, 'Auto-Production Systems in Japan: Organizational and Locational Features', Australian Geographical Studies, Vol.21 (April 1983), pp.49-68; K. Shimokawa, 'Japan's Keiretsu System', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.19 (1985), pp.3-31; M. Smitka, Competitive Ties: Subcontracting in the Japanese Automotive Industry (New York, 1991).
28. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion of the automobile keiretsus is based on the following sources: Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance; B. Asanuma, 'The Contractual Framework for Parts Supply in the Japanese Automotive Industry', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.13 (Summer 1985), pp.54-78; idem. 'The Organization of Parts Purchases in the Japanese Automotive Industry', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.13 (1985), pp.32-53; Clark, 'Project Scope'; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; K. Fujita and R.C. Hill, 'Toyota City: Industrial Organization and the Local State in Japan', in K. Fujita and R.C. Hill (eds.), Japanese Cities in the World Economy (Philadelphia, 1993); Helper, 'Supplier Relations'; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations'; Y. Monden, 'What Makes the Toyota Production System Really Tick', Industrial Engineering (Jan. 1981), pp.36-46; P. Sheard, 'Auto-Production Systems in Japan: Organizational and Locational Features', Australian Geographical Studies, Vol.21 (April 1983), pp.49-68; K. Shimokawa, 'Japan's Keiretsu System', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.19 (1985), pp.3-31; M. Smitka, Competitive Ties: Subcontracting in the Japanese Automotive Industry (New York, 1991).
29. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion of the automobile keiretsus is based on the following sources: Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance; B. Asanuma, 'The Contractual Framework for Parts Supply in the Japanese Automotive Industry', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.13 (Summer 1985), pp.54-78; idem. 'The Organization of Parts Purchases in the Japanese Automotive Industry', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.13 (1985), pp.32-53; Clark, 'Project Scope'; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; K. Fujita and R.C. Hill, 'Toyota City: Industrial Organization and the Local State in Japan', in K. Fujita and R.C. Hill (eds.), Japanese Cities in the World Economy (Philadelphia, 1993); Helper, 'Supplier Relations'; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations'; Y. Monden, 'What Makes the Toyota Production System Really Tick', Industrial Engineering (Jan. 1981), pp.36-46; P. Sheard, 'Auto-Production Systems in Japan: Organizational and Locational Features', Australian Geographical Studies, Vol.21 (April 1983), pp.49-68; K. Shimokawa, 'Japan's Keiretsu System', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.19 (1985), pp.3-31; M. Smitka, Competitive Ties: Subcontracting in the Japanese Automotive Industry (New York, 1991).
30. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion of the automobile keiretsus is based on the following sources: Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance; B. Asanuma, 'The Contractual Framework for Parts Supply in the Japanese Automotive Industry', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.13 (Summer 1985), pp.54-78; idem. 'The Organization of Parts Purchases in the Japanese Automotive Industry', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.13 (1985), pp.32-53; Clark, 'Project Scope'; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; K. Fujita and R.C. Hill, 'Toyota City: Industrial Organization and the Local State in Japan', in K. Fujita and R.C. Hill (eds.), Japanese Cities in the World Economy (Philadelphia, 1993); Helper, 'Supplier Relations'; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations'; Y. Monden, 'What Makes the Toyota Production System Really Tick', Industrial Engineering (Jan. 1981), pp.36-46; P. Sheard, 'Auto-Production Systems in Japan: Organizational and Locational Features', Australian Geographical Studies, Vol.21 (April 1983), pp.49-68; K. Shimokawa, 'Japan's Keiretsu System', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.19 (1985), pp.3-31; M. Smitka, Competitive Ties: Subcontracting in the Japanese Automotive Industry (New York, 1991).
31. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion of the automobile keiretsus is based on the following sources: Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance; B. Asanuma, 'The Contractual Framework for Parts Supply in the Japanese Automotive Industry', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.13 (Summer 1985), pp.54-78; idem. 'The Organization of Parts Purchases in the Japanese Automotive Industry', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.13 (1985), pp.32-53; Clark, 'Project Scope'; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; K. Fujita and R.C. Hill, 'Toyota City: Industrial Organization and the Local State in Japan', in K. Fujita and R.C. Hill (eds.), Japanese Cities in the World Economy (Philadelphia, 1993); Helper, 'Supplier Relations'; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations'; Y. Monden, 'What Makes the Toyota Production System Really Tick', Industrial Engineering (Jan. 1981), pp.36-46; P. Sheard, 'Auto-Production Systems in Japan: Organizational and Locational Features', Australian Geographical Studies, Vol.21 (April 1983), pp.49-68; K. Shimokawa, 'Japan's Keiretsu System', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.19 (1985), pp.3-31; M. Smitka, Competitive Ties: Subcontracting in the Japanese Automotive Industry (New York, 1991).
32. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion of the automobile keiretsus is based on the following sources: Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance; B. Asanuma, 'The Contractual Framework for Parts Supply in the Japanese Automotive Industry', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.13 (Summer 1985), pp.54-78; idem. 'The Organization of Parts Purchases in the Japanese Automotive Industry', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.13 (1985), pp.32-53; Clark, 'Project Scope'; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; K. Fujita and R.C. Hill, 'Toyota City: Industrial Organization and the Local State in Japan', in K. Fujita and R.C. Hill (eds.), Japanese Cities in the World Economy (Philadelphia, 1993); Helper, 'Supplier Relations'; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations'; Y. Monden, 'What Makes the Toyota Production System Really Tick', Industrial Engineering (Jan. 1981), pp.36-46; P. Sheard, 'Auto-Production Systems in Japan: Organizational and Locational Features', Australian Geographical Studies, Vol.21 (April 1983), pp.49-68; K. Shimokawa, 'Japan's Keiretsu System', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.19 (1985), pp.3-31; M. Smitka, Competitive Ties: Subcontracting in the Japanese Automotive Industry (New York, 1991).
33. Unless otherwise noted, the discussion of the automobile keiretsus is based on the following sources: Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance; B. Asanuma, 'The Contractual Framework for Parts Supply in the Japanese Automotive Industry', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.13 (Summer 1985), pp.54-78; idem. 'The Organization of Parts Purchases in the Japanese Automotive Industry', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.13 (1985), pp.32-53; Clark, 'Project Scope'; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; K. Fujita and R.C. Hill, 'Toyota City: Industrial Organization and the Local State in Japan', in K. Fujita and R.C. Hill (eds.), Japanese Cities in the World Economy (Philadelphia, 1993); Helper, 'Supplier Relations'; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations'; Y. Monden, 'What Makes the Toyota Production System Really Tick', Industrial Engineering (Jan. 1981), pp.36-46; P. Sheard, 'Auto-Production Systems in Japan: Organizational and Locational Features', Australian Geographical Studies, Vol.21 (April 1983), pp.49-68; K. Shimokawa, 'Japan's Keiretsu System', Japanese Economic Studies, Vol.19 (1985), pp.3-31; M. Smitka, Competitive Ties: Subcontracting in the Japanese Automotive Industry (New York, 1991).
34. Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance, p.73. Cusumano notes that Taiichi Ono, the architect of Toyota's pioneering system that was later copied by Toyo Kogyo and Nissan, saw this system as a radical expansion of Ford's system, since 'only Ford's final assembly line achieved anything resembling a continuous process flow'. (Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry, p.270.) See also Monden, 'Toyota Production System', and Hall, Driving the Productivity Machine.
35. Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance, p.73. Cusumano notes that Taiichi Ono, the architect of Toyota's pioneering system that was later copied by Toyo Kogyo and Nissan, saw this system as a radical expansion of Ford's system, since 'only Ford's final assembly line achieved anything resembling a continuous process flow'. (Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry, p.270.) See also Monden, 'Toyota Production System', and Hall, Driving the Productivity Machine.
36. Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance, p.73. Cusumano notes that Taiichi Ono, the architect of Toyota's pioneering system that was later copied by Toyo Kogyo and Nissan, saw this system as a radical expansion of Ford's system, since 'only Ford's final assembly line achieved anything resembling a continuous process flow'. (Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry, p.270.) See also Monden, 'Toyota Production System', and Hall, Driving the Productivity Machine.
37. Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance, p.73. Cusumano notes that Taiichi Ono, the architect of Toyota's pioneering system that was later copied by Toyo Kogyo and Nissan, saw this system as a radical expansion of Ford's system, since 'only Ford's final assembly line achieved anything resembling a continuous process flow'. (Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry, p.270.) See also Monden, 'Toyota Production System', and Hall, Driving the Productivity Machine.
38. Monden, 'Toyota Production System', p.36. For similar views, see also Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; Smitka, Competitive Ties; K. Fujita and R.C. Hill, 'Global Toyotaism and Local Development', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research (March 1995). A notable exception is Helper ('Comparative Supplier Relations'), whose exit-voice analysis emphasises the similarities between the Japanese system and the pre-World War II American system. Another is A.J. Kuhn (GM Passes Ford, 1918-1938: Designing the General Motors Performance Control System (University Park, PA, 1986), pp.9, 178, 265), who pointed to the existence of a comparable system in Detroit in the 1920s as evidence for the effectiveness of the multidivisional form pioneered by General Motors.
39. Monden, 'Toyota Production System', p.36. For similar views, see also Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; Smitka, Competitive Ties; K. Fujita and R.C. Hill, 'Global Toyotaism and Local Development', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research (March 1995). A notable exception is Helper ('Comparative Supplier Relations'), whose exit-voice analysis emphasises the similarities between the Japanese system and the pre-World War II American system. Another is A.J. Kuhn (GM Passes Ford, 1918-1938: Designing the General Motors Performance Control System (University Park, PA, 1986), pp.9, 178, 265), who pointed to the existence of a comparable system in Detroit in the 1920s as evidence for the effectiveness of the multidivisional form pioneered by General Motors.
40. Monden, 'Toyota Production System', p.36. For similar views, see also Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; Smitka, Competitive Ties; K. Fujita and R.C. Hill, 'Global Toyotaism and Local Development', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research (March 1995). A notable exception is Helper ('Comparative Supplier Relations'), whose exit-voice analysis emphasises the similarities between the Japanese system and the pre-World War II American system. Another is A.J. Kuhn (GM Passes Ford, 1918-1938: Designing the General Motors Performance Control System (University Park, PA, 1986), pp.9, 178, 265), who pointed to the existence of a comparable system in Detroit in the 1920s as evidence for the effectiveness of the multidivisional form pioneered by General Motors.
41. Monden, 'Toyota Production System', p.36. For similar views, see also Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; Smitka, Competitive Ties; K. Fujita and R.C. Hill, 'Global Toyotaism and Local Development', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research (March 1995). A notable exception is Helper ('Comparative Supplier Relations'), whose exit-voice analysis emphasises the similarities between the Japanese system and the pre-World War II American system. Another is A.J. Kuhn (GM Passes Ford, 1918-1938: Designing the General Motors Performance Control System (University Park, PA, 1986), pp.9, 178, 265), who pointed to the existence of a comparable system in Detroit in the 1920s as evidence for the effectiveness of the multidivisional form pioneered by General Motors.
42. Monden, 'Toyota Production System', p.36. For similar views, see also Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; Smitka, Competitive Ties; K. Fujita and R.C. Hill, 'Global Toyotaism and Local Development', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research (March 1995). A notable exception is Helper ('Comparative Supplier Relations'), whose exit-voice analysis emphasises the similarities between the Japanese system and the pre-World War II American system. Another is A.J. Kuhn (GM Passes Ford, 1918-1938: Designing the General Motors Performance Control System (University Park, PA, 1986), pp.9, 178, 265), who pointed to the existence of a comparable system in Detroit in the 1920s as evidence for the effectiveness of the multidivisional form pioneered by General Motors.
43. Monden, 'Toyota Production System', p.36. For similar views, see also Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry; Smitka, Competitive Ties; K. Fujita and R.C. Hill, 'Global Toyotaism and Local Development', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research (March 1995). A notable exception is Helper ('Comparative Supplier Relations'), whose exit-voice analysis emphasises the similarities between the Japanese system and the pre-World War II American system. Another is A.J. Kuhn (GM Passes Ford, 1918-1938: Designing the General Motors Performance Control System (University Park, PA, 1986), pp.9, 178, 265), who pointed to the existence of a comparable system in Detroit in the 1920s as evidence for the effectiveness of the multidivisional form pioneered by General Motors.
44. J. Bennet, 'Detroit Struggles to Learn Another Lesson from Japan', New York Times, 19 June 1994, F5, p.5.
45. M. Piore and C. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York, 1984), pp.124-32.
46. This account of the creation of the Toyota just-in-time system is taken from Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry, pp.264-84. See also Asanuma, 'Contractual Framework'; idem, 'Organization of Parts Purchases'; and Monden, 'Toyota Production System'. For a detailed description of the day-to-day operation of the system, see Hall, Productivity Machine. We use Cusumano's spelling of Ono's name. Other scholars have translated the Japanese characters as Ouno or Ohno (see, for example, Monden, 'Toyota Production System', p.46).
47. This account of the creation of the Toyota just-in-time system is taken from Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry, pp.264-84. See also Asanuma, 'Contractual Framework'; idem, 'Organization of Parts Purchases'; and Monden, 'Toyota Production System'. For a detailed description of the day-to-day operation of the system, see Hall, Productivity Machine. We use Cusumano's spelling of Ono's name. Other scholars have translated the Japanese characters as Ouno or Ohno (see, for example, Monden, 'Toyota Production System', p.46).
48. This account of the creation of the Toyota just-in-time system is taken from Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry, pp.264-84. See also Asanuma, 'Contractual Framework'; idem, 'Organization of Parts Purchases'; and Monden, 'Toyota Production System'. For a detailed description of the day-to-day operation of the system, see Hall, Productivity Machine. We use Cusumano's spelling of Ono's name. Other scholars have translated the Japanese characters as Ouno or Ohno (see, for example, Monden, 'Toyota Production System', p.46).
49. This account of the creation of the Toyota just-in-time system is taken from Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry, pp.264-84. See also Asanuma, 'Contractual Framework'; idem, 'Organization of Parts Purchases'; and Monden, 'Toyota Production System'. For a detailed description of the day-to-day operation of the system, see Hall, Productivity Machine. We use Cusumano's spelling of Ono's name. Other scholars have translated the Japanese characters as Ouno or Ohno (see, for example, Monden, 'Toyota Production System', p.46).
50. This account of the creation of the Toyota just-in-time system is taken from Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry, pp.264-84. See also Asanuma, 'Contractual Framework'; idem, 'Organization of Parts Purchases'; and Monden, 'Toyota Production System'. For a detailed description of the day-to-day operation of the system, see Hall, Productivity Machine. We use Cusumano's spelling of Ono's name. Other scholars have translated the Japanese characters as Ouno or Ohno (see, for example, Monden, 'Toyota Production System', p.46).
51. This account of the creation of the Toyota just-in-time system is taken from Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry, pp.264-84. See also Asanuma, 'Contractual Framework'; idem, 'Organization of Parts Purchases'; and Monden, 'Toyota Production System'. For a detailed description of the day-to-day operation of the system, see Hall, Productivity Machine. We use Cusumano's spelling of Ono's name. Other scholars have translated the Japanese characters as Ouno or Ohno (see, for example, Monden, 'Toyota Production System', p.46).
52. Monden, 'Toyota Production System', p.42; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry, pp.284-5.
53. Monden, 'Toyota Production System', p.42; Cusumano, Japanese Automobile Industry, pp.284-5.
54. Hall, Productivity Machine, p.13.
55. Toyota's system would eventually become the ideal type for the production methodology that would bear its' name (Toyotaism), and therefore the model for the other Japanese auto manufacturers. As a result, Toyota can be seen as representative of the Japanese system while not representative of all Japanese producers. As Karel Williams and his associates note, other Japanese producers were unable to emulate all aspects of the Toyota system because they did not share Toyota's advantages of size and market share (K. Williams et al., Cars, Analysis, History, Cases (Providence, RI, 1994), pp.115-19).
56. This chronology of the first period of hand-to-mouth inventories is based on the following sources: H. Ford (in collaboration with S. Crowther), Today and Tomorrow (Garden City, NY, 1926), pp.105-15; C.B. Durham, 'We Make 1,400% More Cars With 10% More Men', Magazine of Business, Vol.52 (July 1927), pp.29-31, 56-64; K.W. Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying: What Has It Done - and What Will It Do?', Automotive Industries, Vol.57 (2 July 1927), pp.1-4; F.L. Faurote, 'Henry Ford Still on the Job with Renewed Vigor', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Oct. 1927), p.202; W.S. Knudsen, 'For Economical Transportation: How the Chevrolet Motor Company Applies Its Own Slogan to Production', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Aug. 1927), pp. 67-8; L.H. Seltzer, Financial History of the American Automobile Industry (Boston, 1928), pp.100, 114-18; E. Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems of Integration in the Automobile Industry', Journal of Political Economy, Vol.37 (April 1929), pp.160-65; A. Pound, The Turning Wheel: The Story of General Motors Through Twenty-Five Years, 1908-1933 (New York, 1934), pp.196-8; H. Barclay, Ford Production Methods (New York, 1936), pp.24, 109-15; C.F. Sorensen, My Forty Years with Ford (New York, 1956), pp.166, 199-200; A.D. Chandler (ed.), Giant Enterprise: Ford, General Motors and the Automobile Industry (New York, 1964), p.196; A.P. Sloan, Jr., My Years with General Motors (Garden City, NY, 1964), pp.195-8; W.J. Abernathy, The Productivity Dilemma (Baltimore, 1978), pp.89-90; Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow Industrial Renaissance, p.80; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.9, 71, 178, 200-202, 274-5; R.N. Langlois and P.L. Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration: Lessons from the American Automobile Industry', Journal of Economic History, Vol.49 (June 1989), pp.361-75, 370; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations', p. 157; S.R. Helper, 'Strategy and Irreversibility in Supplier Relations: The Case of the U.S. Automotive Industry', Business History Review, Vol.65 (Winter 1991), p.791.
57. This chronology of the first period of hand-to-mouth inventories is based on the following sources: H. Ford (in collaboration with S. Crowther), Today and Tomorrow (Garden City, NY, 1926), pp.105-15; C.B. Durham, 'We Make 1,400% More Cars With 10% More Men', Magazine of Business, Vol.52 (July 1927), pp.29-31, 56-64; K.W. Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying: What Has It Done - and What Will It Do?', Automotive Industries, Vol.57 (2 July 1927), pp.1-4; F.L. Faurote, 'Henry Ford Still on the Job with Renewed Vigor', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Oct. 1927), p.202; W.S. Knudsen, 'For Economical Transportation: How the Chevrolet Motor Company Applies Its Own Slogan to Production', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Aug. 1927), pp. 67-8; L.H. Seltzer, Financial History of the American Automobile Industry (Boston, 1928), pp.100, 114-18; E. Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems of Integration in the Automobile Industry', Journal of Political Economy, Vol.37 (April 1929), pp.160-65; A. Pound, The Turning Wheel: The Story of General Motors Through Twenty-Five Years, 1908-1933 (New York, 1934), pp.196-8; H. Barclay, Ford Production Methods (New York, 1936), pp.24, 109-15; C.F. Sorensen, My Forty Years with Ford (New York, 1956), pp.166, 199-200; A.D. Chandler (ed.), Giant Enterprise: Ford, General Motors and the Automobile Industry (New York, 1964), p.196; A.P. Sloan, Jr., My Years with General Motors (Garden City, NY, 1964), pp.195-8; W.J. Abernathy, The Productivity Dilemma (Baltimore, 1978), pp.89-90; Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow Industrial Renaissance, p.80; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.9, 71, 178, 200-202, 274-5; R.N. Langlois and P.L. Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration: Lessons from the American Automobile Industry', Journal of Economic History, Vol.49 (June 1989), pp.361-75, 370; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations', p. 157; S.R. Helper, 'Strategy and Irreversibility in Supplier Relations: The Case of the U.S. Automotive Industry', Business History Review, Vol.65 (Winter 1991), p.791.
58. This chronology of the first period of hand-to-mouth inventories is based on the following sources: H. Ford (in collaboration with S. Crowther), Today and Tomorrow (Garden City, NY, 1926), pp.105-15; C.B. Durham, 'We Make 1,400% More Cars With 10% More Men', Magazine of Business, Vol.52 (July 1927), pp.29-31, 56-64; K.W. Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying: What Has It Done - and What Will It Do?', Automotive Industries, Vol.57 (2 July 1927), pp.1-4; F.L. Faurote, 'Henry Ford Still on the Job with Renewed Vigor', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Oct. 1927), p.202; W.S. Knudsen, 'For Economical Transportation: How the Chevrolet Motor Company Applies Its Own Slogan to Production', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Aug. 1927), pp. 67-8; L.H. Seltzer, Financial History of the American Automobile Industry (Boston, 1928), pp.100, 114-18; E. Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems of Integration in the Automobile Industry', Journal of Political Economy, Vol.37 (April 1929), pp.160-65; A. Pound, The Turning Wheel: The Story of General Motors Through Twenty-Five Years, 1908-1933 (New York, 1934), pp.196-8; H. Barclay, Ford Production Methods (New York, 1936), pp.24, 109-15; C.F. Sorensen, My Forty Years with Ford (New York, 1956), pp.166, 199-200; A.D. Chandler (ed.), Giant Enterprise: Ford, General Motors and the Automobile Industry (New York, 1964), p.196; A.P. Sloan, Jr., My Years with General Motors (Garden City, NY, 1964), pp.195-8; W.J. Abernathy, The Productivity Dilemma (Baltimore, 1978), pp.89-90; Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow Industrial Renaissance, p.80; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.9, 71, 178, 200-202, 274-5; R.N. Langlois and P.L. Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration: Lessons from the American Automobile Industry', Journal of Economic History, Vol.49 (June 1989), pp.361-75, 370; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations', p. 157; S.R. Helper, 'Strategy and Irreversibility in Supplier Relations: The Case of the U.S. Automotive Industry', Business History Review, Vol.65 (Winter 1991), p.791.
59. This chronology of the first period of hand-to-mouth inventories is based on the following sources: H. Ford (in collaboration with S. Crowther), Today and Tomorrow (Garden City, NY, 1926), pp.105-15; C.B. Durham, 'We Make 1,400% More Cars With 10% More Men', Magazine of Business, Vol.52 (July 1927), pp.29-31, 56-64; K.W. Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying: What Has It Done - and What Will It Do?', Automotive Industries, Vol.57 (2 July 1927), pp.1-4; F.L. Faurote, 'Henry Ford Still on the Job with Renewed Vigor', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Oct. 1927), p.202; W.S. Knudsen, 'For Economical Transportation: How the Chevrolet Motor Company Applies Its Own Slogan to Production', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Aug. 1927), pp. 67-8; L.H. Seltzer, Financial History of the American Automobile Industry (Boston, 1928), pp.100, 114-18; E. Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems of Integration in the Automobile Industry', Journal of Political Economy, Vol.37 (April 1929), pp.160-65; A. Pound, The Turning Wheel: The Story of General Motors Through Twenty-Five Years, 1908-1933 (New York, 1934), pp.196-8; H. Barclay, Ford Production Methods (New York, 1936), pp.24, 109-15; C.F. Sorensen, My Forty Years with Ford (New York, 1956), pp.166, 199-200; A.D. Chandler (ed.), Giant Enterprise: Ford, General Motors and the Automobile Industry (New York, 1964), p.196; A.P. Sloan, Jr., My Years with General Motors (Garden City, NY, 1964), pp.195-8; W.J. Abernathy, The Productivity Dilemma (Baltimore, 1978), pp.89-90; Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow Industrial Renaissance, p.80; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.9, 71, 178, 200-202, 274-5; R.N. Langlois and P.L. Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration: Lessons from the American Automobile Industry', Journal of Economic History, Vol.49 (June 1989), pp.361-75, 370; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations', p. 157; S.R. Helper, 'Strategy and Irreversibility in Supplier Relations: The Case of the U.S. Automotive Industry', Business History Review, Vol.65 (Winter 1991), p.791.
60. This chronology of the first period of hand-to-mouth inventories is based on the following sources: H. Ford (in collaboration with S. Crowther), Today and Tomorrow (Garden City, NY, 1926), pp.105-15; C.B. Durham, 'We Make 1,400% More Cars With 10% More Men', Magazine of Business, Vol.52 (July 1927), pp.29-31, 56-64; K.W. Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying: What Has It Done - and What Will It Do?', Automotive Industries, Vol.57 (2 July 1927), pp.1-4; F.L. Faurote, 'Henry Ford Still on the Job with Renewed Vigor', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Oct. 1927), p.202; W.S. Knudsen, 'For Economical Transportation: How the Chevrolet Motor Company Applies Its Own Slogan to Production', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Aug. 1927), pp. 67-8; L.H. Seltzer, Financial History of the American Automobile Industry (Boston, 1928), pp.100, 114-18; E. Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems of Integration in the Automobile Industry', Journal of Political Economy, Vol.37 (April 1929), pp.160-65; A. Pound, The Turning Wheel: The Story of General Motors Through Twenty-Five Years, 1908-1933 (New York, 1934),
61. This chronology of the first period of hand-to-mouth inventories is based on the following sources: H. Ford (in collaboration with S. Crowther), Today and Tomorrow (Garden City, NY, 1926), pp.105-15; C.B. Durham, 'We Make 1,400% More Cars With 10% More Men', Magazine of Business, Vol.52 (July 1927), pp.29-31, 56-64; K.W. Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying: What Has It Done - and What Will It Do?', Automotive Industries, Vol.57 (2 July 1927), pp.1-4; F.L. Faurote, 'Henry Ford Still on the Job with Renewed Vigor', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Oct. 1927), p.202; W.S. Knudsen, 'For Economical Transportation: How the Chevrolet Motor Company Applies Its Own Slogan to Production', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Aug. 1927), pp. 67-8; L.H. Seltzer, Financial History of the American Automobile Industry (Boston, 1928), pp.100, 114-18; E. Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems of Integration in the Automobile Industry', Journal of Political Economy, Vol.37 (April 1929), pp.160-65; A. Pound, The Turning Wheel: The Story of General Motors Through Twenty-Five Years, 1908-1933 (New York, 1934), pp.196-8; H. Barclay, Ford Production Methods (New York, 1936), pp.24, 109-15; C.F. Sorensen, My Forty Years with Ford (New York, 1956), pp.166, 199-200; A.D. Chandler (ed.), Giant Enterprise: Ford, General Motors and the Automobile Industry (New York, 1964), p.196; A.P. Sloan, Jr., My Years with General Motors (Garden City, NY, 1964), pp.195-8; W.J. Abernathy, The Productivity Dilemma (Baltimore, 1978), pp.89-90; Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow Industrial Renaissance, p.80; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.9, 71, 178, 200-202, 274-5; R.N. Langlois and P.L. Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration: Lessons from the American Automobile Industry', Journal of Economic History, Vol.49 (June 1989), pp.361-75, 370; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations', p. 157; S.R. Helper, 'Strategy and Irreversibility in Supplier Relations: The Case of the U.S. Automotive Industry', Business History Review, Vol.65 (Winter 1991), p.791.
62. This chronology of the first period of hand-to-mouth inventories is based on the following sources: H. Ford (in collaboration with S. Crowther), Today and Tomorrow (Garden City, NY, 1926), pp.105-15; C.B. Durham, 'We Make 1,400% More Cars With 10% More Men', Magazine of Business, Vol.52 (July 1927), pp.29-31, 56-64; K.W. Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying: What Has It Done - and What Will It Do?', Automotive Industries, Vol.57 (2 July 1927), pp.1-4; F.L. Faurote, 'Henry Ford Still on the Job with Renewed Vigor', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Oct. 1927), p.202; W.S. Knudsen, 'For Economical Transportation: How the Chevrolet Motor Company Applies Its Own Slogan to Production', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Aug. 1927), pp. 67-8; L.H. Seltzer, Financial History of the American Automobile Industry (Boston, 1928), pp.100, 114-18; E. Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems of Integration in the Automobile Industry', Journal of Political Economy, Vol.37 (April 1929), pp.160-65; A. Pound, The Turning Wheel: The Story of General Motors Through Twenty-Five Years, 1908-1933 (New York, 1934), pp.196-8; H. Barclay, Ford Production Methods (New York, 1936), pp.24, 109-15; C.F. Sorensen, My Forty Years with Ford (New York, 1956), pp.166, 199-200; A.D. Chandler (ed.), Giant Enterprise: Ford, General Motors and the Automobile Industry (New York, 1964), p.196; A.P. Sloan, Jr., My Years with General Motors (Garden City, NY, 1964), pp.195-8; W.J. Abernathy, The Productivity Dilemma (Baltimore, 1978), pp.89-90; Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow Industrial Renaissance, p.80; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.9, 71, 178, 200-202, 274-5; R.N. Langlois and P.L. Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration: Lessons from the American Automobile Industry', Journal of Economic History, Vol.49 (June 1989), pp.361-75, 370; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations', p. 157; S.R. Helper, 'Strategy and Irreversibility in Supplier Relations: The Case of the U.S. Automotive Industry', Business History Review, Vol.65 (Winter 1991), p.791.
63. This chronology of the first period of hand-to-mouth inventories is based on the following sources: H. Ford (in collaboration with S. Crowther), Today and Tomorrow (Garden City, NY, 1926), pp.105-15; C.B. Durham, 'We Make 1,400% More Cars With 10% More Men', Magazine of Business, Vol.52 (July 1927), pp.29-31, 56-64; K.W. Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying: What Has It Done - and What Will It Do?', Automotive Industries, Vol.57 (2 July 1927), pp.1-4; F.L. Faurote, 'Henry Ford Still on the Job with Renewed Vigor', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Oct. 1927), p.202; W.S. Knudsen, 'For Economical Transportation: How the Chevrolet Motor Company Applies Its Own Slogan to Production', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Aug. 1927), pp. 67-8; L.H. Seltzer, Financial History of the American Automobile Industry (Boston, 1928), pp.100, 114-18; E. Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems of Integration in the Automobile Industry', Journal of Political Economy, Vol.37 (April 1929), pp.160-65; A. Pound, The Turning Wheel: The Story of General Motors Through Twenty-Five Years, 1908-1933 (New York, 1934), pp.196-8; H. Barclay, Ford Production Methods (New York, 1936), pp.24, 109-15; C.F. Sorensen, My Forty Years with Ford (New York, 1956), pp.166, 199-200; A.D. Chandler (ed.), Giant Enterprise: Ford, General Motors and the Automobile Industry (New York, 1964), p.196; A.P. Sloan, Jr., My Years with General Motors (Garden City, NY, 1964), pp.195-8; W.J. Abernathy, The Productivity Dilemma (Baltimore, 1978), pp.89-90; Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow Industrial Renaissance, p.80; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.9, 71, 178, 200-202, 274-5; R.N. Langlois and P.L. Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration: Lessons from the American Automobile Industry', Journal of Economic History, Vol.49 (June 1989), pp.361-75, 370; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations', p. 157; S.R. Helper, 'Strategy and Irreversibility in Supplier Relations: The Case of the U.S. Automotive Industry', Business History Review, Vol.65 (Winter 1991), p.791.
64. This chronology of the first period of hand-to-mouth inventories is based on the following sources: H. Ford (in collaboration with S. Crowther), Today and Tomorrow (Garden City, NY, 1926), pp.105-15; C.B. Durham, 'We Make 1,400% More Cars With 10% More Men', Magazine of Business, Vol.52 (July 1927), pp.29-31, 56-64; K.W. Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying: What Has It Done - and What Will It Do?', Automotive Industries, Vol.57 (2 July 1927), pp.1-4; F.L. Faurote, 'Henry Ford Still on the Job with Renewed Vigor', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Oct. 1927), p.202; W.S. Knudsen, 'For Economical Transportation: How the Chevrolet Motor Company Applies Its Own Slogan to Production', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Aug. 1927), pp. 67-8; L.H. Seltzer, Financial History of the American Automobile Industry (Boston, 1928), pp.100, 114-18; E. Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems of Integration in the Automobile Industry', Journal of Political Economy, Vol.37 (April 1929), pp.160-65; A. Pound, The Turning Wheel: The Story of General Motors Through Twenty-Five Years, 1908-1933 (New York, 1934), pp.196-8; H. Barclay, Ford Production Methods (New York, 1936), pp.24, 109-15; C.F. Sorensen, My Forty Years with Ford (New York, 1956), pp.166, 199-200; A.D. Chandler (ed.), Giant Enterprise: Ford, General Motors and the Automobile Industry (New York, 1964), p.196; A.P. Sloan, Jr., My Years with General Motors (Garden City, NY, 1964), pp.195-8; W.J. Abernathy, The Productivity Dilemma (Baltimore, 1978), pp.89-90; Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow Industrial Renaissance, p.80; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.9, 71, 178, 200-202, 274-5; R.N. Langlois and P.L. Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration: Lessons from the American Automobile Industry', Journal of Economic History, Vol.49 (June 1989), pp.361-75, 370; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations', p. 157; S.R. Helper, 'Strategy and Irreversibility in Supplier Relations: The Case of the U.S. Automotive Industry', Business History Review, Vol.65 (Winter 1991), p.791.
65. This chronology of the first period of hand-to-mouth inventories is based on the following sources: H. Ford (in collaboration with S. Crowther), Today and Tomorrow (Garden City, NY, 1926), pp.105-15; C.B. Durham, 'We Make 1,400% More Cars With 10% More Men', Magazine of Business, Vol.52 (July 1927), pp.29-31, 56-64; K.W. Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying: What Has It Done - and What Will It Do?', Automotive Industries, Vol.57 (2 July 1927), pp.1-4; F.L. Faurote, 'Henry Ford Still on the Job with Renewed Vigor', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Oct. 1927), p.202; W.S. Knudsen, 'For Economical Transportation: How the Chevrolet Motor Company Applies Its Own Slogan to Production', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Aug. 1927), pp. 67-8; L.H. Seltzer, Financial History of the American Automobile Industry (Boston, 1928), pp.100, 114-18; E. Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems of Integration in the Automobile Industry', Journal of Political Economy, Vol.37 (April 1929), pp.160-65; A. Pound, The Turning Wheel: The Story of General Motors Through Twenty-Five Years, 1908-1933 (New York, 1934), pp.196-8; H. Barclay, Ford Production Methods (New York, 1936), pp.24, 109-15; C.F. Sorensen, My Forty Years with Ford (New York, 1956), pp.166, 199-200; A.D. Chandler (ed.), Giant Enterprise: Ford, General Motors and the Automobile Industry (New York, 1964), p.196; A.P. Sloan, Jr., My Years with General Motors (Garden City, NY, 1964), pp.195-8; W.J. Abernathy, The Productivity Dilemma (Baltimore, 1978), pp.89-90; Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow Industrial Renaissance, p.80; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.9, 71, 178, 200-202, 274-5; R.N. Langlois and P.L. Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration: Lessons from the American Automobile Industry', Journal of Economic History, Vol.49 (June 1989), pp.361-75, 370; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations', p. 157; S.R. Helper, 'Strategy and Irreversibility in Supplier Relations: The Case of the U.S. Automotive Industry', Business History Review, Vol.65 (Winter 1991), p.791.
66. This chronology of the first period of hand-to-mouth inventories is based on the following sources: H. Ford (in collaboration with S. Crowther), Today and Tomorrow (Garden City, NY, 1926), pp.105-15; C.B. Durham, 'We Make 1,400% More Cars With 10% More Men', Magazine of Business, Vol.52 (July 1927), pp.29-31, 56-64; K.W. Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying: What Has It Done - and What Will It Do?', Automotive Industries, Vol.57 (2 July 1927), pp.1-4; F.L. Faurote, 'Henry Ford Still on the Job with Renewed Vigor', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Oct. 1927), p.202; W.S. Knudsen, 'For Economical Transportation: How the Chevrolet Motor Company Applies Its Own Slogan to Production', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Aug. 1927), pp. 67-8; L.H. Seltzer, Financial History of the American Automobile Industry (Boston, 1928), pp.100, 114-18; E. Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems of Integration in the Automobile Industry', Journal of Political Economy, Vol.37 (April 1929), pp.160-65; A. Pound, The Turning Wheel: The Story of General Motors Through Twenty-Five Years, 1908-1933 (New York, 1934), pp.196-8; H. Barclay, Ford Production Methods (New York, 1936), pp.24, 109-15; C.F. Sorensen, My Forty Years with Ford (New York, 1956), pp.166, 199-200; A.D. Chandler (ed.), Giant Enterprise: Ford, General Motors and the Automobile Industry (New York, 1964), p.196; A.P. Sloan, Jr., My Years with General Motors (Garden City, NY, 1964), pp.195-8; W.J. Abernathy, The Productivity Dilemma (Baltimore, 1978), pp.89-90; Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow Industrial Renaissance, p.80; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.9, 71, 178, 200-202, 274-5; R.N. Langlois and P.L. Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration: Lessons from the American Automobile Industry', Journal of Economic History, Vol.49 (June 1989), pp.361-75, 370; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations', p. 157; S.R. Helper, 'Strategy and Irreversibility in Supplier Relations: The Case of the U.S. Automotive Industry', Business History Review, Vol.65 (Winter 1991), p.791.
67. This chronology of the first period of hand-to-mouth inventories is based on the following sources: H. Ford (in collaboration with S. Crowther), Today and Tomorrow (Garden City, NY, 1926), pp.105-15; C.B. Durham, 'We Make 1,400% More Cars With 10% More Men', Magazine of Business, Vol.52 (July 1927), pp.29-31, 56-64; K.W. Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying: What Has It Done - and What Will It Do?', Automotive Industries, Vol.57 (2 July 1927), pp.1-4; F.L. Faurote, 'Henry Ford Still on the Job with Renewed Vigor', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Oct. 1927), p.202; W.S. Knudsen, 'For Economical Transportation: How the Chevrolet Motor Company Applies Its Own Slogan to Production', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Aug. 1927), pp. 67-8; L.H. Seltzer, Financial History of the American Automobile Industry (Boston, 1928), pp.100, 114-18; E. Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems of Integration in the Automobile Industry', Journal of Political Economy, Vol.37 (April 1929), pp.160-65; A. Pound, The Turning Wheel: The Story of General Motors Through Twenty-Five Years, 1908-1933 (New York, 1934), pp.196-8; H. Barclay, Ford Production Methods (New York, 1936), pp.24, 109-15; C.F. Sorensen, My Forty Years with Ford (New York, 1956), pp.166, 199-200; A.D. Chandler (ed.), Giant Enterprise: Ford, General Motors and the Automobile Industry (New York, 1964), p.196; A.P. Sloan, Jr., My Years with General Motors (Garden City, NY, 1964), pp.195-8; W.J. Abernathy, The Productivity Dilemma (Baltimore, 1978), pp.89-90; Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow Industrial Renaissance, p.80; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.9, 71, 178, 200-202, 274-5; R.N. Langlois and P.L. Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration: Lessons from the American Automobile Industry', Journal of Economic History, Vol.49 (June 1989), pp.361-75, 370; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations', p. 157; S.R. Helper, 'Strategy and Irreversibility in Supplier Relations: The Case of the U.S. Automotive Industry', Business History Review, Vol.65 (Winter 1991), p.791.
68. This chronology of the first period of hand-to-mouth inventories is based on the following sources: H. Ford (in collaboration with S. Crowther), Today and Tomorrow (Garden City, NY, 1926), pp.105-15; C.B. Durham, 'We Make 1,400% More Cars With 10% More Men', Magazine of Business, Vol.52 (July 1927), pp.29-31, 56-64; K.W. Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying: What Has It Done - and What Will It Do?', Automotive Industries, Vol.57 (2 July 1927), pp.1-4; F.L. Faurote, 'Henry Ford Still on the Job with Renewed Vigor', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Oct. 1927), p.202; W.S. Knudsen, 'For Economical Transportation: How the Chevrolet Motor Company Applies Its Own Slogan to Production', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Aug. 1927), pp. 67-8; L.H. Seltzer, Financial History of the American Automobile Industry (Boston, 1928), pp.100, 114-18; E. Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems of Integration in the Automobile Industry', Journal of Political Economy, Vol.37 (April 1929), pp.160-65; A. Pound, The Turning Wheel: The Story of General Motors Through Twenty-Five Years, 1908-1933 (New York, 1934), pp.196-8; H. Barclay, Ford Production Methods (New York, 1936), pp.24, 109-15; C.F. Sorensen, My Forty Years with Ford (New York, 1956), pp.166, 199-200; A.D. Chandler (ed.), Giant Enterprise: Ford, General Motors and the Automobile Industry (New York, 1964), p.196; A.P. Sloan, Jr., My Years with General Motors (Garden City, NY, 1964), pp.195-8; W.J. Abernathy, The Productivity Dilemma (Baltimore, 1978), pp.89-90; Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow Industrial Renaissance, p.80; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.9, 71, 178, 200-202, 274-5; R.N. Langlois and P.L. Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration: Lessons from the American Automobile Industry', Journal of Economic History, Vol.49 (June 1989), pp.361-75, 370; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations', p. 157; S.R. Helper, 'Strategy and Irreversibility in Supplier Relations: The Case of the U.S. Automotive Industry', Business History Review, Vol.65 (Winter 1991), p.791.
69. This chronology of the first period of hand-to-mouth inventories is based on the following sources: H. Ford (in collaboration with S. Crowther), Today and Tomorrow (Garden City, NY, 1926), pp.105-15; C.B. Durham, 'We Make 1,400% More Cars With 10% More Men', Magazine of Business, Vol.52 (July 1927), pp.29-31, 56-64; K.W. Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying: What Has It Done - and What Will It Do?', Automotive Industries, Vol.57 (2 July 1927), pp.1-4; F.L. Faurote, 'Henry Ford Still on the Job with Renewed Vigor', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Oct. 1927), p.202; W.S. Knudsen, 'For Economical Transportation: How the Chevrolet Motor Company Applies Its Own Slogan to Production', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Aug. 1927), pp. 67-8; L.H. Seltzer, Financial History of the American Automobile Industry (Boston, 1928), pp.100, 114-18; E. Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems of Integration in the Automobile Industry', Journal of Political Economy, Vol.37 (April 1929), pp.160-65; A. Pound, The Turning Wheel: The Story of General Motors Through Twenty-Five Years, 1908-1933 (New York, 1934), pp.196-8; H. Barclay, Ford Production Methods (New York, 1936), pp.24, 109-15; C.F. Sorensen, My Forty Years with Ford (New York, 1956), pp.166, 199-200; A.D. Chandler (ed.), Giant Enterprise: Ford, General Motors and the Automobile Industry (New York, 1964), p.196; A.P. Sloan, Jr., My Years with General Motors (Garden City, NY, 1964), pp.195-8; W.J. Abernathy, The Productivity Dilemma (Baltimore, 1978), pp.89-90; Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow Industrial Renaissance, p.80; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.9, 71, 178, 200-202, 274-5; R.N. Langlois and P.L. Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration: Lessons from the American Automobile Industry', Journal of Economic History, Vol.49 (June 1989), pp.361-75, 370; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations', p. 157; S.R. Helper, 'Strategy and Irreversibility in Supplier Relations: The Case of the U.S. Automotive Industry', Business History Review, Vol.65 (Winter 1991), p.791.
70. This chronology of the first period of hand-to-mouth inventories is based on the following sources: H. Ford (in collaboration with S. Crowther), Today and Tomorrow (Garden City, NY, 1926), pp.105-15; C.B. Durham, 'We Make 1,400% More Cars With 10% More Men', Magazine of Business, Vol.52 (July 1927), pp.29-31, 56-64; K.W. Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying: What Has It Done - and What Will It Do?', Automotive Industries, Vol.57 (2 July 1927), pp.1-4; F.L. Faurote, 'Henry Ford Still on the Job with Renewed Vigor', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Oct. 1927), p.202; W.S. Knudsen, 'For Economical Transportation: How the Chevrolet Motor Company Applies Its Own Slogan to Production', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Aug. 1927), pp. 67-8; L.H. Seltzer, Financial History of the American Automobile Industry (Boston, 1928), pp.100, 114-18; E. Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems of Integration in the Automobile Industry', Journal of Political Economy, Vol.37 (April 1929), pp.160-65; A. Pound, The Turning Wheel: The Story of General Motors Through Twenty-Five Years, 1908-1933 (New York, 1934), pp.196-8; H. Barclay, Ford Production Methods (New York, 1936), pp.24, 109-15; C.F. Sorensen, My Forty Years with Ford (New York, 1956), pp.166, 199-200; A.D. Chandler (ed.), Giant Enterprise: Ford, General Motors and the Automobile Industry (New York, 1964), p.196; A.P. Sloan, Jr., My Years with General Motors (Garden City, NY, 1964), pp.195-8; W.J. Abernathy, The Productivity Dilemma (Baltimore, 1978), pp.89-90; Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow Industrial Renaissance, p.80; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.9, 71, 178, 200-202, 274-5; R.N. Langlois and P.L. Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration: Lessons from the American Automobile Industry', Journal of Economic History, Vol.49 (June 1989), pp.361-75, 370; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations', p. 157; S.R. Helper, 'Strategy and Irreversibility in Supplier Relations: The Case of the U.S. Automotive Industry', Business History Review, Vol.65 (Winter 1991), p.791.
71. This chronology of the first period of hand-to-mouth inventories is based on the following sources: H. Ford (in collaboration with S. Crowther), Today and Tomorrow (Garden City, NY, 1926), pp.105-15; C.B. Durham, 'We Make 1,400% More Cars With 10% More Men', Magazine of Business, Vol.52 (July 1927), pp.29-31, 56-64; K.W. Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying: What Has It Done - and What Will It Do?', Automotive Industries, Vol.57 (2 July 1927), pp.1-4; F.L. Faurote, 'Henry Ford Still on the Job with Renewed Vigor', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Oct. 1927), p.202; W.S. Knudsen, 'For Economical Transportation: How the Chevrolet Motor Company Applies Its Own Slogan to Production', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Aug. 1927), pp. 67-8; L.H. Seltzer, Financial History of the American Automobile Industry (Boston, 1928), pp.100, 114-18; E. Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems of Integration in the Automobile Industry', Journal of Political Economy, Vol.37 (April 1929), pp.160-65; A. Pound, The Turning Wheel: The Story of General Motors Through Twenty-Five Years, 1908-1933 (New York, 1934), pp.196-8; H. Barclay, Ford Production Methods (New York, 1936), pp.24, 109-15; C.F. Sorensen, My Forty Years with Ford (New York, 1956), pp.166, 199-200; A.D. Chandler (ed.), Giant Enterprise: Ford, General Motors and the Automobile Industry (New York, 1964), p.196; A.P. Sloan, Jr., My Years with General Motors (Garden City, NY, 1964), pp.195-8; W.J. Abernathy, The Productivity Dilemma (Baltimore, 1978), pp.89-90; Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow Industrial Renaissance, p.80; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.9, 71, 178, 200-202, 274-5; R.N. Langlois and P.L. Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration: Lessons from the American Automobile Industry', Journal of Economic History, Vol.49 (June 1989), pp.361-75, 370; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations', p. 157; S.R. Helper, 'Strategy and Irreversibility in Supplier Relations: The Case of the U.S. Automotive Industry', Business History Review, Vol.65 (Winter 1991), p.791.
72. This chronology of the first period of hand-to-mouth inventories is based on the following sources: H. Ford (in collaboration with S. Crowther), Today and Tomorrow (Garden City, NY, 1926), pp.105-15; C.B. Durham, 'We Make 1,400% More Cars With 10% More Men', Magazine of Business, Vol.52 (July 1927), pp.29-31, 56-64; K.W. Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying: What Has It Done - and What Will It Do?', Automotive Industries, Vol.57 (2 July 1927), pp.1-4; F.L. Faurote, 'Henry Ford Still on the Job with Renewed Vigor', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Oct. 1927), p.202; W.S. Knudsen, 'For Economical Transportation: How the Chevrolet Motor Company Applies Its Own Slogan to Production', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Aug. 1927), pp. 67-8; L.H. Seltzer, Financial History of the American Automobile Industry (Boston, 1928), pp.100, 114-18; E. Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems of Integration in the Automobile Industry', Journal of Political Economy, Vol.37 (April 1929), pp.160-65; A. Pound, The Turning Wheel: The Story of General Motors Through Twenty-Five Years, 1908-1933 (New York, 1934), pp.196-8; H. Barclay, Ford Production Methods (New York, 1936), pp.24, 109-15; C.F. Sorensen, My Forty Years with Ford (New York, 1956), pp.166, 199-200; A.D. Chandler (ed.), Giant Enterprise: Ford, General Motors and the Automobile Industry (New York, 1964), p.196; A.P. Sloan, Jr., My Years with General Motors (Garden City, NY, 1964), pp.195-8; W.J. Abernathy, The Productivity Dilemma (Baltimore, 1978), pp.89-90; Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow Industrial Renaissance, p.80; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.9, 71, 178, 200-202, 274-5; R.N. Langlois and P.L. Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration: Lessons from the American Automobile Industry', Journal of Economic History, Vol.49 (June 1989), pp.361-75, 370; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations', p. 157; S.R. Helper, 'Strategy and Irreversibility in Supplier Relations: The Case of the U.S. Automotive Industry', Business History Review, Vol.65 (Winter 1991), p.791.
73. This chronology of the first period of hand-to-mouth inventories is based on the following sources: H. Ford (in collaboration with S. Crowther), Today and Tomorrow (Garden City, NY, 1926), pp.105-15; C.B. Durham, 'We Make 1,400% More Cars With 10% More Men', Magazine of Business, Vol.52 (July 1927), pp.29-31, 56-64; K.W. Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying: What Has It Done - and What Will It Do?', Automotive Industries, Vol.57 (2 July 1927), pp.1-4; F.L. Faurote, 'Henry Ford Still on the Job with Renewed Vigor', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Oct. 1927), p.202; W.S. Knudsen, 'For Economical Transportation: How the Chevrolet Motor Company Applies Its Own Slogan to Production', Industrial Management, Vol.74 (Aug. 1927), pp. 67-8; L.H. Seltzer, Financial History of the American Automobile Industry (Boston, 1928), pp.100, 114-18; E. Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems of Integration in the Automobile Industry', Journal of Political Economy, Vol.37 (April 1929), pp.160-65; A. Pound, The Turning Wheel: The Story of General Motors Through Twenty-Five Years, 1908-1933 (New York, 1934), pp.196-8; H. Barclay, Ford Production Methods (New York, 1936), pp.24, 109-15; C.F. Sorensen, My Forty Years with Ford (New York, 1956), pp.166, 199-200; A.D. Chandler (ed.), Giant Enterprise: Ford, General Motors and the Automobile Industry (New York, 1964), p.196; A.P. Sloan, Jr., My Years with General Motors (Garden City, NY, 1964), pp.195-8; W.J. Abernathy, The Productivity Dilemma (Baltimore, 1978), pp.89-90; Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow Industrial Renaissance, p.80; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.9, 71, 178, 200-202, 274-5; R.N. Langlois and P.L. Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration: Lessons from the American Automobile Industry', Journal of Economic History, Vol.49 (June 1989), pp.361-75, 370; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations', p. 157; S.R. Helper, 'Strategy and Irreversibility in Supplier Relations: The Case of the U.S. Automotive Industry', Business History Review, Vol.65 (Winter 1991), p.791.
74. In fact, recent commentary on the ascendancy of Toyota gives considerable weight to the role played by Toyota Motor Sales and its ability to adapt American marketing and distribution techniques to the Japanese market (Williams et al., Cars, Analysis, History, Cases, p.118).
75. The fact that just-in-time and hand-to-mouth occurred in different historical and structural contexts should frame discussions of the similarities of the processes and the role each played in the ascendancy of systems in which they were embedded.
76. For information on the Association of Automotive Engineers and on the standardisation movement it authored, see C.A. Adams, 'Industrial Standardization', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.82 (1919), pp.289-99; C.F. Clarkson, 'Government Transportation Plans: Great Work of the Society of Automobile Engineers in Standardizing Parts', Scientific American, Vol.64 (1916), pp.582-92; Seltzer, Financial History, Ch. II; and G. Thompson, 'Intercompany Technical Standardization in the Early American Automobile Industry', Journal of Economic History; Vol.14 (Winter 1954), pp.1-20.
77. For information on the Association of Automotive Engineers and on the standardisation movement it authored, see C.A. Adams, 'Industrial Standardization', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.82 (1919), pp.289-99; C.F. Clarkson, 'Government Transportation Plans: Great Work of the Society of Automobile Engineers in Standardizing Parts', Scientific American, Vol.64 (1916), pp.582-92; Seltzer, Financial History, Ch. II; and G. Thompson, 'Intercompany Technical Standardization in the Early American Automobile Industry', Journal of Economic History; Vol.14 (Winter 1954), pp.1-20.
78. For information on the Association of Automotive Engineers and on the standardisation movement it authored, see C.A. Adams, 'Industrial Standardization', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.82 (1919), pp.289-99; C.F. Clarkson, 'Government Transportation Plans: Great Work of the Society of Automobile Engineers in Standardizing Parts', Scientific American, Vol.64 (1916), pp.582-92; Seltzer, Financial History, Ch. II; and G. Thompson, 'Intercompany Technical Standardization in the Early American Automobile Industry', Journal of Economic History; Vol.14 (Winter 1954), pp.1-20.
79. For information on the Association of Automotive Engineers and on the standardisation movement it authored, see C.A. Adams, 'Industrial Standardization', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.82 (1919), pp.289-99; C.F. Clarkson, 'Government Transportation Plans: Great Work of the Society of Automobile Engineers in Standardizing Parts', Scientific American, Vol.64 (1916), pp.582-92; Seltzer, Financial History, Ch. II; and G. Thompson, 'Intercompany Technical Standardization in the Early American Automobile Industry', Journal of Economic History; Vol.14 (Winter 1954), pp.1-20.
80. Direct measures of stock levels at Ford are difficult to establish. William Abernathy's examination of the Ford engine plant prior to 1908 suggests initial hand-to-mouth purchasing for utilisation in short production runs (Abernathy, Productivity Dilemma, p.90).
81. H.L. Arnold and F.L. Faurote, Ford Methods and the Ford Shops (New York, 1972), p.63
82. Instead, the moving assembly line was allocated the role of prime mover, and it pushed many of the other innovations from view - including hand-to-mouth inventories. Originally, historians allocated the moving assembly line principal importance, even though there was strong evidence of other significant process innovations. Later scholarship argued that there were several other equally important methods for moving work through the production process (see, for example, K. Williams et al., 'The Myth of the Line: Ford's Production of the Model T at Highland Park, 1909-16', Business History, Vol.35 (1993), p.81).
83. Arnold and Faurote, Ford Methods, p.72. They note that in 1914 the Ford Motor Company employed two full time shortage chasers whose job it was to make sure that sufficient parts were available at each work station and monitor the flow of material though the production process. The shortage chasers kept detailed records of stock and produced two written stock reports daily. In addition, Ford employed 800 stock chasers to facilitate the movement of stock between work stations.
84. The best account of the rise of Ford can be found in D.A. Hounshell, From the American System to Mass Production, 1800-1932: The Development of Manufacturing Technology in the United States (Baltimore, 1984).
85. H. Ford, My Life and Work (Garden City, NY, 1922), p.224
86. Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying', pp.1-2
87. See, for example, Ford, Today and Tomorrow, pp.105-15; Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying'; Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems'.
88. See, for example, Ford, Today and Tomorrow, pp.105-15; Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying'; Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems'.
89. See, for example, Ford, Today and Tomorrow, pp.105-15; Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying'; Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems'.
90. A. Nevins and F.E. Hill, Ford: The Times, the Man, the Company (New York, 1954), p.155.
91. Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.264-5; Nevins and Hill, Ford, pp.266-72.
92. Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.264-5; Nevins and Hill, Ford, pp.266-72.
93. Ford, Today and Tomorrow, p.115. Sorensen estimated the cycle at four days (96 hours), rather than 81 hours ( Sorensen, My Forty Years, p. 166)
94. Ford, Today and Tomorrow, p.115. Sorensen estimated the cycle at four days (96 hours), rather than 81 hours ( Sorensen, My Forty Years, p. 166)
95. Ford, Today and Tomorrow, pp.115-16. For a similar estimate based on Ford company records, see Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance, p.80. Unfortunately, when Kanzler sought to follow the same logic as Ono, and used his vantage point to propose drastic changes in the Model T, Henry Ford Senior dismissed him (Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.264-5; Nevins and Hill, Ford, pp.266-72) This dismissal did not, of course, prevent Henry Senior from extolling the virtues of the system Kanzler had developed.
96. Ford, Today and Tomorrow, pp.115-16. For a similar estimate based on Ford company records, see Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance, p.80. Unfortunately, when Kanzler sought to follow the same logic as Ono, and used his vantage point to propose drastic changes in the Model T, Henry Ford Senior dismissed him (Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.264-5; Nevins and Hill, Ford, pp.266-72) This dismissal did not, of course, prevent Henry Senior from extolling the virtues of the system Kanzler had developed.
97. Ford, Today and Tomorrow, pp.115-16. For a similar estimate based on Ford company records, see Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance, p.80. Unfortunately, when Kanzler sought to follow the same logic as Ono, and used his vantage point to propose drastic changes in the Model T, Henry Ford Senior dismissed him (Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.264-5; Nevins and Hill, Ford, pp.266-72) This dismissal did not, of course, prevent Henry Senior from extolling the virtues of the system Kanzler had developed.
98. Ford, Today and Tomorrow, pp.115-16. For a similar estimate based on Ford company records, see Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance, p.80. Unfortunately, when Kanzler sought to follow the same logic as Ono, and used his vantage point to propose drastic changes in the Model T, Henry Ford Senior dismissed him (Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.264-5; Nevins and Hill, Ford, pp.266-72) This dismissal did not, of course, prevent Henry Senior from extolling the virtues of the system Kanzler had developed.
99. Durham '1,400% More Cars', p.56.
100. Ibid., p.56.
101. Ibid., p.56.
102. Ibid., p.30.
103. Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying', p.2.
104. Abernathy, Productivity Dilemma, p.110.
105. Barclay, Ford Production Methods, pp.108-15. Though this was more rigid than the kanban system developed at Toyota, it was also less labour-intensive.
106. Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying', pp.1-3; Ford, Today and Tomorrow, pp.110-14; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations', p.157; Helper, 'Strategy and Irreversibility', p.791.
107. Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying', pp.1-3; Ford, Today and Tomorrow, pp.110-14; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations', p.157; Helper, 'Strategy and Irreversibility', p.791.
108. Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying', pp.1-3; Ford, Today and Tomorrow, pp.110-14; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations', p.157; Helper, 'Strategy and Irreversibility', p.791.
109. Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying', pp.1-3; Ford, Today and Tomorrow, pp.110-14; Helper, 'Comparative Supplier Relations', p.157; Helper, 'Strategy and Irreversibility', p.791.
110. This tendency was first identified and analysed by economist Eva Flugge in the Journal of Political Economy in 1929, in an insightful article that correctly predicted the trend toward outsourcing at a time when other economists were assuming that increased vertical integration was a monotonic trend in oligopolised industries (Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems', see particularly pp.162-5).
111. Knudsen, 'Economical Transportation'; Hounshell, American System.
112. Knudsen, 'Economical Transportation'; Hounshell, American System.
113. P. Heidt, 'Parts Makers' Role Gets Bigger as Automotive History Unfolds', Automotive Industries, 6 May 1933, pp.46-7. For material on the standardisation movement, see Adams, 'Industrial Standardization'; Clarkson, 'Government Transportation Plans'; Seltzer, Financial History, Ch. II; and Thompson, 'Intercompany Technical Standardization'.
114. P. Heidt, 'Parts Makers' Role Gets Bigger as Automotive History Unfolds', Automotive Industries, 6 May 1933, pp.46-7. For material on the standardisation movement, see Adams, 'Industrial Standardization'; Clarkson, 'Government Transportation Plans'; Seltzer, Financial History, Ch. II; and Thompson, 'Intercompany Technical Standardization'.
115. P. Heidt, 'Parts Makers' Role Gets Bigger as Automotive History Unfolds', Automotive Industries, 6 May 1933, pp.46-7. For material on the standardisation movement, see Adams, 'Industrial Standardization'; Clarkson, 'Government Transportation Plans'; Seltzer, Financial History, Ch. II; and Thompson, 'Intercompany Technical Standardization'.
116. P. Heidt, 'Parts Makers' Role Gets Bigger as Automotive History Unfolds', Automotive Industries, 6 May 1933, pp.46-7. For material on the standardisation movement, see Adams, 'Industrial Standardization'; Clarkson, 'Government Transportation Plans'; Seltzer, Financial History, Ch. II; and Thompson, 'Intercompany Technical Standardization'.
117. P. Heidt, 'Parts Makers' Role Gets Bigger as Automotive History Unfolds', Automotive Industries, 6 May 1933, pp.46-7. For material on the standardisation movement, see Adams, 'Industrial Standardization'; Clarkson, 'Government Transportation Plans'; Seltzer, Financial History, Ch. II; and Thompson, 'Intercompany Technical Standardization'.
118. Stillman, 'Hand-to-Mouth Buying', p.4.
119. 18 Aug. 1927; quoted in Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems', p.163 note 29.
120. For information on the rise of Chrysler, see W.P. Chrysler (in collaboration with B. Sparkes), Life of an American Workman (New York, 1937), pp.171-90; T.F. MacManus and N. Beasley, Men. Money, and Motors: The Drama of the Automobile (New York, 1930), pp.249-59; Fortune (Aug. 1935), pp.33-7; E.D. Kennedy, The Automobile Industry: The Coming of Age of Capitalism's Favorite Child (New York, 1941, reprinted, Clifton, NJ, 1972); R.P. Thomas, 'Style Change and the Automobile Industry during the Roaring Twenties', in L.P. Cain and P.J. Uselding (eds.), Business Enterprise and Economic Change: Essays in Honor of Harold F Williams (Kent, OH, 1973), pp.130, 162-5; Chrysler Corporation, Chrysler Corporation: The Story of an American Company (Detroit, 1955), pp.12-18; J.B. Rae, American Automobile Manufacturers: The First Forty Years (Philadelphia, 1959), pp.144-50.
121. For information on the rise of Chrysler, see W.P. Chrysler (in collaboration with B. Sparkes), Life of an American Workman (New York, 1937), pp.171-90; T.F. MacManus and N. Beasley, Men. Money, and Motors: The Drama of the Automobile (New York, 1930), pp.249-59; Fortune (Aug. 1935), pp.33-7; E.D. Kennedy, The Automobile Industry: The Coming of Age of Capitalism's Favorite Child (New York, 1941, reprinted, Clifton, NJ, 1972); R.P. Thomas, 'Style Change and the Automobile Industry during the Roaring Twenties', in L.P. Cain and P.J. Uselding (eds.), Business Enterprise and Economic Change: Essays in Honor of Harold F Williams (Kent, OH, 1973), pp.130, 162-5; Chrysler Corporation, Chrysler Corporation: The Story of an American Company (Detroit, 1955), pp.12-18; J.B. Rae, American Automobile Manufacturers: The First Forty Years (Philadelphia, 1959), pp.144-50.
122. For information on the rise of Chrysler, see W.P. Chrysler (in collaboration with B. Sparkes), Life of an American Workman (New York, 1937), pp.171-90; T.F. MacManus and N. Beasley, Men. Money, and Motors: The Drama of the Automobile (New York, 1930), pp.249-59; Fortune (Aug. 1935), pp.33-7; E.D. Kennedy, The Automobile Industry: The Coming of Age of Capitalism's Favorite Child (New York, 1941, reprinted, Clifton, NJ, 1972); R.P. Thomas, 'Style Change and the Automobile Industry during the Roaring Twenties', in L.P. Cain and P.J. Uselding (eds.), Business Enterprise and Economic Change: Essays in Honor of Harold F Williams (Kent, OH, 1973), pp.130, 162-5; Chrysler Corporation, Chrysler Corporation: The Story of an American Company (Detroit, 1955), pp.12-18; J.B. Rae, American Automobile Manufacturers: The First Forty Years (Philadelphia, 1959), pp.144-50.
123. For information on the rise of Chrysler, see W.P. Chrysler (in collaboration with B. Sparkes), Life of an American Workman (New York, 1937), pp.171-90; T.F. MacManus and N. Beasley, Men. Money, and Motors: The Drama of the Automobile (New York, 1930), pp.249-59; Fortune (Aug. 1935), pp.33-7; E.D. Kennedy, The Automobile Industry: The Coming of Age of Capitalism's Favorite Child (New York, 1941, reprinted, Clifton, NJ, 1972); R.P. Thomas, 'Style Change and the Automobile Industry during the Roaring Twenties', in L.P. Cain and P.J. Uselding (eds.), Business Enterprise and Economic Change: Essays in Honor of Harold F Williams (Kent, OH, 1973), pp.130, 162-5; Chrysler Corporation, Chrysler Corporation: The Story of an American Company (Detroit, 1955), pp.12-18; J.B. Rae, American Automobile Manufacturers: The First Forty Years (Philadelphia, 1959), pp.144-50.
124. For information on the rise of Chrysler, see W.P. Chrysler (in collaboration with B. Sparkes), Life of an American Workman (New York, 1937), pp.171-90; T.F. MacManus and N. Beasley, Men. Money, and Motors: The Drama of the Automobile (New York, 1930), pp.249-59; Fortune (Aug. 1935), pp.33-7; E.D. Kennedy, The Automobile Industry: The Coming of Age of Capitalism's Favorite Child (New York, 1941, reprinted, Clifton, NJ, 1972); R.P. Thomas, 'Style Change and the Automobile Industry during the Roaring Twenties', in L.P. Cain and P.J. Uselding (eds.), Business Enterprise and Economic Change: Essays in Honor of Harold F Williams (Kent, OH, 1973), pp.130, 162-5; Chrysler Corporation, Chrysler Corporation: The Story of an American Company (Detroit, 1955), pp.12-18; J.B. Rae, American Automobile Manufacturers: The First Forty Years (Philadelphia, 1959), pp.144-50.
125. For information on the rise of Chrysler, see W.P. Chrysler (in collaboration with B. Sparkes), Life of an American Workman (New York, 1937), pp.171-90; T.F. MacManus and N. Beasley, Men. Money, and Motors: The Drama of the Automobile (New York, 1930), pp.249-59; Fortune (Aug. 1935), pp.33-7; E.D. Kennedy, The Automobile Industry: The Coming of Age of Capitalism's Favorite Child (New York, 1941, reprinted, Clifton, NJ, 1972); R.P. Thomas, 'Style Change and the Automobile Industry during the Roaring Twenties', in L.P. Cain and P.J. Uselding (eds.), Business Enterprise and Economic Change: Essays in Honor of Harold F Williams (Kent, OH, 1973), pp.130, 162-5; Chrysler Corporation, Chrysler Corporation: The Story of an American Company (Detroit, 1955), pp.12-18; J.B. Rae, American Automobile Manufacturers: The First Forty Years (Philadelphia, 1959), pp.144-50.
126. For information on the rise of Chrysler, see W.P. Chrysler (in collaboration with B. Sparkes), Life of an American Workman (New York, 1937), pp.171-90; T.F. MacManus and N. Beasley, Men. Money, and Motors: The Drama of the Automobile (New York, 1930), pp.249-59; Fortune (Aug. 1935), pp.33-7; E.D. Kennedy, The Automobile Industry: The Coming of Age of Capitalism's Favorite Child (New York, 1941, reprinted, Clifton, NJ, 1972); R.P. Thomas, 'Style Change and the Automobile Industry during the Roaring Twenties', in L.P. Cain and P.J. Uselding (eds.), Business Enterprise and Economic Change: Essays in Honor of Harold F Williams (Kent, OH, 1973), pp.130, 162-5; Chrysler Corporation, Chrysler Corporation: The Story of an American Company (Detroit, 1955), pp.12-18; J.B. Rae, American Automobile Manufacturers: The First Forty Years (Philadelphia, 1959), pp.144-50.
127. See Seltzer, Financial History, p.77. Seltzer compiled U.S. Census of Manufactures statistics for 1919, 1921, 1923 and 1925, including employees, primary horsepower, wages, value of products and value added. The 1921 recession makes comparisons within this period deceptive, so growth of the industry is best measured by considering the 1919 and 1925 figures. During that span, employment in the parts industry increased from 130,000 to 230,000 and value added from $330 million to $661 million. On the other hand, the number of parts manufacturers declined precipitously, from 2,123 in 1919 to 1,154 in 1929, and it continued to decline thereafter, to 939 in 1939. While this was offset by in increasing average number of workers per company (from 62 to 191 to 304), it nevertheless demonstrates once again that high levels of competition and even prosperity often lead to a much smaller number of (much larger) companies (H. Katz, The Decline of Competition in the Automobile Industry, 1920-1940 (New York, 1977), p.270).
128. See Seltzer, Financial History, p.77. Seltzer compiled U.S. Census of Manufactures statistics for 1919, 1921, 1923 and 1925, including employees, primary horsepower, wages, value of products and value added. The 1921 recession makes comparisons within this period deceptive, so growth of the industry is best measured by considering the 1919 and 1925 figures. During that span, employment in the parts industry increased from 130,000 to 230,000 and value added from $330 million to $661 million. On the other hand, the number of parts manufacturers declined precipitously, from 2,123 in 1919 to 1,154 in 1929, and it continued to decline thereafter, to 939 in 1939. While this was offset by in increasing average number of workers per company (from 62 to 191 to 304), it nevertheless demonstrates once again that high levels of competition and even prosperity often lead to a much smaller number of (much larger) companies (H. Katz, The Decline of Competition in the Automobile Industry, 1920-1940 (New York, 1977), p.270).
129. Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems'; Heidt, 'Parts Makers' Role', p.546; Langlois and Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration', p.369. This trend has been missed by most observers of the early American automobile industry, apparently because of the overarching assumption in neo-classical economics that vertical integration yields economies of scale, allows a firm to secure its sources of supply, and transfers profits of erstwhile suppliers into the company. See, for example, Katz (Decline of Competition, pp.260-64), who asserts a continuous increase in vertical integration between World War I and World War II, despite his own evidence that vertical integration did not increase in the period after 1923 (260). Even Susan Helper, who has provided key insights into the changing profile of supplier-assembler relationships during this period, accepts the received wisdom that internalisation increased monotonically, at least until 1929 (S.R. Helper and D.I. Levine, 'Long-Term Supplier Relations and Product-Market Structure', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.8 No.3 (1992), pp.561-81, 573) For a contemporary scholarly account that noted and appreciated the significance of this trend towards outsourcing, see Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems'; for a recent academic account, see Langlois and Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration', p.369.
130. Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems'; Heidt, 'Parts Makers' Role', p.546; Langlois and Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration', p.369. This trend has been missed by most observers of the early American automobile industry, apparently because of the overarching assumption in neo-classical economics that vertical integration yields economies of scale, allows a firm to secure its sources of supply, and transfers profits of erstwhile suppliers into the company. See, for example, Katz (Decline of Competition, pp.260-64), who asserts a continuous increase in vertical integration between World War I and World War II, despite his own evidence that vertical integration did not increase in the period after 1923 (260). Even Susan Helper, who has provided key insights into the changing profile of supplier-assembler relationships during this period, accepts the received wisdom that internalisation increased monotonically, at least until 1929 (S.R. Helper and D.I. Levine, 'Long-Term Supplier Relations and Product-Market Structure', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.8 No.3 (1992), pp.561-81, 573) For a contemporary scholarly account that noted and appreciated the significance of this trend towards outsourcing, see Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems'; for a recent academic account, see Langlois and Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration', p.369.
131. Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems'; Heidt, 'Parts Makers' Role', p.546; Langlois and Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration', p.369. This trend has been missed by most observers of the early American automobile industry, apparently because of the overarching assumption in neo-classical economics that vertical integration yields economies of scale, allows a firm to secure its sources of supply, and transfers profits of erstwhile suppliers into the company. See, for example, Katz (Decline of Competition, pp.260-64), who asserts a continuous increase in vertical integration between World War I and World War II, despite his own evidence that vertical integration did not increase in the period after 1923 (260). Even Susan Helper, who has provided key insights into the changing profile of supplier-assembler relationships during this period, accepts the received wisdom that internalisation increased monotonically, at least until 1929 (S.R. Helper and D.I. Levine, 'Long-Term Supplier Relations and Product-Market Structure', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.8 No.3 (1992), pp.561-81, 573) For a contemporary scholarly account that noted and appreciated the significance of this trend towards outsourcing, see Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems'; for a recent academic account, see Langlois and Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration', p.369.
132. Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems'; Heidt, 'Parts Makers' Role', p.546; Langlois and Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration', p.369. This trend has been missed by most observers of the early American automobile industry, apparently because of the overarching assumption in neo-classical economics that vertical integration yields economies of scale, allows a firm to secure its sources of supply, and transfers profits of erstwhile suppliers into the company. See, for example, Katz (Decline of Competition, pp.260-64), who asserts a continuous increase in vertical integration between World War I and World War II, despite his own evidence that vertical integration did not increase in the period after 1923 (260). Even Susan Helper, who has provided key insights into the changing profile of supplier-assembler relationships during this period, accepts the received wisdom that internalisation increased monotonically, at least until 1929 (S.R. Helper and D.I. Levine, 'Long-Term Supplier Relations and Product-Market Structure', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.8 No.3 (1992), pp.561-81, 573) For a contemporary scholarly account that noted and appreciated the significance of this trend towards outsourcing, see Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems'; for a recent academic account, see Langlois and Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration', p.369.
133. Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems'; Heidt, 'Parts Makers' Role', p.546; Langlois and Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration', p.369. This trend has been missed by most observers of the early American automobile industry, apparently because of the overarching assumption in neo-classical economics that vertical integration yields economies of scale, allows a firm to secure its sources of supply, and transfers profits of erstwhile suppliers into the company. See, for example, Katz (Decline of Competition, pp.260-64), who asserts a continuous increase in vertical integration between World War I and World War II, despite his own evidence that vertical integration did not increase in the period after 1923 (260). Even Susan Helper, who has provided key insights into the changing profile of supplier-assembler relationships during this period, accepts the received wisdom that internalisation increased monotonically, at least until 1929 (S.R. Helper and D.I. Levine, 'Long-Term Supplier Relations and Product-Market Structure', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.8 No.3 (1992), pp.561-81, 573) For a contemporary scholarly account that noted and appreciated the significance of this trend towards outsourcing, see Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems'; for a recent academic account, see Langlois and Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration', p.369.
134. Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems'; Heidt, 'Parts Makers' Role', p.546; Langlois and Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration', p.369. This trend has been missed by most observers of the early American automobile industry, apparently because of the overarching assumption in neo-classical economics that vertical integration yields economies of scale, allows a firm to secure its sources of supply, and transfers profits of erstwhile suppliers into the company. See, for example, Katz (Decline of Competition, pp.260-64), who asserts a continuous increase in vertical integration between World War I and World War II, despite his own evidence that vertical integration did not increase in the period after 1923 (260). Even Susan Helper, who has provided key insights into the changing profile of supplier-assembler relationships during this period, accepts the received wisdom that internalisation increased monotonically, at least until 1929 (S.R. Helper and D.I. Levine, 'Long-Term Supplier Relations and Product-Market Structure', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.8 No.3 (1992), pp.561-81, 573) For a contemporary scholarly account that noted and appreciated the significance of this trend towards outsourcing, see Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems'; for a recent academic account, see Langlois and Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration', p.369.
135. Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems'; Heidt, 'Parts Makers' Role', p.546; Langlois and Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration', p.369. This trend has been missed by most observers of the early American automobile industry, apparently because of the overarching assumption in neo-classical economics that vertical integration yields economies of scale, allows a firm to secure its sources of supply, and transfers profits of erstwhile suppliers into the company. See, for example, Katz (Decline of Competition, pp.260-64), who asserts a continuous increase in vertical integration between World War I and World War II, despite his own evidence that vertical integration did not increase in the period after 1923 (260). Even Susan Helper, who has provided key insights into the changing profile of supplier-assembler relationships during this period, accepts the received wisdom that internalisation increased monotonically, at least until 1929 (S.R. Helper and D.I. Levine, 'Long-Term Supplier Relations and Product-Market Structure', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol.8 No.3 (1992), pp.561-81, 573) For a contemporary scholarly account that noted and appreciated the significance of this trend towards outsourcing, see Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems'; for a recent academic account, see Langlois and Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration', p.369.
136. Kennedy, Automobile Industry, p.207; Katz, Decline of Competition, pp.258-60.
137. Kennedy, Automobile Industry, p.207; Katz, Decline of Competition, pp.258-60.
138. Fortune (Dec. 1933), pp.121, 128; Katz, Decline of Competition, p.252. In 1926, Henry Ford wrote: 'We buy about twice as much as we manufacture ourselves' (Ford, Today and Tomorrow, p.3). This comment led Katz to conclude that Ford was outsourcing 67 per cent of its costs and that Ford had therefore increased its degree of vertical integration between 1926 and 1933 (Katz, Decline of Competition, p.252). It seems likely that this casual comment was grossly inaccurate or was referring to a particular type of component, since census data showed that the industry as a whole purchased only 26 per cent externally that year (Seltzer, Financial History, p.57). Had Ford, which constituted some 40 per cent of the industry, outsourced 67 per cent, then GM would have had to outsource 100 per cent to achieve the industry-wide figure.
139. Fortune (Dec. 1933), pp.121, 128; Katz, Decline of Competition, p.252. In 1926, Henry Ford wrote: 'We buy about twice as much as we manufacture ourselves' (Ford, Today and Tomorrow, p.3). This comment led Katz to conclude that Ford was outsourcing 67 per cent of its costs and that Ford had therefore increased its degree of vertical integration between 1926 and 1933 (Katz, Decline of Competition, p.252). It seems likely that this casual comment was grossly inaccurate or was referring to a particular type of component, since census data showed that the industry as a whole purchased only 26 per cent externally that year (Seltzer, Financial History, p.57). Had Ford, which constituted some 40 per cent of the industry, outsourced 67 per cent, then GM would have had to outsource 100 per cent to achieve the industry-wide figure.
140. Fortune (Dec. 1933), pp.121, 128; Katz, Decline of Competition, p.252. In 1926, Henry Ford wrote: 'We buy about twice as much as we manufacture ourselves' (Ford, Today and Tomorrow, p.3). This comment led Katz to conclude that Ford was outsourcing 67 per cent of its costs and that Ford had therefore increased its degree of vertical integration between 1926 and 1933 (Katz, Decline of Competition, p.252). It seems likely that this casual comment was grossly inaccurate or was referring to a particular type of component, since census data showed that the industry as a whole purchased only 26 per cent externally that year (Seltzer, Financial History, p.57). Had Ford, which constituted some 40 per cent of the industry, outsourced 67 per cent, then GM would have had to outsource 100 per cent to achieve the industry-wide figure.
141. Fortune (Dec. 1933), pp.121, 128; Katz, Decline of Competition, p.252. In 1926, Henry Ford wrote: 'We buy about twice as much as we manufacture ourselves' (Ford, Today and Tomorrow, p.3). This comment led Katz to conclude that Ford was outsourcing 67 per cent of its costs and that Ford had therefore increased its degree of vertical integration between 1926 and 1933 (Katz, Decline of Competition, p.252). It seems likely that this casual comment was grossly inaccurate or was referring to a particular type of component, since census data showed that the industry as a whole purchased only 26 per cent externally that year (Seltzer, Financial History, p.57). Had Ford, which constituted some 40 per cent of the industry, outsourced 67 per cent, then GM would have had to outsource 100 per cent to achieve the industry-wide figure.
142. Fortune (Dec. 1933), pp.121, 128; Katz, Decline of Competition, p.252. In 1926, Henry Ford wrote: 'We buy about twice as much as we manufacture ourselves' (Ford, Today and Tomorrow, p.3). This comment led Katz to conclude that Ford was outsourcing 67 per cent of its costs and that Ford had therefore increased its degree of vertical integration between 1926 and 1933 (Katz, Decline of Competition, p.252). It seems likely that this casual comment was grossly inaccurate or was referring to a particular type of component, since census data showed that the industry as a whole purchased only 26 per cent externally that year (Seltzer, Financial History, p.57). Had Ford, which constituted some 40 per cent of the industry, outsourced 67 per cent, then GM would have had to outsource 100 per cent to achieve the industry-wide figure.
143. Fortune (Jan. 1939), p. 104.
144. Heidt, 'Parts Makers' Role', pp.46-7; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.68-74, 222; Fortune (Feb. 1937), p.130; Katz, Decline of Competition, pp.265-77.
145. Heidt, 'Parts Makers' Role', pp.46-7; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.68-74, 222; Fortune (Feb. 1937), p.130; Katz, Decline of Competition, pp.265-77.
146. Heidt, 'Parts Makers' Role', pp.46-7; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.68-74, 222; Fortune (Feb. 1937), p.130; Katz, Decline of Competition, pp.265-77.
147. Heidt, 'Parts Makers' Role', pp.46-7; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, pp.68-74, 222; Fortune (Feb. 1937), p.130; Katz, Decline of Competition, pp.265-77.
148. Fortune (Aug. 1935), pp.114, 117.
149. In fact, we have been able to find only one contemporary observer who understood the role of the hand-to-mouth in the broader profile of the Detroit production culture. Eva Flugge, commenting that the high rates of innovation and low inventory levels, presciently concluded: 'The entire situation is based on the existence of an efficient and competitive parts industry; should important changes in its structure occur, the whole situation would be changed' (Flugge, 'Possibilities and Problems', p.164).
150. Inventory turnover (also called turnover ratio and stock turn ration) is the value of the average inventory during a year divided into the total supplies purchased during that year.
151. Cusomano's inventory turnover ratios are an over-estimate of the differences in the size of stock piles. He does not account for the fact that Toyota's lower vertical integration produced a flatter stock turn ratio. Because General Motors, Ford and Chrysler performed more of their operations 'in house', their average stocks appear higher. However, the large differences stock piles cannot be entirely accounted for by differences in integration.
152. Ford, Today and Tomorrow, p.114. For other data see, Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow Industrial Renaissance, p.80; Barclay, Ford Production Methods, p.24; Ford, Today and Tomorrow, p.109; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, p.178; Pound, Turning Wheel, pp.196-8; Sorensen, My Forty Years, p.166.
153. Ford, Today and Tomorrow, p.114. For other data see, Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow Industrial Renaissance, p.80; Barclay, Ford Production Methods, p.24; Ford, Today and Tomorrow, p.109; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, p.178; Pound, Turning Wheel, pp.196-8; Sorensen, My Forty Years, p.166.
154. Ford, Today and Tomorrow, p.114. For other data see, Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow Industrial Renaissance, p.80; Barclay, Ford Production Methods, p.24; Ford, Today and Tomorrow, p.109; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, p.178; Pound, Turning Wheel, pp.196-8; Sorensen, My Forty Years, p.166.
155. Ford, Today and Tomorrow, p.114. For other data see, Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow Industrial Renaissance, p.80; Barclay, Ford Production Methods, p.24; Ford, Today and Tomorrow, p.109; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, p.178; Pound, Turning Wheel, pp.196-8; Sorensen, My Forty Years, p.166.
156. Ford, Today and Tomorrow, p.114. For other data see, Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow Industrial Renaissance, p.80; Barclay, Ford Production Methods, p.24; Ford, Today and Tomorrow, p.109; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, p.178; Pound, Turning Wheel, pp.196-8; Sorensen, My Forty Years, p.166.
157. Ford, Today and Tomorrow, p.114. For other data see, Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow Industrial Renaissance, p.80; Barclay, Ford Production Methods, p.24; Ford, Today and Tomorrow, p.109; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, p.178; Pound, Turning Wheel, pp.196-8; Sorensen, My Forty Years, p.166.
158. Ford, Today and Tomorrow, p.114. For other data see, Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow Industrial Renaissance, p.80; Barclay, Ford Production Methods, p.24; Ford, Today and Tomorrow, p.109; Kuhn, GM Passes Ford, p.178; Pound, Turning Wheel, pp.196-8; Sorensen, My Forty Years, p.166.
159. Abernathy, Productivity Dilemma, p.80.
160. For a detailed analysis, see Kenney and Florida, Beyond Mass Production.
161. Piore and Sabel, Second Industrial Divide
162. J.M. Rubenstein, The Changing US Auto Industry: A Geographical Analysis (New York, 1992).