Export controls and biological weapons: New roles, new challenges

Critical Reviews in Microbiology

Volumn 24, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 235-254

  Roberts, Brad ^a  

^a INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES   (United States)

Author keywords

Biological weapons; Biological weapons convention; Export controls

Indexed keywords

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE; INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION; MILITARY PHENOMENA; PRIORITY JOURNAL; REVIEW; TECHNOLOGY; WAR;

AUSTRALIA; BIOLOGICAL WARFARE; INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION; POLITICS; UNITED STATES;

EID: 0031657226     PISSN: 1040841X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10408419891294244     Document Type: Review

References (14)

1. Jones, R. W. and McDonough, M. G., Eds., Nuclear supplier organizations, in Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 1998, 307-310.
2. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Export Controls and Nonproliferation Policy (Washington, D.C.: GPO, May 1994), OTA-ISS-596.
3. The CWC puts four specific export control obligations on states parties. First, immediately upon entry into force of the convention they must halt trade to non-parties of certain chemicals immediately useful for chemical warfare purposes (schedule one chemicals). Second, three years after entry into force they must halt trade to non-parties of the precursors of chemical warfare agents (schedule two chemicals). Third, during these three years, they are required to provide end-use certification of such trade. And fourth, they must track and report the quantities of chemicals exported for general industrial usage (schedule three chemicals). This obliges many developing countries, some of which are significant chemical exporters, to create an export control system.
4. For a full text of the convention and a discussion of its provisions, see Anns Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1990), pp. 129-141.
5. Figures provided by U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Export Enforcement, 1993.
6. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, Special Licensing Division, April 13, 1995.
7. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Infectious Diseases, March 29, 1995.
8. Parallel data in the chemical domain makes an even stronger case for this conclusion. Despite the founding of the Australia Group in 1985, trade in chemicals has flourished. Between 1980 and 1991, the exports of chemicals from the developed world to the developing world nearly doubled, from $33 billion to $57 billion. (In 1993, the global market for chemical products totaled $1.26 trillion.) But trade is merely one measure of the degree of international cooperation in this area and is, in fact, a poor measure of technology transfer. The latter is more accurately depicted in patterns of foreign direct investment. Between 1983 and 1993, direct investment abroad in chemical and allied products by U.S. chemical manufacturers doubled from $4.05 billion to $9.98 billion (these are annual investments). The relative percentage of investment in the developing world has remained unchanged during this period, running at 21 percent in both 1983 and 1993. Industry specialists report that the significant barriers to further investment in developing countries derive from the failure of some such countries to protect intellectual property rights and to remove other national barriers to trade. Source: Chemical Manufacturers' Association, 1994.
9. WuDunn, S., Miller, J., and Broad, W. J., How Japan germ terror alerted world, New York Times, May 26, 1998.
10. These and many other points in this paper are taken from Roberts, B., Rethinking export controls on dual-use materials and technologies: from trade restraints to trade enablers, Arena No. 2, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, Alexandria, Va., June 1995.
11. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, Special Licensing Division, April 13, 1995.
12. Export Controls and Nonproliferation Policy, pp. 26-30, 38-39, 61-63.
13. Export Controls and Nonproliferation Policy, p. 23.
14. "Working Paper Addressed to the Western Group," Federation of American Scientists working Group on Biological and Toxin Weapons Verification, March 1995, p. 5.