Ukraine, Russia, and European security: Thinking beyond NATO expansion

Problems of Post-Communism

Volumn 45, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 21-29

  Balmaceda, Margarita M ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0031629282     PISSN: 10758216     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10758216.1998.11655769     Document Type: Review

References (64)

1. That Russia does not aspire to maintain a status-quo policy in Europe is made clear by the theses of the influential Council for Foreign and Defense Policy. See Nezavisimaia gazeta (May 20, 1997). I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this point to my attention.
2. Rzeczpospolita (January 31, 1997), translated in World News Connection, Daily Report: East Europe [hereafter WNC:EEU] (February 7, 1997).
3. The phrase "once the cards are dealt" is from Warsaw Sztandar (December 30, 1996), in WNC:EEU (January 8, 1997).
4. See Margarita M. Balmaceda, "Two Is Company, Three Is a Crowd: The Role of Central Europe in Ukrainian Security," East European Quarterly 31, no. 3 (1997), forthcoming.
5. See Taras Kuzio, Ukrainian Security Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger/ The Washington Papers, 1995), p. 56.
6. Vechirnii Kyiv (January 17, 1997), translated in World News Connection, Daily Report: Central Eurasia [hereafter WNC:SOV] (February 6, 1997).
7. Nezavisimaia gazeta (April 17, 1996).
8. For the full text of the doctrine in Ukrainian, see Uryadovy Kuryer [Kyiv] (January 6, 1997). For the full version in Russian, see Zerkalo Nedeli [Kyiv] (January 18, 1997).
9. For the full text of the doctrine in Ukrainian, see Uryadovy Kuryer [Kyiv] (January 6, 1997). For the full version in Russian, see Zerkalo Nedeli [Kyiv] (January 18, 1997).
10. Interview with Boris Tarasiuk, Ukrainian ambassador to Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg, in Vysokyy Zamok [Lviv] (February 13, 1997), in WNC:SOV (February 20, 1997).
11. IntelNews Weekly Digest (February 3, 1997).
12. Taras Kuzio, "Ukraine and NATO Enlargement," NATO Review, forthcoming. Figures from a survey of forty-four experts indicated that 82.5 percent of them favored membership either now, within three to four years, or within five to ten years, with only 16.7 percent of the experts rejecting NATO membership under any circumstances. The survey was conducted in November-December 1996 by the Kyiv-based Ukrainian Center for Peace, Conversion, and Conflict Resolution Studies. See Volodymyr Zviglyanich, "What Do Ukrainians Think of NATO?" Jamestown Foundation Prism 3, Part 3 (February 1997).
13. Taras Kuzio, "Ukraine and NATO Enlargement," NATO Review, forthcoming. Figures from a survey of forty-four experts indicated that 82.5 percent of them favored membership either now, within three to four years, or within five to ten years, with only 16.7 percent of the experts rejecting NATO membership under any circumstances. The survey was conducted in November-December 1996 by the Kyiv-based Ukrainian Center for Peace, Conversion, and Conflict Resolution Studies. See Volodymyr Zviglyanich, "What Do Ukrainians Think of NATO?" Jamestown Foundation Prism 3, Part 3 (February 1997).
14. Zerkalo Nedeli (November 23, 1996).
15. According to Volodimyr Mukin, chair of the Rada's committee on defense, IntelNews Weekly Digest (February 10, 1997).
16. Zviglyanich, "What Do Ukrainians Think of NATO?"
17. Eastern Economist (January 20, 1997).
18. Sueddeutsche Zeitung [Munich] (November 27, 1996).
19. "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation," Paris, May 27, 1997.
20. "Charter on a Distinctive Partnership Between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine," Madrid, July 9, 1997.
21. Ibid.
22. Vechirniy Kyiv (February 21, 1997), in WNC:SOV (February 28, 1997).
23. Ibid.
24. "Founding Act on Mutual Relations."
25. Harvey Sicherman, "The Loud Voice of the NATO-Russian Council," Transition 4, no. 3 (August 1997): 53.
26. Ukrayina Moloda (July 8, 1997), in WNC:SOV (July 14, 1997).
27. Washington Post (July 12, 1997).
28. Author's interviews, Moscow, March-April 1997.
29. See Kuzio, "Ukraine and NATO Enlargement."
30. Ukrainian writer Rostislav Khotin has pointed to some of the psychological factors involved: "Only a country with a post-totalitarian consciousness can propose a foreign policy initiative and call it a 'zone.' One can imagine what goes through the mind of the average Pole or Hungarian - we just came out of one zone, Soviet and Socialist, and now Ukraine proposes still another.... It does not matter what kind of 'zone': Leonid Kravchuk's zone of security and stability, or Leonid Kuchma's nuclear free zone." Zerkalo Nedeli (November 16, 1996).
31. Belarus's proposal was rejected by NATO in a letter dated February 1, 1997 (IntelNews Weekly Digest [February 10, 1997]).
32. Zerkalo Nedeli (November 16, 1996).
33. Zerkalo Nedeli (February 15, 1997).
34. Vysokyy Zamok [Lviv] (February 13, 1997), in WNC:SOV (February 20, 1997).
35. I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to my attention.
36. Kuzio, "Ukraine and NATO Enlargement."
37. See Ukrayina Moloda (July 8, 1997), in WNC:SOV (July 14, 1997).
38. Kuzio, "Ukraine and NATO Enlargement."
39. Novaia gazeta [Moscow] (June 2-8, 1997), in WNC:SOV (June 5, 1997).
40. In 1995, Belarus and Russia signed an agreement abolishing borders, providing for monetary union, and creating the Confederation of Russia and Belarus.
41. Novoe vremia [Moscow] no. 38 (September 1995): 15.
42. Kuzio, "Ukraine and NATO Enlargement," Intel News Weekly Digest (March 3, 1997): 80.
43. In November 1996 a crisis erupted in Belarus as President Lukashenka proposed a referendum that would have effectively disbanded the parliament. Lukashenka won a majority in a referendum widely denounced as invalid. As a result, two rival parliaments were formed.
44. In November 1996 the three countries held a summit to discuss the Belarusan situation and condemned Lukashenka's attempt to establish an authoritarian regime. A similar meeting took place in May 1997.
45. Rzeczpospolita (November 27, 1996).
46. Markian Bilyskyi, "A Tale of Two Letters," Update on Ukraine (electronic newsletter, January 27, 1997): 4. Indeed, on February 21, 1997, Belarus imposed a VAT tax on imports from Ukraine on the basis of an agreement between Belarus and Russia "regarding the Customs Union and Unification of tax legislation."
47. Moscow Interfax (April 27, 1997), in WNC:SOV (April 29, 1997).
48. IntelNews Weekly Digest (February 10, 1997).
49. Business Central Europe (February 1996).
50. J.F. Brown, "Everybody Needs Russia - Including Eastern Europe," Transition 2, no. 23 (November 15, 1996): 8
51. Gazeta Wyborcza (January 22, 1997), in WNC:SOV (February 10, 1997).
52. The acceptance of new member states must be approved by all current members of the alliance.
53. In this respect, it is interesting to note Slovenia's aloof position vis-à-vis Southeast European cooperation agreements such as the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative and the European transportation corridor. Slovenia has opposed regional cooperation agreements such as the extension of the Trieste-Kyiv "European highway" up to Croatia. Nepszabadsag [Budapest] (January 25, 1997).
54. See Pierre Béhar, "Europe Centrale: les nouvelles fractures" (Central Europe: New Divisions), Geopolitique no. 39 (autumn 1992): 58-63.
55. Moldova's neutrality is mandated in its constitution.
56. Moscow NTV (March 4, 1997), in WNC:SOV (March 7, 1997); and Moscow Interfax (July 1, 1997), in WNC:SOV (July 14, 1997).
57. Moscow NTV (March 4, 1997), in WNC:SOV (March 7, 1997); and Moscow Interfax (July 1, 1997), in WNC:SOV (July 14, 1997).
58. Witness the recent agreements between Hungary and Slovakia (1995) and Hungary and Romania (1996).
59. Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick, "NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States," Survival 38, no. 2 (summer 1996): 135.
60. Ibid.
61. Ihor Kharchenko, director of policy planning at Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, quoted in Kuzio, "Ukraine and NATO Enlargement."
62. Indeed, as has been highlighted by Kuzio, three of the four politicians most likely to eventually replace Yeltsin would back territorial claims on the Crimea and Sevastopol (of the likely candidates Aleksandr Lebed, Gennadii Ziuganov, Iurii Luzhkov, and Viktor Chernomyrdin, only the last is not expected to overtly back these claims). See Kuzio, "Ukraine and NATO Enlargement."
63. See Dana H. Allin, "Can Containment Work Again?" Survival 37, no. 1 (spring 1995): 60, 62.
64. Asmus and Nurick, "NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States," p. 134.