Wage secrecy as a social convention

Economic Inquiry

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 59-69

  Danziger, Leif ^a   Katz, Eliakim ^a  

^a YORK UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031542901     PISSN: 00952583     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1997.tb01894.x     Document Type: Article

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