The Effects of Rivalry with Price Regulation of Electric Power Generation

Journal of Regulatory Economics

Volumn 11, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 119-137

  Braeutigam, Ronald R ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031541688     PISSN: 0922680X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1007989730081     Document Type: Article

References (11)

1. Baumol, W. J., and D. F. Bradford. 1970, "Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing." American Economic Review 60: 265-283.
2. Baumol, W. J., J. C. Panzar, and R. D. Willig. 1982. Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
3. Berg, S. and Tschirhart, J. 1989. Natural Monopoly Regulation: Principles and Practice. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
4. Bonbright, J. 1961. "Fully Distributed Costs in Utility Rate Making." American Economic Review 51: 305-312.
5. Braeutigam, R. 1989. "Optimal Policies for Natural Monopolies." In Handbook of Industrial Organization, edited by Schmalensee, R. and R. D. Willig, vol. 2. New York, NY: North-Holland: 1289-1346.
6. Braeutigam, R. 1980. "An Analysis of Fully Distributed Cost Pricing in Regulated Industries." Bell Journal of Economics 11(1): 182-196.
7. Faulhaber, G. R. 1975. "Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises." American Economic Review 65: 966-977.
8. Joskow, P. L. 1989. "Regulatory Failure, Regulatory Reform,. and Structural Change in the Electrical Power Industry." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution: 125-199.
9. Joskow, P.L., and R. Schmalensee. 1983. Markets for Power: An Analysis of Electric Utility Deregulation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
10. Lofgren, S. 1996. Economic Policy Implications of the Changing Structure of the Electric Utility Industry: Effects on Reliability and Wholesale Electricity Markets, Ph.D. Dissertation, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University.
11. Sweeney, G. 1982. "Welfare Implications of Fully Distributed Cost Pricing Applied to Partially Regulated Firms." Bell Journal of Economics 13: 525-533.