Referendum design: An exercise in applied social choice theory

Scandinavian Political Studies

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 33-52

  Nurmi, Hannu ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TURKU   (Finland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031541298     PISSN: 00806757     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9477.1997.tb00183.x     Document Type: Article

References (41)

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