On the consistency of merger policy

Journal of Industrial Economics

Volumn 45, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 89-100

  Nilssen, Tore ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031538067     PISSN: 00221821     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-6451.00036     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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