Democratization and foreign policy change: The case of the Russian Federation

Review of International Studies

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 49-74

  Kozhemiakin, Alexander V ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0031537771     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210597000491     Document Type: Article

References (141)

1. See, e.g., Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, 80:4 (1986), pp. 1151-69; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, 1993); Rudolph Rummel, 'Libertarian Propositions on Violence Between and Within Nations', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29:3 (1985), pp. 419-55; David Lake, 'Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War', American Political Science Review, 86:1 (Mar. 1992), pp. 24-37; Clifton Morgan, 'Democracy and War: Reflections on the Literature', International Interactions, 18:3 (1993), pp. 197-204; John M. Owen, 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125. It should be emphasized, however, that some analysts question the validity of the 'democratic peace' argument. See, e.g., Christopher Layne, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 5-49; David Spiro, 'The Insignificance of Liberal Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 50-86; Raymond Cohen, 'Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory that "Democracies do not Go to War with Each Other" ', Review of International Studies, 20:3 (1994), pp. 207-23. For the response of the 'democratic peace' theorists to these criticisms, see Bruce Russett, 'The Democratic Peace: "And Yet it Moves" ', International Security, 19:4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-75; Bruce Russett and James Lee Ray, 'Why the Democratic-Peace Proposition Lives', Review of International Studies, 21:3 (1995), pp. 319-23.
2. See, e.g., Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, 80:4 (1986), pp. 1151-69; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, 1993); Rudolph Rummel, 'Libertarian Propositions on Violence Between and Within Nations', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29:3 (1985), pp. 419-55; David Lake, 'Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War', American Political Science Review, 86:1 (Mar. 1992), pp. 24-37; Clifton Morgan, 'Democracy and War: Reflections on the Literature', International Interactions, 18:3 (1993), pp. 197-204; John M. Owen, 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125. It should be emphasized, however, that some analysts question the validity of the 'democratic peace' argument. See, e.g., Christopher Layne, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 5-49; David Spiro, 'The Insignificance of Liberal Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 50-86; Raymond Cohen, 'Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory that "Democracies do not Go to War with Each Other" ', Review of International Studies, 20:3 (1994), pp. 207-23. For the response of the 'democratic peace' theorists to these criticisms, see Bruce Russett, 'The Democratic Peace: "And Yet it Moves" ', International Security, 19:4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-75; Bruce Russett and James Lee Ray, 'Why the Democratic-Peace Proposition Lives', Review of International Studies, 21:3 (1995), pp. 319-23.
3. See, e.g., Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, 80:4 (1986), pp. 1151-69; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, 1993); Rudolph Rummel, 'Libertarian Propositions on Violence Between and Within Nations', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29:3 (1985), pp. 419-55; David Lake, 'Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War', American Political Science Review, 86:1 (Mar. 1992), pp. 24-37; Clifton Morgan, 'Democracy and War: Reflections on the Literature', International Interactions, 18:3 (1993), pp. 197-204; John M. Owen, 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125. It should be emphasized, however, that some analysts question the validity of the 'democratic peace' argument. See, e.g., Christopher Layne, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 5-49; David Spiro, 'The Insignificance of Liberal Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 50-86; Raymond Cohen, 'Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory that "Democracies do not Go to War with Each Other" ', Review of International Studies, 20:3 (1994), pp. 207-23. For the response of the 'democratic peace' theorists to these criticisms, see Bruce Russett, 'The Democratic Peace: "And Yet it Moves" ', International Security, 19:4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-75; Bruce Russett and James Lee Ray, 'Why the Democratic-Peace Proposition Lives', Review of International Studies, 21:3 (1995), pp. 319-23.
4. See, e.g., Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, 80:4 (1986), pp. 1151-69; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, 1993); Rudolph Rummel, 'Libertarian Propositions on Violence Between and Within Nations', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29:3 (1985), pp. 419-55; David Lake, 'Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War', American Political Science Review, 86:1 (Mar. 1992), pp. 24-37; Clifton Morgan, 'Democracy and War: Reflections on the Literature', International Interactions, 18:3 (1993), pp. 197-204; John M. Owen, 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125. It should be emphasized, however, that some analysts question the validity of the 'democratic peace' argument. See, e.g., Christopher Layne, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 5-49; David Spiro, 'The Insignificance of Liberal Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 50-86; Raymond Cohen, 'Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory that "Democracies do not Go to War with Each Other" ', Review of International Studies, 20:3 (1994), pp. 207-23. For the response of the 'democratic peace' theorists to these criticisms, see Bruce Russett, 'The Democratic Peace: "And Yet it Moves" ', International Security, 19:4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-75; Bruce Russett and James Lee Ray, 'Why the Democratic-Peace Proposition Lives', Review of International Studies, 21:3 (1995), pp. 319-23.
5. See, e.g., Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, 80:4 (1986), pp. 1151-69; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, 1993); Rudolph Rummel, 'Libertarian Propositions on Violence Between and Within Nations', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29:3 (1985), pp. 419-55; David Lake, 'Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War', American Political Science Review, 86:1 (Mar. 1992), pp. 24-37; Clifton Morgan, 'Democracy and War: Reflections on the Literature', International Interactions, 18:3 (1993), pp. 197-204; John M. Owen, 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125. It should be emphasized, however, that some analysts question the validity of the 'democratic peace' argument. See, e.g., Christopher Layne, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 5-49; David Spiro, 'The Insignificance of Liberal Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 50-86; Raymond Cohen, 'Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory that "Democracies do not Go to War with Each Other" ', Review of International Studies, 20:3 (1994), pp. 207-23. For the response of the 'democratic peace' theorists to these criticisms, see Bruce Russett, 'The Democratic Peace: "And Yet it Moves" ', International Security, 19:4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-75; Bruce Russett and James Lee Ray, 'Why the Democratic-Peace Proposition Lives', Review of International Studies, 21:3 (1995), pp. 319-23.
6. See, e.g., Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, 80:4 (1986), pp. 1151-69; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, 1993); Rudolph Rummel, 'Libertarian Propositions on Violence Between and Within Nations', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29:3 (1985), pp. 419-55; David Lake, 'Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War', American Political Science Review, 86:1 (Mar. 1992), pp. 24-37; Clifton Morgan, 'Democracy and War: Reflections on the Literature', International Interactions, 18:3 (1993), pp. 197-204; John M. Owen, 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125. It should be emphasized, however, that some analysts question the validity of the 'democratic peace' argument. See, e.g., Christopher Layne, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 5-49; David Spiro, 'The Insignificance of Liberal Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 50-86; Raymond Cohen, 'Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory that "Democracies do not Go to War with Each Other" ', Review of International Studies, 20:3 (1994), pp. 207-23. For the response of the 'democratic peace' theorists to these criticisms, see Bruce Russett, 'The Democratic Peace: "And Yet it Moves" ', International Security, 19:4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-75; Bruce Russett and James Lee Ray, 'Why the Democratic-Peace Proposition Lives', Review of International Studies, 21:3 (1995), pp. 319-23.
7. See, e.g., Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, 80:4 (1986), pp. 1151-69; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, 1993); Rudolph Rummel, 'Libertarian Propositions on Violence Between and Within Nations', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29:3 (1985), pp. 419-55; David Lake, 'Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War', American Political Science Review, 86:1 (Mar. 1992), pp. 24-37; Clifton Morgan, 'Democracy and War: Reflections on the Literature', International Interactions, 18:3 (1993), pp. 197-204; John M. Owen, 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125. It should be emphasized, however, that some analysts question the validity of the 'democratic peace' argument. See, e.g., Christopher Layne, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 5-49; David Spiro, 'The Insignificance of Liberal Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 50-86; Raymond Cohen, 'Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory that "Democracies do not Go to War with Each Other" ', Review of International Studies, 20:3 (1994), pp. 207-23. For the response of the 'democratic peace' theorists to these criticisms, see Bruce Russett, 'The Democratic Peace: "And Yet it Moves" ', International Security, 19:4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-75; Bruce Russett and James Lee Ray, 'Why the Democratic-Peace Proposition Lives', Review of International Studies, 21:3 (1995), pp. 319-23.
8. See, e.g., Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, 80:4 (1986), pp. 1151-69; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, 1993); Rudolph Rummel, 'Libertarian Propositions on Violence Between and Within Nations', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29:3 (1985), pp. 419-55; David Lake, 'Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War', American Political Science Review, 86:1 (Mar. 1992), pp. 24-37; Clifton Morgan, 'Democracy and War: Reflections on the Literature', International Interactions, 18:3 (1993), pp. 197-204; John M. Owen, 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125. It should be emphasized, however, that some analysts question the validity of the 'democratic peace' argument. See, e.g., Christopher Layne, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 5-49; David Spiro, 'The Insignificance of Liberal Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 50-86; Raymond Cohen, 'Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory that "Democracies do not Go to War with Each Other" ', Review of International Studies, 20:3 (1994), pp. 207-23. For the response of the 'democratic peace' theorists to these criticisms, see Bruce Russett, 'The Democratic Peace: "And Yet it Moves" ', International Security, 19:4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-75; Bruce Russett and James Lee Ray, 'Why the Democratic-Peace Proposition Lives', Review of International Studies, 21:3 (1995), pp. 319-23.
9. See, e.g., Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, 80:4 (1986), pp. 1151-69; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, 1993); Rudolph Rummel, 'Libertarian Propositions on Violence Between and Within Nations', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29:3 (1985), pp. 419-55; David Lake, 'Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War', American Political Science Review, 86:1 (Mar. 1992), pp. 24-37; Clifton Morgan, 'Democracy and War: Reflections on the Literature', International Interactions, 18:3 (1993), pp. 197-204; John M. Owen, 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125. It should be emphasized, however, that some analysts question the validity of the 'democratic peace' argument. See, e.g., Christopher Layne, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 5-49; David Spiro, 'The Insignificance of Liberal Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 50-86; Raymond Cohen, 'Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory that "Democracies do not Go to War with Each Other" ', Review of International Studies, 20:3 (1994), pp. 207-23. For the response of the 'democratic peace' theorists to these criticisms, see Bruce Russett, 'The Democratic Peace: "And Yet it Moves" ', International Security, 19:4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-75; Bruce Russett and James Lee Ray, 'Why the Democratic-Peace Proposition Lives', Review of International Studies, 21:3 (1995), pp. 319-23.
10. See, e.g., Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, 80:4 (1986), pp. 1151-69; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, 1993); Rudolph Rummel, 'Libertarian Propositions on Violence Between and Within Nations', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29:3 (1985), pp. 419-55; David Lake, 'Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War', American Political Science Review, 86:1 (Mar. 1992), pp. 24-37; Clifton Morgan, 'Democracy and War: Reflections on the Literature', International Interactions, 18:3 (1993), pp. 197-204; John M. Owen, 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125. It should be emphasized, however, that some analysts question the validity of the 'democratic peace' argument. See, e.g., Christopher Layne, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 5-49; David Spiro, 'The Insignificance of Liberal Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 50-86; Raymond Cohen, 'Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory that "Democracies do not Go to War with Each Other" ', Review of International Studies, 20:3 (1994), pp. 207-23. For the response of the 'democratic peace' theorists to these criticisms, see Bruce Russett, 'The Democratic Peace: "And Yet it Moves" ', International Security, 19:4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-75; Bruce Russett and James Lee Ray, 'Why the Democratic-Peace Proposition Lives', Review of International Studies, 21:3 (1995), pp. 319-23.
11. See, e.g., Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', American Political Science Review, 80:4 (1986), pp. 1151-69; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, 1993); Rudolph Rummel, 'Libertarian Propositions on Violence Between and Within Nations', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29:3 (1985), pp. 419-55; David Lake, 'Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War', American Political Science Review, 86:1 (Mar. 1992), pp. 24-37; Clifton Morgan, 'Democracy and War: Reflections on the Literature', International Interactions, 18:3 (1993), pp. 197-204; John M. Owen, 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125. It should be emphasized, however, that some analysts question the validity of the 'democratic peace' argument. See, e.g., Christopher Layne, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 5-49; David Spiro, 'The Insignificance of Liberal Peace', International Security, 19:2 (Fall 1994), pp. 50-86; Raymond Cohen, 'Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory that "Democracies do not Go to War with Each Other" ', Review of International Studies, 20:3 (1994), pp. 207-23. For the response of the 'democratic peace' theorists to these criticisms, see Bruce Russett, 'The Democratic Peace: "And Yet it Moves" ', International Security, 19:4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164-75; Bruce Russett and James Lee Ray, 'Why the Democratic-Peace Proposition Lives', Review of International Studies, 21:3 (1995), pp. 319-23.
12. 'Excerpts from President Clinton's State of the Union Message', New York Times, 26 January 1994, p. A17.
13. Cited in Cohen, 'Pacific Unions', p. 223.
14. Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT, and London, 1968), p. 41.
15. See Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, 'Democratization and the Danger of War', International Security, 20:1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38.
16. Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK, 1991), p. 9.
17. Ibid, pp. 14-15.
18. For a discussion of various modes of interaction between governing and opposition groups in bringing about democracy, see Donald Share and Scott Mainwaring, 'Transitions Through Transaction: Democratization in Brazil and Spain', in Wayne Selcher (ed.), Political Liberalization in Brazil: Dynamics, Dilemmas, and Future Prospects (Boulder, CO, 1986), pp. 177-9.
19. For a review of numerous conceptualizations of a democratic regime, see David Collier and Steven Levitsky, 'Democracy "with Adjectives": Finding Conceptual Order in Recent Comparative Research', paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 1-4 September 1994.
20. Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York, 1974), p. 269.
21. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, MD, 1986). These procedural requirements are quite similar to the criteria for Robert Dahl's polyarchy. See Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT, 1971), p. 3.
22. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, MD, 1986). These procedural requirements are quite similar to the criteria for Robert Dahl's polyarchy. See Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT, 1971), p. 3.
23. See Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes', in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela (eds.), Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame, IN, 1992), pp. 48-9.
24. For an analysis of various problems of democratic consolidation, see Huntington, Third Wave, pp. 208-79; J. Samuel Valenzuela, 'Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions', in Mainwaring et al. (eds.), Issues, pp. 57-104.
25. For an analysis of various problems of democratic consolidation, see Huntington, Third Wave, pp. 208-79; J. Samuel Valenzuela, 'Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions', in Mainwaring et al. (eds.), Issues, pp. 57-104.
26. Ronald Inglehart, 'The Renaissance of Political Culture', American Political Science Review, 82:4 (Dec. 1988), p. 1204. Also see Daniel Franklin and Michael Baun (eds.), Political Culture and Constitutionalism: A Comparative Approach (Armonk, NY, 1995).
27. Ronald Inglehart, 'The Renaissance of Political Culture', American Political Science Review, 82:4 (Dec. 1988), p. 1204. Also see Daniel Franklin and Michael Baun (eds.), Political Culture and Constitutionalism: A Comparative Approach (Armonk, NY, 1995).
28. See, e.g., Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, 1963).
29. See, e.g. Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl, 'What Democracy is . . . And is Not', Journal of Democracy, 2:3 (Summer 1991), pp. 75-88; Terry Karl, 'Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America', in Dankwart Rustow and Kenneth Erickson (eds.), Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives (New York, 1991), pp. 163-91.
30. See, e.g. Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl, 'What Democracy is . . . And is Not', Journal of Democracy, 2:3 (Summer 1991), pp. 75-88; Terry Karl, 'Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America', in Dankwart Rustow and Kenneth Erickson (eds.), Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives (New York, 1991), pp. 163-91.
31. Samuel Huntington, 'Democracy's Third Wave', Journal of Democracy (Spring 1991), pp. 12-34. It should also be noted that a high level of economic development is a factor that both helps trigger the beginning of a transition and significantly facilitates the subsequent process of democratic consolidation. See S. M. Lipset, K. Seong and J. C. Torrer, 'A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy', International Social Science Journal, 136 (May 1993), pp. 155-75. For an elaboration of the original argument linking high GNP per capita to the strength of democratic institutions, see Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York, 1958); Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York, 1960). It was demonstrated, however, that the type of linear relationship between economic development and democracy which was originally proposed by the 'social mobilization' theorists of the 1950s and 1960s can be empirically refuted. See, e.g., Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley, CA, 1973).
32. Samuel Huntington, 'Democracy's Third Wave', Journal of Democracy (Spring 1991), pp. 12-34. It should also be noted that a high level of economic development is a factor that both helps trigger the beginning of a transition and significantly facilitates the subsequent process of democratic consolidation. See S. M. Lipset, K. Seong and J. C. Torrer, 'A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy', International Social Science Journal, 136 (May 1993), pp. 155-75. For an elaboration of the original argument linking high GNP per capita to the strength of democratic institutions, see Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York, 1958); Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York, 1960). It was demonstrated, however, that the type of linear relationship between economic development and democracy which was originally proposed by the 'social mobilization' theorists of the 1950s and 1960s can be empirically refuted. See, e.g., Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley, CA, 1973).
33. Samuel Huntington, 'Democracy's Third Wave', Journal of Democracy (Spring 1991), pp. 12-34. It should also be noted that a high level of economic development is a factor that both helps trigger the beginning of a transition and significantly facilitates the subsequent process of democratic consolidation. See S. M. Lipset, K. Seong and J. C. Torrer, 'A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy', International Social Science Journal, 136 (May 1993), pp. 155-75. For an elaboration of the original argument linking high GNP per capita to the strength of democratic institutions, see Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York, 1958); Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York, 1960). It was demonstrated, however, that the type of linear relationship between economic development and democracy which was originally proposed by the 'social mobilization' theorists of the 1950s and 1960s can be empirically refuted. See, e.g., Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley, CA, 1973).
34. Samuel Huntington, 'Democracy's Third Wave', Journal of Democracy (Spring 1991), pp. 12-34. It should also be noted that a high level of economic development is a factor that both helps trigger the beginning of a transition and significantly facilitates the subsequent process of democratic consolidation. See S. M. Lipset, K. Seong and J. C. Torrer, 'A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy', International Social Science Journal, 136 (May 1993), pp. 155-75. For an elaboration of the original argument linking high GNP per capita to the strength of democratic institutions, see Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York, 1958); Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York, 1960). It was demonstrated, however, that the type of linear relationship between economic development and democracy which was originally proposed by the 'social mobilization' theorists of the 1950s and 1960s can be empirically refuted. See, e.g., Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley, CA, 1973).
35. Samuel Huntington, 'Democracy's Third Wave', Journal of Democracy (Spring 1991), pp. 12-34. It should also be noted that a high level of economic development is a factor that both helps trigger the beginning of a transition and significantly facilitates the subsequent process of democratic consolidation. See S. M. Lipset, K. Seong and J. C. Torrer, 'A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy', International Social Science Journal, 136 (May 1993), pp. 155-75. For an elaboration of the original argument linking high GNP per capita to the strength of democratic institutions, see Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York, 1958); Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York, 1960). It was demonstrated, however, that the type of linear relationship between economic development and democracy which was originally proposed by the 'social mobilization' theorists of the 1950s and 1960s can be empirically refuted. See, e.g., Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley, CA, 1973).
36. In other words, authoritarian decisions often have to be made to institute economic reforms, because governments cannot rely on popular support for the painful process of economic transition.
37. See Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge, MA, 1991).
38. See Schmitter and Karl, 'What Democracy is'.
39. For the classical elaboration of the argument concerning the importance of the re-election imperative for officials in a democracy, see Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York, 1957).
40. It should be noted, however, that public concern with international affairs as the country's 'most important problem' is intermittent, with domestic issues frequently dominant for long periods of time. See T. W. Smith, 'The Polls: America's Most Important Problem, Part I: National and International', Public Opinion Quarterly, 49 (1985), pp. 264-74.
41. See Jack Levy, 'Domestic Politics and War', Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 8:4 (Spring 1988), pp. 653-73. Public opinion is believed to have an important impact on foreign policy formulation. Thus, for example, in their review of the relationship between public opinion and the national security policy of the United States, Bruce Russett and Thomas Graham note that 'in forming constraints and providing incentives, public opinion is not purely passive and has a more important and intricate relationship to foreign policy decision-making at the presidential level than previously suggested'. See Bruce Russett and Thomas Graham, 'Public Opinion and National Security Policy: Relationships and Impacts', in Manus Midlarsky (ed.), Handbook of War Studies (Ann Arbor, MI, 1993), p. 255. Also see Philip Powlick, 'The Attitudinal Bases for Responsiveness to Public Opinion Among American Foreign Policy Officials', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35 (1991), pp. 611-41: R. Hinckley, People, Polls, and Policymakers: American Public Opinion and National Security (New York, 1992).
42. See Jack Levy, 'Domestic Politics and War', Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 8:4 (Spring 1988), pp. 653-73. Public opinion is believed to have an important impact on foreign policy formulation. Thus, for example, in their review of the relationship between public opinion and the national security policy of the United States, Bruce Russett and Thomas Graham note that 'in forming constraints and providing incentives, public opinion is not purely passive and has a more important and intricate relationship to foreign policy decision-making at the presidential level than previously suggested'. See Bruce Russett and Thomas Graham, 'Public Opinion and National Security Policy: Relationships and Impacts', in Manus Midlarsky (ed.), Handbook of War Studies (Ann Arbor, MI, 1993), p. 255. Also see Philip Powlick, 'The Attitudinal Bases for Responsiveness to Public Opinion Among American Foreign Policy Officials', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35 (1991), pp. 611-41: R. Hinckley, People, Polls, and Policymakers: American Public Opinion and National Security (New York, 1992).
43. See Jack Levy, 'Domestic Politics and War', Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 8:4 (Spring 1988), pp. 653-73. Public opinion is believed to have an important impact on foreign policy formulation. Thus, for example, in their review of the relationship between public opinion and the national security policy of the United States, Bruce Russett and Thomas Graham note that 'in forming constraints and providing incentives, public opinion is not purely passive and has a more important and intricate relationship to foreign policy decision-making at the presidential level than previously suggested'. See Bruce Russett and Thomas Graham, 'Public Opinion and National Security Policy: Relationships and Impacts', in Manus Midlarsky (ed.), Handbook of War Studies (Ann Arbor, MI, 1993), p. 255. Also see Philip Powlick, 'The Attitudinal Bases for Responsiveness to Public Opinion Among American Foreign Policy Officials', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35 (1991), pp. 611-41: R. Hinckley, People, Polls, and Policymakers: American Public Opinion and National Security (New York, 1992).
44. See Jack Levy, 'Domestic Politics and War', Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 8:4 (Spring 1988), pp. 653-73. Public opinion is believed to have an important impact on foreign policy formulation. Thus, for example, in their review of the relationship between public opinion and the national security policy of the United States, Bruce Russett and Thomas Graham note that 'in forming constraints and providing incentives, public opinion is not purely passive and has a more important and intricate relationship to foreign policy decision-making at the presidential level than previously suggested'. See Bruce Russett and Thomas Graham, 'Public Opinion and National Security Policy: Relationships and Impacts', in Manus Midlarsky (ed.), Handbook of War Studies (Ann Arbor, MI, 1993), p. 255. Also see Philip Powlick, 'The Attitudinal Bases for Responsiveness to Public Opinion Among American Foreign Policy Officials', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35 (1991), pp. 611-41: R. Hinckley, People, Polls, and Policymakers: American Public Opinion and National Security (New York, 1992).
45. See, e.g., Joe Hagan, Political Opposition and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective (Boulder, CO, 1993).
46. Joe Hagan, 'Domestic Political Systems and War Proneness', Mershon International Studies Review, 38:2 (Oct. 1994), pp. 183-208; Miroslav Nincic, Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Fallacy of Political Realism (New York, 1992); Bruce Russett, Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security (Cambridge, MA, 1990).
47. Joe Hagan, 'Domestic Political Systems and War Proneness', Mershon International Studies Review, 38:2 (Oct. 1994), pp. 183-208; Miroslav Nincic, Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Fallacy of Political Realism (New York, 1992); Bruce Russett, Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security (Cambridge, MA, 1990).
48. Joe Hagan, 'Domestic Political Systems and War Proneness', Mershon International Studies Review, 38:2 (Oct. 1994), pp. 183-208; Miroslav Nincic, Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Fallacy of Political Realism (New York, 1992); Bruce Russett, Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security (Cambridge, MA, 1990).
49. At this point, however, an important caveat needs to be lodged. The conceptualization of a liberal democracy as an outcome of the process of democratic transition should not obscure the fact that even well-established, consolidated liberal democracies are in a state of constant change and often face serious political, cultural, and socio-economic problems that can potentially lead to the breakdown of democratic institutions.
50. It is important to note that this is a probabilistic rather than a deterministic argument.
51. See Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, 'Democratization and the Danger of War', International Security, 20:1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38; Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY, 1991), pp. 32-5, 49-52.
52. See Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, 'Democratization and the Danger of War', International Security, 20:1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38; Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY, 1991), pp. 32-5, 49-52.
53. Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Delegative Democracy?', Journal of Democracy, 5:1 (1994), pp. 55-69.
54. 0 See, e.g., Ekkart Zimmerman, 'Political Breakdown and the Process of National Consensus Formation: On the Collapse of the Weimar Republic in Comparative Perspective', Research on Democracy and Society, 1 (1993), pp. 267-97; Godfrey Scheele, The Weimar Republic: Overture to the Third Reich (London, 1946), esp. pp. 145-60; Eliot Barculo Wheaton, Prelude to Calamity: The Nazi Revolution 1933-35 (Garden City, NY, 1968), esp. pp. 93-124.
55. 0 See, e.g., Ekkart Zimmerman, 'Political Breakdown and the Process of National Consensus Formation: On the Collapse of the Weimar Republic in Comparative Perspective', Research on Democracy and Society, 1 (1993), pp. 267-97; Godfrey Scheele, The Weimar Republic: Overture to the Third Reich (London, 1946), esp. pp. 145-60; Eliot Barculo Wheaton, Prelude to Calamity: The Nazi Revolution 1933-35 (Garden City, NY, 1968), esp. pp. 93-124.
56. 0 See, e.g., Ekkart Zimmerman, 'Political Breakdown and the Process of National Consensus Formation: On the Collapse of the Weimar Republic in Comparative Perspective', Research on Democracy and Society, 1 (1993), pp. 267-97; Godfrey Scheele, The Weimar Republic: Overture to the Third Reich (London, 1946), esp. pp. 145-60; Eliot Barculo Wheaton, Prelude to Calamity: The Nazi Revolution 1933-35 (Garden City, NY, 1968), esp. pp. 93-124.
57. A. J. Nicholls, Weimar and the Rise of Hitler (London, 1968), p. 147.
58. For a detailed discussion of the 'diversionary' theory of war, see Jack Levy, 'The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique', in Midlarsky (ed.), Handbook, pp. 259-88. As convincingly argued by Levy, one of the most important reasons why quantitative literature (in contrast to theoretical and historical literature on the diversionary theory of conflict) has repeatedly found no consistent and meaningful relationship between the internal and external conflict behaviour of states is a poor fit between the hypotheses supposedly being investigated and the overall research design guiding the empirical analyses. See also J. M. Scolnick, Jr, 'An Appraisal of Studies of the Linkages between Domestic and International Conflict', Comparative Political Studies, 6 (Jan. 1974), pp. 485-509; Michael Stohl, 'The Nexus of Civil and International Conflict', in Ted Gurr (ed.), Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research (New York, 1980), pp. 297-330.
59. For a detailed discussion of the 'diversionary' theory of war, see Jack Levy, 'The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique', in Midlarsky (ed.), Handbook, pp. 259-88. As convincingly argued by Levy, one of the most important reasons why quantitative literature (in contrast to theoretical and historical literature on the diversionary theory of conflict) has repeatedly found no consistent and meaningful relationship between the internal and external conflict behaviour of states is a poor fit between the hypotheses supposedly being investigated and the overall research design guiding the empirical analyses. See also J. M. Scolnick, Jr, 'An Appraisal of Studies of the Linkages between Domestic and International Conflict', Comparative Political Studies, 6 (Jan. 1974), pp. 485-509; Michael Stohl, 'The Nexus of Civil and International Conflict', in Ted Gurr (ed.), Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research (New York, 1980), pp. 297-330.
60. For a detailed discussion of the 'diversionary' theory of war, see Jack Levy, 'The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique', in Midlarsky (ed.), Handbook, pp. 259-88. As convincingly argued by Levy, one of the most important reasons why quantitative literature (in contrast to theoretical and historical literature on the diversionary theory of conflict) has repeatedly found no consistent and meaningful relationship between the internal and external conflict behaviour of states is a poor fit between the hypotheses supposedly being investigated and the overall research design guiding the empirical analyses. See also J. M. Scolnick, Jr, 'An Appraisal of Studies of the Linkages between Domestic and International Conflict', Comparative Political Studies, 6 (Jan. 1974), pp. 485-509; Michael Stohl, 'The Nexus of Civil and International Conflict', in Ted Gurr (ed.), Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research (New York, 1980), pp. 297-330.
61. Ernst Haas and A. S. Whiting, Dynamics of International Relations (New York, 1956), p. 62.
62. See, e.g., A. Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism (Oxford, 1984); J. Raz, The Mortality of Freedom (Oxford, 1986); J. Waldron, 'Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism', Philosophical Quarterly, 37, 147 (1987), pp. 127-50.
63. See, e.g., A. Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism (Oxford, 1984); J. Raz, The Mortality of Freedom (Oxford, 1986); J. Waldron, 'Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism', Philosophical Quarterly, 37, 147 (1987), pp. 127-50.
64. See, e.g., A. Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism (Oxford, 1984); J. Raz, The Mortality of Freedom (Oxford, 1986); J. Waldron, 'Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism', Philosophical Quarterly, 37, 147 (1987), pp. 127-50.
65. See, e.g., Susan Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism (Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1989).
66. Trond Gilberg, 'New Wine in Old Bottles: Democratization in Balkan Authoritarian Cultures', in Joan Serafin (ed.), East-Central Europe in the 1990s (Boulder, CO, 1994), pp. 195-218. For criticism of the 'ethnic hatreds' argument, see V. P. Gagnon, Jr, 'Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia', International Security, 19:3 (Winter 1994/5), pp. 130-66.
67. Trond Gilberg, 'New Wine in Old Bottles: Democratization in Balkan Authoritarian Cultures', in Joan Serafin (ed.), East-Central Europe in the 1990s (Boulder, CO, 1994), pp. 195-218. For criticism of the 'ethnic hatreds' argument, see V. P. Gagnon, Jr, 'Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia', International Security, 19:3 (Winter 1994/5), pp. 130-66.
68. See, e.g., Sabrina Ramet and Ljubisa Adamovich (eds.), Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics and Culture in a Shattered Community (Boulder, CO, 1995).
69. Despite their numerical superiority, Serbs have traditionally perceived themselves as victimized and 'satanized' people squeezed between the 'Ottoman South' (Muslim Bosnia) and the 'Habsburg North' (Croatia and Slovenia). See Andrew Michta, The Government and Politics of Post-Communist Europe (Westport, CT, 1994), p. 106.
70. Aleksa Djilas, 'A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic', Foreign Affairs, 72:3 (Summer 1993), p. 88.
71. See Stuart Bremer, 'Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36:2 (1992), pp. 309-41.
72. See Giovanni Sartori, 'Comparing and Miscomparing', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 3:3 (1991), pp. 243-57.
73. George Kennan, 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct', Foreign Affairs, 25:4 (1947), pp. 566-82. It should be noted, however, that for Kennan the relaxation of the Soviet regime's domestic grip was not necessarily synonymous with democratization.
74. See, e.g., Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, 'The International Sources of Soviet Change', International Security, 16 (1991/2), pp. 74-118.
75. Jeff Checkel, 'Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution', World Politics, 45:1 (1993), pp. 271-300. See also Jonathan Valdez, Internationalism and the Ideology of Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe (Cambridge, MA, 1993), passim.
76. Jeff Checkel, 'Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution', World Politics, 45:1 (1993), pp. 271-300. See also Jonathan Valdez, Internationalism and the Ideology of Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe (Cambridge, MA, 1993), passim.
77. See, e.g., Huntington, Third Wave, pp. 49-50; Valenzuela, 'Democratic Consolidation', pp. 78-89.
78. See, e.g., Huntington, Third Wave, pp. 49-50; Valenzuela, 'Democratic Consolidation', pp. 78-89.
79. R. Bova, 'Political Dynamics of Post-Communist Transition: A Comparative Perspective', World Politics, 44:1 (Oct. 1991), p. 119.
80. A. Roxburgh, The Second Russian Revolution (London, 1991), p. 36.
81. Jan Adams, A Foreign Policy in Transition: Moscow's Retreat from Central America and the Caribbean, 1985-1992 (Durham, NC, and London, 1992), p. 47.
82. Neil Malcolm, 'New Thinking and After: Debate in Moscow about Europe', in Neil Malcolm (ed.), Russia and Europe: An End to Confrontation? (London, 1994), pp. 151-81.
83. See Joseph Nogee and Robert Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York, 1992), pp. 64-5.
84. Alex Pravda, 'The Politics of Foreign and Security Policy', in Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman (eds.), Developments in Soviet Politics (Durham, NC, 1990), p. 219.
85. See Richard Crockatt, The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941-1991 (London, 1955), p. 362.
86. Coit Blacker, Hostage to Revolution: Gorbachev and Soviet Security Policy, 1985-1991 (New York, 1993), pp. 155-6.
87. Michael Sodaro, Moscow, Germany and the West: From Khrushchev to Gorbachev (Ithaca, NY, 1990), p. 330.
88. Jan Adams, 'Legislature Asserts its Role in Russian Foreign Policy', RFE/RL Research Report, 2:4 (22 January 1993), p. 32.
89. See, e.g., Roger Kanet, with Garth Katner, 'From New Thinking to the Fragmentation of Consensus in Soviet Foreign Policy: The USSR and the Developing World', in Roger Kanet, Deborah Nutter Miner and Tamara Resler (eds.), Soviet Foreign Policy in Transition (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 121-44.
90. Alexei Arbatov, 'Russian Foreign Policy Priorities for the 1990s', in Teresa Johnson and Steven Miller (eds.), Russian Security After the Cold War (Washington, DC, 1994), pp. 1-42. Also see Hannes Adomeit, 'Russia as a "Great Power" in World Affairs: Images and Reality', International Affairs, 71:1 (1995), pp. 35-68.
91. Alexei Arbatov, 'Russian Foreign Policy Priorities for the 1990s', in Teresa Johnson and Steven Miller (eds.), Russian Security After the Cold War (Washington, DC, 1994), pp. 1-42. Also see Hannes Adomeit, 'Russia as a "Great Power" in World Affairs: Images and Reality', International Affairs, 71:1 (1995), pp. 35-68.
92. Arbatov, 'Russian Foreign Policy Priorities', pp. 1-42.
93. Izvestiya, 18 May 1995.
94. Ibid.
95. See Dzinta Bungs, 'Russia Agrees to Withdraw Troops from Latvia', RFE/RL Research Report, 3:22 (3 June 1994), pp. 1-9; Stephen Foye, 'Estonia-Russia Agreement: Russian Perspective', RFE/RL Daily Report, 27 July 1994.
96. See Dzinta Bungs, 'Russia Agrees to Withdraw Troops from Latvia', RFE/RL Research Report, 3:22 (3 June 1994), pp. 1-9; Stephen Foye, 'Estonia-Russia Agreement: Russian Perspective', RFE/RL Daily Report, 27 July 1994.
97. See Suzanne Crow, The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia Under Yeltsin (Munich, 1993), p. 35.
98. Den, 7-13 June 1992.
99. For a detailed review of Russia's attempts to reform, see Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman (eds.), Developments in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics (Durham, NC, 1994).
100. Richard Sakwa, 'Parties and the Multiparty System in Russia', RFE/RL Research Report, 2:31 (30 July 1993), pp. 7-15. See also Alexander Dallin (ed.), Political Parties in Russia (Berkeley, CA, 1993).
101. Richard Sakwa, 'Parties and the Multiparty System in Russia', RFE/RL Research Report, 2:31 (30 July 1993), pp. 7-15. See also Alexander Dallin (ed.), Political Parties in Russia (Berkeley, CA, 1993).
102. Goskomstat Rossii, Rossiiskaya Federatsiya v tsifrakh v 1993 godu, pp. 13-14.
103. Izvestiya, 30 March 1992.
104. ROMIR survey published in 'Political Attitudes in Russia', RFE/RL Research Report, 2:3 (Jan. 1993), pp. 42-4.
105. See, e.g., Stephen Whitefield and Geoffrey Evans, 'The Russian Elections of 1993: Public Opinion and the Transition Experience', Post-Soviet Affairs, 10:1 (1994), pp. 38-60.
106. 'Weimar on the Volga', The Economist (18 December 1993), pp. 45-7.
107. See Ekkart Zimmerman, 'Theories of Re-Democratization: Paths and Promises, or Shadow of the Past? Is There a Weimar-Moscow Syndrome?', paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, 21-5 February 1995.
108. Igor Torbakov, 'The "Statists" and the Ideology of Russian Imperial Nationalism', RFE/RL Research Report, 1:49 (11 December 1992). On the rise of Russian nationalism, see Robert Kaiser, The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR (Princeton, 1994).
109. Igor Torbakov, 'The "Statists" and the Ideology of Russian Imperial Nationalism', RFE/RL Research Report, 1:49 (11 December 1992). On the rise of Russian nationalism, see Robert Kaiser, The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR (Princeton, 1994).
110. Ekho Moskvy, 14 October 1992. Quoted in Vera Tolz, 'Russia: Westernizers Continue to Challenge National Patriots', RFE/RL Research Report, 1:49 (11 December 1992), p. 3.
111. Ekho Moskvy, 14 October 1992. Quoted in Vera Tolz, 'Russia: Westernizers Continue to Challenge National Patriots', RFE/RL Research Report, 1:49 (11 December 1992), p. 3.
112. The very term 'near abroad' which refers to the former Soviet region is highly nationalist. It can be interpreted to imply that Russia treats other post-Soviet republics as semi-foreign and hence semi-independent entities.
113. Adomeit, 'Russia as a "Great Power" ', p. 57.
114. Suzanne Crow, 'Russia Seeks Leadership in Regional Peacekeeping', RFE/RL Research Report, 2:5 (1993), pp. 28-32.
115. Quoted in 'Certain Forces in the West Oppose Russia's Growth as World Power', Interfax News Agency, Diplomatic Panorama, 21 September 1994.
116. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 10 January 1995, p. 3. This article is based on a report by the Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service, the successor organization to the KGB.
117. See Alexei Arbatov, 'Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives', International Security, 18:4 (1993), pp. 5-43.
118. Sergei Morozov's article in Den, 21-27 June 1992. Cited in Tolz, 'Russia', p. 6.
119. Sergei Morozov's article in Den, 21-27 June 1992. Cited in Tolz, 'Russia', p. 6.
120. See Alex Pravda, 'The Politics of Foreign Policy', in White et al. (eds.), Developments in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics, p. 216.
121. See Adams, 'Legislature', pp. 32-6.
122. Cited in Therese Raphael, Claudia Rosett and Suzanne Crow, 'An Interview with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev', RFE/RL Research Report, 3:28 (15 July 1994), p. 36 (emphasis added).
123. Trud, 16 July 1992.
124. See, e.g., Paul Kubicek, 'Delegative Democracy in Russia and Ukraine', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 27:4 (1994), pp. 423-41.
125. Peter Shearman, 'Defining the National Interest: Russian Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics', in Roger Kanet and Alexander Kozhemiakin (eds.), The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (London, 1996), p. 14.
126. Crow, Making of Foreign Policy, p. 76.
127. Rossiyskaia Gazeta, 18 November 1992.
128. Quoted in Lena Jonson, 'The Foreign Policy Debate in Russia: In Search of a National Interest', Nationalities Papers, 22:1 (1994), p. 190.
129. Quoted in 'Russia Has No Special Minority Rights Claim', The Christian Science Monitor, 14 April 1993.
130. Pravda, 28 February 1993.
131. See Henry Huttenbach, 'Focus on the Caspian: the Pipeline War', Association for the Study of Nationalities: Analysis of Current Events, 6:4.
132. The chief of the Russian General Staff, Mikhail Kolesnikov, announced that Moscow was planning to sign bilateral agreements with every former Soviet republic except Ukraine and the Baltic states on the establishment of some 30 military bases throughout the CIS. Quoted in Bruce Porter and Carol Saivetz, 'The Once and Future Empire: Russia and the "Near Abroad" ', The Washington Quarterly, 17:3 (1994), p. 87.
133. Elizabeth Fuller, 'The Transcaucasus: War, Turmoil, Economic Collapse', RFE/RL Research Report, 3:1 (7 January 1994), p. 57.
134. Elizabeth Fuller, 'Grachev Visits Georgia', RFE/RL Daily Report, 13 June 1994.
135. Suzanne Crow, 'Russia Promotes the CIS as an International Organization', RFE/RL Research Reports, 3:11 (18 March 1994), pp. 33-8.
136. Quoted in Leonid Bershidsky, 'Georgia Peace Force Riles Duma', The Moscow Times, 18 June 1994. See, also Andrei Kozyrev, 'Vneshnyaya Politika Preobrazhayushcheysia Rossii', Voprosy Istorii, 1 (1994), pp. 3ff.
137. Quoted in Leonid Bershidsky, 'Georgia Peace Force Riles Duma', The Moscow Times, 18 June 1994. See, also Andrei Kozyrev, 'Vneshnyaya Politika Preobrazhayushcheysia Rossii', Voprosy Istorii, 1 (1994), pp. 3ff.
138. Anthony Hyman, 'Russians Outside Russia', World Today, 49:11 (Nov. 1993), pp. 205-7.
139. Paul Goble, 'The Situation in Russia', Implementation of the Helsinki Accords (October 1993). Briefing of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, DC.
140. Celestine Bohlen, 'Nationalist Vote Toughens Russian Foreign Policy', New York Times, 25 January 1994.
141. Consider, for example, the successful completion of democratization in Spain, Portugal and Greece which was extensively assisted by the European Community. It should be noted, however, that, if foreign economic aid to democratizing nations fails to provide tangible results, it may have the paradoxical effect of reinforcing nationalist sentiment.