Shepherds and their leaders among the raikas of India: A principal-agent perspective

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 9, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 235-263

  Agrawal, Arun ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Monitoring; Nomadic pastoralism; Principal agent; Raikas; Rajasthan

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031535511     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951692897009002005     Document Type: Article

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