A Model of Product Recalls with Asymmetric Information

Journal of Regulatory Economics

Volumn 12, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 245-265

  Marino, Anthony M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031534581     PISSN: 0922680X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1007901928782     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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11. Shavell, S. 1984. "A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation." Rand Journal of Economics 15: 271-280.
12. Shavell, S. 1987. Economic Analysis of Accident Law, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
13. Simon, M.J. 1981. "Imperfect Information, Costly Litigation, and Product Quality." Bell Journal of Economics 12: 171-8-4.
14. U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance. 1995. "Compliance Testing Program." Statement issued on the internet, March 6, 1995.
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16. Welling, L. 1991. "A Theory of Voluntary Recalls and Products Liability." Southern Economic Journal 57, 1092-1111.