Resurrecting a neglected theorist: The philosophical foundations of Raymond Aron's theory of international relations

Review of International Studies

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 143-166

  Frost, Bryan Paul ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0031528327     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210597001435     Document Type: Review

References (157)

1. This is not to deny points of agreement between Aron and theorists like Carr and Morgenthau, but merely to indicate that many scholars fail to articulate and to take into consideration the numerous fundamental differences between Aron and other classical Realists.
2. J. Hall, Diagnoses of Our Time: Six Views on Our Social Condition (London, 1981 ), p. 164.
3. O. Young, 'Aron and the Whale: A Jonah in Theory', in K. Knorr and J. Rosenau (eds.), Contending Approaches to International Politics (Princeton, 1969), p. 143.
4. D. Thomson, 'The Three Worlds of Raymond Aron', International Affairs, 39:1 (1963), pp. 53-5. See also U. Luterbacher, 'The Frustrated Commentator: An Evaluation of the Work of Raymond Aron', International Studies Quarterly, 29:4 (1985), pp. 39-49; and K. Waltz, 'Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory', Journal of International Affairs, 44:1 (1990), pp. 21-37.
5. D. Thomson, 'The Three Worlds of Raymond Aron', International Affairs, 39:1 (1963), pp. 53-5. See also U. Luterbacher, 'The Frustrated Commentator: An Evaluation of the Work of Raymond Aron', International Studies Quarterly, 29:4 (1985), pp. 39-49; and K. Waltz, 'Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory', Journal of International Affairs, 44:1 (1990), pp. 21-37.
6. D. Thomson, 'The Three Worlds of Raymond Aron', International Affairs, 39:1 (1963), pp. 53-5. See also U. Luterbacher, 'The Frustrated Commentator: An Evaluation of the Work of Raymond Aron', International Studies Quarterly, 29:4 (1985), pp. 39-49; and K. Waltz, 'Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory', Journal of International Affairs, 44:1 (1990), pp. 21-37.
7. R. Aron, Introduction to the Philosophy of History: An Essay on the Limits of Historical Objectivity, tr. G. Irwin (Boston, MA, 1961). Where possible, all references to Aron's work will be to the English translations. In general, I have followed these translations, although I have sometimes altered them to make them more strictly literal.
8. Another reason why Aron's theoretical writings (e.g., the Introduction and Peace and War) are generally ignored is that they have, as P. Hassner points out, 'a somewhat strained and static character from which, precisely, his historical works [e.g., The Century of Total War] escaped altogether'. See P. Hassner, 'Raymond Aron and the History of the Twentieth Century', International Studies Quarterly, 29:4 (1985). pp. 29-30. It is as if Aron is being rather un-Aronian when he seeks to bring theoretical clarity to a field like international relations, and it is perhaps for this reason that many theorists have found his theoretical works difficult and, ultimately, of little use. I am thankful to Daniel Mahoney for pointing out to me the importance of Hassner's observation.
9. Another reason why Aron's theoretical writings (e.g., the Introduction and Peace and War) are generally ignored is that they have, as P. Hassner points out, 'a somewhat strained and static character from which, precisely, his historical works [e.g., The Century of Total War] escaped altogether'. See P. Hassner, 'Raymond Aron and the History of the Twentieth Century', International Studies Quarterly, 29:4 (1985). pp. 29-30. It is as if Aron is being rather un-Aronian when he seeks to bring theoretical clarity to a field like international relations, and it is perhaps for this reason that many theorists have found his theoretical works difficult and, ultimately, of little use. I am thankful to Daniel Mahoney for pointing out to me the importance of Hassner's observation.
10. Another reason why Aron's theoretical writings (e.g., the Introduction and Peace and War) are generally ignored is that they have, as P. Hassner points out, 'a somewhat strained and static character from which, precisely, his historical works [e.g., The Century of Total War] escaped altogether'. See P. Hassner, 'Raymond Aron and the History of the Twentieth Century', International Studies Quarterly, 29:4 (1985). pp. 29-30. It is as if Aron is being rather un-Aronian when he seeks to bring theoretical clarity to a field like international relations, and it is perhaps for this reason that many theorists have found his theoretical works difficult and, ultimately, of little use. I am thankful to Daniel Mahoney for pointing out to me the importance of Hassner's observation.
11. R. Aron, 'Introduction', in M. Conant (ed.), Politics and History: Selected Essays by Raymond Aron (New York, 1978), p. xix.
12. R. Aron, Memoirs: Fifty Years of Political Reflection, tr. G. Holoch (New York, 1990), pp. 36-47.
13. F. Draus, 'Introduction', in F. Draus (ed.), History, Truth, Liberty: Selected Writings of Raymond Aron (Chicago, 1985), p. 22. In this article, all emphases in quotations are contained in the original.
14. R. Colquhoun, Raymond Aron: The Philosopher in History, 1905-1955 (London, 1986), p. 3; and M. Conant, 'Preface', Politics and History (see n.7 above), p. xii.
15. R. Colquhoun, Raymond Aron: The Philosopher in History, 1905-1955 (London, 1986), p. 3; and M. Conant, 'Preface', Politics and History (see n.7 above), p. xii.
16. See A. Toynbee, 'The Philosophy and Morphology of History', in J.-C. Casanova, E. Shils and M. Sperber (eds.). Mélanges en l'honneur de Raymond Aron: science et conscience de la société, vol. 1 (Paris, 1971), pp. 22-4.
17. R. Aron, La Philosophie critique de l'histoire: essai sur une théorie allemande de l'histoire (Paris, 1987). Aron submitted La Philosophie critique as his thèse complémentaire, the Introduction being his thèse principale. For a brief summary of La Philosophie critique, see Colquhoun, Raymond Aron, pp. 119-29, and F. Draus, 'La Dialectique de la liberté dans la pensée de Raymond Aron', Revue européenne des sciences sociales, 21(65) (1983), pp. 143-59. The more serious student will also want to read Aron's first discussion of the German writers who so influenced his thinking, namely, German Sociology, tr. M. Bottomore and T. Bottomore (New York, 1964).
18. R. Aron, La Philosophie critique de l'histoire: essai sur une théorie allemande de l'histoire (Paris, 1987). Aron submitted La Philosophie critique as his thèse complémentaire, the Introduction being his thèse principale. For a brief summary of La Philosophie critique, see Colquhoun, Raymond Aron, pp. 119-29, and F. Draus, 'La Dialectique de la liberté dans la pensée de Raymond Aron', Revue européenne des sciences sociales, 21(65) (1983), pp. 143-59. The more serious student will also want to read Aron's first discussion of the German writers who so influenced his thinking, namely, German Sociology, tr. M. Bottomore and T. Bottomore (New York, 1964).
19. R. Aron, La Philosophie critique de l'histoire: essai sur une théorie allemande de l'histoire (Paris, 1987). Aron submitted La Philosophie critique as his thèse complémentaire, the Introduction being his thèse principale. For a brief summary of La Philosophie critique, see Colquhoun, Raymond Aron, pp. 119-29, and F. Draus, 'La Dialectique de la liberté dans la pensée de Raymond Aron', Revue européenne des sciences sociales, 21(65) (1983), pp. 143-59. The more serious student will also want to read Aron's first discussion of the German writers who so influenced his thinking, namely, German Sociology, tr. M. Bottomore and T. Bottomore (New York, 1964).
20. R. Aron, La Philosophie critique de l'histoire: essai sur une théorie allemande de l'histoire (Paris, 1987). Aron submitted La Philosophie critique as his thèse complémentaire, the Introduction being his thèse principale. For a brief summary of La Philosophie critique, see Colquhoun, Raymond Aron, pp. 119-29, and F. Draus, 'La Dialectique de la liberté dans la pensée de Raymond Aron', Revue européenne des sciences sociales, 21(65) (1983), pp. 143-59. The more serious student will also want to read Aron's first discussion of the German writers who so influenced his thinking, namely, German Sociology, tr. M. Bottomore and T. Bottomore (New York, 1964).
21. Aron, La Philosophie critique, p. 307.
22. Aron, Introduction, p. 9.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 21.
25. Ibid., p. 16. According to Aron (p. 43), the problem for a thinker like Cournot, and to a certain extent for Marx as well, is that 'he was ready to despair of the etiology of history unless he arrived at the conclusion that the final state would somehow or other be produced. Events were to permeate, retard, or accelerate, but not to divert, the [historical] evolution.' For Aron, however, 'the concept of history is not essentially tied in with the hypothesis of a total order. The decisive thing is the consciousness of the past and the desire to define oneself according to it.'
26. Ibid., p. 31.
27. Ibid., p. 35.
28. R. Aron, 'Evidence and Inference in History', in D. Lerner (ed.), Evidence and Inference: The Hayden Colloquium on Scientific Concept and Method (Chicago, 1959), p. 21.
29. Ibid., p. 24.
30. Aron, Introduction, pp. 32-9, 43-4, 82.
31. Ibid., pp. 45-7.
32. R. Aron, 'Three Forms of Historical Intelligibility', in Conant (ed.), Politics and History, p. 47.
33. Aron, Introduction, p. 45.
34. Ibid., p. 51.
35. Ibid., p. 73.
36. Ibid., pp. 62-7.
37. Ibid., pp. 74-6.
38. Using the example of a battle, Aron notes that this entity, as 'reconstituted by the historian, has never been lived by anybody'. The battle cannot be considered as an 'elementary fact' since it is 'effectively constituted of a multiplicity of acts, gestures, thoughts, of the individual combatants and their leaders': it is the historian who organizes this multiplicity into an ordered whole. Of course, what is true of a battle is equally true for such concepts as the Middle Ages or Renaissance, where the spatial-temporal boundaries are more complex and indistinct. See R. Aron, 'The Philosophy of History', in M. Farber (ed.), Philosophic Thought in France and the United States: Essays Representing the Major Trends in Contemporary French and American Philosophy (Albany, NY, 1968), pp. 310-11.
39. Aron, Introduction, p. 79.
40. Ibid., pp. 89-93, 97-101; and 'Evidence and Inference', p. 46.
41. Ibid., pp. 89-93, 97-101; and 'Evidence and Inference', p. 46.
42. Aron, Introduction, p. 92. It is important to keep in mind that while Aron holds that there are considerable differences between the physical and historical sciences, there are also some fundamental similarities. 'In a strict sense, all the sciences spring from a certain manner of interrogating the real and this manner of interrogation is inspired or justified by a certain conception of the structure of reality. It is thus in the case of the physico-mathematical sciences, which were originally bound up with a certain philosophy of nature, even though the success of these sciences has led, gradually, to the forgetting of this philosophy.' In fact, it is the very success of the natural sciences that has allowed them 'to make abstraction of the implicit philosophy and elaborate the principles and methods of the effective science, according to the results obtained, as though no philosophy were implicated'. See Aron, 'Philosophy of History', p. 302.
43. Aron, Introduction, p. 92. It is important to keep in mind that while Aron holds that there are considerable differences between the physical and historical sciences, there are also some fundamental similarities. 'In a strict sense, all the sciences spring from a certain manner of interrogating the real and this manner of interrogation is inspired or justified by a certain conception of the structure of reality. It is thus in the case of the physico-mathematical sciences, which were originally bound up with a certain philosophy of nature, even though the success of these sciences has led, gradually, to the forgetting of this philosophy.' In fact, it is the very success of the natural sciences that has allowed them 'to make abstraction of the implicit philosophy and elaborate the principles and methods of the effective science, according to the results obtained, as though no philosophy were implicated'. See Aron, 'Philosophy of History', p. 302.
44. Aron, Introduction, p. 118.
45. Ibid., p. 120.
46. Ibid., p. 132. Although Aron believes that historians' epochs and social environments influence their research, he does not claim that their research is simply the product of these influences. See R. Aron, 'The Concepts of "Class Truth" and "National Truth" in the Social Sciences', in Science and Freedom: Congress for Cultural Freedom (London, 1955), pp. 156-70, and 'Max Weber and Modern Social Science', in Draus (ed.), History, Truth, Liberty, pp. 344-6. As K. Whiteside in 'Perspectivism and Historical Objectivity: Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Covert Debate with Raymond Aron', History and Theory, 25:2 (1986), p. 136, puts it: 'The historian's perspective-setting . . . is the result of a dialectic between an individual's vision and his historical-cultural context.' For an account of this very 'dialectic' in Aron's own political thought before and immediately after the Second World War, see S. Campbell, 'Raymond Aron During the Interwar Period: From Leftist Pacifism to a Critique of the Left', The South Atlantic Quarterly, 86:1 (1987), pp. 57-68, and 'Raymond Aron: The Making of a Cold Warrior', The Historian, 51:4 (1989), pp. 551-73.
47. Ibid., p. 132. Although Aron believes that historians' epochs and social environments influence their research, he does not claim that their research is simply the product of these influences. See R. Aron, 'The Concepts of "Class Truth" and "National Truth" in the Social Sciences', in Science and Freedom: Congress for Cultural Freedom (London, 1955), pp. 156-70, and 'Max Weber and Modern Social Science', in Draus (ed.), History, Truth, Liberty, pp. 344-6. As K. Whiteside in 'Perspectivism and Historical Objectivity: Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Covert Debate with Raymond Aron', History and Theory, 25:2 (1986), p. 136, puts it: 'The historian's perspective-setting . . . is the result of a dialectic between an individual's vision and his historical-cultural context.' For an account of this very 'dialectic' in Aron's own political thought before and immediately after the Second World War, see S. Campbell, 'Raymond Aron During the Interwar Period: From Leftist Pacifism to a Critique of the Left', The South Atlantic Quarterly, 86:1 (1987), pp. 57-68, and 'Raymond Aron: The Making of a Cold Warrior', The Historian, 51:4 (1989), pp. 551-73.
48. Ibid., p. 132. Although Aron believes that historians' epochs and social environments influence their research, he does not claim that their research is simply the product of these influences. See R. Aron, 'The Concepts of "Class Truth" and "National Truth" in the Social Sciences', in Science and Freedom: Congress for Cultural Freedom (London, 1955), pp. 156-70, and 'Max Weber and Modern Social Science', in Draus (ed.), History, Truth, Liberty, pp. 344-6. As K. Whiteside in 'Perspectivism and Historical Objectivity: Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Covert Debate with Raymond Aron', History and Theory, 25:2 (1986), p. 136, puts it: 'The historian's perspective-setting . . . is the result of a dialectic between an individual's vision and his historical-cultural context.' For an account of this very 'dialectic' in Aron's own political thought before and immediately after the Second World War, see S. Campbell, 'Raymond Aron During the Interwar Period: From Leftist Pacifism to a Critique of the Left', The South Atlantic Quarterly, 86:1 (1987), pp. 57-68, and 'Raymond Aron: The Making of a Cold Warrior', The Historian, 51:4 (1989), pp. 551-73.
49. Ibid., p. 132. Although Aron believes that historians' epochs and social environments influence their research, he does not claim that their research is simply the product of these influences. See R. Aron, 'The Concepts of "Class Truth" and "National Truth" in the Social Sciences', in Science and Freedom: Congress for Cultural Freedom (London, 1955), pp. 156-70, and 'Max Weber and Modern Social Science', in Draus (ed.), History, Truth, Liberty, pp. 344-6. As K. Whiteside in 'Perspectivism and Historical Objectivity: Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Covert Debate with Raymond Aron', History and Theory, 25:2 (1986), p. 136, puts it: 'The historian's perspective-setting . . . is the result of a dialectic between an individual's vision and his historical-cultural context.' For an account of this very 'dialectic' in Aron's own political thought before and immediately after the Second World War, see S. Campbell, 'Raymond Aron During the Interwar Period: From Leftist Pacifism to a Critique of the Left', The South Atlantic Quarterly, 86:1 (1987), pp. 57-68, and 'Raymond Aron: The Making of a Cold Warrior', The Historian, 51:4 (1989), pp. 551-73.
50. Ibid., p. 132. Although Aron believes that historians' epochs and social environments influence their research, he does not claim that their research is simply the product of these influences. See R. Aron, 'The Concepts of "Class Truth" and "National Truth" in the Social Sciences', in Science and Freedom: Congress for Cultural Freedom (London, 1955), pp. 156-70, and 'Max Weber and Modern Social Science', in Draus (ed.), History, Truth, Liberty, pp. 344-6. As K. Whiteside in 'Perspectivism and Historical Objectivity: Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Covert Debate with Raymond Aron', History and Theory, 25:2 (1986), p. 136, puts it: 'The historian's perspective-setting . . . is the result of a dialectic between an individual's vision and his historical-cultural context.' For an account of this very 'dialectic' in Aron's own political thought before and immediately after the Second World War, see S. Campbell, 'Raymond Aron During the Interwar Period: From Leftist Pacifism to a Critique of the Left', The South Atlantic Quarterly, 86:1 (1987), pp. 57-68, and 'Raymond Aron: The Making of a Cold Warrior', The Historian, 51:4 (1989), pp. 551-73.
51. Ibid., p. 132. Although Aron believes that historians' epochs and social environments influence their research, he does not claim that their research is simply the product of these influences. See R. Aron, 'The Concepts of "Class Truth" and "National Truth" in the Social Sciences', in Science and Freedom: Congress for Cultural Freedom (London, 1955), pp. 156-70, and 'Max Weber and Modern Social Science', in Draus (ed.), History, Truth, Liberty, pp. 344-6. As K. Whiteside in 'Perspectivism and Historical Objectivity: Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Covert Debate with Raymond Aron', History and Theory, 25:2 (1986), p. 136, puts it: 'The historian's perspective-setting . . . is the result of a dialectic between an individual's vision and his historical-cultural context.' For an account of this very 'dialectic' in Aron's own political thought before and immediately after the Second World War, see S. Campbell, 'Raymond Aron During the Interwar Period: From Leftist Pacifism to a Critique of the Left', The South Atlantic Quarterly, 86:1 (1987), pp. 57-68, and 'Raymond Aron: The Making of a Cold Warrior', The Historian, 51:4 (1989), pp. 551-73.
52. R. Aron, 'The Philosophy of History', in Conant (ed.), Politics and History, p. 5.
53. In this respect, Aron has articulated what might be described as the social science equivalent of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. Historians are doomed to influence their investigations because they will always have a particular perspective and system of interpretation. 'History never completely overcomes this relativity, because life experiences constitute the material of the science, and because facts, to the extent that they transcend individuals, exist not in themselves, but by and for consciousness. History considers an object which not only has passed (if it is an event), not only has disappeared (if it is a natural or human condition), but which attains existence only in minds, and changes with them.' See Aron, Introduction, p. 289.
54. Ibid., p. 160.
55. Ibid., p. 161.
56. Aron, 'Three Forms', p. 50.
57. Aron, Introduction, p. 160.
58. Ibid., p. 178.
59. Ibid., p. 187.
60. Ibid., p. 262. According to Aron (p. 225), statistical analysis cannot overcome the limitations associated with relativity and probability: not only is some sort of interpretation required to translate the numbers found in statistical columns into causal relations, but it is often the case that some statistics do not fit neatly into any recognizable category.
61. Ibid., pp. 246-9.
62. Ibid., p. 254.
63. See R. Aron, 'On False Historical Consciousness', in Draus (ed.), History, Truth, Liberty, pp. 98-103.
64. Aron, Introduction, pp. 256-7.
65. Ibid., p. 264.
66. Not even Weber's attempt to overcome this subjectivity - namely, to claim that while historians freely dictate the direction of their inquiry, the results of their inquiry are objectively determined -satisfied Aron. Weber had neither demonstrated that it was 'possible to distinguish in reality between question and answer' nor shown that 'the experienced meaning [of an historical event] could be rigorously grasped'. See R. Aron, 'Max Weber and Michael Polanyi', in The Logic of Personal Knowledge: Essays Presented to Michael Polanyi on his Seventieth Birthday (London, 1961), p. 102.
67. Whiteside 'Perspectivism', p. 135.
68. Aron, 'Introduction', in Conant (ed.), Politics and History, p. xxiii.
69. R. Aron, 'Theory and Theories in International Relations: A Conceptual Analysis', in N. Palmer (ed.), A Design for International Relations Research: Scope, Theory, Method, and Relevance (Philadelphia, PA, 1970), p. 55.
70. R. Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, tr. R. Howard and A. Fox (New York, 1966), pp. 17, 177-80.
71. Aron saw that there was a real need for an adequate theoretical framework in international relations, a discipline which had hitherto (at least in France) been monopolized by diplomatic historians, many of whom were ill equipped both to discuss the implicit logic of interstate relations and to recognize the need of bringing to bear the insights and conclusions of other social sciences, such as economics and psychology. See R. Aron, 'Political Science in France', in Contemporary Political Science: A Survey of Methods, Research, and Training (Paris, 1950), p. 57.
72. See R. Aron, 'A propos de la théorie politique', in R. Aron, Études politiques (Paris, 1972), pp. 160-6.
73. Aron, Peace and War, preface.
74. S. Hoffmann, The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics (New York, 1965), p. 25; see also P. Manent, 'Raymond Aron éducateur', Commentaire, 8(28-9) (1985), p. 161.
75. S. Hoffmann, The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics (New York, 1965), p. 25; see also P. Manent, 'Raymond Aron éducateur', Commentaire, 8(28-9) (1985), p. 161.
76. R. Aron, 'What is a Theory of International Relations?', Journal of International Affairs, 21:2 (1967), p. 190.
77. See J. Hall, 'Raymond Aron's Sociology of States, or the Non-Relative Autonomy of Inter-State Behaviour', in M. Shaw (ed.), War, State, and Society (London, 1984), p. 73; and S. Hoffmann, 'Raymond Aron and the Theory of International Relations', International Studies Quarterly, 29:4 (1985), p. 14.
78. See J. Hall, 'Raymond Aron's Sociology of States, or the Non-Relative Autonomy of Inter-State Behaviour', in M. Shaw (ed.), War, State, and Society (London, 1984), p. 73; and S. Hoffmann, 'Raymond Aron and the Theory of International Relations', International Studies Quarterly, 29:4 (1985), p. 14.
79. Cf. Aron, Peace and War, pp. 339-66, and B. Kerkvliet, 'A Critique of Raymond Aron's Theory of War and Prescriptions', International Studies Quarterly, 12:4 (1968), pp. 424-5.
80. Cf. Aron, Peace and War, pp. 339-66, and B. Kerkvliet, 'A Critique of Raymond Aron's Theory of War and Prescriptions', International Studies Quarterly, 12:4 (1968), pp. 424-5.
81. Aron, 'Theory and Theories', p. 58.
82. One question that can legitimately be raised today about Aron's point of departure is whether or not international relations can be so clearly separated from domestic politics. Aron is aware that his definition of international relations cannot categorically circumscribe or distinguish this type of relation from similar types of political relations in and between states, as well as that domestic factors influence the behaviour of states internationally. Nonetheless, despite the perhaps increasing interconnectedness between domestic and international politics, Aron's point of departure still seems to be exceedingly helpful (if not the most accurate) if only because of the lack of a monopoly of legitimate violence in the international system and the continuing presence and relevance of armed conflict. For a recent and quite thoughtful critique of this position, see H. Milner, 'The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory', Review of International Studies, 17:1 (1991), pp. 67-85. I am thankful to Stanley Hoffmann for pointing out this important question, which certainly deserves more attention than I can give it in this essay.
83. Aron, Peace and War, pp. 4-8, 16, 24.
84. R. Aron, 'Les sociologues et les institutions représentatives', in Aron, Études politiques, p. 285. See also R. Aron, Democracy and Totalitarianism: A Theory of Political Systems, tr. V. Ionescu (Ann Arbor, MI, 1968), pp. 3-13; B. de Jouvenel, 'Raymond Aron et l'autonomie de l'ordre politique', in Casanova et al. (eds.), Mélanges en l'honneur de Raymond Aron, pp. 233-47; and D. Mahoney, The Liberal Political Science of Raymond Aron: A Critical Introduction (Lanham, MD, 1992), pp. 121-3, 137-47. For a discussion on whether or not this is Aron's final word on the subject, see F. Draus, 'Raymond Aron et la politique', Revue française de science politique, 34:6 (1984), pp. 1198-1210; and M. Merle, 'Le Dernier Message de Raymond Aron: système interétatique ou société internationale?', Revue française de science politique, 34:6 (1984), pp. 1181-97.
85. R. Aron, 'Les sociologues et les institutions représentatives', in Aron, Études politiques, p. 285. See also R. Aron, Democracy and Totalitarianism: A Theory of Political Systems, tr. V. Ionescu (Ann Arbor, MI, 1968), pp. 3-13; B. de Jouvenel, 'Raymond Aron et l'autonomie de l'ordre politique', in Casanova et al. (eds.), Mélanges en l'honneur de Raymond Aron, pp. 233-47; and D. Mahoney, The Liberal Political Science of Raymond Aron: A Critical Introduction (Lanham, MD, 1992), pp. 121-3, 137-47. For a discussion on whether or not this is Aron's final word on the subject, see F. Draus, 'Raymond Aron et la politique', Revue française de science politique, 34:6 (1984), pp. 1198-1210; and M. Merle, 'Le Dernier Message de Raymond Aron: système interétatique ou société internationale?', Revue française de science politique, 34:6 (1984), pp. 1181-97.
86. R. Aron, 'Les sociologues et les institutions représentatives', in Aron, Études politiques, p. 285. See also R. Aron, Democracy and Totalitarianism: A Theory of Political Systems, tr. V. Ionescu (Ann Arbor, MI, 1968), pp. 3-13; B. de Jouvenel, 'Raymond Aron et l'autonomie de l'ordre politique', in Casanova et al. (eds.), Mélanges en l'honneur de Raymond Aron, pp. 233-47; and D. Mahoney, The Liberal Political Science of Raymond Aron: A Critical Introduction (Lanham, MD, 1992), pp. 121-3, 137-47. For a discussion on whether or not this is Aron's final word on the subject, see F. Draus, 'Raymond Aron et la politique', Revue française de science politique, 34:6 (1984), pp. 1198-1210; and M. Merle, 'Le Dernier Message de Raymond Aron: système interétatique ou société internationale?', Revue française de science politique, 34:6 (1984), pp. 1181-97.
87. R. Aron, 'Les sociologues et les institutions représentatives', in Aron, Études politiques, p. 285. See also R. Aron, Democracy and Totalitarianism: A Theory of Political Systems, tr. V. Ionescu (Ann Arbor, MI, 1968), pp. 3-13; B. de Jouvenel, 'Raymond Aron et l'autonomie de l'ordre politique', in Casanova et al. (eds.), Mélanges en l'honneur de Raymond Aron, pp. 233-47; and D. Mahoney, The Liberal Political Science of Raymond Aron: A Critical Introduction (Lanham, MD, 1992), pp. 121-3, 137-47. For a discussion on whether or not this is Aron's final word on the subject, see F. Draus, 'Raymond Aron et la politique', Revue française de science politique, 34:6 (1984), pp. 1198-1210; and M. Merle, 'Le Dernier Message de Raymond Aron: système interétatique ou société internationale?', Revue française de science politique, 34:6 (1984), pp. 1181-97.
88. R. Aron, 'Les sociologues et les institutions représentatives', in Aron, Études politiques, p. 285. See also R. Aron, Democracy and Totalitarianism: A Theory of Political Systems, tr. V. Ionescu (Ann Arbor, MI, 1968), pp. 3-13; B. de Jouvenel, 'Raymond Aron et l'autonomie de l'ordre politique', in Casanova et al. (eds.), Mélanges en l'honneur de Raymond Aron, pp. 233-47; and D. Mahoney, The Liberal Political Science of Raymond Aron: A Critical Introduction (Lanham, MD, 1992), pp. 121-3, 137-47. For a discussion on whether or not this is Aron's final word on the subject, see F. Draus, 'Raymond Aron et la politique', Revue française de science politique, 34:6 (1984), pp. 1198-1210; and M. Merle, 'Le Dernier Message de Raymond Aron: système interétatique ou société internationale?', Revue française de science politique, 34:6 (1984), pp. 1181-97.
89. R. Aron, 'Les sociologues et les institutions représentatives', in Aron, Études politiques, p. 285. See also R. Aron, Democracy and Totalitarianism: A Theory of Political Systems, tr. V. Ionescu (Ann Arbor, MI, 1968), pp. 3-13; B. de Jouvenel, 'Raymond Aron et l'autonomie de l'ordre politique', in Casanova et al. (eds.), Mélanges en l'honneur de Raymond Aron, pp. 233-47; and D. Mahoney, The Liberal Political Science of Raymond Aron: A Critical Introduction (Lanham, MD, 1992), pp. 121-3, 137-47. For a discussion on whether or not this is Aron's final word on the subject, see F. Draus, 'Raymond Aron et la politique', Revue française de science politique, 34:6 (1984), pp. 1198-1210; and M. Merle, 'Le Dernier Message de Raymond Aron: système interétatique ou société internationale?', Revue française de science politique, 34:6 (1984), pp. 1181-97.
90. Aron, Peace and War, pp. 279ff. Aron's emphasis on the regime is in many ways the obverse of his notion of the autonomy of politics. As politics cannot be reduced to and explained by economic concerns (even though such concerns influence politics), so is it impossible to explain a regime's foreign policy simply by reference to systemic constraints or national interest.
91. E. Kolodziej, 'Raymond Aron: A Critical Retrospective and Prospective', International Studies Quarterly, 29:4 (1985), p. 8; see also G. Ionescu, 'Raymond Aron: A Modern Classicist', in A. de Crespigny and K. Minogue (eds.), Contemporary Political Philosophers (London, 1976), pp. 206-7.
92. E. Kolodziej, 'Raymond Aron: A Critical Retrospective and Prospective', International Studies Quarterly, 29:4 (1985), p. 8; see also G. Ionescu, 'Raymond Aron: A Modern Classicist', in A. de Crespigny and K. Minogue (eds.), Contemporary Political Philosophers (London, 1976), pp. 206-7.
93. K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA, 1979).
94. Aron, Peace and War, p. 148.
95. Ibid., p. 147. If anything, Aron (p. 95) sees that the homogeneity or heterogeneity of states has more influence on the system than vice versa. 'Therefore, the principal actors never have the sense of being subject to the system in the manner in which an average-size firm is subject to the laws of the market . . . In each period the principal actors have determined the system more than they have been determined by it. A change of regime within one of the chief powers suffices to change the style and sometimes the course of international relations.'
96. S. Hoffmann, 'An American Social Science: International Relations', Daedalus, 106:3 (1977), p. 52.
97. Cf. Waltz, Theory, pp. 43-9, and 'Realist Thought', pp. 29-37, with Aron, 'Theory and Theories', pp. 61-4.
98. Cf. Waltz, Theory, pp. 43-9, and 'Realist Thought', pp. 29-37, with Aron, 'Theory and Theories', pp. 61-4.
99. Cf. Waltz, Theory, pp. 43-9, and 'Realist Thought', pp. 29-37, with Aron, 'Theory and Theories', pp. 61-4.
100. R. Yalem, 'The Theory of International Relations of Raymond Aron', International Relations, 3 (Nov. 1971), p. 919.
101. Aron, 'What is a Theory', p. 196; Peace and War, pp. 7, 15, 17, 88-93.
102. Aron, 'What is a Theory', p. 196; Peace and War, pp. 7, 15, 17, 88-93.
103. Aron. 'What is a Theory', p. 192.
104. Aron notes that part of the reason why international relations theorists are often unwilling to accept the limitations of theory is that they have become enchanted with the success of economics. Aron, however, points out that this success depends by and large on the 'imaginary actor' homo economicus, that self-seeking being whose sole concern is to maximize profit. International relations, by contrast, does not have a homo diplomaticus, and this means that the more-or-less rigorous causal propositions generated in economics cannot be achieved in international relations. 'The diplomaticus of theory, who would have as his goal the maximization of resources, of actual forces, or of power, would not be an idealized portrait of the diplomats of all ages; he would be the caricatured simplification of certain diplomatic personages at certain periods.' See Aron, 'What is a Theory', p. 187, and Peace and War, p. 91. As the goals states seek are diverse, international relations theory is limited by this very diversity. For a thoughtful discussion of whether or not Aron is too pessimistic concerning the 'indeterminacy' of international politics - but a discussion that operates within Aron's own theoretical framework - see J.-B. Duroselle, 'Paix et guerre entre les nations: la théorie des relations internationales selon Raymond Aron', Revue française de science politique, 12:4 (1962), pp. 963-79.
105. Aron notes that part of the reason why international relations theorists are often unwilling to accept the limitations of theory is that they have become enchanted with the success of economics. Aron, however, points out that this success depends by and large on the 'imaginary actor' homo economicus, that self-seeking being whose sole concern is to maximize profit. International relations, by contrast, does not have a homo diplomaticus, and this means that the more-or-less rigorous causal propositions generated in economics cannot be achieved in international relations. 'The diplomaticus of theory, who would have as his goal the maximization of resources, of actual forces, or of power, would not be an idealized portrait of the diplomats of all ages; he would be the caricatured simplification of certain diplomatic personages at certain periods.' See Aron, 'What is a Theory', p. 187, and Peace and War, p. 91. As the goals states seek are diverse, international relations theory is limited by this very diversity. For a thoughtful discussion of whether or not Aron is too pessimistic concerning the 'indeterminacy' of international politics - but a discussion that operates within Aron's own theoretical framework - see J.-B. Duroselle, 'Paix et guerre entre les nations: la théorie des relations internationales selon Raymond Aron', Revue française de science politique, 12:4 (1962), pp. 963-79.
106. Aron notes that part of the reason why international relations theorists are often unwilling to accept the limitations of theory is that they have become enchanted with the success of economics. Aron, however, points out that this success depends by and large on the 'imaginary actor' homo economicus, that self-seeking being whose sole concern is to maximize profit. International relations, by contrast, does not have a homo diplomaticus, and this means that the more-or-less rigorous causal propositions generated in economics cannot be achieved in international relations. 'The diplomaticus of theory, who would have as his goal the maximization of resources, of actual forces, or of power, would not be an idealized portrait of the diplomats of all ages; he would be the caricatured simplification of certain diplomatic personages at certain periods.' See Aron, 'What is a Theory', p. 187, and Peace and War, p. 91. As the goals states seek are diverse, international relations theory is limited by this very diversity. For a thoughtful discussion of whether or not Aron is too pessimistic concerning the 'indeterminacy' of international politics - but a discussion that operates within Aron's own theoretical framework - see J.-B. Duroselle, 'Paix et guerre entre les nations: la théorie des relations internationales selon Raymond Aron', Revue française de science politique, 12:4 (1962), pp. 963-79.
107. H. Morgenthau, 'Review of Peace and War', American Political Science Review, 61:4 (1967), pp. 1110-12; and C. McClelland, 'Conceptualization, Not Theory', in Palmer (ed.), Design for International Relations Research, pp. 72-5.
108. H. Morgenthau, 'Review of Peace and War', American Political Science Review, 61:4 (1967), pp. 1110-12; and C. McClelland, 'Conceptualization, Not Theory', in Palmer (ed.), Design for International Relations Research, pp. 72-5.
109. Aron, 'What is a Theory', pp. 193-4.
110. Ibid., pp. 194-5.
111. See, for example, H. Bull, 'International Theory: The Case for the Classical Approach', in Knorr and Rosenau (eds.), Contending Approaches, pp. 20-38; T. Strong, 'History and Choices: The Foundations of the Political Thought of Raymond Aron', History and Theory, 11:2 (1972), pp. 179-92; and M. Beloff, 'Historians and Others: On the Sense of History', Encounter, 54:2 (1980), pp. 61-6.
112. See, for example, H. Bull, 'International Theory: The Case for the Classical Approach', in Knorr and Rosenau (eds.), Contending Approaches, pp. 20-38; T. Strong, 'History and Choices: The Foundations of the Political Thought of Raymond Aron', History and Theory, 11:2 (1972), pp. 179-92; and M. Beloff, 'Historians and Others: On the Sense of History', Encounter, 54:2 (1980), pp. 61-6.
113. See, for example, H. Bull, 'International Theory: The Case for the Classical Approach', in Knorr and Rosenau (eds.), Contending Approaches, pp. 20-38; T. Strong, 'History and Choices: The Foundations of the Political Thought of Raymond Aron', History and Theory, 11:2 (1972), pp. 179-92; and M. Beloff, 'Historians and Others: On the Sense of History', Encounter, 54:2 (1980), pp. 61-6.
114. Aron, Introduction, pp. 177-81. Of course, this claim raises the following question: if any historical investigation already assumes the possession of some sort of system of interpretation, how can an individual begin to make sense of the historical record without first articulating that system? Although Aron might answer this question by stating that an individual's initial interpretive framework is a product of education or of historians and leaders who have written about the past, the more important point is that as an individual begins to study history, there must be a corresponding effort to articulate a system of interpretation as it emerges from and is shaped by this study. Not surprisingly, then, the first thing that Aron does in Peace and War is to make as clear as possible the interpretative framework that emerged from his many years of historical research.
115. Hoffmann, State of War, pp. 32-3.
116. P. Katzenstein, 'International Relations Theory and the Analysis of Change', in E.-O. Czempiel and J. Rosenau (eds.), Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s (Lexington, MA, 1989), pp. 296-8. There are other indications that the renewed interest in history in no way comes close to Aron's philosophical interest, e.g., when Katzenstein (p. 299) observes that 'most of the theorists published in this book have made it a habit to read history' or again that 'theorists of international relations are also reading history because, let's face it, reading history is fun'. If these comments are indicative of the seriousness of this renewed interest in history, then Aron's comments about making history the touchstone of theory retain their force today.
117. Ibid., p. 296.
118. R. Aron, 'Conflict and War from the Viewpoint of Historical Sociology', in R. Aron, The Nature of Conflict: Studies on the Sociological Aspects of International Relations (Paris, 1957), pp. 190-8.
119. See Aron, Introduction, pp. 187, 210, 213, 229, and 'Conflict and War', pp. 185-7.
120. See Aron, Introduction, pp. 187, 210, 213, 229, and 'Conflict and War', pp. 185-7.
121. Aron, 'What is a Theory', p. 189.
122. Aron, 'Theory and Theories', pp. 64-5.
123. Aron, 'What is a Theory', p. 201.
124. See Aron, Peace and War, pp. 767-87.
125. Hall, Diagnoses, p. 173.
126. Aron, 'Max Weber', in Draus (ed.), History, Truth, Liberty, p. 336; cf. Aron, Introduction, pp. 324-5, and 'Three Forms', pp. 54-7.
127. Aron, 'Max Weber', in Draus (ed.), History, Truth, Liberty, p. 336; cf. Aron, Introduction, pp. 324-5, and 'Three Forms', pp. 54-7.
128. Aron, 'Max Weber', in Draus (ed.), History, Truth, Liberty, p. 336; cf. Aron, Introduction, pp. 324-5, and 'Three Forms', pp. 54-7.
129. It is because political questions necessarily involve moral questions that Aron denies that a strictly scientific (i.e., value-free) study of politics is possible. Aron's understanding of the practical implications of theory strives to reach a 'middle ground between the radical Weberian distinction between moral choice and scientific demonstration on the one hand and the scientific demonstration of moral choice on the other hand'. Theory cannot determine moral choice, because of the element of uncertainty and unpredictability found in all forms of choice; but theory is not divorced from moral choice since all theoretical frameworks influence and are influenced by politics and morality. At best, theoretical analysis can inform and clarify political decisions. See R. Pierce, Contemporary French Political Thought (London, 1966), p. 240.
130. Aron gives several examples of the kind of 'help' that theory can offer in the nuclear age. Since the destructive power of nuclear weapons is so great, it is necessary to have sufficient conventional forces to prevent an un wanted fait accompli. Or again, theory suggests that in a confrontation between two nuclear powers, a state should gradually demonstrate its resolve to the other state rather than give nuclear ultimatums; for the other state might think that such an ultimatum is a bluff, something that would be less likely to occur should a state give repeated manifestations of its political resolve. See Aron, 'What is a Theory', pp. 202-4.
131. Aron, 'Theory and Theories', p. 66.
132. Y. Lapid, 'The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era', International Studies Quarterly, 33:3 (1989), p. 236. Because Lapid summarizes and brings into critical focus the major themes of this debate, I will take the article as a touchstone in this section.
133. Ibid., pp. 236-40.
134. Ibid., pp. 241-2.
135. Ibid., pp. 243, 246-7.
136. We can note here in passing that the method of historical sociology tries to safeguard against both of these extremes by expressing the dialectical relationship between theory and data, i.e., the necessity of continually moving back and forth from data to theory and from theory to data. For an interesting description and discussion of the dialectical character of Aron's theory of international relations as a whole, see A. Piquemal, Raymond Aron et l'ordre international (Paris, 1978).
137. See Lapid, 'Third Debate', pp. 240-1, 245-6; and K. Holsti, 'Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Which Are the Fairest Theories of All?', International Studies Quarterly, 33:3 (1989), pp. 257-8.
138. See Lapid, 'Third Debate', pp. 240-1, 245-6; and K. Holsti, 'Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Which Are the Fairest Theories of All?', International Studies Quarterly, 33:3 (1989), pp. 257-8.
139. Of course, this assumes that post-positivists are ultimately interested in increasing phenomenal knowledge about international politics. But as Thomas Biersteker suggests, some post-positivists (as well as positivists) have a decidedly social and political purpose to their work, and one would have to wonder whether these theorists are more interested in promoting a certain political programme or in adding to current research. If the former is true, then post-positivists may indeed find their theoretical El Dorado by using their theories to advance certain policy recommendations. See T. Biersteker, 'Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations'. International Studies Quarterly, 33:3 (1989), pp. 264-6. Cf. J. George, 'International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: Another View of the Third Debate', International Studies Quarterly, 33:3 (1989), pp. 272-3; and Lapid, 'Third Debate', p. 247.
140. Of course, this assumes that post-positivists are ultimately interested in increasing phenomenal knowledge about international politics. But as Thomas Biersteker suggests, some post-positivists (as well as positivists) have a decidedly social and political purpose to their work, and one would have to wonder whether these theorists are more interested in promoting a certain political programme or in adding to current research. If the former is true, then post-positivists may indeed find their theoretical El Dorado by using their theories to advance certain policy recommendations. See T. Biersteker, 'Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations'. International Studies Quarterly, 33:3 (1989), pp. 264-6. Cf. J. George, 'International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: Another View of the Third Debate', International Studies Quarterly, 33:3 (1989), pp. 272-3; and Lapid, 'Third Debate', p. 247.
141. Of course, this assumes that post-positivists are ultimately interested in increasing phenomenal knowledge about international politics. But as Thomas Biersteker suggests, some post-positivists (as well as positivists) have a decidedly social and political purpose to their work, and one would have to wonder whether these theorists are more interested in promoting a certain political programme or in adding to current research. If the former is true, then post-positivists may indeed find their theoretical El Dorado by using their theories to advance certain policy recommendations. See T. Biersteker, 'Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations'. International Studies Quarterly, 33:3 (1989), pp. 264-6. Cf. J. George, 'International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: Another View of the Third Debate', International Studies Quarterly, 33:3 (1989), pp. 272-3; and Lapid, 'Third Debate', p. 247.
142. Lapid, 'Third Debate', pp. 243-4.
143. Aron, 'Theory and Theories', pp. 57-8, and 'What is a Theory', pp. 196-7.
144. Aron, 'Theory and Theories', pp. 57-8, and 'What is a Theory', pp. 196-7.
145. See Biersteker, 'Critical Reflections', p. 266.
146. Lapid, Third Debate', pp. 249-50.
147. Whiteside, 'Perspectivism', p. 137.
148. Aron, 'Introduction', in Conant (ed.), Politics, and History, p. xxii. Daniel Mahoney in Liberal Political Science, pp. 1-16, indicates the ways in which Aron later changed his position on certain issues in the Introduction, most notably in his analysis of Weber and political choice.
149. Aron, 'Introduction', in Conant (ed.), Politics, and History, p. xxii. Daniel Mahoney in Liberal Political Science, pp. 1-16, indicates the ways in which Aron later changed his position on certain issues in the Introduction, most notably in his analysis of Weber and political choice.
150. Aron, 'Introduction', in Conant (ed.), Politics and History, p. xxvi.
151. Aron, Introduction, p. 111.
152. See Aron, 'Concepts of "Class Truth"', pp. 163-5; 'A propos de la théorie politique', pp. 165-70; and 'Science and Consciousness of Society', in Draus (ed.), History, Truth, Liberty, pp. 211-17. Clearly, much more can (and should) be said about Aron's efforts to overcome the problem of relativism, and the above remarks are only meant to begin such a discussion. Despite the appearance of relativism in the Introduction, Aron wants to emphasize first and foremost that absolute certainty cannot be attained in historical investigations because of the limits of human knowledge and understanding. Aron's ultimate position - his 'probabilistic determinism' - is a 'mean between the Marxist deification of the historical process and the existentialist proclamation of unlimited human freedom', a position that attempts to avoid both a strict determinism and a radical relativity. See Mahoney, Liberal Political Science, p. 111. Nonetheless, as Mahoney (pp. 19-25) himself admits, all historical interpretations remain tinged with a certain degree of relativism, even if Aron tries to limit the scope and severity in his later writings. Therefore, it is a question whether probabilistic determinism is sufficient to overcome the problem of relativism; it is still difficult to see the standard which would allow a theorist to separate a fact from an interpretation of it, or to judge between two different interpretations.
153. See Aron, 'Concepts of "Class Truth"', pp. 163-5; 'A propos de la théorie politique', pp. 165-70; and 'Science and Consciousness of Society', in Draus (ed.), History, Truth, Liberty, pp. 211-17. Clearly, much more can (and should) be said about Aron's efforts to overcome the problem of relativism, and the above remarks are only meant to begin such a discussion. Despite the appearance of relativism in the Introduction, Aron wants to emphasize first and foremost that absolute certainty cannot be attained in historical investigations because of the limits of human knowledge and understanding. Aron's ultimate position - his 'probabilistic determinism' - is a 'mean between the Marxist deification of the historical process and the existentialist proclamation of unlimited human freedom', a position that attempts to avoid both a strict determinism and a radical relativity. See Mahoney, Liberal Political Science, p. 111. Nonetheless, as Mahoney (pp. 19-25) himself admits, all historical interpretations remain tinged with a certain degree of relativism, even if Aron tries to limit the scope and severity in his later writings. Therefore, it is a question whether probabilistic determinism is sufficient to overcome the problem of relativism; it is still difficult to see the standard which would allow a theorist to separate a fact from an interpretation of it, or to judge between two different interpretations.
154. See Aron, 'Concepts of "Class Truth"', pp. 163-5; 'A propos de la théorie politique', pp. 165-70; and 'Science and Consciousness of Society', in Draus (ed.), History, Truth, Liberty, pp. 211-17. Clearly, much more can (and should) be said about Aron's efforts to overcome the problem of relativism, and the above remarks are only meant to begin such a discussion. Despite the appearance of relativism in the Introduction, Aron wants to emphasize first and foremost that absolute certainty cannot be attained in historical investigations because of the limits of human knowledge and understanding. Aron's ultimate position - his 'probabilistic determinism' - is a 'mean between the Marxist deification of the historical process and the existentialist proclamation of unlimited human freedom', a position that attempts to avoid both a strict determinism and a radical relativity. See Mahoney, Liberal Political Science, p. 111. Nonetheless, as Mahoney (pp. 19-25) himself admits, all historical interpretations remain tinged with a certain degree of relativism, even if Aron tries to limit the scope and severity in his later writings. Therefore, it is a question whether probabilistic determinism is sufficient to overcome the problem of relativism; it is still difficult to see the standard which would allow a theorist to separate a fact from an interpretation of it, or to judge between two different interpretations.
155. See Aron, 'Concepts of "Class Truth"', pp. 163-5; 'A propos de la théorie politique', pp. 165-70; and 'Science and Consciousness of Society', in Draus (ed.), History, Truth, Liberty, pp. 211-17. Clearly, much more can (and should) be said about Aron's efforts to overcome the problem of relativism, and the above remarks are only meant to begin such a discussion. Despite the appearance of relativism in the Introduction, Aron wants to emphasize first and foremost that absolute certainty cannot be attained in historical investigations because of the limits of human knowledge and understanding. Aron's ultimate position - his 'probabilistic determinism' - is a 'mean between the Marxist deification of the historical process and the existentialist proclamation of unlimited human freedom', a position that attempts to avoid both a strict determinism and a radical relativity. See Mahoney, Liberal Political Science, p. 111. Nonetheless, as Mahoney (pp. 19-25) himself admits, all historical interpretations remain tinged with a certain degree of relativism, even if Aron tries to limit the scope and severity in his later writings. Therefore, it is a question whether probabilistic determinism is sufficient to overcome the problem of relativism; it is still difficult to see the standard which would allow a theorist to separate a fact from an interpretation of it, or to judge between two different interpretations.
156. This is true not only for systems like those of Marx and Hegel, but also for systems like that of Spengler, systems that deny that there is any order or progress in history. See S. Mesure, Raymond Aron et la raison historique (Paris, 1984), pp. 59-80.
157. Aron, 'Introduction', in Conant (ed.), Politics and History, p. xxiv.