Human capital, committee power and legislative outcomes

Public Choice

Volumn 92, Issue 3-4, 1997, Pages 301-316

  Saving, Jason L ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031524352     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1017954823397     Document Type: Article

References (21)

1. Austen-Smith, D. and Riker, W.H. (1987). Asymmetric information and the coherence of legislation. American Political Science Review 81: 897-918.
2. Austen-Smith, D. and Riker, W.H. (1990). Asymmetric information and the coherence of legislation: A correction. American Political Science Review 84: 243-245.
3. Baron, D.P. and Ferejohn, J. (1987). Bargaining and agenda formation in legislatures. American Economic Journal 77(2): 303-309.
4. Becker, G.S. (1975). Human capital, 2nd edition. New York: Columbia University Press.
5. Black, D. (1948). On the rationale of group decision-making. Journal of Political Economy 56: 23-34.
6. Bowen, H.R. (1943). The interpretation of voting in the allocation of economic resources. Quarterly Journal of Economics 58: 27-48.
7. Cooper, J. (1970). The origins of the standing committees and the development of the modern house. Houston, TX: Rice University Studies.
8. Fenno, R.F. Jr. (1973). Congressmen in committees. Boston: Little, Brown.
9. Gilligan, T.W. and Krehbiel, K. (1989). Asymmetric information and legislative rules. American Journal of Political Science 33: 459-490.
10. Gilligan, T.W. and Krehbiel, K. (1990). Organization of informative committees by a rational legislature. American Journal of Political Science 34: 531-564.
11. Groseclose, T. (1994). The committee outlier debate: A review and a reexamination of some of the evidence. Public Choice 80: 265-273.
12. Krehbiel, K. (1990). Are congressional committees composed of preference outliers? American Political Science Review 84: 149-163.
13. Krehbiel, K. (1991). Information and legislative organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
14. Matthews, D.R. (1959). The folkways of the United States Senate: Conformity to group norms and legislative effectiveness. American Political Science Review 53: 1064-1089.
15. Rothschild, M. and Stiglitz, J.E. (1970). Increasing risk: I. A definition. Journal of Economic Theory 2: 225-243.
16. Shepsle, K.A. (1986). Institutional equilibrium and equilibrium institutions. In H.F. Weisberg (Ed.), Political science: The science of politics, 51-81. Washington, DC: American Political Science Association.
17. Shepsle, K.A. (1993). Political institutions and the new institutional economics: Comment. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 149: 347-350.
18. Shepsle, K.A. and Weingast, B.R. (1984). Legislative politics and budget outcomes. In G.B. Mills and J.L. Palmer (Eds.), Federal budget policy in the 1980s, 343-367. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press.
19. Shepsle, K.A. and Weingast, B.R. (1987). The institutional foundations of committee power. American Political Science Review 81: 85-104.
20. Smith, S.S. and Deering, C.J. (1990). Committees in Congress, 2nd edition. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
21. Weingast, B.R. and Marshall, W. (1988). The industrial organization of Congress; or why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets. Journal of Political Economy 96: 132-163.