Imperfect rent dissipation with unionized labor

Public Choice

Volumn 93, Issue 1-2, 1997, Pages 55-75

  Rama, Martin ^a  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031518751     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1017912721561     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. Comanor, W. and Leibenstein, H. (1969). Allocative efficiency, X-efficiency, and the measurement of welfare loss. Economica 36 (August): 304-309.
2. Christophides, L. and Oswald, A. (1992). Real wage determination and rent-sharing in collective bargaining agreements. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(3) (August): 985-1002.
3. Ellsingen, T. (1991). Strategic buyers and the social cost of monopoly. American Economic Review 81(3) (June): 648-657.
4. Formby, J., Keeler, J. and Thistle, P. (1988). X-efficiency, rent-seeking and social costs. Public Choice 57(2) (May): 115-126.
5. Higgins, R., Shughart, W. and Tollison, R. (1985). Free entry and efficient rent seeking. Public Choice 46: 227-246.
6. Hillman, A. (1989). The Political Economy of Protection. London: Harwood Academic Publishers.
7. Hillman, A. and Katz, E. (1984). Risk-averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly power. Economic Journal 94 (March): 104-110.
8. Hillman, A. and Samet, D. (1987). Dissipation of rents and revenues in small numbers contests. Public Choice 54(1) (January): 63-82.
9. Hirshleifer, J. (1989). Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success. Public Choice 63: 101-112.
10. Krueger, A. (1974). The political economy of the rent-seeking society. American Economic Review 64 (June): 291-303.
11. McDonald, I. and Solow, R. (1981). Wage bargaining and employment. American Economic Review 71 (December): 896-908.
12. McNutt, P. (1993). Rent-seeking and X-inefficiency. Public Choice 75: 371-378.
13. Magee, S., Brock, W. and Young, L. (1989). Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.
14. Nitzan, S. (1994). Modelling rent-seeking contests. European Journal of Political Economy 10(1) (May): 41-60.
15. Olson, M. (1971). The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
16. Oswald, A. (1985). The economic theory of trade unions: an introductory survey. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 87(2): 160-193.
17. Paul, C. and Schoening, N. (1991). Regulation and rent-seeking: prices, profits, and third-party transfers. Public Choice 68(1-3) January: 185-194.
18. Pérez-Castrillo J. and Verdier, T. (1992). A general analysis of rent-seeking games. Public Choice 73 (April): 335-350.
19. Posner, R. (1975). The social costs of monopoly and regulation. Journal of Political Economy 83 (August): 807-827.
20. Rama, M. (1994). Endogenous trade policy: a time-series approach. Economics & Politics 6(3) (November): 215-232.
21. Rose, N. (1987). Labor rent sharing and regulation: evidence from the trucking industry. Journal of Political Economy 95(6) (December): 1146-1178.
22. Schap, D. (1985). X-inefficiency in a rent-seeking society: a graphical analysis. Quarterly Review of Economics and Business 25(1) (Spring): 19-27.
23. Schmidt, T. (1992). Rent-seeking firms and consumers: an equilibrium analysis. Economics & Politics 4(2) (July): 137-149.
24. Stewart, M. (1990). Union wage differentials, product market influences and the division of rents. Economic Journal (December): 1122-1137.
25. Tollison, R. (1982). Rent seeking: a survey. Kyklos 35(4): 575-602.
26. Tullock, G. (1967). The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies and theft. Western Economic Journal 5 (June): 224-232.
27. Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent seeking. In J. Buchanan, R. Tollison and G. Tullock (Eds.), Towards a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, 269-282. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
28. Wenders, J. (1987). On perfect rent dissipation. American Economic Review 77 (June): 456-459.