Reinventing workplace regulation

California Management Review

Volumn , Issue 4, 1997, Pages 98-117

  Levine, David I ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0031515976     PISSN: 00081256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/41165912     Document Type: Article

References (55)

1. GAO [General Accounting Office], Report on Workplace Regulation, Washington, D.C., June 1994.
2. Regulatory Systems, Accompanying Report of the National Performance Review, Office of the Vice President, Washington, D.C., September 1993.
3. Philip K. Howard, The Death of Common Sense (New York, NY: Random House, 1994).
4. Al Gore, Common Sense Government (New York, NY: Random House, 1995).
5. The New OSHA, Department of Labor, URL http://www.osha-slc.gov/Reinventing, 1995.
6. Joel Rogers and Richard B. Freeman, "Who Speaks for Us? Employee Representation in a Nonunion Labor Market," in Bruce E. Kaufman and Morris M. Kleiner, eds., Employee Representation: Alternatives and Future Directions (Madison, WI: IRRA, 1993). Some analysts dispute the need for any safety regulation. They assume that workers have good information before taking jobs or that workers quickly find out about hazards and find it easy to move between jobs. In this setting, employers will face market incentives to provide the efficient amount of safety because unsafe employers will need to pay higher wages that compensate workers for hazards. Unfortunately, the empirical support for this theory is mixed. In addition, a number of market failures suggest government intervention is called for. For example, information on safety and (especially) health risks that may take decades to materialize is often far from perfect. Moreover, the presence of social insurance implies that injured workers do not pay the full cost of their injuries; thus, the free market will lead to inefficiently little safety. Finally, even if markets work well, we should still favor proposals such as this one that reduce the costs of the politically chosen level of safety regulation.
7. Bob Port and John Solomon, "OSHA Never Saw 75% of Fatal Sites," San Jose Mercury News, September 5, 1995, pp. 1E, 5E.
8. Edward E. Potter and Judith A. Youngman, Keeping America Competitive: Employment Policy for the Twenty-First Century (Lakewood, CO : Glenbridge, 1995).
9. The New OSHA, Department of Labor, URL http://www.osha-slc.gov/Reinventing, 1995.
10. Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, Report and Recommendations, U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 1994.
11. Ibid.
12. OSHA [Occupational Safety and Health Administration], Review and Analysis of State-Mandated and Other Worker Protections Programs, June 1995.
13. "Oregon Safety Committees Touted," Occupational Safety and Health, (September 1993), pp. 26-27.
14. GAO [General Accounting Office], "Workplace Safety and Health Programs Show Promise," Testimony before the House Committee on Education and Labor, GAO/T-HRD-92-15, 1992.
15. The New OSHA, Department of Labor, URL http://www.osha-slc.gov/Reinventing, 1995, Appendix 1.
16. Ibid., Appendix 2.
17. See, for example, ibid., Appendix 3.
18. Ibid.
19. Paul Adler, Barbara Goldoftas, and David I. Levine, "Ergonomics, Employee Involvement, and the Toyota Production System: A Case Study of NUMMI's 1993 Model Change," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 50/3 (April 1997): 416-437; David Weil, "Enforcing OSHA: The Role of Labor Unions," Industrial Relations, 30/1 (Winter 1991): 20-36.
20. Paul Adler, Barbara Goldoftas, and David I. Levine, "Ergonomics, Employee Involvement, and the Toyota Production System: A Case Study of NUMMI's 1993 Model Change," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 50/3 (April 1997): 416-437; David Weil, "Enforcing OSHA: The Role of Labor Unions," Industrial Relations, 30/1 (Winter 1991): 20-36.
21. My 1991 article explains several market imperfections that may lead employers to have inefficiently or unfairly little protection against unjust dismissal. David I. Levine, "Just Cause Employment Policies in the Presence of Worker Adverse Selection," Journal of Labor Economics, 9/3 (July 1991): 294-305.
22. Marc Bendick et al., "Measuring Employment Discrimination Through Controlled Experiments," Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc., Washington, D.C., May 1993; George Glaster, Wendy Zimmerman, et al., "Sandwich Hiring Audit Pilot Program Report," Urban Institute, Washington, D.C., 1994; David Neumark, Roy J. Bank, and Kyle D. Van Nort, "Sex Discrimination in Restaurant Hiring: An Audit Study," National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, 1995; Michael Fix and Raymond J. Struyk, eds., Clear and Convincing Evidence: Measurement of Discrimination in America (Washington, D.C. : Urban Institute Press, 1993).
23. Marc Bendick et al., "Measuring Employment Discrimination Through Controlled Experiments," Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc., Washington, D.C., May 1993; George Glaster, Wendy Zimmerman, et al., "Sandwich Hiring Audit Pilot Program Report," Urban Institute, Washington, D.C., 1994; David Neumark, Roy J. Bank, and Kyle D. Van Nort, "Sex Discrimination in Restaurant Hiring: An Audit Study," National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, 1995; Michael Fix and Raymond J. Struyk, eds., Clear and Convincing Evidence: Measurement of Discrimination in America (Washington, D.C. : Urban Institute Press, 1993).
24. Marc Bendick et al., "Measuring Employment Discrimination Through Controlled Experiments," Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc., Washington, D.C., May 1993; George Glaster, Wendy Zimmerman, et al., "Sandwich Hiring Audit Pilot Program Report," Urban Institute, Washington, D.C., 1994; David Neumark, Roy J. Bank, and Kyle D. Van Nort, "Sex Discrimination in Restaurant Hiring: An Audit Study," National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, 1995; Michael Fix and Raymond J. Struyk, eds., Clear and Convincing Evidence: Measurement of Discrimination in America (Washington, D.C. : Urban Institute Press, 1993).
25. Marc Bendick et al., "Measuring Employment Discrimination Through Controlled Experiments," Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc., Washington, D.C., May 1993; George Glaster, Wendy Zimmerman, et al., "Sandwich Hiring Audit Pilot Program Report," Urban Institute, Washington, D.C., 1994; David Neumark, Roy J. Bank, and Kyle D. Van Nort, "Sex Discrimination in Restaurant Hiring: An Audit Study," National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, 1995; Michael Fix and Raymond J. Struyk, eds., Clear and Convincing Evidence: Measurement of Discrimination in America (Washington, D.C. : Urban Institute Press, 1993).
26. Shannon P. Duffy, "Casellas: EEOC Suffering Backlash," The Legal Intelligencer, June 20, 1995, p. 1.
27. John J. Donahue, III, and Peter Siegelman, "The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation," Stanford Law Review (May 1991).
28. Mary P. Rowe, "People Who Feel Harassed Need a Complaint System with both Formal and Informal Options," Negotiations Journal (January 1990), pp. 1-12
29. Jack Steiber, "Employment-At-Will: An Issue for the 1980s," 1983 IRRA Proceedings, Industrial Relations Research Association, Madison, WI, 1984, p. 2.
30. Potter and Youngman, op. cit., p. 141.
31. Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, Report and Recommendations, U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 1994, p. 30.
32. Potter and Youngman, op. cit., p. 141.
33. Donahue and Siegelman, op. cit.
34. Joseph Goldstein, "Alternatives to High-Cost Litigation," Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly, 36/1 (February 1995): 28 ff.
35. This section draws on the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, Report and Recommendations, December 1994, pp. 29-30.
36. Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, Report and Recommendations, Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Labor : U.S. Department of Commerce, 1994, p. 28.
37. Ibid., p. 27.
38. Ibid., p. 29. For more detail on the proposed quality standards, see pp. 29-33.
39. The proposed system would not preclude court cases when management practices systematically discriminate against a group or potential group of employees. Particularly in such a setting, a majority of the existing workforce may favor discrimination that favors incumbent workers; thus, reliance on outside enforcement is called for. At the same time, when management has practices in place that have been approved by the workforce and that appear effective (such as education on sexual harassment, and prompt and effective investigations of complaints), then the employer should not be held liable for the misdeeds of a single manager. Potter and Youngman, op. cit., p. 352).
40. In unionized settings, unions might retain their current right to stop certain grievances from being appealed all the way to outside arbitration. As under current law, in discrimination cases a worker should not need the union's permission to appeal a grievance.
41. Thomas Kochan, "Using the Dunlop Report to Achieve Mutual Gains," Industrial Relations, 34/3 (July 1995): 350-367, quote on p. 358.
42. Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations. Fact Finding Report, U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 1994.
43. David I. Levine, Reinventing the Workplace (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995).
44. This section draws on Gregory J. Kamer, Scott M. Abbot, and Lisa G. Salevitz, "The New Legal Challenge to Participation," Labor Law Journal (January 1994), pp. 41-48; Donna Sockell, "The Legality of Employee-Participation Programs in Unionized Firms," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 37 (July 1984): 541-556.
45. This section draws on Gregory J. Kamer, Scott M. Abbot, and Lisa G. Salevitz, "The New Legal Challenge to Participation," Labor Law Journal (January 1994), pp. 41-48; Donna Sockell, "The Legality of Employee-Participation Programs in Unionized Firms," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 37 (July 1984): 541-556.
46. Rogers and Freeman, op. cit., pp. 30-32.
47. Robert Drago, "Quality Circle Survival," Industrial Relations, 27 (Fall 1988): 336-51.
48. Potter and Youngman, op. cit., p. 293.
49. Ibid., p. 295.
50. Shulamit Kahn and Kevin Lang, "Constraints on the Choice of Hours of Work," Journal of Human Resources , 27/4 (Fall 1992): 661-688.
51. The current set of ESOP tax subsidies is quite complicated. For a short presentation, see Joseph Blasi and Douglas Kruse, The New Owners (New York, NY: Harper Business, 1991), pp. 23-24.
52. Ibid.
53. Potter and Youngman, op. cit., p. 195.
54. Lisa Lynch, "Payoffs to Alternative Training Strategies at Work," in Richard B. Freeman, ed., Working Under Different Rules (New York, NY: Sage, 1994), pp. 63-96.
55. See Levine for a list of additional policies that remove barriers to employee involvement. Levine (1995), op. cit., chapter 8.