The return of party government in the US House of Representatives: Central leadership - Committee relations in the 104th Congress

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 247-272

  Owens, John E ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031512210     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123497000136     Document Type: Article

References (99)

1. Roger H. Davidson, 'Committees as Moving Targets', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 11 (1986), 19-33; and Michael Foley and John E. Owens, Congress and the Presidency: Institutional Politics in a Separated System (Manchester and New York: Manchester University/St. Martins Press, 1996), chap. 2.
2. Roger H. Davidson, 'Committees as Moving Targets', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 11 (1986), 19-33; and Michael Foley and John E. Owens, Congress and the Presidency: Institutional Politics in a Separated System (Manchester and New York: Manchester University/St. Martins Press, 1996), chap. 2.
3. Even Cox and McCubbins' 'party government' model allows committees considerable autonomy. See Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 278; and Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, 'Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 215-32, pp. 226-7. Relevant literature includes Kenneth A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models', American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 27-59; Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, 'The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power', American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 85-104; Keith Krehbiel, 'Why are Committees Powerful?' and a reply by Shepsle and Weingast in American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 929-45; Barry R. Weingast and William Marshall, 'The Industrial Organisation of Congress', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1988), 148-9; D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Richard F. Fenno, Congressmen in Committees (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1973); David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974); Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organisation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).
4. Even Cox and McCubbins' 'party government' model allows committees considerable autonomy. See Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 278; and Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, 'Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 215-32, pp. 226-7. Relevant literature includes Kenneth A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models', American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 27-59; Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, 'The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power', American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 85-104; Keith Krehbiel, 'Why are Committees Powerful?' and a reply by Shepsle and Weingast in American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 929-45; Barry R. Weingast and William Marshall, 'The Industrial Organisation of Congress', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1988), 148-9; D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Richard F. Fenno, Congressmen in Committees (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1973); David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974); Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organisation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).
5. Even Cox and McCubbins' 'party government' model allows committees considerable autonomy. See Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 278; and Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, 'Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 215-32, pp. 226-7. Relevant literature includes Kenneth A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models', American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 27-59; Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, 'The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power', American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 85-104; Keith Krehbiel, 'Why are Committees Powerful?' and a reply by Shepsle and Weingast in American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 929-45; Barry R. Weingast and William Marshall, 'The Industrial Organisation of Congress', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1988), 148-9; D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Richard F. Fenno, Congressmen in Committees (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1973); David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974); Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organisation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).
6. Even Cox and McCubbins' 'party government' model allows committees considerable autonomy. See Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 278; and Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, 'Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 215-32, pp. 226-7. Relevant literature includes Kenneth A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models', American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 27-59; Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, 'The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power', American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 85-104; Keith Krehbiel, 'Why are Committees Powerful?' and a reply by Shepsle and Weingast in American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 929-45; Barry R. Weingast and William Marshall, 'The Industrial Organisation of Congress', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1988), 148-9; D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Richard F. Fenno, Congressmen in Committees (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1973); David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974); Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organisation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).
7. Even Cox and McCubbins' 'party government' model allows committees considerable autonomy. See Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 278; and Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, 'Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 215-32, pp. 226-7. Relevant literature includes Kenneth A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models', American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 27-59; Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, 'The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power', American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 85-104; Keith Krehbiel, 'Why are Committees Powerful?' and a reply by Shepsle and Weingast in American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 929-45; Barry R. Weingast and William Marshall, 'The Industrial Organisation of Congress', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1988), 148-9; D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Richard F. Fenno, Congressmen in Committees (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1973); David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974); Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organisation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).
8. Even Cox and McCubbins' 'party government' model allows committees considerable autonomy. See Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 278; and Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, 'Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 215-32, pp. 226-7. Relevant literature includes Kenneth A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models', American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 27-59; Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, 'The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power', American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 85-104; Keith Krehbiel, 'Why are Committees Powerful?' and a reply by Shepsle and Weingast in American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 929-45; Barry R. Weingast and William Marshall, 'The Industrial Organisation of Congress', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1988), 148-9; D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Richard F. Fenno, Congressmen in Committees (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1973); David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974); Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organisation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).
9. Even Cox and McCubbins' 'party government' model allows committees considerable autonomy. See Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 278; and Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, 'Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 215-32, pp. 226-7. Relevant literature includes Kenneth A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models', American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 27-59; Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, 'The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power', American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 85-104; Keith Krehbiel, 'Why are Committees Powerful?' and a reply by Shepsle and Weingast in American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 929-45; Barry R. Weingast and William Marshall, 'The Industrial Organisation of Congress', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1988), 148-9; D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Richard F. Fenno, Congressmen in Committees (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1973); David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974); Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organisation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).
10. Even Cox and McCubbins' 'party government' model allows committees considerable autonomy. See Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 278; and Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, 'Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 215-32, pp. 226-7. Relevant literature includes Kenneth A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models', American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 27-59; Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, 'The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power', American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 85-104; Keith Krehbiel, 'Why are Committees Powerful?' and a reply by Shepsle and Weingast in American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 929-45; Barry R. Weingast and William Marshall, 'The Industrial Organisation of Congress', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1988), 148-9; D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Richard F. Fenno, Congressmen in Committees (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1973); David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974); Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organisation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).
11. Even Cox and McCubbins' 'party government' model allows committees considerable autonomy. See Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 278; and Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, 'Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 215-32, pp. 226-7. Relevant literature includes Kenneth A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models', American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 27-59; Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, 'The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power', American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 85-104; Keith Krehbiel, 'Why are Committees Powerful?' and a reply by Shepsle and Weingast in American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 929-45; Barry R. Weingast and William Marshall, 'The Industrial Organisation of Congress', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1988), 148-9; D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Richard F. Fenno, Congressmen in Committees (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1973); David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974); Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organisation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).
12. Even Cox and McCubbins' 'party government' model allows committees considerable autonomy. See Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 278; and Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, 'Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 215-32, pp. 226-7. Relevant literature includes Kenneth A. Shepsle, 'Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models', American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 27-59; Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, 'The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power', American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 85-104; Keith Krehbiel, 'Why are Committees Powerful?' and a reply by Shepsle and Weingast in American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 929-45; Barry R. Weingast and William Marshall, 'The Industrial Organisation of Congress', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1988), 148-9; D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Richard F. Fenno, Congressmen in Committees (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1973); David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974); Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organisation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).
13. Steven S. Smith, Call To Order: Floor Politics in the House and Senate (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1989), pp. 141-5 and chap. 6; and Steven S. Smith and Forrest Maltzman, 'Declining Committee Power in the House of Representatives' (paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1989).
14. Steven S. Smith, Call To Order: Floor Politics in the House and Senate (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1989), pp. 141-5 and chap. 6; and Steven S. Smith and Forrest Maltzman, 'Declining Committee Power in the House of Representatives' (paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1989).
15. David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991); Ronald M. Peters, The American Speakership: The Office in Historical Perspective (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990); Barbara Sinclair, Majority Leadership in the US House (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); Barbara Sinclair, 'House Majority Leadership in the Late 1980s', in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered, 4th edn (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1989), pp. 316-28; Barbara Sinclair, 'The Emergence of Strong Leadership in the 1980s House of Representatives', Journal of Politics, 54 (1992), 657-84; and Paul S. Herrnson and Kelly D. Patterson, 'Toward a More Programmatic Democratic Party? Agenda-Setting and Coalition Building in the House of Representatives', Polity, 27 (1995), 607-28.
16. David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991); Ronald M. Peters, The American Speakership: The Office in Historical Perspective (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990); Barbara Sinclair, Majority Leadership in the US House (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); Barbara Sinclair, 'House Majority Leadership in the Late 1980s', in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered, 4th edn (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1989), pp. 316-28; Barbara Sinclair, 'The Emergence of Strong Leadership in the 1980s House of Representatives', Journal of Politics, 54 (1992), 657-84; and Paul S. Herrnson and Kelly D. Patterson, 'Toward a More Programmatic Democratic Party? Agenda-Setting and Coalition Building in the House of Representatives', Polity, 27 (1995), 607-28.
17. David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991); Ronald M. Peters, The American Speakership: The Office in Historical Perspective (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990); Barbara Sinclair, Majority Leadership in the US House (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); Barbara Sinclair, 'House Majority Leadership in the Late 1980s', in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered, 4th edn (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1989), pp. 316-28; Barbara Sinclair, 'The Emergence of Strong Leadership in the 1980s House of Representatives', Journal of Politics, 54 (1992), 657-84; and Paul S. Herrnson and Kelly D. Patterson, 'Toward a More Programmatic Democratic Party? Agenda-Setting and Coalition Building in the House of Representatives', Polity, 27 (1995), 607-28.
18. David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991); Ronald M. Peters, The American Speakership: The Office in Historical Perspective (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990); Barbara Sinclair, Majority Leadership in the US House (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); Barbara Sinclair, 'House Majority Leadership in the Late 1980s', in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered, 4th edn (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1989), pp. 316-28; Barbara Sinclair, 'The Emergence of Strong Leadership in the 1980s House of Representatives', Journal of Politics, 54 (1992), 657-84; and Paul S. Herrnson and Kelly D. Patterson, 'Toward a More Programmatic Democratic Party? Agenda-Setting and Coalition Building in the House of Representatives', Polity, 27 (1995), 607-28.
19. David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991); Ronald M. Peters, The American Speakership: The Office in Historical Perspective (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990); Barbara Sinclair, Majority Leadership in the US House (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); Barbara Sinclair, 'House Majority Leadership in the Late 1980s', in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered, 4th edn (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1989), pp. 316-28; Barbara Sinclair, 'The Emergence of Strong Leadership in the 1980s House of Representatives', Journal of Politics, 54 (1992), 657-84; and Paul S. Herrnson and Kelly D. Patterson, 'Toward a More Programmatic Democratic Party? Agenda-Setting and Coalition Building in the House of Representatives', Polity, 27 (1995), 607-28.
20. David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991); Ronald M. Peters, The American Speakership: The Office in Historical Perspective (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990); Barbara Sinclair, Majority Leadership in the US House (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); Barbara Sinclair, 'House Majority Leadership in the Late 1980s', in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered, 4th edn (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1989), pp. 316-28; Barbara Sinclair, 'The Emergence of Strong Leadership in the 1980s House of Representatives', Journal of Politics, 54 (1992), 657-84; and Paul S. Herrnson and Kelly D. Patterson, 'Toward a More Programmatic Democratic Party? Agenda-Setting and Coalition Building in the House of Representatives', Polity, 27 (1995), 607-28.
21. Daniel J. Palazzolo, The Speaker and the Budget: Leadership in the Post-Reform House of Representatives (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992).
22. Barbara Sinclair, 'House Majority Party Leadership in an Era of Divided Control', in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered, 5th edn (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993), pp. 250-1; Barbara Sinclair, 'Trying to Govern Positively in a Negative Era', in Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman, eds, The Clinton Presidency: First Appraisals (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995), pp. 105-18; and Barbara Sinclair, Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking: The US House of Representatives in the Postreform Era (Baltimore, Md: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 189-92.
23. Barbara Sinclair, 'House Majority Party Leadership in an Era of Divided Control', in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered, 5th edn (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993), pp. 250-1; Barbara Sinclair, 'Trying to Govern Positively in a Negative Era', in Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman, eds, The Clinton Presidency: First Appraisals (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995), pp. 105-18; and Barbara Sinclair, Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking: The US House of Representatives in the Postreform Era (Baltimore, Md: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 189-92.
24. Barbara Sinclair, 'House Majority Party Leadership in an Era of Divided Control', in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered, 5th edn (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993), pp. 250-1; Barbara Sinclair, 'Trying to Govern Positively in a Negative Era', in Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman, eds, The Clinton Presidency: First Appraisals (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995), pp. 105-18; and Barbara Sinclair, Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking: The US House of Representatives in the Postreform Era (Baltimore, Md: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 189-92.
25. In 1995, for example, Speaker Tom Foley (D-WA) orchestrated removal of Dave McCurdy (D-OK) as chair of the House Select Committee on Intelligence.
26. Smith and Maltzman, 'Declining Committee Power'; Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House, Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 'Consolidating Power in the House: The Rise of a New Oligarchy' in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered, 4th edn (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1989), pp. 39-64; and John M. Barry, The Ambition and the Power: A True Story of Washington (New York: Viking, 1989).
27. Smith and Maltzman, 'Declining Committee Power'; Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House, Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 'Consolidating Power in the House: The Rise of a New Oligarchy' in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered, 4th edn (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1989), pp. 39-64; and John M. Barry, The Ambition and the Power: A True Story of Washington (New York: Viking, 1989).
28. Smith and Maltzman, 'Declining Committee Power'; Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House, Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 'Consolidating Power in the House: The Rise of a New Oligarchy' in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered, 4th edn (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1989), pp. 39-64; and John M. Barry, The Ambition and the Power: A True Story of Washington (New York: Viking, 1989).
29. Smith and Maltzman, 'Declining Committee Power'; Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House, Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 'Consolidating Power in the House: The Rise of a New Oligarchy' in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered, 4th edn (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1989), pp. 39-64; and John M. Barry, The Ambition and the Power: A True Story of Washington (New York: Viking, 1989).
30. Quoted in David S. Cloud, 'Gingrich clears path for Republican advance', Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 19 November 1995, p. 3319.
31. The committee's membership comprised all House Republican leaders, the chairs of the four most important committees (approved by Gingrich), nine regional representatives, and representatives of the two most recent Republican classes. Most of the votes on the old Committee on Committees were exercised by large state delegations such as those from California and Florida.
32. Moderates such as Jim Leach (R-IA), Nancy Johnson (R-CT), and Ben Gilman (R-NY) were nominated to the chairs of the Banking, Ethics and International Relations committees evidently because they had demonstrated energy, commitment and focus in advancing the party agenda before the elections. Leach and Johnson had also supported Gingrich in the Whip election in 1969.
33. Interviews for this research were conducted by the author in June 1995.
34. Quoted in David S. Cloud, 'Shakeup time', Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 25 March 1995, p. 10.
35. In the context of a 12 per cent overall cut in committee positions (106 seats), eighteen of thirty-one vacancies on 'exclusive' committees (51 per cent) - including three on Ways and Means (the first since 1966), six on Appropriations (even though the committee membership was cut by four), eight on Commerce, one on Rules (the first since 1983), and five of nine vacancies on Budget - were given to newcomers.
36. Commerce lost about 20 per cent of its jurisdiction.
37. Interview with anonymous Ways and Means staffer, 5 June 1995.
38. Mary Jacoby, 'Livingston: "I don't want to lose control"', Roll Call, 9 January 1995, p. 13; and Gabriel Kahn, 'From "Armed Services" to "National Security", and Chairman Dellums to Chairman Spence', Roll Call, 15 December 1994, p. 13.
39. Mary Jacoby, 'Livingston: "I don't want to lose control"', Roll Call, 9 January 1995, p. 13; and Gabriel Kahn, 'From "Armed Services" to "National Security", and Chairman Dellums to Chairman Spence', Roll Call, 15 December 1994, p. 13.
40. According to data compiled by the House Oversight Committee in March 1995, the number of committee staff positions fell from 1,854 positions in the 103rd Congress to 1,233 in the 104th - a fall of 33 per cent. Committee budgets fell from $222.3 to $156.3 millions. Most reductions were borne, however, by minority Democrats while Republicans retained or slightly increased the budgets they had previously operated under.
41. Rules Committee data show that 63 per cent of rules were open or modified open in 1995 compared with 44 per cent in the previous Congress. From January to May 1996, however, the rate fell below that for the 103rd Congress even after the committee made many non-controversial bills subject to special rules instead of being placed on the suspension calendar. Data provided by Don Wolfensberger, Chief of Staff, House Rules Committee.
42. Alice A. Love, 'Lobby disclosure bill, meanwhile, faces death by House amendment', Roll Call, 21 November 1995, p. 22.
43. Although used very rarely in 1995, its use generated disquiet among members of committees affected, for example, in respect of a proposal to lift the moratorium on mining patents. See Elizabeth A. Palmer, 'Empowering the rank and file', Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 22 July 1995, p. 2165.
44. The rules change continued to allow the Speaker to refer whole bills sequentially and parts of bills to the committees. Nine out of thirty Contract bills were referred sequentially to at least one other committee, and one to as many as eight different committees.
45. Steven S. Smith and Christopher J. Deering, Committees in Congress, 2nd edn (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1990), p. 140.
46. Jonathan D. Salant, 'New chairmen swing to the right; freshmen get choice post', Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 10 December 1994, pp. 3493-4. Full committee chairs also lost the right to hold committee members' proxy votes, to chair a subcommittee as well, and to appoint their own (so-called 5-D) staff to subcommittees in addition to those appointed by subcommittee chairs.
47. See, for example, the comments of Henry Waxman (D-CA), the former activist chair of the Commerce Committee's Health and Environment Subcommittee, quoted in Jackie Koszczuk, 'Gingrich puts more power into Speaker's hands', Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 7 October 1995, p. 3052.
48. William F. Connelly and John J. Pitney, Congress' Permanent Minority? Republicans in the US House (Lanham, Md: Littlefield Adams, 1994), pp. 24, 62-4.
49. Thomas Rosenstiel, 'Why Newt is no joke', Newsweek, 10 April 1995, p. 26.
50. Gabriel Kahn, 'Hyde battles away on Judiciary panel', Roll Call, 20 February 1995, p. 15.
51. Richard E. Cohen, 'The Transformers', National Journal, 4 March 1995, p. 531.
52. Rosenstiel, 'Why Newt is no joke', p. 27.
53. Two Contract bills - congressional compliance and House rules changes - were not referred to committees. Half the remaining bills were referred to just one committee, Judiciary, chaired by Hyde.
54. Jeffrey L. Katz, 'GOP moderates central to welfare overhaul', Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 18 March 1995, p. 814.
55. I rely on Congressional Quarterly's use of terms such as 'important', 'major' or 'significant' to classify amendments.
56. See, for example, Fenno, Congressmen in Committees; and John W. Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions, 3rd edn (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989), p. 139.
57. See, for example, Fenno, Congressmen in Committees; and John W. Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions, 3rd edn (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989), p. 139.
58. Jennifer Babson, 'Armey stood guard over the Contract', Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 8 April 1995, p. 987. Apparently in contrast, Gingrich insisted that the details of the Contract were subject to revision. See David S. Cloud, 'House GOP shows a united front in crossing "Contract" divide', Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 25 February 1995, p. 579.
59. Jennifer Babson, 'Armey stood guard over the Contract', Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 8 April 1995, p. 987. Apparently in contrast, Gingrich insisted that the details of the Contract were subject to revision. See David S. Cloud, 'House GOP shows a united front in crossing "Contract" divide', Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 25 February 1995, p. 579.
60. Evidently, one of the sponsors of one of these versions made an offer to Armey to drop his six-year term limits bill because it enjoyed little support. The Majority Leader flatly refused, insisting, 'It's in the Contract. Period.' See Babson, 'Armey stood guard over the Contract', p. 987.
61. Sinclair, 'House majority party leadership in an era of divided control', p. 239. 'Major involvement' defined by Sinclair as leadership participating in shaping the content of legislation by talking or negotiating with or among the committees (or with the Senate or the president), fell, however, to 54 per cent in the 102nd Congress.
62. Gabriel Kahn, 'Even after Contract, House chairs take a back seat to the leadership', Roll Call, 21 September 1995, pp. 3 and 22.
63. 'The New(t) politburo', Roll Call, 9 October 1995, p. 4; Jon Healey, 'Leader's last minute additions offer morsels for everyone - almost', Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 5 August 1995, p. 2348.
64. 'The New(t) politburo', Roll Call, 9 October 1995, p. 4; Jon Healey, 'Leader's last minute additions offer morsels for everyone - almost', Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 5 August 1995, p. 2348.
65. According to a misdirected e-mail written by a staffer for DeLay which reached House Democrats, Gingrich spelt out specific sanctions against the three dissidents: '(1) Baker will be taken off [the committee] and put on Transportation. (2) Emerson [the second ranking Republican] will not become chairman if Roberts runs for the Senate. (3) Combest [the third ranking Republican] will be stripped of the Intelligence Committee chairmanship.' See Craig Winneker, 'Heard on the Hill', Roll Call, 28 September 1995, p. 16. Subsequently, Gingrich assured these members that he had no intention of threatening them and offered to broker a compromise with Roberts.
66. By the August recess, 209 programmes had been eliminated in this way. See George Hager, 'As they cut, appropriators add stiff dose of policy', Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 29 July 1995, p. 2247.
67. Koszczuk, 'Gingrich puts more power into Speaker's hands', p. 3052.
68. Juliet Eilperin, 'House bills bypass committee process', Roll Call, 18 March 1996, p. 27. Data provided by Jeff Lockwood, House Rules Committee.
69. Quoted in Gabriel Kahn, 'Gingrich plan: end to panels?' Roll Call, 9 October, 1995, p. 22. Gingrich subsequently stated that 'nothing could be further from the truth ... Rather than consolidating power in the leadership or funnelling it away from members, task forces actually allow for greater member participation.' See Newt Gingrich, 'Leadership task forces: The "third wave" to consider legislation', Roll Call, 16 November 1995, p. 5.
70. Quoted in Gabriel Kahn, 'Gingrich plan: end to panels?' Roll Call, 9 October, 1995, p. 22. Gingrich subsequently stated that 'nothing could be further from the truth ... Rather than consolidating power in the leadership or funnelling it away from members, task forces actually allow for greater member participation.' See Newt Gingrich, 'Leadership task forces: The "third wave" to consider legislation', Roll Call, 16 November 1995, p. 5.
71. Emphasis on a single leader contrasts with the party government arrangements around the turn of the century when 'few if any distinctions were made between party leaders and committee leaders' and a number of powerful intra-party factional leaders contested with one another for the Speakership, chairs and ranking positions on the most important committees. See David W. Brady and Philip Althoff, 'Party Voting in the US House of Representatives, 1890-1910: Elements of a Responsible Party System', Journal of Politics, 36 (1974), 753-75, p. 762; Lauros McConachie, Congressional Committees (Boston, Mass.: Thomas Crowell Company, 1898), p. 165.
72. Emphasis on a single leader contrasts with the party government arrangements around the turn of the century when 'few if any distinctions were made between party leaders and committee leaders' and a number of powerful intra-party factional leaders contested with one another for the Speakership, chairs and ranking positions on the most important committees. See David W. Brady and Philip Althoff, 'Party Voting in the US House of Representatives, 1890-1910: Elements of a Responsible Party System', Journal of Politics, 36 (1974), 753-75, p. 762; Lauros McConachie, Congressional Committees (Boston, Mass.: Thomas Crowell Company, 1898), p. 165.
73. See Maltzman's distinction between party-dominated, autonomous and chamber-dominated committee systems. See Forrest Maltzman, 'Committee-Chamber-Party Relations in the Post-Reform House' (paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1992), pp. 2-3.
74. Connelly and Pitney, Congress' Permanent Minority?, pp. 24-6, 62-4.
75. Timothy J. Burger, 'Gingrich warns all ranking members not to take anything for granted next year', Roll Call, 24 March 1994, p. 3.
76. Remarks of former House Speaker Thomas Foley, United States Embassy, London, 23 February 1995.
77. See, for example, Walter Dean Burnham, 'Realignment Lives: The 1994 Earthquake and Its Implications', in Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman, eds, The Clinton Presidency: First Appraisals (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995), pp. 363-95, at p. 363. See also Everett Carll Ladd, '1994 Vote: Against the Backdrop of Continuing Realignment' in Everett Carll Ladd, ed., America at the Polls 1994, Occasional Papers and Monographs Series, No. 2 (Storrs, Conn.: The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1995), p. 20.
78. See, for example, Walter Dean Burnham, 'Realignment Lives: The 1994 Earthquake and Its Implications', in Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman, eds, The Clinton Presidency: First Appraisals (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995), pp. 363-95, at p. 363. See also Everett Carll Ladd, '1994 Vote: Against the Backdrop of Continuing Realignment' in Everett Carll Ladd, ed., America at the Polls 1994, Occasional Papers and Monographs Series, No. 2 (Storrs, Conn.: The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1995), p. 20.
79. David W. Brady, 'Congressional Leadership and Party Voting in the McKinley Era: A Comparison to the Modern House', Midwest Journal of Political Science, 16 (1972), 452-9; Brady and Althoff, 'Party Voting in the US House of Representatives', pp. 756, 762-3; and George Rothwell Brown, The Leadership of Congress (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1922), p. 246.
80. David W. Brady, 'Congressional Leadership and Party Voting in the McKinley Era: A Comparison to the Modern House', Midwest Journal of Political Science, 16 (1972), 452-9; Brady and Althoff, 'Party Voting in the US House of Representatives', pp. 756, 762-3; and George Rothwell Brown, The Leadership of Congress (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1922), p. 246.
81. David W. Brady, 'Congressional Leadership and Party Voting in the McKinley Era: A Comparison to the Modern House', Midwest Journal of Political Science, 16 (1972), 452-9; Brady and Althoff, 'Party Voting in the US House of Representatives', pp. 756, 762-3; and George Rothwell Brown, The Leadership of Congress (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1922), p. 246.
82. Using Congressional Quarterly's minimal criterion - at least 50 per cent of one party opposing at least 50 per cent of the other party - 73 per cent of votes divided the parties. Using the more demanding 90 per cent versus 90 per cent, the level (31.6 per cent) is unprecedented since 1904 (David W. Brady, Joseph Cooper and Patricia A. Hurley, 'The Decline of Party in the US House of Representatives, 1887-1968', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 4 (1979), 381-407, pp. 384-5).
83. Earlier data is taken from Brady, Cooper and Hurley, 'The Decline of Party in the US House of Representatives, 1887-1968', pp. 384-5, and Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports.
84. Whereas in 1969 less than half the Republican Conference could be classified as very conservative (CQ conservative coalition scores of 84 per cent or above), since 1989 over 70 per cent have fallen into this category. By 1994, all the party's putative central leaders in the 104th Congress were slightly more conservative than the Conference as a whole (mean conservative coalition scores in the 103rd Congress of 91 per cent, compared with a mean of 88 per cent for all Republicans). In 1995, the standard deviation of Republicans' normalized conservative coalition scores fell from 10.6 in the 103rd Congress to 8.4.
85. Keith Krehbiel, 'Where's the Party?' British Journal of Political Science, 23 (1993), 235-66.
86. On the trend to increased party support among Democratic committee leaders, see Sara Brandes Crook and John R. Hibbing, 'Congressional Reform and Party Discipline: The Effect of Changes in the Seniority System on Party Loyalty in the US House of Representatives', British Journal of Political Science, 15 (1985), 207-26.
87. Space precludes discussion of the effects on majority party cohesion of greater constituency homogeneity and control of the White House by the other party (see Brady and Althoff, 'Party Voting in the US House of Representatives', pp. 762 and 773; and Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House, pp. 45-8 and 166-9). The contemporary weakness of parties in structuring voting does not suggest strong similarities with the late nineteenth century. According to the 1994 American National Election Study data only 17 per cent of those surveyed expressed either a like or dislike for the party connections of House candidates in open seats and only 6 per cent in incumbent-held seats.
88. Space precludes discussion of the effects on majority party cohesion of greater constituency homogeneity and control of the White House by the other party (see Brady and Althoff, 'Party Voting in the US House of Representatives', pp. 762 and 773; and Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House, pp. 45-8 and 166-9). The contemporary weakness of parties in structuring voting does not suggest strong similarities with the late nineteenth century. According to the 1994 American National Election Study data only 17 per cent of those surveyed expressed either a like or dislike for the party connections of House candidates in open seats and only 6 per cent in incumbent-held seats.
89. See, for example, the pressures placed on newly elected Wyoming Republican Barbara Cubin by Resources Committee Chair Don Young to vote for the sale of certain Power Marketing Administration facilities. Elected by just 53 per cent of the vote in 1994, Cubin faced considerable opposition from her constituents as a result of her vote. See Timothy J. Burger and Gabriel Kahn, 'Aftershocks: BTU all over again?' Roll Call, 30 October 1995, pp. 3 and 20.
90. See Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House, p. 31; and Sinclair, 'The Emergence of Strong Leadership', pp. 657-84.
91. See Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House, p. 31; and Sinclair, 'The Emergence of Strong Leadership', pp. 657-84.
92. David W. Rohde and Kenneth A. Shepsle, 'Leaders and Followers in the House of Representatives: Reflections on Woodrow Wilson's Congressional Government', Congress and the Presidency, 14 (1987), 123-7; Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 'The House in Transition: Change and Consolidation', in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered, 2nd edn (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981), p. 35; and John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 240.
93. David W. Rohde and Kenneth A. Shepsle, 'Leaders and Followers in the House of Representatives: Reflections on Woodrow Wilson's Congressional Government', Congress and the Presidency, 14 (1987), 123-7; Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 'The House in Transition: Change and Consolidation', in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered, 2nd edn (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981), p. 35; and John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 240.
94. David W. Rohde and Kenneth A. Shepsle, 'Leaders and Followers in the House of Representatives: Reflections on Woodrow Wilson's Congressional Government', Congress and the Presidency, 14 (1987), 123-7; Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 'The House in Transition: Change and Consolidation', in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered, 2nd edn (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981), p. 35; and John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 240.
95. Richard E. Cohen, 'Washington off balance', National Journal, 20 April 1996.
96. Damon Chappie. 'House GOP plans to launch reform of Appropriations', Roll Call, 13 May 1996, p. 1.
97. Gabriel Kahn, 'Democrats nix all reform ideas but one: more power to their leader', Roll Call, 19 December 1994, p. 3.
98. Based on Brady et al.'s index of party homogeneity, traditional divisions between southern/border and northern Democrats are more significant than those between eastern and non-eastern Republicans. Since 1990, about 80 per cent of House Republicans have represented non-eastern districts whereas just over 60 per cent of Democrats have represented northern districts. The index is found in Brady, Cooper and Hurley, 'The Decline of Party in the US House of Representatives', p. 389.
99. Since 1990, about 20 per cent of Democrats have been careerists (10 or more terms) compared with under 10 per cent of Republicans, giving a ratio of careerists to new members (1-3 terms) of 1:2 among Democrats and about 1:8 among Republicans.