Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Middle East

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 143-171

  Levite, Ariel E ^a,b   Landau, Emily B ^c,d  

^a Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies   (Israel)

^b Ministry of Defence Government of Israel   (Israel)

^c Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies   (Israel)

^d HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031507281     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402399708437667     Document Type: Article

References (74)

1. US Dept of State Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman 'Remarks by Secretary of State James A. Baker III before the Organizational Meeting for the Multilateral Negotiations on the Middle East', House of Unions, Moscow, 28 Jan. 1992.
2. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, 'Beyond Deterrence', Jnl of Social Issues 43/4 (1987) pp.41-61.
3. See Raymond Cohen, International Politics: The Rules of the Game (London: Longman 1981).
4. See for example Stephen D. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', International Organization [hereafter Int. Org.] 36/2 (Spring 1982).
5. One of the major obstacles to cooperation in international relations is the problem of distrust. John Herz first coined the term 'security dilemma' in his analysis of international relations in the nuclear age; the term is premised on the notion that a lack of central authority in international relations leaves actors with a constant sense of distrust regarding the intentions and actions of other actors: John Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (NY: Columbia UP 1959) p.231.
6. In this context see also Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, ACIS Working Paper, No.4 (Los Angeles: Center for Arms Control and Int. Security 1977).
7. Regarding the basic incentive to cooperate, Joseph S. Nye Jr, in an article on realism and liberalism, cites Hayward Alker's support for Hedley Bull's concept of an 'anarchic society,' 'which admits the absence of any formal government above states, but does not define anarchy as the absence of communication, cooperation, and governance.' [Joseph S. Nye Jr, 'Neorealism and Neoliberalism', World Politics 40/2 (Jan. 1988) p.249].
8. See also Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (NY: Columbia UP 1977) pp.24-41;
9. Robert Lieber, No Common Power: Understanding International Relations (NY: HarperCollins 1991) pp.10-15, 345-7.
10. For theoretical background material regarding the conditions under which cooperation may emerge in an anarchical international system see: Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (NY: Basic Books 1984);
11. Kenneth A. Oye, 'Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies', World Politics 38/1 (Oct. 1985) pp.1-24;
12. Kenneth Oye (ed.) Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton UP 1986).
13. See Joseph S. Nye, 'Neorealism and Neoliberalism';
14. Robert O. Keohane, 'Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics', in idem (ed.) Neorealism and Its Critics (NY: Columbia UP 1986);
15. David A. Baldwin (ed.) Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (NY: Columbia UP 1993).
16. Joseph M. Grieco, 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism', Int. Org. 42/3 (Summer 1988) p.485. Grieco notes that his essay does not distinguish between realism and neorealism because on crucial issues (the meaning of anarchy, and the problem of cooperation) modern realists are very much in accord with the classic realists.
17. Grieco, 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation' (note 8) pp.497-8.
18. Many of Grieco's arguments (esp. pp.495-503) appear also in a later article that includes his response to some neoliberalist responses to his original critique of neoliberal institutionalism: Joseph M. Grieco, 'Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory', in David A. Baldwin (ed.) Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (NY: Columbia UP 1993) pp.301-38.
19. Grieco (note 8) p.499.
20. See Yair Evron, 'Arms Control in the Middle East: Some Proposals and Their Confidence-Building Roles', in J. Alford (ed.) The Future of Arms Control: Part III: Confidence-Building Measures, Adelphi Paper No.149 (London: IISS 1979);
21. Jonathan Alford, 'CBMs and Verification', in K. Kaiser (ed.) Confidence-Building Measures (Bonn: Res. Inst. of the German Soc. for Foreign Affairs 1983) p.61;
22. Hans Gunter Brauch, 'Confidence-Building and Disarmament Supporting Measures', in W. Epstein and B. Feld (eds.) New Directions in Disarmament (NY: Praeger 1981) p.147.
23. Regarding the distinction between intentions (CSBMs) and capabilities (arms control) see: Jonathan Alford, 'Confidence-Building Measures in Europe: The Military Aspects', in Alford, Future of Arms Control (note 11) p.3.
24. See Arms Control and National Security: An Introduction (Washington DC: Arms Control Assoc. 1989) pp.98-9;
25. A Chronology of United States Arms Control and Security Initiatives, 1946-1990 (US Information Agency 1990) pp.24-33.
26. Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, 2nd ed. (NY: OUP 1990) p.172.
27. See, for example, Victor-Yves Ghebali and Fred Tanner, 'Confidence-Building Measures in Arms Control: The Mouse That Roared?', International Defense Review 10 (Oct. 1988) pp.1269-72.
28. See Johan J. Holst, 'Confidence Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework', Survival 25/1 (Jan.-Feb. 1983) p.10.
29. See for example John Grin and Henry van der Graaf (eds.) Unconventional Approaches to Conventional Arms Control Verification (Amsterdam: VU UP 1990) p.4.
30. Heinz Vetschera, 'Regional Security Arrangements in Europe: The CSCE Experience with Confidence-Building Measures, Crisis Mechanisms and Conflict Prevention', (paper in preparation).
31. For an overview and summary of the various stages in the process see: Richard E. Darilek, 'East-West Confidence-building: Defusing the Cold War in Europe', pp.17-25,
32. Cathleen S. Fisher, 'The Preconditions of Confidence-building: Lessons from the European Experience', pp.42-5: both articles appear in Michael Krepon (ed.) A Handbook of Confidence-Building Measures for Regional Security, Handbook No.1 (Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center 1993).
33. For some of the more salient studies of confidence building, see Johan Jorgen Holst and Karen Alette Melander, 'European Security and Confidence-building Measures', Survival 19/4 (July/Aug. 1977) pp.146-54;
34. Jonathan Alford, 'Confidence Building Measures in Europe: The Military Aspects' in idem, Future of Arms Control (note 11) pp.4-13;
35. Holst, 'Confidence-building Measures (note 16) pp.2-15;
36. Stephen Larrabee and Dietrich Stobbe (eds.) Confidence-Building Measures in Europe (ibid. 1983);
37. Rolf Berg and Adam-Daniel Rotfeld, Building Security in Europe: Confidence Building Measures and the CSCE (NY: Ins. for East-West Security Studies 1986);
38. R.B. Byers, F. Stephen Larrabee, and Allen Lynch, Confidence-building Measures and International Security, Institute for East-West Security Studies, East-West monograph series No.4 (ibid. 1987);
39. Igor Scherbak, Confidence-building Measures and International Security-The Political and Military Aspects: A Soviet Approach, UNIDIR/91/36 (NY: UN 1991).
40. See Charles E. Osgood, 'Disarmament Demands GRIT', in Burns H. Weston (ed.) Toward Nuclear Disarmament and Global Security (Boulder, CO: Westview 1984) pp.337-44.
41. See Thomas Schelling, 'Confidence in Crisis', in K. Kaiser (ed.) Confidence-Building Measures (Bonn: Res. Inst. of the German Soc. for Foreign Affairs 1983) p.90.
42. According to Kenneth Oye, there are strategies that can be adopted by states to foster the emergence of cooperation between them: Kenneth Oye, 'Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy', pp.16-17.
43. I. William Zartman, 'The Middle East - The Ripe Moment?', in G. Ben-Dor and D. Dewitt (eds.) Conflict Management in the Middle East (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books 1987) pp.284-5.
44. See also Richard N. Haass, 'Ripeness and the Settlement of International Disputes', Survival 30/3 (May-June 1988) pp.245-6;
45. Richard N. Haass, Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1990) Ch.1.
46. See: Emily Landau, 'Confidence Building Measures and Their Application in the Arab-Israeli Conflict' (MA Thesis: Tel Aviv Univ.1992) (Hebrew).
47. An additional researcher subsequently reached similar conclusions regarding the importance of ripeness for negotiating CSBMs. Cathleen Fisher, 'The Preconditions of Confidence-building: Lessons from the European Experience', pp.34-7 suggests three types of factors that contributed to successful negotiation and implementation of the European CSBMs: contextual factors, processual factors, and political developments in East-West relations.
48. For an excellent collection of essays on the issue of the European CSBM experience and its potential adaptability to other regions, see UN Dept for Disarmament Affairs, Confidence and Security Building Measures: From Europe to Other Regions, Disarmament : Topical Papers No.7 (NY: UN 1991).
49. On the differences between the two arenas see: Geoffrey Kemp, The Control of the Middle East Arms Race (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for Int. Peace 1991) pp.124-8.
50. See also Richard E. Darilek and Geoffrey Kemp, 'Prospects for Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Middle East', in Alan Platt (ed.) Confidence Building in the Middle East (Washington DC: US Inst. of Peace Press 1992) pp.25-9.
51. See e.g. Darilek and Kemp, 'Prospects for CSBMs' (supra);
52. David B. Dewitt and Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds.) Confidence Building in the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview 1994).
53. Dennis B. Ross used this phrase when echoing Arab resistance to CBMs in a speech he delivered at Tel Aviv University on 24 July 1992 (unpub. transcript).
54. See Michael Krepon (ed.) A Handbook of Confidence-building Measures for Regional Security, 2nd ed. (Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center 1995) esp. pp.41-69.
55. For detailed descriptions of these agreements see Itshak Lederman, The Arab-Israeli Experience in Verification and Its Relevance to Conventional Arms Control in Europe, Occasional Paper 2 (Center for Int. Security Studies at Maryland 1989);
56. Brian S. Mandell, 'Anatomy of a Confidence-Building Regime: Egyptian-Israeli Security Cooperation, 1973-1979', Int. Jnl 45 (Spring 1990) pp.202-23.
57. See also Janice Gross Stein, 'A Common Aversion to War: Regime Creation by Egypt and Israel as a Strategy of Conflict Management', in Ben-Dor and Dewitt (eds.) Conflict Management in the Middle East (note 24) pp.59-77.
58. United Nations Disarmament Commission, 'Guidelines for Confidence Building Measures at the Global and Regional Levels', 1980. This logic has found its way into the UN General Assembly resolution 47/52G which explicitly endorsed CBMs on the regional level.
59. See note 31; these studies have focused primarily on Israeli-Egyptian relations.
60. Yair Evron, 'The Role of Arms Control in the Middle East', Adelphi Paper No.138, in Christoph Bertram (ed.) Arms Control and Military Force, Adelphi Library 3 (Hampshire: Gower 1980)p.102.
61. Yair Evron, Arms Control and Military Force, Ibid. p.67.
62. David B. Dewitt, 'Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Middle East: Is There a Role?', in Ben-Dor and Dewitt, Conflict Management in the Middle East (note 24) pp.241-59.
63. David B. Dewitt, Conflict Management in the Middle East Ibid. p.253.
64. David B. Dewitt, Conflict Management in the Middle East Ibid. pp.247, 254.
65. See: Darilek and Kemp, 'Prospects for CSBMs in the Middle East' (note 27) pp.29-31;
66. Gerald M. Steinberg, 'Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security', Survival 36/1 (Spring 1994) pp.126-7.
67. For specific suggestions regarding CSBMs that may be applied, see: Shai Feldman, Arms Control: An Agenda for Israel, JCSS Memorandum No.35, Nov. 1991 (Hebrew);
68. articles by Richard E. Darilek and Geoffrey Kemp, Michael Krepon and Peter D. Constable, W. Seth Carus and Janne E. Nolan, and Charles Flowerree and Brad Roberts in Platt, Arms Control and Confidence Building in the Middle East (note 27); and Steinberg (supra).
69. SANA in Arabic, 1530 GMT, 27 Oct.1991 in SWB, ME/1215, A/2, 29 Oct. 1991. For evidence of the continuation of the approach whereby territorial agreements must precede security arrangements see for example a commentary by Syrian radio: Syrian Arab Republic Radio, 1137 GMT, 13 July 1995 in SWB, ME/2356, MED/3-4, 15 July 1995.
70. In this context, see a 1995 statement made by Iranian president Rafsanjani in an interview with Middle East Insight. In answer to a question whether Iran could see itself at the point where it can declare its impartiality toward the Arab-Israeli peace process, Rafsanjani answered: 'Practically speaking, we do not take any action against the peace plan. When we see this whole process is unjust, we state our opposition as a matter of principle. But if the content of the peace plan is just, the substance is just, we shall go along with it.' George A. Nader, 'Interview with President-Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani', Middle East Insight 11/5 (July-Aug. 1995) p.11.
71. See Alan Makovsky, Bruce Jentleson, et al. Building a Middle East Community: The Future of the Multilateral Middle East Peace Process (Washington Inst., forthcoming).
72. The 15 participating regional parties are Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.
73. For a discussion of these and related themes, especially regarding Egyptian fears of Israel's attempts to utilize the peace process in order to dominate the Middle East, see Fawaz A. Gerges, 'Egyptian-Israeli Relations Turn Sour', Foreign Affairs 74/3 (May-June 1995) pp.69-78.
74. Grieco (note 8) notes that the concern with future intentions is a major factor that bears upon states' preoccupation with relative gains: ibid, p.500. In fact, CSBMs deal directly with intentions, and the importance of building confidence with a clear eye to sustaining the grounds for confidence over time.