Federalism and the European Union: A constitutional perspective

Public Choice

Volumn 90, Issue 1-4, 1997, Pages 255-280

  Mueller, Dennis C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031504796     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-5728-5_12     Document Type: Review

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