Turkey-Syria relations since the gulf war: Kurds and water

Middle East Policy

Volumn 5, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 168-193

  Olson, Robert ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0031502275     PISSN: 10611924     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4967.1997.tb00272.x     Document Type: Article

References (70)

1. For the role of Turkish foreign policy in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War see my, "The Creation of a Kurdish State in the 1990's?" Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies vol. xv, no.4 (Summer 1992), pp. 1-25.
2. For more on this topic see Suha Bolukbasi, "Ankara, Damascus, Baghdad, and the Regionalization of Turkey's Kurdish Succession," Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies, vol. xiv, no. 4 (1991), pp. 15-36.
3. For the orgins of the PKK see Ismet G. Imset, The PKK: A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey (1973-1992) (Ankara: The Turkish Daily News Publications, 1992; Michael Gunter, The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 57-96.
4. For the orgins of the PKK see Ismet G. Imset, The PKK: A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey (1973-1992) (Ankara: The Turkish Daily News Publications, 1992; Michael Gunter, The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 57-96.
5. Ibid.
6. Ismet G. Imset makes a point of stating that Özal was accompanied by Hiram Abas representing Turkey's National Security Agency (MIT) and who was of Jewish origin.
7. There is a copy of the nine articles of July 17, 1987 Protocol of Cooperation on Matters of Security Between the Arab Repbublic of Syria and the Republic of Turkey as well as articles 6-10 concerning the water issue in the Protocol on Economic Cooperation Between Turkey and Syria signed by prime ministers Turgut Özal and A. R. Kassem in Fahir Alaçam, "Turkish-Syrian Relations," Turkish Review of Middle East Studies, vol. 8 (1994-95), pp. 1-18.
8. Imset, The PKK... p. 174.
9. Ibid, p. 175.
10. Ibid, p. 178.
11. Ibid, p. 178.
12. Newspot no. 93/24 2 December, 1993, p. 4.
13. There is a copy of the November 20, 1993 Joint Memorandum of Minutes on Security Issues signed between Turkey and Syria in Fahir Alaçam, "Turkish-Syrian Relations," in Turkish Review of Middle East Studies, vol. 8 (1994-95), p. 15.
14. Newspot, no. 93/25, December 21, 1993, p. 4.
15. For a copy of the comminiqué see Fahir Alaçam, "Turkish-Syrian Relations," Turkish Review of Middle East Studies, vol. 8 (1994-95), pp. 15-17.
16. Hürriyet, August 23, 1994.
17. Hürriyet, September 11, 1994.
18. Hürriyet, August 24, 1994.
19. Hürriyet, December 4-6, 1994.
20. Hürriyet, February 11, 1995. As of the writing of this article no agreement over the flow of water had been reached.
21. Kurdistan Report, no. 22 (September-October 1995), p. 25.
22. Hürriyet, September 17, 1995.
23. Hürriyet, November 22-26, 1995.
24. Hürriyet, December 30, 1995.
25. The capacity of the Atatürk dam is 48.7 billion cm while that of the Tabqa is 12 billion cm. See Hürriyet January 8-9, 1996.
26. Hürriyet, February 15, 1996.
27. Sabah, February 21, 1996.
28. Hürriyet, February 24, 1996.
29. Although it is important to note that the original source of this particular claim was Israel's Armed Forces radio. See Hürriyet, April 9, 1996.
30. Hürriyet, August 1, 1996.
31. Hürriyet, July 14, 1996.
32. In this regard see Robert Olson, "The Kurdish Question and Chechnya: Turkish and Russian Foreign Policies Since the Gulf War," Middle East Policy, vol. iv, no. 3 (March 1996), pp. 106-118.
33. TRKNWS-L (Turkish News Service on Internet), December 2, 1996.
34. TRKNWS-L, December 11, 1996.
35. In January 1997 the bill to ratify the Turkish-Israeli Free Trade Area Accord cleared the Turkish parliament's Industry and Foreign Affairs committees. The accord envisages lower customs duties in stages over a period of two years. The customs tax on Turkish textile exports to Israel is currently 62 percent. Israeli textiles imported to Turkey were subject to a 12 percent tax prior to the accord. The accord also envisages mutual concessions regarding agricultural products as well as provisions to develop trade services.
36. Hürriyet, February 24, 1997. In January 1997 the Turkish press was full of stories that Turkey was interested in signing another $150 billion military agreement with Israel for a 25 year period. There was no official announcement in either the Turkish or Israeli press that such an agreement would be on the agenda during Karadayi's visit to Israel.
37. Hürriyet, February 26, 1997.
38. Cumhuriyet, February 25, 1997.
39. TRKNSW-L, February 25, 1997.
40. Hürriyet, June 17, 1996.
41. Robert Olson, "An Israeli-Kurdish Conflict?" Middle East International, no. 529 (5 July 1996), p. 17.
42. Christian Science Monitor. April 29, 1996.
43. Michael Jansen, "Clearing the Air," Middle East International, no. 528 (June 21, 1996), p. 7.
44. Ibid.
45. Hürriyet, March 10, 1996.
46. Hürriyet, March 16, 1996.
47. Hürriyet, April 22, 1996.
48. Hürriyet, May 8, 1996.
49. Hürriyet, June 11, 1996.
50. Hürriyet, June 24, 1996; Reuter's Wire Service, June 24, 1996.
51. Hürriyet, June 24, 1996; Reuter's Wire Service, June 24, 1996.
52. Reuter's, July 1, 1996.
53. Ettela'at, July 1, 1996.
54. Hürriyet reported on July 12, 1996, relying on an account in the Egyptian newspaper Al-Arabi. The same report in Hürriyet stated that a few days before this Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Musa had sent a message to Damascus encouraging Asad to expell Abdullah Öcalan.
55. Hürriyet, July 16, 1996. The death by strangulation of Ahmet Görmez, a top PKK official in Europe was cited as an indication of such differences. Turkish media stress constantly alleged fractional infighting among the PKK leadership.
56. Hürriyet, August 22, 1996.
57. Hürriyet, August 23, 1996. There were reports in both the Turkish and Syrian media that Syria suggested that the downflow of the Euphrates be raised to 800 to 1,000 cm per second from the current flow of 500 cm per second.
58. For more on this topic see, Hamit Bozarslan, "Political Crisis and the Kurdish Issue in Turkey," in The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1996), pp. 135-53.
59. Hürriyet, August 13, 1996.
60. Ibid.
61. Hürriyet, April 21, 1996.
62. Al-Ba'th, September 5, 1996.
63. Hürriyet, January 7-15, 1996.
64. Turkish Daily Press Review, Internet, February 17, 1997.
65. Iraq opened its oil pipeline via Turkey to the Yumurtalik on the Mediterranean on December 10, 1996.
66. There are two opposing views on whether GAP will dampen Kurdish nationalism. The United States and Turkey hold that GAP, by increasing economic development in the southeast, will reduce the attractiveness of the PKK and, therefore, its threat to GAP installations. The contrary view is that Turkish ethnic cleansing in the Southeast and the subsequent migration of some two million Kurds to the west has increased the challenge of Kurdish nationalism. For the first view see, Carl E. Nestor, "Dimensions of Turkey's Kurdish Question and the Potential Impact of the Southeast Anatolian Project (GAP): Part I," The International Journal of Kurdish Studies, vol. 8, nos. 1 & 2 (1995), pp. 33-78; Part II, vol. 9, nos. 1 & 2, pp. 35-78. For the second view see, Robert Olson, "The Impact of the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP) on Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey," The International Journal of Kurdish Studies, vol. 9, nos. 1 & 2 (1996), pp. 95-102. One of the best articles to appear on the GAP project is Servet Mutlu, "The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) of Turkey: its context, objectives and prospects," Orient, vol. 37, no. 1(1996), pp. 59-86. Mutlu's caution on GAP is based on his view that the funds allocated for development of irrigated agriculture may not be sufficient and that the agricultural extension and training system is inadequate. A host of other problems, including attracting appropriate industrial capital and personnel, according o Mutlu, "will make long-term sustainable development difficult if not impossible" (p. 81).
67. There are two opposing views on whether GAP will dampen Kurdish nationalism. The United States and Turkey hold that GAP, by increasing economic development in the southeast, will reduce the attractiveness of the PKK and, therefore, its threat to GAP installations. The contrary view is that Turkish ethnic cleansing in the Southeast and the subsequent migration of some two million Kurds to the west has increased the challenge of Kurdish nationalism. For the first view see, Carl E. Nestor, "Dimensions of Turkey's Kurdish Question and the Potential Impact of the Southeast Anatolian Project (GAP): Part I," The International Journal of Kurdish Studies, vol. 8, nos. 1 & 2 (1995), pp. 33-78; Part II, vol. 9, nos. 1 & 2, pp. 35-78. For the second view see, Robert Olson, "The Impact of the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP) on Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey," The International Journal of Kurdish Studies, vol. 9, nos. 1 & 2 (1996), pp. 95-102. One of the best articles to appear on the GAP project is Servet Mutlu, "The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) of Turkey: its context, objectives and prospects," Orient, vol. 37, no. 1(1996), pp. 59-86. Mutlu's caution on GAP is based on his view that the funds allocated for development of irrigated agriculture may not be sufficient and that the agricultural extension and training system is inadequate. A host of other problems, including attracting appropriate industrial capital and personnel, according o Mutlu, "will make long-term sustainable development difficult if not impossible" (p. 81).
68. There are two opposing views on whether GAP will dampen Kurdish nationalism. The United States and Turkey hold that GAP, by increasing economic development in the southeast, will reduce the attractiveness of the PKK and, therefore, its threat to GAP installations. The contrary view is that Turkish ethnic cleansing in the Southeast and the subsequent migration of some two million Kurds to the west has increased the challenge of Kurdish nationalism. For the first view see, Carl E. Nestor, "Dimensions of Turkey's Kurdish Question and the Potential Impact of the Southeast Anatolian Project (GAP): Part I," The International Journal of Kurdish Studies, vol. 8, nos. 1 & 2 (1995), pp. 33-78; Part II, vol. 9, nos. 1 & 2, pp. 35-78. For the second view see, Robert Olson, "The Impact of the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP) on Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey," The International Journal of Kurdish Studies, vol. 9, nos. 1 & 2 (1996), pp. 95-102. One of the best articles to appear on the GAP project is Servet Mutlu, "The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) of Turkey: its context, objectives and prospects," Orient, vol. 37, no. 1(1996), pp. 59-86. Mutlu's caution on GAP is based on his view that the funds allocated for development of irrigated agriculture may not be sufficient and that the agricultural extension and training system is inadequate. A host of other problems, including attracting appropriate industrial capital and personnel, according o Mutlu, "will make long-term sustainable development difficult if not impossible" (p. 81).
69. There are two opposing views on whether GAP will dampen Kurdish nationalism. The United States and Turkey hold that GAP, by increasing economic development in the southeast, will reduce the attractiveness of the PKK and, therefore, its threat to GAP installations. The contrary view is that Turkish ethnic cleansing in the Southeast and the subsequent migration of some two million Kurds to the west has increased the challenge of Kurdish nationalism. For the first view see, Carl E. Nestor, "Dimensions of Turkey's Kurdish Question and the Potential Impact of the Southeast Anatolian Project (GAP): Part I," The International Journal of Kurdish Studies, vol. 8, nos. 1 & 2 (1995), pp. 33-78; Part II, vol. 9, nos. 1 & 2, pp. 35-78. For the second view see, Robert Olson, "The Impact of the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP) on Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey," The International Journal of Kurdish Studies, vol. 9, nos. 1 & 2 (1996), pp. 95-102. One of the best articles to appear on the GAP project is Servet Mutlu, "The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) of Turkey: its context, objectives and prospects," Orient, vol. 37, no. 1(1996), pp. 59-86. Mutlu's caution on GAP is based on his view that the funds allocated for development of irrigated agriculture may not be sufficient and that the agricultural extension and training system is inadequate. A host of other problems, including attracting appropriate industrial capital and personnel, according o Mutlu, "will make long-term sustainable development difficult if not impossible" (p. 81).
70. There are two opposing views on whether GAP will dampen Kurdish nationalism. The United States and Turkey hold that GAP, by increasing economic development in the southeast, will reduce the attractiveness of the PKK and, therefore, its threat to GAP installations. The contrary view is that Turkish ethnic cleansing in the Southeast and the subsequent migration of some two million Kurds to the west has increased the challenge of Kurdish nationalism. For the first view see, Carl E. Nestor, "Dimensions of Turkey's Kurdish Question and the Potential Impact of the Southeast Anatolian Project (GAP): Part I," The International Journal of Kurdish Studies, vol. 8, nos. 1 & 2 (1995), pp. 33-78; Part II, vol. 9, nos. 1 & 2, pp. 35-78. For the second view see, Robert Olson, "The Impact of the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP) on Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey," The International Journal of Kurdish Studies, vol. 9, nos. 1 & 2 (1996), pp. 95-102. One of the best articles to appear on the GAP project is Servet Mutlu, "The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) of Turkey: its context, objectives and prospects," Orient, vol. 37, no. 1(1996), pp. 59-86. Mutlu's caution on GAP is based on his view that the funds allocated for development of irrigated agriculture may not be sufficient and that the agricultural extension and training system is inadequate. A host of other problems, including attracting appropriate industrial capital and personnel, according o Mutlu, "will make long-term sustainable development difficult if not impossible" (p. 81).