Empirical evidence on a special-interest-group perspective to antitrust

Public Choice

Volumn 92, Issue 3-4, 1997, Pages 317-335

  Delorme Jr , Charles D ^a   Frame, W Scott ^a   Kamerschen, David R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031500206     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

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