Intention thus far

Criminal Law Review

Volumn 1997, Issue 10, 1997, Pages 704-719

  Simester, A P ^a   Chan, Winnie ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031494710     PISSN: 0011135X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (142)

1. [1961] A.C. 290, HL.
2. [1975] A.C. 55, HL.
3. [1985] A.C. 905, HL.
4. [1986] A.C. 455, CA; HL.
5. [1986] 1 W.L.R. 1025, CA.
6. e.g. R. A. Duff, "The Obscure Intentions of the House of Lords" [1986] Crim.L.R. 771; G. Williams, "Oblique Intention" (1987) 46 C.L.J. 417; A. Halpin, "Intended Consequences and Unintended Fallacies" (1987) 7 O.J.L.S. 104; R. Buxton, "Some Simple Thoughts on Intention" [1988] Crim.L.R. 484; R. A. Duff, "Intentions Legal and Philosophical" (1989) 9 O.J.L.S. 76; A. Nome, "Oblique Intention and Legal Politics" [1989] Crim.L.R. 793; S. G. Griffin, "Inferring the Requisite Intention to Kill" (1989) 139 N.L.J. 1637; J. C. Smith, "A Note on 'Intention'" [1990] Crim.L.R. 85; R. A. Duff, "The Politics of Intention: A Response to Norrie" [1990] Crim.L.R. 637; A. Norrie, "Intention: More Loose Talk" [1990] Crim.L.R. 642; N. Lacey, "A Clear Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?" (1993) 56 M.L.R. 621. Earlier writing, in the decade or so before Nedrick, includes J. C. Smith, "Intention in Criminal Law" (1974) 27 C.L.P. 93; A. White, "Intention, Purpose, Foresight and Desire" (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 569; J. H. Buzzard, "'Intent" [1978] Crim.L.R. 5; J. C. Smith, "'Intent': A Reply" [1978] Crim.L.R. 14; R. A. Duff, "Intention, Mens Rea and the Law Commission Report" [1980] Crim.L.R. 149. See also D. Stuart, "Mens Rea, Negligence and Attempts" [1968] Crim.L.R. 647.
7. e.g. R. A. Duff, "The Obscure Intentions of the House of Lords" [1986] Crim.L.R. 771; G. Williams, "Oblique Intention" (1987) 46 C.L.J. 417; A. Halpin, "Intended Consequences and Unintended Fallacies" (1987) 7 O.J.L.S. 104; R. Buxton, "Some Simple Thoughts on Intention" [1988] Crim.L.R. 484; R. A. Duff, "Intentions Legal and Philosophical" (1989) 9 O.J.L.S. 76; A. Nome, "Oblique Intention and Legal Politics" [1989] Crim.L.R. 793; S. G. Griffin, "Inferring the Requisite Intention to Kill" (1989) 139 N.L.J. 1637; J. C. Smith, "A Note on 'Intention'" [1990] Crim.L.R. 85; R. A. Duff, "The Politics of Intention: A Response to Norrie" [1990] Crim.L.R. 637; A. Norrie, "Intention: More Loose Talk" [1990] Crim.L.R. 642; N. Lacey, "A Clear Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?" (1993) 56 M.L.R. 621. Earlier writing, in the decade or so before Nedrick, includes J. C. Smith, "Intention in Criminal Law" (1974) 27 C.L.P. 93; A. White, "Intention, Purpose, Foresight and Desire" (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 569; J. H. Buzzard, "'Intent" [1978] Crim.L.R. 5; J. C. Smith, "'Intent': A Reply" [1978] Crim.L.R. 14; R. A. Duff, "Intention, Mens Rea and the Law Commission Report" [1980] Crim.L.R. 149. See also D. Stuart, "Mens Rea, Negligence and Attempts" [1968] Crim.L.R. 647.
8. e.g. R. A. Duff, "The Obscure Intentions of the House of Lords" [1986] Crim.L.R. 771; G. Williams, "Oblique Intention" (1987) 46 C.L.J. 417; A. Halpin, "Intended Consequences and Unintended Fallacies" (1987) 7 O.J.L.S. 104; R. Buxton, "Some Simple Thoughts on Intention" [1988] Crim.L.R. 484; R. A. Duff, "Intentions Legal and Philosophical" (1989) 9 O.J.L.S. 76; A. Nome, "Oblique Intention and Legal Politics" [1989] Crim.L.R. 793; S. G. Griffin, "Inferring the Requisite Intention to Kill" (1989) 139 N.L.J. 1637; J. C. Smith, "A Note on 'Intention'" [1990] Crim.L.R. 85; R. A. Duff, "The Politics of Intention: A Response to Norrie" [1990] Crim.L.R. 637; A. Norrie, "Intention: More Loose Talk" [1990] Crim.L.R. 642; N. Lacey, "A Clear Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?" (1993) 56 M.L.R. 621. Earlier writing, in the decade or so before Nedrick, includes J. C. Smith, "Intention in Criminal Law" (1974) 27 C.L.P. 93; A. White, "Intention, Purpose, Foresight and Desire" (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 569; J. H. Buzzard, "'Intent" [1978] Crim.L.R. 5; J. C. Smith, "'Intent': A Reply" [1978] Crim.L.R. 14; R. A. Duff, "Intention, Mens Rea and the Law Commission Report" [1980] Crim.L.R. 149. See also D. Stuart, "Mens Rea, Negligence and Attempts" [1968] Crim.L.R. 647.
9. e.g. R. A. Duff, "The Obscure Intentions of the House of Lords" [1986] Crim.L.R. 771; G. Williams, "Oblique Intention" (1987) 46 C.L.J. 417; A. Halpin, "Intended Consequences and Unintended Fallacies" (1987) 7 O.J.L.S. 104; R. Buxton, "Some Simple Thoughts on Intention" [1988] Crim.L.R. 484; R. A. Duff, "Intentions Legal and Philosophical" (1989) 9 O.J.L.S. 76; A. Nome, "Oblique Intention and Legal Politics" [1989] Crim.L.R. 793; S. G. Griffin, "Inferring the Requisite Intention to Kill" (1989) 139 N.L.J. 1637; J. C. Smith, "A Note on 'Intention'" [1990] Crim.L.R. 85; R. A. Duff, "The Politics of Intention: A Response to Norrie" [1990] Crim.L.R. 637; A. Norrie, "Intention: More Loose Talk" [1990] Crim.L.R. 642; N. Lacey, "A Clear Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?" (1993) 56 M.L.R. 621. Earlier writing, in the decade or so before Nedrick, includes J. C. Smith, "Intention in Criminal Law" (1974) 27 C.L.P. 93; A. White, "Intention, Purpose, Foresight and Desire" (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 569; J. H. Buzzard, "'Intent" [1978] Crim.L.R. 5; J. C. Smith, "'Intent': A Reply" [1978] Crim.L.R. 14; R. A. Duff, "Intention, Mens Rea and the Law Commission Report" [1980] Crim.L.R. 149. See also D. Stuart, "Mens Rea, Negligence and Attempts" [1968] Crim.L.R. 647.
10. e.g. R. A. Duff, "The Obscure Intentions of the House of Lords" [1986] Crim.L.R. 771; G. Williams, "Oblique Intention" (1987) 46 C.L.J. 417; A. Halpin, "Intended Consequences and Unintended Fallacies" (1987) 7 O.J.L.S. 104; R. Buxton, "Some Simple Thoughts on Intention" [1988] Crim.L.R. 484; R. A. Duff, "Intentions Legal and Philosophical" (1989) 9 O.J.L.S. 76; A. Nome, "Oblique Intention and Legal Politics" [1989] Crim.L.R. 793; S. G. Griffin, "Inferring the Requisite Intention to Kill" (1989) 139 N.L.J. 1637; J. C. Smith, "A Note on 'Intention'" [1990] Crim.L.R. 85; R. A. Duff, "The Politics of Intention: A Response to Norrie" [1990] Crim.L.R. 637; A. Norrie, "Intention: More Loose Talk" [1990] Crim.L.R. 642; N. Lacey, "A Clear Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?" (1993) 56 M.L.R. 621. Earlier writing, in the decade or so before Nedrick, includes J. C. Smith, "Intention in Criminal Law" (1974) 27 C.L.P. 93; A. White, "Intention, Purpose, Foresight and Desire" (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 569; J. H. Buzzard, "'Intent" [1978] Crim.L.R. 5; J. C. Smith, "'Intent': A Reply" [1978] Crim.L.R. 14; R. A. Duff, "Intention, Mens Rea and the Law Commission Report" [1980] Crim.L.R. 149. See also D. Stuart, "Mens Rea, Negligence and Attempts" [1968] Crim.L.R. 647.
11. e.g. R. A. Duff, "The Obscure Intentions of the House of Lords" [1986] Crim.L.R. 771; G. Williams, "Oblique Intention" (1987) 46 C.L.J. 417; A. Halpin, "Intended Consequences and Unintended Fallacies" (1987) 7 O.J.L.S. 104; R. Buxton, "Some Simple Thoughts on Intention" [1988] Crim.L.R. 484; R. A. Duff, "Intentions Legal and Philosophical" (1989) 9 O.J.L.S. 76; A. Nome, "Oblique Intention and Legal Politics" [1989] Crim.L.R. 793; S. G. Griffin, "Inferring the Requisite Intention to Kill" (1989) 139 N.L.J. 1637; J. C. Smith, "A Note on 'Intention'" [1990] Crim.L.R. 85; R. A. Duff, "The Politics of Intention: A Response to Norrie" [1990] Crim.L.R. 637; A. Norrie, "Intention: More Loose Talk" [1990] Crim.L.R. 642; N. Lacey, "A Clear Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?" (1993) 56 M.L.R. 621. Earlier writing, in the decade or so before Nedrick, includes J. C. Smith, "Intention in Criminal Law" (1974) 27 C.L.P. 93; A. White, "Intention, Purpose, Foresight and Desire" (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 569; J. H. Buzzard, "'Intent" [1978] Crim.L.R. 5; J. C. Smith, "'Intent': A Reply" [1978] Crim.L.R. 14; R. A. Duff, "Intention, Mens Rea and the Law Commission Report" [1980] Crim.L.R. 149. See also D. Stuart, "Mens Rea, Negligence and Attempts" [1968] Crim.L.R. 647.
12. e.g. R. A. Duff, "The Obscure Intentions of the House of Lords" [1986] Crim.L.R. 771; G. Williams, "Oblique Intention" (1987) 46 C.L.J. 417; A. Halpin, "Intended Consequences and Unintended Fallacies" (1987) 7 O.J.L.S. 104; R. Buxton, "Some Simple Thoughts on Intention" [1988] Crim.L.R. 484; R. A. Duff, "Intentions Legal and Philosophical" (1989) 9 O.J.L.S. 76; A. Nome, "Oblique Intention and Legal Politics" [1989] Crim.L.R. 793; S. G. Griffin, "Inferring the Requisite Intention to Kill" (1989) 139 N.L.J. 1637; J. C. Smith, "A Note on 'Intention'" [1990] Crim.L.R. 85; R. A. Duff, "The Politics of Intention: A Response to Norrie" [1990] Crim.L.R. 637; A. Norrie, "Intention: More Loose Talk" [1990] Crim.L.R. 642; N. Lacey, "A Clear Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?" (1993) 56 M.L.R. 621. Earlier writing, in the decade or so before Nedrick, includes J. C. Smith, "Intention in Criminal Law" (1974) 27 C.L.P. 93; A. White, "Intention, Purpose, Foresight and Desire" (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 569; J. H. Buzzard, "'Intent" [1978] Crim.L.R. 5; J. C. Smith, "'Intent': A Reply" [1978] Crim.L.R. 14; R. A. Duff, "Intention, Mens Rea and the Law Commission Report" [1980] Crim.L.R. 149. See also D. Stuart, "Mens Rea, Negligence and Attempts" [1968] Crim.L.R. 647.
13. e.g. R. A. Duff, "The Obscure Intentions of the House of Lords" [1986] Crim.L.R. 771; G. Williams, "Oblique Intention" (1987) 46 C.L.J. 417; A. Halpin, "Intended Consequences and Unintended Fallacies" (1987) 7 O.J.L.S. 104; R. Buxton, "Some Simple Thoughts on Intention" [1988] Crim.L.R. 484; R. A. Duff, "Intentions Legal and Philosophical" (1989) 9 O.J.L.S. 76; A. Nome, "Oblique Intention and Legal Politics" [1989] Crim.L.R. 793; S. G. Griffin, "Inferring the Requisite Intention to Kill" (1989) 139 N.L.J. 1637; J. C. Smith, "A Note on 'Intention'" [1990] Crim.L.R. 85; R. A. Duff, "The Politics of Intention: A Response to Norrie" [1990] Crim.L.R. 637; A. Norrie, "Intention: More Loose Talk" [1990] Crim.L.R. 642; N. Lacey, "A Clear Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?" (1993) 56 M.L.R. 621. Earlier writing, in the decade or so before Nedrick, includes J. C. Smith, "Intention in Criminal Law" (1974) 27 C.L.P. 93; A. White, "Intention, Purpose, Foresight and Desire" (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 569; J. H. Buzzard, "'Intent" [1978] Crim.L.R. 5; J. C. Smith, "'Intent': A Reply" [1978] Crim.L.R. 14; R. A. Duff, "Intention, Mens Rea and the Law Commission Report" [1980] Crim.L.R. 149. See also D. Stuart, "Mens Rea, Negligence and Attempts" [1968] Crim.L.R. 647.
14. e.g. R. A. Duff, "The Obscure Intentions of the House of Lords" [1986] Crim.L.R. 771; G. Williams, "Oblique Intention" (1987) 46 C.L.J. 417; A. Halpin, "Intended Consequences and Unintended Fallacies" (1987) 7 O.J.L.S. 104; R. Buxton, "Some Simple Thoughts on Intention" [1988] Crim.L.R. 484; R. A. Duff, "Intentions Legal and Philosophical" (1989) 9 O.J.L.S. 76; A. Nome, "Oblique Intention and Legal Politics" [1989] Crim.L.R. 793; S. G. Griffin, "Inferring the Requisite Intention to Kill" (1989) 139 N.L.J. 1637; J. C. Smith, "A Note on 'Intention'" [1990] Crim.L.R. 85; R. A. Duff, "The Politics of Intention: A Response to Norrie" [1990] Crim.L.R. 637; A. Norrie, "Intention: More Loose Talk" [1990] Crim.L.R. 642; N. Lacey, "A Clear Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?" (1993) 56 M.L.R. 621. Earlier writing, in the decade or so before Nedrick, includes J. C. Smith, "Intention in Criminal Law" (1974) 27 C.L.P. 93; A. White, "Intention, Purpose, Foresight and Desire" (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 569; J. H. Buzzard, "'Intent" [1978] Crim.L.R. 5; J. C. Smith, "'Intent': A Reply" [1978] Crim.L.R. 14; R. A. Duff, "Intention, Mens Rea and the Law Commission Report" [1980] Crim.L.R. 149. See also D. Stuart, "Mens Rea, Negligence and Attempts" [1968] Crim.L.R. 647.
15. e.g. R. A. Duff, "The Obscure Intentions of the House of Lords" [1986] Crim.L.R. 771; G. Williams, "Oblique Intention" (1987) 46 C.L.J. 417; A. Halpin, "Intended Consequences and Unintended Fallacies" (1987) 7 O.J.L.S. 104; R. Buxton, "Some Simple Thoughts on Intention" [1988] Crim.L.R. 484; R. A. Duff, "Intentions Legal and Philosophical" (1989) 9 O.J.L.S. 76; A. Nome, "Oblique Intention and Legal Politics" [1989] Crim.L.R. 793; S. G. Griffin, "Inferring the Requisite Intention to Kill" (1989) 139 N.L.J. 1637; J. C. Smith, "A Note on 'Intention'" [1990] Crim.L.R. 85; R. A. Duff, "The Politics of Intention: A Response to Norrie" [1990] Crim.L.R. 637; A. Norrie, "Intention: More Loose Talk" [1990] Crim.L.R. 642; N. Lacey, "A Clear Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?" (1993) 56 M.L.R. 621. Earlier writing, in the decade or so before Nedrick, includes J. C. Smith, "Intention in Criminal Law" (1974) 27 C.L.P. 93; A. White, "Intention, Purpose, Foresight and Desire" (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 569; J. H. Buzzard, "'Intent" [1978] Crim.L.R. 5; J. C. Smith, "'Intent': A Reply" [1978] Crim.L.R. 14; R. A. Duff, "Intention, Mens Rea and the Law Commission Report" [1980] Crim.L.R. 149. See also D. Stuart, "Mens Rea, Negligence and Attempts" [1968] Crim.L.R. 647.
16. e.g. R. A. Duff, "The Obscure Intentions of the House of Lords" [1986] Crim.L.R. 771; G. Williams, "Oblique Intention" (1987) 46 C.L.J. 417; A. Halpin, "Intended Consequences and Unintended Fallacies" (1987) 7 O.J.L.S. 104; R. Buxton, "Some Simple Thoughts on Intention" [1988] Crim.L.R. 484; R. A. Duff, "Intentions Legal and Philosophical" (1989) 9 O.J.L.S. 76; A. Nome, "Oblique Intention and Legal Politics" [1989] Crim.L.R. 793; S. G. Griffin, "Inferring the Requisite Intention to Kill" (1989) 139 N.L.J. 1637; J. C. Smith, "A Note on 'Intention'" [1990] Crim.L.R. 85; R. A. Duff, "The Politics of Intention: A Response to Norrie" [1990] Crim.L.R. 637; A. Norrie, "Intention: More Loose Talk" [1990] Crim.L.R. 642; N. Lacey, "A Clear Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?" (1993) 56 M.L.R. 621. Earlier writing, in the decade or so before Nedrick, includes J. C. Smith, "Intention in Criminal Law" (1974) 27 C.L.P. 93; A. White, "Intention, Purpose, Foresight and Desire" (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 569; J. H. Buzzard, "'Intent" [1978] Crim.L.R. 5; J. C. Smith, "'Intent': A Reply" [1978] Crim.L.R. 14; R. A. Duff, "Intention, Mens Rea and the Law Commission Report" [1980] Crim.L.R. 149. See also D. Stuart, "Mens Rea, Negligence and Attempts" [1968] Crim.L.R. 647.
17. e.g. R. A. Duff, "The Obscure Intentions of the House of Lords" [1986] Crim.L.R. 771; G. Williams, "Oblique Intention" (1987) 46 C.L.J. 417; A. Halpin, "Intended Consequences and Unintended Fallacies" (1987) 7 O.J.L.S. 104; R. Buxton, "Some Simple Thoughts on Intention" [1988] Crim.L.R. 484; R. A. Duff, "Intentions Legal and Philosophical" (1989) 9 O.J.L.S. 76; A. Nome, "Oblique Intention and Legal Politics" [1989] Crim.L.R. 793; S. G. Griffin, "Inferring the Requisite Intention to Kill" (1989) 139 N.L.J. 1637; J. C. Smith, "A Note on 'Intention'" [1990] Crim.L.R. 85; R. A. Duff, "The Politics of Intention: A Response to Norrie" [1990] Crim.L.R. 637; A. Norrie, "Intention: More Loose Talk" [1990] Crim.L.R. 642; N. Lacey, "A Clear Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?" (1993) 56 M.L.R. 621. Earlier writing, in the decade or so before Nedrick, includes J. C. Smith, "Intention in Criminal Law" (1974) 27 C.L.P. 93; A. White, "Intention, Purpose, Foresight and Desire" (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 569; J. H. Buzzard, "'Intent" [1978] Crim.L.R. 5; J. C. Smith, "'Intent': A Reply" [1978] Crim.L.R. 14; R. A. Duff, "Intention, Mens Rea and the Law Commission Report" [1980] Crim.L.R. 149. See also D. Stuart, "Mens Rea, Negligence and Attempts" [1968] Crim.L.R. 647.
18. e.g. R. A. Duff, "The Obscure Intentions of the House of Lords" [1986] Crim.L.R. 771; G. Williams, "Oblique Intention" (1987) 46 C.L.J. 417; A. Halpin, "Intended Consequences and Unintended Fallacies" (1987) 7 O.J.L.S. 104; R. Buxton, "Some Simple Thoughts on Intention" [1988] Crim.L.R. 484; R. A. Duff, "Intentions Legal and Philosophical" (1989) 9 O.J.L.S. 76; A. Nome, "Oblique Intention and Legal Politics" [1989] Crim.L.R. 793; S. G. Griffin, "Inferring the Requisite Intention to Kill" (1989) 139 N.L.J. 1637; J. C. Smith, "A Note on 'Intention'" [1990] Crim.L.R. 85; R. A. Duff, "The Politics of Intention: A Response to Norrie" [1990] Crim.L.R. 637; A. Norrie, "Intention: More Loose Talk" [1990] Crim.L.R. 642; N. Lacey, "A Clear Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?" (1993) 56 M.L.R. 621. Earlier writing, in the decade or so before Nedrick, includes J. C. Smith, "Intention in Criminal Law" (1974) 27 C.L.P. 93; A. White, "Intention, Purpose, Foresight and Desire" (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 569; J. H. Buzzard, "'Intent" [1978] Crim.L.R. 5; J. C. Smith, "'Intent': A Reply" [1978] Crim.L.R. 14; R. A. Duff, "Intention, Mens Rea and the Law Commission Report" [1980] Crim.L.R. 149. See also D. Stuart, "Mens Rea, Negligence and Attempts" [1968] Crim.L.R. 647.
19. e.g. R. A. Duff, "The Obscure Intentions of the House of Lords" [1986] Crim.L.R. 771; G. Williams, "Oblique Intention" (1987) 46 C.L.J. 417; A. Halpin, "Intended Consequences and Unintended Fallacies" (1987) 7 O.J.L.S. 104; R. Buxton, "Some Simple Thoughts on Intention" [1988] Crim.L.R. 484; R. A. Duff, "Intentions Legal and Philosophical" (1989) 9 O.J.L.S. 76; A. Nome, "Oblique Intention and Legal Politics" [1989] Crim.L.R. 793; S. G. Griffin, "Inferring the Requisite Intention to Kill" (1989) 139 N.L.J. 1637; J. C. Smith, "A Note on 'Intention'" [1990] Crim.L.R. 85; R. A. Duff, "The Politics of Intention: A Response to Norrie" [1990] Crim.L.R. 637; A. Norrie, "Intention: More Loose Talk" [1990] Crim.L.R. 642; N. Lacey, "A Clear Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?" (1993) 56 M.L.R. 621. Earlier writing, in the decade or so before Nedrick, includes J. C. Smith, "Intention in Criminal Law" (1974) 27 C.L.P. 93; A. White, "Intention, Purpose, Foresight and Desire" (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 569; J. H. Buzzard, "'Intent" [1978] Crim.L.R. 5; J. C. Smith, "'Intent': A Reply" [1978] Crim.L.R. 14; R. A. Duff, "Intention, Mens Rea and the Law Commission Report" [1980] Crim.L.R. 149. See also D. Stuart, "Mens Rea, Negligence and Attempts" [1968] Crim.L.R. 647.
20. e.g. R. A. Duff, "The Obscure Intentions of the House of Lords" [1986] Crim.L.R. 771; G. Williams, "Oblique Intention" (1987) 46 C.L.J. 417; A. Halpin, "Intended Consequences and Unintended Fallacies" (1987) 7 O.J.L.S. 104; R. Buxton, "Some Simple Thoughts on Intention" [1988] Crim.L.R. 484; R. A. Duff, "Intentions Legal and Philosophical" (1989) 9 O.J.L.S. 76; A. Nome, "Oblique Intention and Legal Politics" [1989] Crim.L.R. 793; S. G. Griffin, "Inferring the Requisite Intention to Kill" (1989) 139 N.L.J. 1637; J. C. Smith, "A Note on 'Intention'" [1990] Crim.L.R. 85; R. A. Duff, "The Politics of Intention: A Response to Norrie" [1990] Crim.L.R. 637; A. Norrie, "Intention: More Loose Talk" [1990] Crim.L.R. 642; N. Lacey, "A Clear Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?" (1993) 56 M.L.R. 621. Earlier writing, in the decade or so before Nedrick, includes J. C. Smith, "Intention in Criminal Law" (1974) 27 C.L.P. 93; A. White, "Intention, Purpose, Foresight and Desire" (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 569; J. H. Buzzard, "'Intent" [1978] Crim.L.R. 5; J. C. Smith, "'Intent': A Reply" [1978] Crim.L.R. 14; R. A. Duff, "Intention, Mens Rea and the Law Commission Report" [1980] Crim.L.R. 149. See also D. Stuart, "Mens Rea, Negligence and Attempts" [1968] Crim.L.R. 647.
21. e.g. R. A. Duff, "The Obscure Intentions of the House of Lords" [1986] Crim.L.R. 771; G. Williams, "Oblique Intention" (1987) 46 C.L.J. 417; A. Halpin, "Intended Consequences and Unintended Fallacies" (1987) 7 O.J.L.S. 104; R. Buxton, "Some Simple Thoughts on Intention" [1988] Crim.L.R. 484; R. A. Duff, "Intentions Legal and Philosophical" (1989) 9 O.J.L.S. 76; A. Nome, "Oblique Intention and Legal Politics" [1989] Crim.L.R. 793; S. G. Griffin, "Inferring the Requisite Intention to Kill" (1989) 139 N.L.J. 1637; J. C. Smith, "A Note on 'Intention'" [1990] Crim.L.R. 85; R. A. Duff, "The Politics of Intention: A Response to Norrie" [1990] Crim.L.R. 637; A. Norrie, "Intention: More Loose Talk" [1990] Crim.L.R. 642; N. Lacey, "A Clear Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?" (1993) 56 M.L.R. 621. Earlier writing, in the decade or so before Nedrick, includes J. C. Smith, "Intention in Criminal Law" (1974) 27 C.L.P. 93; A. White, "Intention, Purpose, Foresight and Desire" (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 569; J. H. Buzzard, "'Intent" [1978] Crim.L.R. 5; J. C. Smith, "'Intent': A Reply" [1978] Crim.L.R. 14; R. A. Duff, "Intention, Mens Rea and the Law Commission Report" [1980] Crim.L.R. 149. See also D. Stuart, "Mens Rea, Negligence and Attempts" [1968] Crim.L.R. 647.
22. e.g. R. A. Duff, "The Obscure Intentions of the House of Lords" [1986] Crim.L.R. 771; G. Williams, "Oblique Intention" (1987) 46 C.L.J. 417; A. Halpin, "Intended Consequences and Unintended Fallacies" (1987) 7 O.J.L.S. 104; R. Buxton, "Some Simple Thoughts on Intention" [1988] Crim.L.R. 484; R. A. Duff, "Intentions Legal and Philosophical" (1989) 9 O.J.L.S. 76; A. Nome, "Oblique Intention and Legal Politics" [1989] Crim.L.R. 793; S. G. Griffin, "Inferring the Requisite Intention to Kill" (1989) 139 N.L.J. 1637; J. C. Smith, "A Note on 'Intention'" [1990] Crim.L.R. 85; R. A. Duff, "The Politics of Intention: A Response to Norrie" [1990] Crim.L.R. 637; A. Norrie, "Intention: More Loose Talk" [1990] Crim.L.R. 642; N. Lacey, "A Clear Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?" (1993) 56 M.L.R. 621. Earlier writing, in the decade or so before Nedrick, includes J. C. Smith, "Intention in Criminal Law" (1974) 27 C.L.P. 93; A. White, "Intention, Purpose, Foresight and Desire" (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 569; J. H. Buzzard, "'Intent" [1978] Crim.L.R. 5; J. C. Smith, "'Intent': A Reply" [1978] Crim.L.R. 14; R. A. Duff, "Intention, Mens Rea and the Law Commission Report" [1980] Crim.L.R. 149. See also D. Stuart, "Mens Rea, Negligence and Attempts" [1968] Crim.L.R. 647.
23. G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law: (2nd ed., 1983), p.74.
24. [1985] A.C. 905 at 926.
25. e.g. Belfon [1976] 3 All E.R. 46 at 49, 53, CA; Beer (1976) 63 Cr.App.R. 222 at 225, CA; Nedrick [1986] 1 W.L.R. 1025 at 1027, CA.
26. e.g. Belfon [1976] 3 All E.R. 46 at 49, 53, CA; Beer (1976) 63 Cr.App.R. 222 at 225, CA; Nedrick [1986] 1 W.L.R. 1025 at 1027, CA.
27. e.g. Belfon [1976] 3 All E.R. 46 at 49, 53, CA; Beer (1976) 63 Cr.App.R. 222 at 225, CA; Nedrick [1986] 1 W.L.R. 1025 at 1027, CA.
28. [1986] A.C. 455 at 468, HL.
29. In the passage quoted in the text above, Lord Bridge continues, "unless the judge is convinced that, on the facts and having regard to the way the case has been presented to the jury in evidence and argument, some further explanation or elaboration is strictly necessary to avoid understanding." Such occasions should occur only infrequently: "In trials for murder or wounding with intent, I find it very difficult to visualise a case where any such explanation or elaboration could be required, if the offence consisted of a direct attack on the victim with a weapon . . . the cases that will call for a direction by reference to foresight of consequences will be of extremely rare occurrence." Moloney, at 1037. See also at 1039.
30. Hancock [1986] A.C. 455 at 459, HL.
31. [1957] 2 Q.B. 396, CCA.
32. [1950] 2 K.B. 237 at 253, CA.
33. cf. Mohan [1976] 1 Q.B. 1 at 11, CA, per James L.J.: specific intent requires "a decision to bring about, in so far as it lies within the accused's power, the commission of the offence . . .". This analysis was indorsed in Pearman (1984) 80 Cr.App.R. 259, CA.
34. cf. Mohan [1976] 1 Q.B. 1 at 11, CA, per James L.J.: specific intent requires "a decision to bring about, in so far as it lies within the accused's power, the commission of the offence . . .". This analysis was indorsed in Pearman (1984) 80 Cr.App.R. 259, CA.
35. Burke [1991] 1 A.C. 135 at 147, HL.
36. Criminal Law (8th ed., 1996), p.57.
37. Thus, according to Lord Reid in Gollins v. Gollins [1964] A.C. 644 at 663, "If you aim at something you intend to hit it and if you hit something unintentionally you have not aimed at it." cf. M. Bratman, Intention, Hans and Practical Reason (1987), pp.141-142; also Sir James Stephen, History of the Criminal Law (Vol II), p.110.
38. Thus, according to Lord Reid in Gollins v. Gollins [1964] A.C. 644 at 663, "If you aim at something you intend to hit it and if you hit something unintentionally you have not aimed at it." cf. M. Bratman, Intention, Hans and Practical Reason (1987), pp.141-142; also Sir James Stephen, History of the Criminal Law (Vol II), p.110.
39. DPP v. Smith [1961] A.C. 290 at 327; Hyam [1975] A.C. 55 at 79. This element was regarded as unhelpful by Lord Bridge in Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 at 927. With respect to Lord Bridge, however, the counter-example he cites is a doubtful one (cf. Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law (8th ed.), p.62). In any event, it is certainly no more than a borderline case of intention, if at all, and so is not troubling to the attempt here to capture a sense of the core or paradigm instances.
40. DPP v. Smith [1961] A.C. 290 at 327; Hyam [1975] A.C. 55 at 79. This element was regarded as unhelpful by Lord Bridge in Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 at 927. With respect to Lord Bridge, however, the counter-example he cites is a doubtful one (cf. Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law (8th ed.), p.62). In any event, it is certainly no more than a borderline case of intention, if at all, and so is not troubling to the attempt here to capture a sense of the core or paradigm instances.
41. [1985] A.C. 905 at 917.
42. The Times, December 22, 1983, CA. Quoted by Lord Bridge in Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 at 919.
43. The Times, December 22, 1983, CA. Quoted by Lord Bridge in Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 at 919.
44. cf. Walker (1989) 90 Cr.App.R. 226 at 230, CA: "Trying to kill" is synonymous with purpose. It has never been suggested that a man does not intend what he is trying to achieve."
45. R. A. Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability (1990), pp.61-63. See now his Criminal Attempts (1996), Chap. 1.
46. R. A. Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability (1990), pp.61-63. See now his Criminal Attempts (1996), Chap. 1.
47. Duff, op. cit., p.61.
48. cf. G. Williams, "Oblique Intention" (1987) 46 C.L.J. 417 at 421.
49. Or, at least in part because. Very often, a person has more than one reason for acting as he does. By cooking dinner, John might intend not only to assuage his hunger, but also to use up the contents of the fridge, as well as surprise and please his flatmates. All three results are intended. Extraneous intentions are generally ignored by the criminal law, which focuses only on the actus reus; and asks, whatever else he intended, did D intend that actus?
50. Woods v. Brown (1907) 26 N.Z.L.R. 1312 at 1315; 10 G.L.R. 70 at 71, SC.
51. per Lord Bridge in Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 at 926.
52. See Hyam [1974] 2 All E.R. 41 at 74 (Lord Hailsham): intention includes "the means as well as the end"; also G. Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part (2nd ed., 1961), § 16.
53. See Hyam [1974] 2 All E.R. 41 at 74 (Lord Hailsham): intention includes "the means as well as the end"; also G. Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part (2nd ed., 1961), § 16.
54. [1960] 2 Q.B. 423, CCA.
55. Or, more accurately, to "corrupt" the official. In fact s.1(2) of the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889 requires that the defendant act "corruptly". The Court interpreted this to mean only that he must intend to induce a corrupt bargain. The case is difficult to square with Clarke (1984) 80 Cr.App.R. 344, CA, which ruled that someone who participates in a crime solely in order to frustrate its ultimate result might have a defence. (In the latter case, however, D apparently did not initiate the offence.) More generally, the rather technical view of mens rea adopted in Smith - and, more recently, in Yip Chiu-Cheung [1995] 1 A.C. 111, PC - raises questions about the relationship of mens rea with fault which cannot be investigated here.
56. Or, more accurately, to "corrupt" the official. In fact s.1(2) of the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889 requires that the defendant act "corruptly". The Court interpreted this to mean only that he must intend to induce a corrupt bargain. The case is difficult to square with Clarke (1984) 80 Cr.App.R. 344, CA, which ruled that someone who participates in a crime solely in order to frustrate its ultimate result might have a defence. (In the latter case, however, D apparently did not initiate the offence.) More generally, the rather technical view of mens rea adopted in Smith - and, more recently, in Yip Chiu-Cheung [1995] 1 A.C. 111, PC - raises questions about the relationship of mens rea with fault which cannot be investigated here.
57. Heeson (1878) 14 Cox C.C. 40 at 44 (Lush J.).
58. [1986] A.C. 455 at 461 (italics added).
59. A foreseen outcome may even be something D was trying to avoid. "To take a trivial example, if I say I intend to reach the green, people will believe me although we all know that the odds are ten to one against my succeeding; and no one but a lawyer would say that I must be presumed to have intended to put the ball in the bunker because that was the natural and probable result of my shot." Gollins v. Gollins [1964] A.C. 644 at 664 (Lord Reid).
60. [1964] 2 Q.B. 745 at 764 (Pearson L.J.); see also at 758 (Lord Denning M.R.), CA. See too Lord Diplock's definition of "purpose" in Chandler v. DPP [1964] A.C. 763 at 805 to "designate those objects which he knows will probably be achieved by the act, whether he wants them or not."
61. [1961] V.R. 367, 371. Cf. Saunders, Mozley & Whitley's Law Dictionary (9th ed., 1977), p.175: "a person who contemplates any result, as not unlikely to follow from a deliberate act of his own, may be said to intend that result, whether he desire it or not . . ."
62. [1961] V.R. 367, 371. Cf. Saunders, Mozley & Whitley's Law Dictionary (9th ed., 1977), p.175: "a person who contemplates any result, as not unlikely to follow from a deliberate act of his own, may be said to intend that result, whether he desire it or not . . ."
63. [1961] A.C. 290. Cf. Viscount Kilmuir L.C., at 326: "the test of what a reasonable man would contemplate as the probable result of his acts, and, therefore, would intend . . ." See also Ward [1956] 1 Q.B. 351; Kenny, "Intention and Purpose in Law' in Summers (ed.), Essays in Legal Philosophy (1968), p.146.
64. [1961] A.C. 290. Cf. Viscount Kilmuir L.C., at 326: "the test of what a reasonable man would contemplate as the probable result of his acts, and, therefore, would intend . . ." See also Ward [1956] 1 Q.B. 351; Kenny, "Intention and Purpose in Law' in Summers (ed.), Essays in Legal Philosophy (1968), p.146.
65. [1961] A.C. 290. Cf. Viscount Kilmuir L.C., at 326: "the test of what a reasonable man would contemplate as the probable result of his acts, and, therefore, would intend . . ." See also Ward [1956] 1 Q.B. 351; Kenny, "Intention and Purpose in Law' in Summers (ed.), Essays in Legal Philosophy (1968), p.146.
66. [1961] A.C. 290. Cf. Viscount Kilmuir L.C., at 326: "the test of what a reasonable man would contemplate as the probable result of his acts, and, therefore, would intend . . ." See also Ward [1956] 1 Q.B. 351; Kenny, "Intention and Purpose in Law' in Summers (ed.), Essays in Legal Philosophy (1968), p.146.
67. [1975] A.C. 55 at 74.
68. ibid., 82.
69. Lemon [1979] A.C. 617 at 638, HL.
70. See also a similar dictum in Hyam [1975] A.C. 55 at 86; also the authorities cited by Judge Buzzard, "'Intent'" [1978] Crim.L.R. 5.
71. See also a similar dictum in Hyam [1975] A.C. 55 at 86; also the authorities cited by Judge Buzzard, "'Intent'" [1978] Crim.L.R. 5.
72. This is the case of intending serious injury as an end in itself, where elements (a) and (c) are present from the definition at p.708.
73. [1976] 3 All E.R. 46 at 48, CA.
74. [1976] 3 All E.R. 46 at 53.
75. [1976] 1 Q.B. 10. But see Allsop (1976) 64 Cr.App.R. 29 at 32, CA, where Lord Diplock's dictum in Hyam [1975] A.C. 55 at 86, equating intent with foresight of likelihood, was misapplied to "crimes of this class", i.e. conspiracy to defraud. The decision may however be justified on a different ground, concerning the nature of wrongdoing in fraud: see at 31.
76. [1976] 1 Q.B. 10. But see Allsop (1976) 64 Cr.App.R. 29 at 32, CA, where Lord Diplock's dictum in Hyam [1975] A.C. 55 at 86, equating intent with foresight of likelihood, was misapplied to "crimes of this class", i.e. conspiracy to defraud. The decision may however be justified on a different ground, concerning the nature of wrongdoing in fraud: see at 31.
77. [1976] 1 Q.B. 10. But see Allsop (1976) 64 Cr.App.R. 29 at 32, CA, where Lord Diplock's dictum in Hyam [1975] A.C. 55 at 86, equating intent with foresight of likelihood, was misapplied to "crimes of this class", i.e. conspiracy to defraud. The decision may however be justified on a different ground, concerning the nature of wrongdoing in fraud: see at 31.
78. Digest of Criminal Law (1877), art. 223.
79. Hyam [1975] A.C. 55 at 80.
80. cf. Smith and Hogan (8th ed., 1996), p.357.
81. [1985] A.C. 905 at 928 (Lord Bridge). Contrast this with the trial judge's direction (ibid, 917), based as it was upon Hyam: "a man intends the consequences of his voluntary act (a) when he desires it to happen, whether or not he foresees that it probably will happen, and (b) when he foresees that it will happen, whether he desires it or not."
82. cf. Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 at 920; Hancock [1986] A.C. 455 at 460, CA, [1986] A.C. 455 at 468, HL.
83. cf. Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 at 920; Hancock [1986] A.C. 455 at 460, CA, [1986] A.C. 455 at 468, HL.
84. cf. Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 at 920; Hancock [1986] A.C. 455 at 460, CA, [1986] A.C. 455 at 468, HL.
85. Thus, strictly, the decision rules only that inadvertence forecloses intention - contra DPP v. Smith [1961] A.C. 290. Apart from being undone by s.8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, DPP v. Smith itself was effectively overruled by the Privy Council in Frankland and Moore v. R. [1987] A.C. 576.
86. [1986] 1 A.C. 455 at 472 (Lord Scarman). See also, at 473: "the greater the probability of a consequence the more likely it is that the consequence was foreseen and . . . if that consequence was foreseen the greater the probability is that that consequence was also intended . . . [T]he probability, however high, of a consequence is only a factor."
87. [1986] 1 W.L.R. 1025.
88. In the Law Quarterly Review, Lord Goff concludes that "after the journey through Smith, Hyam, Moloney and Hancock, the law is really back where it was . . . Foresight of consequences is not the same as intent, but is material from which the jury may, having regard to the circumstances of the case, infer that the defendant really had the relevant intent." "The Mental Element in the Crime of Murder" (1988) 104 L.Q.R. 30 at 41.
89. For philosophical discussion of the case see Geddes, "On the Intrinsic Wrongness of Killing Innocent People" (1973) 33 Analysis 93; Duff, "Intentionally Killing the Innocent" (1973) 34 Analysis 16; Finnis, "The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: a Reply to Judith Jarvis Thomson" (1973) 2 Philosophy and Public Affairs 117; Hanink, "Some Light on Double Effect" (1975) 35 Analysis 147.
90. For philosophical discussion of the case see Geddes, "On the Intrinsic Wrongness of Killing Innocent People" (1973) 33 Analysis 93; Duff, "Intentionally Killing the Innocent" (1973) 34 Analysis 16; Finnis, "The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: a Reply to Judith Jarvis Thomson" (1973) 2 Philosophy and Public Affairs 117; Hanink, "Some Light on Double Effect" (1975) 35 Analysis 147.
91. For philosophical discussion of the case see Geddes, "On the Intrinsic Wrongness of Killing Innocent People" (1973) 33 Analysis 93; Duff, "Intentionally Killing the Innocent" (1973) 34 Analysis 16; Finnis, "The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: a Reply to Judith Jarvis Thomson" (1973) 2 Philosophy and Public Affairs 117; Hanink, "Some Light on Double Effect" (1975) 35 Analysis 147.
92. For philosophical discussion of the case see Geddes, "On the Intrinsic Wrongness of Killing Innocent People" (1973) 33 Analysis 93; Duff, "Intentionally Killing the Innocent" (1973) 34 Analysis 16; Finnis, "The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: a Reply to Judith Jarvis Thomson" (1973) 2 Philosophy and Public Affairs 117; Hanink, "Some Light on Double Effect" (1975) 35 Analysis 147.
93. See Law Com. No. 218, 7.1-7.14 and Law Com. No. 122 (1992), 5.4-5.11 (italics added).
94. Compare J.C. Smith, "A Note on Intention" [1990] Crim.L.R. 85 at 85-88.
95. Hyam [1975] A.C. 55 at 77.
96. "Oblique Intention" (1987) 46 C.L.J. 417 at 423; cf. his earlier The Mental Element in Crime (1965), pp.34-35.
97. "Oblique Intention" (1987) 46 C.L.J. 417 at 423; cf. his earlier The Mental Element in Crime (1965), pp.34-35.
98. Hyam [1975] A.C. 55 at 74.
99. Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 at 926.
100. Confer Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability (1990), pp.21-22; also Duff, "The Obscure Intentions of the House of Lords" [1986] Crim.L.R. 771.
101. Confer Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability (1990), pp.21-22; also Duff, "The Obscure Intentions of the House of Lords" [1986] Crim.L.R. 771.
102. cf. Lord Bridge in Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 at 925: an overwhelming probability "will suffice to establish the necessary intent." (Emphasis added.) Compare also the use of "conclusively" in the quotation above at n.60.
103. Cf. Nedrick [1986] 1 W.L.R. 1025 at 1029: where D realises that a consequence is inevitable, "the inference may be irresistible that he intended that result." (Emphasis added.)
104. Southern Portland Cement Ltd v. Cooper [1974] A.C. 623 at 640, PC.
105. R. A. Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability (1990), pp. 89-90.
106. [1986] 1 W.L.R. 1025 at 1029 (emphasis added). See also the judgment by Lord Scarman in Hancock, above at n.51.
107. "The Mental Element in the Crime of Murder" (1988) 104 L.Q.R. 30 at 59.
108. More exactly, as an instance of leaving London. See A. P. Simester, "Moral Certainty and the Boundaries of Intention" (1996) 16 O.J.L.S. 445 at 459-60, 467.
109. Thus the test is subjective rather than objective: Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law (8th ed., 1996), p.58; Simester, op. cit., 465-466.
110. Thus the test is subjective rather than objective: Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law (8th ed., 1996), p.58; Simester, op. cit., 465-466.
111. "Intention and Punishment" in Punishment and Responsibility (1968), p.120. See further Simester, op. cit., 456 et seq.
112. "Intention and Punishment" in Punishment and Responsibility (1968), p.120. See further Simester, op. cit., 456 et seq.
113. Above, p.707.
114. Grainge [1974] 1 All E.R. 928, CA.
115. Crooks [1981] 2 N.Z.L.R. 53, CA; Hall (1985) 81 Cr.App.R. 260, CA.
116. Crooks [1981] 2 N.Z.L.R. 53, CA; Hall (1985) 81 Cr.App.R. 260, CA.
117. Simpson [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 221, CA. See the interesting discussion by E. Griew, "Consistency, Communication and Codification - Reflections on Two Mens Rea Words" in P. R. Glazebrook (ed.), Reshaping the Criminal Law (1978), pp.69 et seq.
118. Simpson [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 221, CA. See the interesting discussion by E. Griew, "Consistency, Communication and Codification - Reflections on Two Mens Rea Words" in P. R. Glazebrook (ed.), Reshaping the Criminal Law (1978), pp.69 et seq.
119. Griffiths (1974) 60 Cr.App.R. 14, CA;
120. Woods [1969] 1 Q.B. 447, CCA. However, if his suspicion is a strong one, and there is a straightforward way of checking the truth, he may be imputed with knowledge on the basis of the doctrine of wilful blindness, i.e. where he wilfully closes his eyes to the obvious. See Westminster C.C. v. Croyalgrange Ltd [1986] 2 All E.R. 353, HL.
121. The claim here is merely that knowledge or belief satisfies the demands of intention. It is a further question (not addressed in this paper) whether, with respect to circumstances, intention is required to establish the mens rea of attempt offences. The cases of Khan [1990] 1 W.L.R. 813, CA and Att.-Gen.'s Reference (No. 3 of 1992) [1994] 1 W.L.R. 409, CA suggest otherwise. Fortunately, the reasoning in those cases has not yet been carried over to substantive offences.
122. The claim here is merely that knowledge or belief satisfies the demands of intention. It is a further question (not addressed in this paper) whether, with respect to circumstances, intention is required to establish the mens rea of attempt offences. The cases of Khan [1990] 1 W.L.R. 813, CA and Att.-Gen.'s Reference (No. 3 of 1992) [1994] 1 W.L.R. 409, CA suggest otherwise. Fortunately, the reasoning in those cases has not yet been carried over to substantive offences.
123. Lord Goff, "The Search for Principle" (1983) 69 Proc. Brit. Acad. 169; quoted by him in "The Mental Element in Murder" (1988) 104 L.Q.R. 30 at 30-31.
124. Lord Goff, "The Search for Principle" (1983) 69 Proc. Brit. Acad. 169; quoted by him in "The Mental Element in Murder" (1988) 104 L.Q.R. 30 at 30-31.
125. See, e.g. the cases discussed by A. Ashworth, "Criminal Liability in a Medical Context: the Treatment of Good Intentions" in A. P. Simester and A. T. H. Smith (eds), Harm and Culpability (1996), pp.173-174, 178-179.
126. Hyam [1975] A.C. 55 at 77-79; Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 at 913.
127. Hyam [1975] A.C. 55 at 77-79; Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 at 913.
128. "The Mental Element in Murder" (1988) 104 L.Q.R. 30 at 38. 81 [1975] A.C. 55 at 78.
129. "The Mental Element in Murder" (1988) 104 L.Q.R. 30 at 38. 81 [1975] A.C. 55 at 78.
130. [1985] 1 A.C. 905 at 926.
131. cf. Woollin [1997] 1 Cr.App.R. 97, CA.
132. Law Com. No. 177, Draft Bill, cl.18.
133. Law Com. No. 89, Report of the Mental Element in Crime.
134. Nedrick [1986] 1 W.L.R. 1025 at 1028. Law Com. No. 143, Codification of the Criminal Law.
135. Nedrick [1986] 1 W.L.R. 1025 at 1028. Law Com. No. 143, Codification of the Criminal Law.
136. Law Com. No. 177, A Criminal Code for England and Wales. Compare Lord Bridge's term, "natural", in Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 at 929.
137. Law Com. No. 177, A Criminal Code for England and Wales. Compare Lord Bridge's term, "natural", in Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 at 929.
138. Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 at 925 (Lord Bridge).
139. Compare Walker (1990) 90 Cr.App.R. 226, where the Court of Appeal treated the case before them as involving an inference of intention which the jury was evidentially "entitled" (but not conceptually required) to make; but at the same time remarked, quite extraordinarily, that "It has never been suggested that a man does not intend what he is trying to achieve. The difficulty only arises when he brings about a result which he is not trying to achieve." (Italics added, per Lloyd L.J., at 230.)
140. A. Norrie, "Oblique Intention and Legal Politics" [1989] Crim.L.R. 793 at 801. See also J. C. Smith, "A Note on 'Intention'" [1990] Crim.L.R. 85, 85-88.
141. A. Norrie, "Oblique Intention and Legal Politics" [1989] Crim.L.R. 793 at 801. See also J. C. Smith, "A Note on 'Intention'" [1990] Crim.L.R. 85, 85-88.
142. Norrie, op. cit. at 805.