The Life and Times of Wilburn Boat: A Critical Guide (Part II)

Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce

Volumn 28, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 555-593

  Goldstein, Joel K ^a,b,c,d  

^a SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^d HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0031492924     PISSN: 00222410     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (215)

1. See supra Parts III.B.1 and III.B.3.
2. It is not my intention here to address or offer resolutions of these topics in their full complexity, a pursuit beyond the ambition of this article. My purpose here is simply to locate Wilburn in these debates and suggest its effect on their development. For discussions of uniformity, see, e.g., Robertson, supra note 8, and Gilmore & Black, supra note 2, at 47-51.
3. See Hart & Sacks, supra note 217.
4. Central Gulf Lines, 500 U.S. at 608. See, e.g., Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684, 691 (1950) ("It would be strange indeed thus to hobble a legal system that has been so responsive to the practicalities of maritime commerce and so inventive in adapting its jurisdiction to the needs of that commerce."); but see American Dredging, 510 U.S. 443 (promotion of commerce is not unifying theme of admiralty jurisprudence).
5. Compare Knickerbocker, 253 U.S. 149, with Askew, 411 U.S. 325. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 10, at 271 (uniformity has constitutional dimension); Ruhl, Finding Federalism in the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess" Revisited, 12 Tul. Mar. L.J. 263, 290-94 (1988) (same); Bederman, supra note 10,
6. See The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 572-73 (1874); Force, The Curse of Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.: The Mischief of Seeking "Uniformity" and "Legislative Intent" in Maritime Personal Injury Cases, 55 La. L. Rev. 745, 765-70 (1995) (uniformity is goal of admiralty); Stevens, supra note 58, at 264. See also Friedell, supra note 198, at 7-28 (purpose of grant of admiralty jurisdiction was to preserve adequate harmony and uniformity of maritime law).
7. See Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1513 (1984).
8. Id. at 1576-77.
9. 7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3,776).
10. Id. at 443.
11. See generally G. Dunne, Justice Joseph Story and the Rise of the Supreme Court 130-32 (1970).
12. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1 (1870).
13. Id. at 31.
14. See, e.g., E. Benedict, The American Admiralty: Its Jurisdiction and Practice 174 (1870). In 1870, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Dunham, Benedict wrote: [t]he contract of insurance against the perils of the sea, is one that was suggested by, and sprang from the hazards peculiar to ships and vessels in the pursuits of maritime commerce. In like manner, the rights, duties, and liabilities which are its characteristics, have always been regulated by the maritime law. Benedict, The American Admiralty, at 174. The fourth edition of the same title, published forty years later, contained the same sentence. See E. Benedict, The American Admiralty: Its Jurisdiction and Practice 165 (4th ed. 1910). See also A. Conkling, The Admiralty Jurisdiction, Law and Practice of the Courts of the United States 24-25 (1857) (opining, prior to Dunham, that marine insurance cases should be governed by maritime principles but observing that the "prevalent sentiment" of practitioners opposed including these in admiralty jurisdiction).
15. See, e.g., E. Benedict, The American Admiralty: Its Jurisdiction and Practice 174 (1870). In 1870, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Dunham, Benedict wrote: [t]he contract of insurance against the perils of the sea, is one that was suggested by, and sprang from the hazards peculiar to ships and vessels in the pursuits of maritime commerce. In like manner, the rights, duties, and liabilities which are its characteristics, have always been regulated by the maritime law. Benedict, The American Admiralty, at 174. The fourth edition of the same title, published forty years later, contained the same sentence. See E. Benedict, The American Admiralty: Its Jurisdiction and Practice 165 (4th ed. 1910). See also A. Conkling, The Admiralty Jurisdiction, Law and Practice of the Courts of the United States 24-25 (1857) (opining, prior to Dunham, that marine insurance cases should be governed by maritime principles but observing that the "prevalent sentiment" of practitioners opposed including these in admiralty jurisdiction).
16. See, e.g., E. Benedict, The American Admiralty: Its Jurisdiction and Practice 174 (1870). In 1870, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Dunham, Benedict wrote: [t]he contract of insurance against the perils of the sea, is one that was suggested by, and sprang from the hazards peculiar to ships and vessels in the pursuits of maritime commerce. In like manner, the rights, duties, and liabilities which are its characteristics, have always been regulated by the maritime law. Benedict, The American Admiralty, at 174. The fourth edition of the same title, published forty years later, contained the same sentence. See E. Benedict, The American Admiralty: Its Jurisdiction and Practice 165 (4th ed. 1910). See also A. Conkling, The Admiralty Jurisdiction, Law and Practice of the Courts of the United States 24-25 (1857) (opining, prior to Dunham, that marine insurance cases should be governed by maritime principles but observing that the "prevalent sentiment" of practitioners opposed including these in admiralty jurisdiction).
17. 244 U.S. 205.
18. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot, 346 U.S. 406; Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
19. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216.
20. See, e.g., Dickinson & Andrews, A Decade of Admiralty in the Supreme Court of the United States, 36 Cal. L. Rev. 169, 218-19 (1948).
21. 319 U.S. 306 (1943).
22. Id. at 309.
23. Letter to Justice Reed, May 6, 1953 (on file with the Library of Congress, Black Mss., Box 320).
24. Letter to Justice Douglas, May 19, 1953 (on file with the Library of Congress, Black Mss., Box 320).
25. Robertson, supra note 8, at 196.
26. See, e.g., Kermarec, 358 U.S. 625; Pope & Talbot, 346 U.S. 406; Garrett, 317 U.S. at 244; Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 392 & n.3 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27. Tungus, 358 U.S. at 602 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas joined the opinion.
28. Gilmore & Black, supra note 2, at 17.
29. See MacChesney, supra note 2, at 564.
30. Brief Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of the American Institute of Marine Underwriters, at 5-7, 16-17.
31. Wilburn, 348 U.S. at 332, 333.
32. Id. at 324.
33. Id. at 323. See also Letter from Justice Frankfurter to Justices Reed and Burton, Feb. 23, 1955 (on file with the University of Kentucky Libraries, Reed Mss., Box 157).
34. 348 U.S. at 324.
35. Draft No. 7, 1954 Term, 3d Draft, at 7 (on file with the Library of Congress, Black Mss., Box 324).
36. Id. at 8.
37. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 3, at 189; Sturley, Uniformity in the Law Governing the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 26 J. Mar. L. & Com. 553, 558-59 (1995).
38. The front page of the version in question states in hand writing "Circ. 1/27/55" and that Justices Minton and Clark and Chief Justice Warren agree. This version of the opinion is not found in the case files that Chief Justice Warren, or Justices Reed, Frankfurter, or Clark, maintained. No separate case file exists for Justices Minton, Burton, and Douglas. Accordingly, it seems likely the version was not circulated. A version of the final copy of the opinion, dated January _, 1955, does appear in these files date stamped "Jan 27, 1955." Accordingly, it seems likely that was the draft that was circulated.
39. Printed Draft of Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., Jan. 1955, at 9 (on file with the Library of Congress, Black Mss., Box 324).
40. Central Gulf Lines, 500 U.S. 603 (admiralty jurisdiction designed to promote maritime commerce). But see American Dredging, 510 U.S. at 452 n.3.
41. See Currie, supra note 3, at 189 ("The heart of a commercial enterprise is the ability to engage in transactions for profit. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that the contractual rights of persons engaged in maritime commerce be safeguarded from unwarranted impairment by the diverse laws of the states."). See also M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13 (1972) (emphasizing the importance of commercial certainty).
42. Currie, supra note 3, at 210. See also Robertson, supra note 8, at 198 ("the federal interest in uniformity would generally be greater with respect to commercial matters such as insurance than with respect to personal injuries."); Force, supra note 274, at 765 ("Uniformity is most important in commercial transactions because it enables business persons to plan and calculate the consequences of their actions.").
43. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (federal law governs enforceability of forum selection clauses in passenger tickets); Kossick, 365 U.S. 731.
44. See, e.g., Bremen, 407 U.S. 1. For a more recent discussion of the advantages of international uniformity in commercial matters, see Sturley, supra note 303, at 558-59.
45. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 340 U.S. 54, 60 (1950).
46. See Wilburn, 348 U.S. at 323 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Note, The General Maritime Law vs. State Law in Maritime Cases: Which, When, and Why?, 50 Nw. U.L. Rev. 677, 682 (1955).
47. See Brown, supra note 10; Force, supra note 274, at 787; Kimball, Miles: "This Much and No More . . .", 25 J. Mar. L. & Com. 319, 320 (1994). See also M. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power 138 (2d ed. 1990). Although Professor Redish is one of the few who argues against this power, he recognizes that it has been located in Art. III, § 2 (extending judicial power to "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction"). Id.
48. See Brown, supra note 10; Force, supra note 274, at 787; Kimball, Miles: "This Much and No More . . .", 25 J. Mar. L. & Com. 319, 320 (1994). See also M. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power 138 (2d ed. 1990). Although Professor Redish is one of the few who argues against this power, he recognizes that it has been located in Art. III, § 2 (extending judicial power to "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction"). Id.
49. See Brown, supra note 10, at 251.
50. O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 40 (1943); Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1924). See also Knickerbocker Ice, 253 U.S. at 161; Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 527 (1951) ("Much of this body of maritime law had developed through the centuries in judicial decisions. To reject that body of law and start anew with a complete code would be a novel and drastic step.").
51. See, e.g., Gutoff, Admiralty, Article III, and Supreme Court Review of State-Court Decisionmaking, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 2169, 2170 (1996); Madruga, 346 U.S. at 566 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (admiralty clause of the constitution has afforded the Court "greater substantive law-making powers than it exercises in any other area of law.").
52. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., National Gypsum Co., 115 S. Ct. 2091, 2095 (1995) (Congressional silence "indicates that the question is governed by traditional judge-made principles"); AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202 (judiciary takes lead in fashioning maritime law); Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 259 (1979) ("Admiralty law is judge-made law to a great extent."); MacChesney, supra note 2, at 566 ("The historic fact is that Congress has seldom intervened and that the Court has played the major role in the development of admiralty law."). See also D. Doernberg & C. Wingate, Federal Courts, Federalism and Separation of Powers: Cases and Materials 352-53 (1994) (most admiralty law is judge-made).
53. See Displacement, supra note 10, at 340 n.82.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 325-28.
55. 348 U.S. at 314 ("[I]n the absence of controlling Acts of Congress this Court has fashioned a large part of the existing rules that govern admiralty."). See also Romero, 358 U.S. at 393 (Brennan, J., dissenting and concurring).
56. 342 U.S. 282, 285 (1952).
57. 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953).
58. 374 U.S. 16 (1963).
59. Id. at 20.
60. See, e.g., Mitchell, 362 U.S. 539.
61. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
62. Moragne, 398 U.S. 375.
63. Kermarec, 358 U.S. 625.
64. Id. at 630.
65. Fitzgerald, 374 U.S. at 20.
66. 349 U.S. 85 (1955).
67. Justice Douglas, though not Justice Black, specifically based his concurrence on his conclusion that an admiralty rule existed. He did not think the Court knew enough regarding the towing and barge industries to fashion one.
68. 342 U.S. 282.
69. Id. at 285-87.
70. 343 U.S. 236 (1952).
71. Id. at 242.
72. 346 U.S. 556.
73. Justice Frankfurter suggested an alternative distinction based on the difference between allowing state law to define rights as opposed to remedies. During the October 16, 1954 conference, Justice Reed said that Madruga "bothered" him. See conference notes (on file with the Library of Congress, Burton Mss., Box 269). In a letter to Justice Reed that day, Justice Frankfurter asked rhetorically, "[i]s there not all the difference in the world between allowing a State to enforce a well-known common law remedy, i.e., partition, for an acknowledged right, and allowing a state to determine whether there is a right." In a handwritten note at the bottom of the page signed "SR," Justice Reed restated the right-remedy distinction and added that "[h]ere in Wanderer adm has a sound system and it would work harm to chop it up into state segments." Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Stanley Reed, Oct. 16, 1954 (on file with the Harvard Law School Library, Frankfurter Mss., Box 81).
74. See Laughlin, supra note 3, at 172.
75. Letter from Justice Harold Burton to Justice Stanley Reed, Feb. 21, 1955 (on file at the University of Kentucky Libraries, Reed Mss., Box 157).
76. Cf. Hart & Sacks, supra note 217, at 500 (suggesting that the Court failed in Halcyon to provide such criteria).
77. 348 U.S. at 319-20.
78. 365 U.S. 731.
79. Id. at 742.
80. Id.
81. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Clark, and Douglas from the Wilburn majority were joined by Justices Harlan and Brennan, both of whom reached the Court after Wilburn was decided, to form the six member majority in Kossick. Justice Minton had left the Court.
82. 365 U.S. at 741.
83. See Romero, 358 U.S. at 373 (citing Wilburn as holding that state law regulates the effect of a breach of warranty in a marine insurance contract).
84. 365 U.S. at 742.
85. Id. at 738-39.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 741.
88. Id. at 743 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also American Dredging, 510 U.S. at 451 (citing Kossick as a case relying on the uniformity principle).
89. Not all are enamored of interest analysis. For discussions of the problems inherent in this approach, see Friedell, supra note 198, at 7-35 to 7-39, and Displacement, supra note 10, at 343-44. 355 Kossick, 365 U.S. at 742.
90. Id. at 739.
91. Id. at 741.
92. See, e.g., Vaughan, 369 U.S. 527; Kermarec, 358 U.S. 625.
93. Moragne, 398 U.S. 375 (creating general maritime wrongful death action).
94. Not all agree that Kossick so limited Wilburn or improved the situation. See, e.g., Irwin v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 455 F.2d 827, 829 (5th Circ.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 852 (1972) (Kossick "did an incomplete job of burying" Wilburn's "obeisance" to state law), and Albany Ins. Co. v. Ann Thi Kieu, 927 F.2d 882, 887 n.3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 901 (1991).
95. See supra Part III.C.
96. Gulf Fleet Marine Operations, Inc. v. Wartsila Power, Inc., 797 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1986); Gulf Tampa Drydock Co. v. Great Atl. Ins. Co., 757 F.2d 1172 (11th Cir. 1985); S.E.A. Towing Co. v. Great Atl. Ins. Co., 688 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1038 (1983); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Horne, 787 F. Supp. 337, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (state law governs scope and validity of marine insurance policy and consequences of breach). Cf. New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Martech USA, Inc., 993 F.2d 1195, 1198 (5th Cir. 1993) (regulation of marine insurance is generally properly left to the states); Simon v. Intercontinental Transp. (ICT) B.V., 882 F.2d 1435, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989).
97. Bank of San Pedro v. Forbes Westar, Inc., 53 F.3d 273, 275 (9th Cir. 1995).
98. Many cases adopt this formulation. See, e.g., Morrow Crane Co. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 885 F.2d 612, 614 (9th Cir. 1989); Transco Exploration Co. v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 869 F.2d 862, 863 (5th Cir. 1989); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Board of Comm'rs, 733 F.2d 1161, 1167 (5th Cir. 1984).
99. Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Trotter Towing Corp., 834 F.2d 1206, 1210 (5th Cir. 1988).
100. Pace v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 838 F.2d 572, 579 (1st Cir. 1988).
101. Id. at 580-81 (applying Rhode Island rule allowing punitive recovery for bad faith refusal to pay absent any federal rule or a need for a federal rule). See also Elevating Boats, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Marine, Inc., 766 F.2d 195, 198-99 (5th Cir. 1985) (claiming federal law governs but, absent any, applying Louisiana law).
102. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Wilburn Boat Co., 300 F.2d 631, 633 (5th Cir. 1962).
103. See, e.g., Gulf Fleet Marine Operations, Inc. v. Wartsila Power, Inc., 797 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1986); S.E.A. Towing Co., Inc. v. Great Atl. Ins. Co., 688 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1038 (1983).
104. See Albany Ins. Co. v. Anh Thi Kieu, 927 F.2d 882 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 901 (1991).
105. See, e.g., Trotter Towing, 834 F.2d 1206.
106. Continental Oil Co. v. Bonanza Corp., 677 F.2d 455, 461 n.7 (5th Cir. 1982).
107. See, e.g., Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. M/V Bodena, 829 F.2d 293, 305 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042 (1988) (state law governs marine insurance contracts unless established federal rule exists); Big Lift Shipping Co. (N.A.) Inc. v. Bellefonte Ins. Co., 594 F. Supp. 701, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (state law governs notice of loss provisions absent federal statute or Supreme Court rule); Granite State Minerals, Inc. v. American Ins. Co., 435 F. Supp. 159, 164 (D. Mass. 1977) (state law governs notice of loss provisions due to the lack of any federal statutory or judicially-established rule); Navegacion Goya, S.A. v. Mutual Boiler & Mach. Ins. Co., 411 F. Supp. 929, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (state law governs absent well-settled federal rule applicable to particular issues of the case); Liman v. American S.S. Owners Mut. Protection & Indem. Ass'n, 299 F. Supp. 106, 108 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 417 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970) (state law governs absent any specific federal rule).
108. See, e.g., Kilpatrick Marine Piling v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 795 F.2d 940, 948 (11th Cir. 1986); Elevating Boats, 766 F.2d at 198.
109. Morrow Crane Co. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 885 F.2d 612, 614 (9th Cir. 1989); Illinois Constructors Corp. v. Morency & Assocs., Inc., 802 F. Supp. 185, 187 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Pittston Co. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 795 F. Supp. 678, 689 n.10 (D.N.J. 1992); Healy Tibbitts Constr. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 482 F. Supp. 830, 835 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (also using "well-settled" applicable federal rule).
110. Walter v. Marine Office of America, 537 F.2d 89, 94 (5th Cir. 1976) (absence of "firmly established" rule regarding issues before court); Purofied Down Products Corp. v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 278 F.2d 439, 441-42 n.1 (2d Cir. 1960) (Wilburn requires application of state law unless "well-established" federal admiralty rule governs particular problem); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Charleston Marine Leasing Co., 843 F. Supp. 124, 127 (E.D. Va. 1994), aff'd, 52 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 1995) (state law governs absent federal statute or "well established admiralty rule"). Cf. Reliance Ins. Co. v. McGrath, 671 F. Supp. 669, 676 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (absent "well settled applicable" federal law, state law may be applied to interpret warranties); Navegacion Goya, S.A. v. Mutual Boiler & Mach. Ins. Co., 411 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (state law governs absent "well-settled" federal admiralty rule).
111. Taylor v. Lloyd's Underwriters, 972 F.2d 666, 668 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 952 (1993); Truehart v. Blandon, 884 F.2d 223, 226 (5th Cir. 1989); Transco Exploration Co. v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 869 F.2d 862, 863 (5th Cir. 1989); INA of Texas v. Richard, 800 F.2d 1379, 1380 (5th Cir. 1986); Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 771 F.2d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1046 (1986) (state law governs absent "specific and controlling federal rule"); Eagle Leasing Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 540 F.2d 1257, 1261 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 967 (1977) (state law governs absent "specifically controlling federal authority"); Lemar Towing Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 352 F. Supp. 652, 660 (E.D. La. 1972), aff'd, 471 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
112. Thanh Long Partnership v. Highlands Ins. Co., 32 F.3d 189, 193 (5th Cir. 1994); F.B. Walker, 431 F.2d at 1239 (state law applies to marine insurance cases only where entrenched federal precedent lacking); Cotton Blossom Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 615 F. Supp. 87, 89 n.1 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (same); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Linard, 359 F. Supp. 1012, 1018 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 498 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1974) (state law applies where "entrenched" federal precedent lacking regarding specific issue).
113. Albany Ins. Co. v. Wisniewski, 579 F. Supp. 1004, 1013 (D.R.I. 1984).
114. Thanh Long Partnership, 32 F.3d at 194 (breach of express warranty); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Martech USA, Inc., 993 F.2d 1195, 1198-99 (5th Cir. 1993) (federal and Texas law coincide on burden of proof); Trotter Towing, 834 F.2d at 1210; Suydam v. Reed Stenhouse of Washington, Inc., 820 F.2d 1506, 1510 (9th Cir. 1987) (federal and Washington law on estoppel coincide); Progress Marine, Inc. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 642 F.2d 816, 819 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981) (California and "other law" same with respect to "compulsory removal" clause); Morrison Grain Co. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 632 F.2d 424, 429 (5th Cir. 1980); Gulfstream Cargo, Ltd. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 409 F.2d 974, 980-81 (5th Cir. 1969); Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fleming, 1986 AMC 2077, 2080 (M.D. Fla. 1985) (federal and Florida law coincide regarding misrepresentation); Albany Ins. Co. v. Wisniewski, 579 F. Supp. 1004, 1014 (D.R.I. 1984) (admiralty and New York law the same as to representation and concealment); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Linard, 359 F. Supp. 1012, 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 498 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1974) (federal, New York, and English law coincide on burden of proof); Brittingham v. Tugboat Underwriting Syndicate, 277 A.2d 8, 11 (Md. Ct. App. 1971) (federal and Maryland law same concerning meaning of the word "owner").
115. As Judge Selya put it, absent "significant differences between federal marine insurance principles and applicable state law," a court "need not board the Wilburn Boat." Wisniewski, 579 F. Supp. at 1014. See Continental Oil Co. v. Bonanza Corp., 677 F.2d 455, 461 n.7 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[We] have avoided the Wilburn Boat inquiry when possible. . . .") (citing Morrison, where the court found maritime, Florida, and New York law to be essentially the same); Progress Marine, Inc. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 642 F.2d 816, 819 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 850 (1981) (avoiding the choice-of-law issue because land-based insurance principles were similar to marine principles); Reliance Ins. Co. v. McGrath, 671 F. Supp. 669, 674 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (applying federal and California law regarding warranty of seaworthiness and duty to disclose).
116. See, e.g., Thanh Long, 32 F.3d at 193-94. Cf. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Board of Comm'rs, 733 F.2d 1161, 1165 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing one appellate decision to support implied warranty of seaworthiness).
117. Walter, 537 F.2d at 94.
118. See, e.g., Trotter Towing, 834 F.2d at 1212 (relying on three cases from the Fifth Circuit and related dicta from the Eleventh Circuit to establish an admiralty rule); Bohemia, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 725 F.2d 506, 509 (9th Cir. 1984) (relying primarily on one Fifth Circuit decision).
119. See, e.g., Cotton Blossom, 615 F. Supp. at 89 n.2 (Wilburn does not overrule pre-Wilburn cases that apply the literal compliance rule). One student comment argues that the literal compliance rule "has been strengthened or recognized in a majority of federal jurisdictions" since 1955. "If there was any doubt before, it is now clear that the strict compliance rule has become 'well-established.'" Comment, Strict Compliance With Marine Insurance Contracts: Conflicting Rules in the Ninth Circuit, 70 Wash. L. Rev. 519, 520 (1995).
120. Lien Ho Hsing Steel Enterprise Co. v. Weihtag, 738 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1984). See also 5801 Assocs. Ltd. v. Continental Ins. Co., 983 F.2d 662, 665 (5th Cir. 1993) (three recent district court decisions insufficient to establish a rule regarding serviceability clauses); Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Energy Ins. Agency, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 97, 99 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (finding several district court decisions insufficient to establish a rule regarding agency).
121. Waddell, supra note 3, at 188.
122. See, e.g., Lanasa Fruit S.S. & Importing Co. v. Universal Ins. Co., 302 U.S. 556 (1938) (proximate cause); Thanh Long, 32 F.3d 189 (Inchmaree clause).
123. Home Ins. Co. v. Vernon Holdings, 1995 AMC 369 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
124. See, e.g., Lexington Ins. Co. v. Cooke's Seafood, 835 F.2d 1364, 1366 (11th Cir. 1988); Vernon Holdings, 1995 AMC at 372; Port Lynch, Inc. v. New England Int'l Assurety of Am., Inc., 754 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
125. 1995 AMC at 371. See generally Goldman, Marine Insurance: The "Literal Compliance" Rule Applies to Breaches of Trading and Navigational Warranties, 26 J. Mar. L. & Com. 315 (1995).
126. Fla. Stat. ch. 627.409(2).
127. 1995 AMC at 372.
128. See also Aetna Ins. Co. v. Dudney, 595 So. 2d 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (applying federal literal compliance rule to breach of a navigational warranty instead of Florida law).
129. 754 F. Supp. 816, 824 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
130. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Liberati, 1989 AMC 1436, 1441-42 (N.D. Cal. 1989). See also Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Montford, 1993 AMC 2549 (C.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd, 52 F.3d 219 (9th Cir. 1995) (California law applies to cruising warranty in yacht policy by agreement of the parties).
131. See, e.g., Pace, 838 F.2d at 579; INA of Texas v. Richard, 800 F.2d 1379, 1381 (5th Cir. 1986); J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 466 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1979).
132. American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenealy, 72 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1995).
133. Id. at 270.
134. Aguirre v. Citizens Cas. Co., 441 F.2d 141, 146 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 829 (1971).
135. Thanh Long, 32 F.3d 189; Employer's Ins. of Wausau v. International Marine Towing, 864 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1989); Saskatchewan Gov't Ins. Office v. Spot Pack, Inc., 242 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1957); Jefferson Marine Towing, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 472 So. 2d 146 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 475 So. 2d 362 (La. 1985).
136. Reliance Ins. Co. v. McGrath, 671 F. Supp. 669, 675-76 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (applying California law).
137. Puritan Ins. Co. v. Eagle S.S. Co., 779 F.2d 866, 870 (2d Cir. 1985); Gulfstream Cargo, Ltd. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 409 F.2d 974, 981 (5th Cir. 1969); Crowley Marine Servs., Inc. v. Hunt, 1995 AMC 2562, 2568 (W.D. Wash. 1995), aff'd, 99 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 1996); St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Great Lakes Turnings, Ltd., 829 F. Supp. 982, 985-86 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Port Lynch, Inc. v. New England Int'l Assurety of Am., Inc., 754 F. Supp. 816, 820-21, 822 (W.D. Wash. 1991); Reliance Ins. Co. v. McGrath, 671 F. Supp. 669, 678 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
138. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Wilburn Boat Co., 300 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1962); Gulfstream Cargo, 409 F.2d 974; Austin v. Servac Shipping Line, 794 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986).
139. 927 F.2d 882 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 901 (1991).
140. Id. at 887.
141. Id. at 888-89.
142. Id. at 889-90.
143. See, e.g., Knight v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932 (1987); Steelmet, Inc. v. Caribe Towing Corp., 747 F.2d 689, 695 (11th Cir. 1984).
144. 410 See 927 F.2d at 890 & n.7.
145. Windsor Mount Joy Mut. Ins. Co. v. Giragosian, 57 F.3d 50, 54 n.3 (1st Cir. 1995) (hinting that the concept is not entrenched); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Montford, 1993 AMC 2549 (C.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd, 52 F.3d 219 (9th Cir. 1995) (by agreement of parties, California law applies in yacht policy).
146. See, e.g., Crowley Marine Servs., 1995 AMC at 2568 ("there is an entrenched doctrine of admiralty law that no court has held gives way to state laws, namely, the doctrine of uberrimae fidei.").
147. INA of Texas v. Richard, 800 F.2d 1379, 1380-81 (5th Cir. 1986); Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 771 F.2d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1046 (1986).
148. See, e.g., Pittston Co. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 795 F. Supp. 678, 689 n.10 (D.N.J. 1992) (state law governs "scope and validity" of marine insurance contracts); Horne, 787 F. Supp. at 339.
149. See, e.g., Elevating Boats, 766 F.2d at 198-99; Reliance Ins. Co. v. McGrath, 671 F. Supp. 669, 676 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Big Lift Shipping Co. (N.A.) Inc. v. Bellefonte Ins. Co., 594 F. Supp. 701, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
150. Cargill, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 889 F.2d 174, 178 (8th Cir. 1989).
151. Ahmed v. American S.S. Owners Mut. Protection & Indem. Ass'n, 640 F.2d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 1981).
152. Lien Ho Hsing, 738 F.2d at 1458; Illnois Constructors Corp. v. Morency & Assocs., Inc., 802 F. Supp. 185, 187 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Energy Ins. Agency, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 97, 98-99 (S.D. Tex. 1987); Armada Supply Inc. v. Wright, 665 F. Supp. 1047, 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 858 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1988).
153. Bank of San Pedro, 53 F.3d at 275 (California statute applies imposing certification or bond requirement on foreign insurer wishing to file pleading); Toomer v. Southwest Cas. Ins. Co., 231 F. Supp. 542, 543 (S.D. Tex. 1964).
154. INA of Texas v. Richard, 800 F.2d 1379, 1381 (5th Cir. 1986); J. Ray McDermott, 466 F. Supp. at 366 (state law governs attorneys' fees and penalties).
155. Trotter Towing, 834 F.2d at 1212-13.
156. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Board of Comm'rs, 733 F.2d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1984).
157. Id. at 1167.
158. Litwinowicz v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 179 F. Supp. 812, 820 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
159. Lemar Towing Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 352 F. Supp. 652, 660 (E.D. La. 1972), aff'd, 471 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1973) (relying on Kossick to limit Wilburn "to the specific issue before the court."). See also Vernon Holdings, 1995 AMC at 373 (warranty in Wilburn different than trading warranty). Other cases implicitly construe Wilburn not to have abrogated the literal compliance rule. For instance, in Trotter Towing, 834 F.2d 1206, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that under either admiralty law or Mississippi law, breach of an express warranty regarding the location of a vessel suspended coverage. Id. at 1212.
160. Vernon Holdings, 1995 AMC at 372 (federal law governs trading warranty).
161. Lexington Ins. Co. v. Cooke's Seafood, 686 F. Supp. 323, 328 (S.D. Ga. 1987), aff'd, 835 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir. 1988).
162. Aguirre, 441 F.2d at 146; Lemar Towing, 352 F. Supp. at 660. See also Thanh Long, 32 F.3d at 193-94 (entrenched precedent exists regarding implied warranty of seaworthiness and Inchmaree Clause). But see Rosa v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 296 F. Supp. 167, 172 (S.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 421 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1970) (state law applies regarding warranty of seaworthiness).
163. Kilpatrick Marine Piling v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 795 F.2d 940, 942 (11th Cir. 1986); Gulfstream Cargo, 409 F.2d at 981 (finding "much ground" for concluding that maritime law governs).
164. See, e.g., McKeithen v. S.S. Frosta, 430 F. Supp. 899, 901 (E.D. La. 1977) (under Wilburn Boat, state law applies to marine insurance policy on "ferry boat plying the internal waters of a state" because contract is "sufficiently local").
165. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Energy Ins. Agency, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 97, 98-99 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
166. But see 5801 Assocs., 983 F.2d at 665 n.8 (calling Wilburn "unambiguous" but criticizing it as anomalous and for breeding forum shopping and uncertainty).
167. 927 F.2d at 886.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 887-89.
170. See, e.g., New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Martech USA, Inc., 993 F.2d 1195, 1198 (5th Cir. 1993); 5801 Assocs., 983 F.2d at 665; AGIP Petroleum Co. v. Gulf Island Fabrication, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 1330 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. West of England Shipowners Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 890 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. La. 1995). See also ABB Power T & D Co. v. Gothaer Versicherungsbank VVAG, 939 F. Supp. 1568 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (interpreting Anh Thi Kieu in the same light).
171. 927 F.2d at 890.
172. Id. at 890 n.7.
173. Id. at 882. But see Kilpatrick Marine Piling, 795 F.2d 940 (Wilburn does not require weighing "the relative importance of the state and federal law").
174. Bohemia, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 725 F.2d 506, 510 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding established federal admiralty rule). See also United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Liberati, 1989 AMC 1436, 1440 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (applying California law regarding the effect of a breach of a trading warranty and an agency relationship). Some other courts have articulated a similar test. See, e.g., Steelmet, Inc., 779 F.2d at 1488; Middle East Eng'g & Dev. Co. v. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 675 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (state law applies unless federal law exists or there is a need for the same).
175. 820 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir. 1987).
176. "In the absence of a federal statute, a judicially fashioned admiralty rule, or a need for uniformity in admiralty practice." Id. at 1508.
177. Id. The court may have felt no further analysis was needed because, like Wilburn, Suydam involved a breach of a warranty, although a warranty that the vessel be "operated and maintained in the commercial fishing industry." Id.
178. 800 F.2d 1379, 1381 (5th Cir. 1986). The court stated that the case did not "require extended analysis or discussion." Id. at 1380. Applying federal law to the attorneys' fee question in view of the preponderance of state law in marine insurance would "defy both logic and sound policy." Id. at 1381.
179. 48 F.3d 105 (2d Cir.), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 43 (1995).
180. Id. at 110 (emphasis provided).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 111, 114.
184. 116.S. Ct. 43 (1995). The Court remanded because, based on Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 115 S. Ct. 2137 (1995), decided after Youell, the Court determined Youell had applied the wrong standard to determine whether to dismiss a declaratory judgment case.
185. 74 F.3d 373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2514 (1996).
186. Id. at 376 (quoting Youell, 48 F.3d at 114).
187. Id.
188. 95 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 1996).
189. Namely, "(1) [I]s there a judicially established federal admiralty rule that governs the issue, and (2) if not, should the court fashion one?" Id. at 403.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 403-04.
192. Id. at 404.
193. Id. (quoting Wilburn, 348 U.S. at 322, Frankfurter, J., concurring).
194. Pace, 838 F.2d at 579.
195. 510 U.S. 443 (1994).
196. 116 S. Ct. 619 (1996).
197. 510 U.S. at 447 n.1.
198. In essence, Justice Scalia noted the lack of argument regarding that point. Moreover, the Court concluded that the Louisiana law did not offend Jensen. For a relatively optimistic account of the uniformity doctrine following American Dredging, see Bederman, supra note 10, at 15-17.
199. 116 S. Ct. at 626.
200. 510 U.S. at 458.
201. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
202. 510 U.S. at 450.
203. I do not believe Justice Scalia's point can be saved, or the point of my metaphor fairly attacked, by arguing that although the ball did not originate or find exclusive use in basketball, the basketball did and does. One can often fiddle pertinent categories to distinguish any example. But what we are talking about is whether a "characteristic feature" turns on origins and exclusive use; we are not talking about basketball. If you are not convinced by this basketball example, try any of the following: a) The nose neither originated nor has exclusive use on the human face but no one doubts it is a characteristic feature of our faces; b) Lettuce neither originated nor has exclusive use in a dinner salad but no one doubts it is a characteristic feature of a salad; c) The chair neither originated nor has exclusive use in a classroom but. . . .; d) The combustion engine neither originated nor has exclusive use in Toyotas but. . . .
204. American Dredging, 510 U.S. at 452-53. See also Yamaha Motor, 116 S. Ct. at 626 n.8.
205. American Dredging, 510 U.S. at 452 n.3. The Court erred, of course, in referring to Oklahoma. In Wilburn, the Court did not choose any particular state. To the extent it considered any state law, however, it was Texas law.
206. See, e.g., id. at 455 ("While there is an established and continuing tradition of federal common lawmaking in admiralty").
207. McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202 (1994).
208. Brown, supra note 10.
209. In particular, Judge Brown criticized the Court's decision in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978), and Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
210. Brown, supra note 10, at 283.
211. American Dredging, 510 U.S. at 455.
212. Id. at 453.
213. Id. at 452 n.3.
214. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
215. See, e.g., Reliable Transfer, 421 U.S. at 404-05 (citing criticism of the divided damages rule by Judge Learned Hand and others); Peralta Shipping Corp. v. Smith & Johnson (Shipping) Corp., 739 F.2d 798, 804 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1112 (1985) (calling for an overturning of Minturn v. Maynard, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 477 (1854)).