The integration of the military in post-liberation South Africa: The contribution of revolutionary armies

Armed Forces and Society

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 105-132

  Liebenberg, Ian ^a  

^a NONE   (South Africa)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0031492174     PISSN: 0095327X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X9702400105     Document Type: Article

References (151)

1. This term, although conceptually hazy, denotes the problem of transition to popular democracy (read: "economic democracy" and/or "socialization") through negotiation. At the height of the armed struggle and on the eve of the 1994 elections, there was neither victory nor defeat for any of the major players. Although the apartheid government was forced to negotiate, it retained an influential position during the negotiations and bargaining process at Kempton Park, as well as considerable influence over the defense force. The negotiated settlement was indeed an eclectic mix between revolution and negotiation. See Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, The Negotiated Revolution: Society and Politics in Post-Apartheid South Africa (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1993). Others describe the settlement and the subsequent elections under control of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) as a "messy miracle" and a "long journey." See Steven Friedman, The Long Journey: South Africa's Quest for a Negotiated Settlement (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1993); and Steven Friedman and Doreen Atkinson, eds., The Small Miracle: South Africa's Negotiated Settlement (South African Review 7, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1994), especially the last two chapters.
2. This term, although conceptually hazy, denotes the problem of transition to popular democracy (read: "economic democracy" and/or "socialization") through negotiation. At the height of the armed struggle and on the eve of the 1994 elections, there was neither victory nor defeat for any of the major players. Although the apartheid government was forced to negotiate, it retained an influential position during the negotiations and bargaining process at Kempton Park, as well as considerable influence over the defense force. The negotiated settlement was indeed an eclectic mix between revolution and negotiation. See Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, The Negotiated Revolution: Society and Politics in Post-Apartheid South Africa (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1993). Others describe the settlement and the subsequent elections under control of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) as a "messy miracle" and a "long journey." See Steven Friedman, The Long Journey: South Africa's Quest for a Negotiated Settlement (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1993); and Steven Friedman and Doreen Atkinson, eds., The Small Miracle: South Africa's Negotiated Settlement (South African Review 7, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1994), especially the last two chapters.
3. This term, although conceptually hazy, denotes the problem of transition to popular democracy (read: "economic democracy" and/or "socialization") through negotiation. At the height of the armed struggle and on the eve of the 1994 elections, there was neither victory nor defeat for any of the major players. Although the apartheid government was forced to negotiate, it retained an influential position during the negotiations and bargaining process at Kempton Park, as well as considerable influence over the defense force. The negotiated settlement was indeed an eclectic mix between revolution and negotiation. See Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, The Negotiated Revolution: Society and Politics in Post-Apartheid South Africa (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1993). Others describe the settlement and the subsequent elections under control of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) as a "messy miracle" and a "long journey." See Steven Friedman, The Long Journey: South Africa's Quest for a Negotiated Settlement (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1993); and Steven Friedman and Doreen Atkinson, eds., The Small Miracle: South Africa's Negotiated Settlement (South African Review 7, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1994), especially the last two chapters.
4. See Thomas Hanna, Bodies in Revolt: A Primer in Somatic Thinking (New York: Delta Books, 1970).
5. Apparently there is currently a global tendency to democratize. Among the scholars who have identified this tendency are G. O'Donnell and P.C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1989); G. O'Donnell, P.C. Schmitter, and L. Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1988); Larry Diamond, ed., The Democratic Revolution: Struggles for Freedom and Pluralism in the Developing World (New York: Freedom House, 1992); and Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK: 1991). While the roles of civil society, liberalization, democratization, and the consolidation of democracy have received ample attention in transition studies, the role of revolutionary movements and their armies in pressurizing authoritarian regimes to liberalize and democratize has been grossly neglected.
6. Apparently there is currently a global tendency to democratize. Among the scholars who have identified this tendency are G. O'Donnell and P.C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1989); G. O'Donnell, P.C. Schmitter, and L. Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1988); Larry Diamond, ed., The Democratic Revolution: Struggles for Freedom and Pluralism in the Developing World (New York: Freedom House, 1992); and Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK: 1991). While the roles of civil society, liberalization, democratization, and the consolidation of democracy have received ample attention in transition studies, the role of revolutionary movements and their armies in pressurizing authoritarian regimes to liberalize and democratize has been grossly neglected.
7. Apparently there is currently a global tendency to democratize. Among the scholars who have identified this tendency are G. O'Donnell and P.C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1989); G. O'Donnell, P.C. Schmitter, and L. Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1988); Larry Diamond, ed., The Democratic Revolution: Struggles for Freedom and Pluralism in the Developing World (New York: Freedom House, 1992); and Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK: 1991). While the roles of civil society, liberalization, democratization, and the consolidation of democracy have received ample attention in transition studies, the role of revolutionary movements and their armies in pressurizing authoritarian regimes to liberalize and democratize has been grossly neglected.
8. Apparently there is currently a global tendency to democratize. Among the scholars who have identified this tendency are G. O'Donnell and P.C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1989); G. O'Donnell, P.C. Schmitter, and L. Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1988); Larry Diamond, ed., The Democratic Revolution: Struggles for Freedom and Pluralism in the Developing World (New York: Freedom House, 1992); and Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK: 1991). While the roles of civil society, liberalization, democratization, and the consolidation of democracy have received ample attention in transition studies, the role of revolutionary movements and their armies in pressurizing authoritarian regimes to liberalize and democratize has been grossly neglected.
9. The term "polyarchy" was coined by Robert A. Dahl. It denotes an optimum plateau reached by societies that are democratizing. According to Dahl, primary or real democracy rarely features in the real world and representative democracy or polyarchy is the closest you can get to it. See Robert A. Dahl, After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970), 105ff, 140ff.
10. I am indebted to Peter Vale (Rijksuniversiteit van Utrecht, The Netherlands and University of Western Cape, South Africa) for pointing out that I do make little use of critical theory and post-modern analysis in this article. I fully accept that criticism -and also accept that we are at a crucial historical stage where defense and security issues ask for radical transformation of definitions, which will inevitably lead to a new understanding of the concept of security, also in Southern Africa. I also assume, however, that in an era of a perceived "new global order," "globalization," and "a third wave of democratization," threat perceptions, and hence the structuring of the military and its role might well change. I am also, however, of the opinion that "the new global order" (and here I follow the realist school) will not lead to the end of conflicts. Such conflicts might well be potentially more containable and regionalized, yet will persist. This does not exclude contextualized and limited regional arms races (Southern Africa being one such potential geostrategic area - see Botswana's recent acquisition of tanks, APC's, and aircraft in this regard). The developing role of the military in peacekeeping also will continue to play a role in this interregnum.
11. For an exposition of the development of this civil religion that included elements of Christian nationalism, militarism, and a well-defined communist "threat," see David J. Bosch, "The Roots and Fruits of Afrikaner Civil Religion," in W.G. Hofmeyer and W.S. Vorster, eds., New Faces of Africa: Essays in Honour of Ben Marais (Pretoria: UNISA, 1984). For militaristic elements in the thinking of white South Africans and their effect on education, see Hanneke du Preez, "Meestersimbole in skoolhandboeke," in Rapport, 25 August 1983. For more detail on how power was gained and retained with the support of this hegemony/paradigm/ideology from 1948 onwards, see Liebenberg, Ideologie in Konflik (Bramley: Taurus Uitgewers, 1990), 30-38. See also Philip Bonner, Peter Delius, and Deborah Posel, eds., Apartheid's Genesis: 1935-1962 (Johannesburg: Ravan/Wits University Press, 1993). Especially relevant is the chapter by John Lazar, "Verwoerd versus the 'Visionaries': The South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) and Apartheid, 1948-1961," 362-392. While the apartheid ideology maintained its central position, it was later played down in favor of the proto-ideologies or para-ideologies of "total onslaught" and "reform" (see Willem van Vuuren, "Domination through Reform: The Functional Adaption of Legitimizing Strategies," Politikon 12[2] [1985]: 47-58). See also G. Moss, "Total Strategy," Work in Progress 11 (1980): 1-11.
12. For an exposition of the development of this civil religion that included elements of Christian nationalism, militarism, and a well-defined communist "threat," see David J. Bosch, "The Roots and Fruits of Afrikaner Civil Religion," in W.G. Hofmeyer and W.S. Vorster, eds., New Faces of Africa: Essays in Honour of Ben Marais (Pretoria: UNISA, 1984). For militaristic elements in the thinking of white South Africans and their effect on education, see Hanneke du Preez, "Meestersimbole in skoolhandboeke," in Rapport, 25 August 1983. For more detail on how power was gained and retained with the support of this hegemony/paradigm/ideology from 1948 onwards, see Liebenberg, Ideologie in Konflik (Bramley: Taurus Uitgewers, 1990), 30-38. See also Philip Bonner, Peter Delius, and Deborah Posel, eds., Apartheid's Genesis: 1935-1962 (Johannesburg: Ravan/Wits University Press, 1993). Especially relevant is the chapter by John Lazar, "Verwoerd versus the 'Visionaries': The South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) and Apartheid, 1948-1961," 362-392. While the apartheid ideology maintained its central position, it was later played down in favor of the proto-ideologies or para-ideologies of "total onslaught" and "reform" (see Willem van Vuuren, "Domination through Reform: The Functional Adaption of Legitimizing Strategies," Politikon 12[2] [1985]: 47-58). See also G. Moss, "Total Strategy," Work in Progress 11 (1980): 1-11.
13. For an exposition of the development of this civil religion that included elements of Christian nationalism, militarism, and a well-defined communist "threat," see David J. Bosch, "The Roots and Fruits of Afrikaner Civil Religion," in W.G. Hofmeyer and W.S. Vorster, eds., New Faces of Africa: Essays in Honour of Ben Marais (Pretoria: UNISA, 1984). For militaristic elements in the thinking of white South Africans and their effect on education, see Hanneke du Preez, "Meestersimbole in skoolhandboeke," in Rapport, 25 August 1983. For more detail on how power was gained and retained with the support of this hegemony/paradigm/ideology from 1948 onwards, see Liebenberg, Ideologie in Konflik (Bramley: Taurus Uitgewers, 1990), 30-38. See also Philip Bonner, Peter Delius, and Deborah Posel, eds., Apartheid's Genesis: 1935-1962 (Johannesburg: Ravan/Wits University Press, 1993). Especially relevant is the chapter by John Lazar, "Verwoerd versus the 'Visionaries': The South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) and Apartheid, 1948-1961," 362-392. While the apartheid ideology maintained its central position, it was later played down in favor of the proto-ideologies or para-ideologies of "total onslaught" and "reform" (see Willem van Vuuren, "Domination through Reform: The Functional Adaption of Legitimizing Strategies," Politikon 12[2] [1985]: 47-58). See also G. Moss, "Total Strategy," Work in Progress 11 (1980): 1-11.
14. For an exposition of the development of this civil religion that included elements of Christian nationalism, militarism, and a well-defined communist "threat," see David J. Bosch, "The Roots and Fruits of Afrikaner Civil Religion," in W.G. Hofmeyer and W.S. Vorster, eds., New Faces of Africa: Essays in Honour of Ben Marais (Pretoria: UNISA, 1984). For militaristic elements in the thinking of white South Africans and their effect on education, see Hanneke du Preez, "Meestersimbole in skoolhandboeke," in Rapport, 25 August 1983. For more detail on how power was gained and retained with the support of this hegemony/paradigm/ideology from 1948 onwards, see Liebenberg, Ideologie in Konflik (Bramley: Taurus Uitgewers, 1990), 30-38. See also Philip Bonner, Peter Delius, and Deborah Posel, eds., Apartheid's Genesis: 1935-1962 (Johannesburg: Ravan/Wits University Press, 1993). Especially relevant is the chapter by John Lazar, "Verwoerd versus the 'Visionaries': The South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) and Apartheid, 1948-1961," 362-392. While the apartheid ideology maintained its central position, it was later played down in favor of the proto-ideologies or para-ideologies of "total onslaught" and "reform" (see Willem van Vuuren, "Domination through Reform: The Functional Adaption of Legitimizing Strategies," Politikon 12[2] [1985]: 47-58). See also G. Moss, "Total Strategy," Work in Progress 11 (1980): 1-11.
15. For an exposition of the development of this civil religion that included elements of Christian nationalism, militarism, and a well-defined communist "threat," see David J. Bosch, "The Roots and Fruits of Afrikaner Civil Religion," in W.G. Hofmeyer and W.S. Vorster, eds., New Faces of Africa: Essays in Honour of Ben Marais (Pretoria: UNISA, 1984). For militaristic elements in the thinking of white South Africans and their effect on education, see Hanneke du Preez, "Meestersimbole in skoolhandboeke," in Rapport, 25 August 1983. For more detail on how power was gained and retained with the support of this hegemony/paradigm/ideology from 1948 onwards, see Liebenberg, Ideologie in Konflik (Bramley: Taurus Uitgewers, 1990), 30-38. See also Philip Bonner, Peter Delius, and Deborah Posel, eds., Apartheid's Genesis: 1935-1962 (Johannesburg: Ravan/Wits University Press, 1993). Especially relevant is the chapter by John Lazar, "Verwoerd versus the 'Visionaries': The South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) and Apartheid, 1948-1961," 362-392. While the apartheid ideology maintained its central position, it was later played down in favor of the proto-ideologies or para-ideologies of "total onslaught" and "reform" (see Willem van Vuuren, "Domination through Reform: The Functional Adaption of Legitimizing Strategies," Politikon 12[2] [1985]: 47-58). See also G. Moss, "Total Strategy," Work in Progress 11 (1980): 1-11.
16. For an exposition of the development of this civil religion that included elements of Christian nationalism, militarism, and a well-defined communist "threat," see David J. Bosch, "The Roots and Fruits of Afrikaner Civil Religion," in W.G. Hofmeyer and W.S. Vorster, eds., New Faces of Africa: Essays in Honour of Ben Marais (Pretoria: UNISA, 1984). For militaristic elements in the thinking of white South Africans and their effect on education, see Hanneke du Preez, "Meestersimbole in skoolhandboeke," in Rapport, 25 August 1983. For more detail on how power was gained and retained with the support of this hegemony/paradigm/ideology from 1948 onwards, see Liebenberg, Ideologie in Konflik (Bramley: Taurus Uitgewers, 1990), 30-38. See also Philip Bonner, Peter Delius, and Deborah Posel, eds., Apartheid's Genesis: 1935-1962 (Johannesburg: Ravan/Wits University Press, 1993). Especially relevant is the chapter by John Lazar, "Verwoerd versus the 'Visionaries': The South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) and Apartheid, 1948-1961," 362-392. While the apartheid ideology maintained its central position, it was later played down in favor of the proto-ideologies or para-ideologies of "total onslaught" and "reform" (see Willem van Vuuren, "Domination through Reform: The Functional Adaption of Legitimizing Strategies," Politikon 12[2] [1985]: 47-58). See also G. Moss, "Total Strategy," Work in Progress 11 (1980): 1-11.
17. For an exposition of the development of this civil religion that included elements of Christian nationalism, militarism, and a well-defined communist "threat," see David J. Bosch, "The Roots and Fruits of Afrikaner Civil Religion," in W.G. Hofmeyer and W.S. Vorster, eds., New Faces of Africa: Essays in Honour of Ben Marais (Pretoria: UNISA, 1984). For militaristic elements in the thinking of white South Africans and their effect on education, see Hanneke du Preez, "Meestersimbole in skoolhandboeke," in Rapport, 25 August 1983. For more detail on how power was gained and retained with the support of this hegemony/paradigm/ideology from 1948 onwards, see Liebenberg, Ideologie in Konflik (Bramley: Taurus Uitgewers, 1990), 30-38. See also Philip Bonner, Peter Delius, and Deborah Posel, eds., Apartheid's Genesis: 1935-1962 (Johannesburg: Ravan/Wits University Press, 1993). Especially relevant is the chapter by John Lazar, "Verwoerd versus the 'Visionaries': The South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) and Apartheid, 1948-1961," 362-392. While the apartheid ideology maintained its central position, it was later played down in favor of the proto-ideologies or para-ideologies of "total onslaught" and "reform" (see Willem van Vuuren, "Domination through Reform: The Functional Adaption of Legitimizing Strategies," Politikon 12[2] [1985]: 47-58). See also G. Moss, "Total Strategy," Work in Progress 11 (1980): 1-11.
18. For the ideological development from peaceful resistance to armed resistance, see Ian Liebenberg, "Resistance by the SANNC and the ANC, 1912-1960" (chapter 2), and Tom Lodge, "The Pan-Africanist Congress, 1959-1990" (chapter 11), in Ian Liebenberg, et al., eds., The Long March: The Story of the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa (Pretoria: Kagiso/Haum Publishers, 1994). Also see Heidi Holland, The Struggle: A History of the African National Congress (London: Grafton Books, 1989), 88ff. G.M. Gerhart's Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978) is also enlightening in this regard.
19. For the ideological development from peaceful resistance to armed resistance, see Ian Liebenberg, "Resistance by the SANNC and the ANC, 1912-1960" (chapter 2), and Tom Lodge, "The Pan-Africanist Congress, 1959-1990" (chapter 11), in Ian Liebenberg, et al., eds., The Long March: The Story of the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa (Pretoria: Kagiso/Haum Publishers, 1994). Also see Heidi Holland, The Struggle: A History of the African National Congress (London: Grafton Books, 1989), 88ff. G.M. Gerhart's Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978) is also enlightening in this regard.
20. For the ideological development from peaceful resistance to armed resistance, see Ian Liebenberg, "Resistance by the SANNC and the ANC, 1912-1960" (chapter 2), and Tom Lodge, "The Pan-Africanist Congress, 1959-1990" (chapter 11), in Ian Liebenberg, et al., eds., The Long March: The Story of the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa (Pretoria: Kagiso/Haum Publishers, 1994). Also see Heidi Holland, The Struggle: A History of the African National Congress (London: Grafton Books, 1989), 88ff. G.M. Gerhart's Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978) is also enlightening in this regard.
21. For the ideological development from peaceful resistance to armed resistance, see Ian Liebenberg, "Resistance by the SANNC and the ANC, 1912-1960" (chapter 2), and Tom Lodge, "The Pan-Africanist Congress, 1959-1990" (chapter 11), in Ian Liebenberg, et al., eds., The Long March: The Story of the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa (Pretoria: Kagiso/Haum Publishers, 1994). Also see Heidi Holland, The Struggle: A History of the African National Congress (London: Grafton Books, 1989), 88ff. G.M. Gerhart's Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978) is also enlightening in this regard.
22. For the ideological development from peaceful resistance to armed resistance, see Ian Liebenberg, "Resistance by the SANNC and the ANC, 1912-1960" (chapter 2), and Tom Lodge, "The Pan-Africanist Congress, 1959-1990" (chapter 11), in Ian Liebenberg, et al., eds., The Long March: The Story of the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa (Pretoria: Kagiso/Haum Publishers, 1994). Also see Heidi Holland, The Struggle: A History of the African National Congress (London: Grafton Books, 1989), 88ff. G.M. Gerhart's Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978) is also enlightening in this regard.
23. See Van Zyl Slabbert, The Dynamics of Reform and Revolt in Current South Africa, three Tanner lectures published by IDASA as Occasional Papers 7-9 (1987); and Ismael Omar, Reform in Crisis: Why the Tricameral Parliamentary System Has Failed (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1988).
24. See Van Zyl Slabbert, The Dynamics of Reform and Revolt in Current South Africa, three Tanner lectures published by IDASA as Occasional Papers 7-9 (1987); and Ismael Omar, Reform in Crisis: Why the Tricameral Parliamentary System Has Failed (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1988).
25. See Arend Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) and, by the same author, Machtsdeling: De Oplossing voor Zuid-Afrika (Amsterdam: H.J.W. Becht Uitgeverij, 1987), 63ff, 83ff, for a detailed analysis of constitutional proposals made and implemented by the South African government, especially the 1983 tricameral constitution that did not live up to real consociationalist democracy. On the contrary, it undermined democracy and centralized power, as observed by Pierre du Toit and Chris Heymans, "The 1983 Constitution of South Africa - towards Democracy or Not?" Politikon 12(2) (1985): 79-85; and Gerhard Totemeyer, "Legitimacy and Viability: A Critical Analysis of the New South African Constitution (Act No 110 of 1983) with Special Emphasis on Local Government," Politikon 12(2) (1985): 59-66.
26. See Arend Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) and, by the same author, Machtsdeling: De Oplossing voor Zuid-Afrika (Amsterdam: H.J.W. Becht Uitgeverij, 1987), 63ff, 83ff, for a detailed analysis of constitutional proposals made and implemented by the South African government, especially the 1983 tricameral constitution that did not live up to real consociationalist democracy. On the contrary, it undermined democracy and centralized power, as observed by Pierre du Toit and Chris Heymans, "The 1983 Constitution of South Africa - towards Democracy or Not?" Politikon 12(2) (1985): 79-85; and Gerhard Totemeyer, "Legitimacy and Viability: A Critical Analysis of the New South African Constitution (Act No 110 of 1983) with Special Emphasis on Local Government," Politikon 12(2) (1985): 59-66.
27. See Arend Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) and, by the same author, Machtsdeling: De Oplossing voor Zuid-Afrika (Amsterdam: H.J.W. Becht Uitgeverij, 1987), 63ff, 83ff, for a detailed analysis of constitutional proposals made and implemented by the South African government, especially the 1983 tricameral constitution that did not live up to real consociationalist democracy. On the contrary, it undermined democracy and centralized power, as observed by Pierre du Toit and Chris Heymans, "The 1983 Constitution of South Africa - towards Democracy or Not?" Politikon 12(2) (1985): 79-85; and Gerhard Totemeyer, "Legitimacy and Viability: A Critical Analysis of the New South African Constitution (Act No 110 of 1983) with Special Emphasis on Local Government," Politikon 12(2) (1985): 59-66.
28. See Arend Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) and, by the same author, Machtsdeling: De Oplossing voor Zuid-Afrika (Amsterdam: H.J.W. Becht Uitgeverij, 1987), 63ff, 83ff, for a detailed analysis of constitutional proposals made and implemented by the South African government, especially the 1983 tricameral constitution that did not live up to real consociationalist democracy. On the contrary, it undermined democracy and centralized power, as observed by Pierre du Toit and Chris Heymans, "The 1983 Constitution of South Africa - towards Democracy or Not?" Politikon 12(2) (1985): 79-85; and Gerhard Totemeyer, "Legitimacy and Viability: A Critical Analysis of the New South African Constitution (Act No 110 of 1983) with Special Emphasis on Local Government," Politikon 12(2) (1985): 59-66.
29. For more detail on militarization, see Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan, eds., War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989); Richard Leonard, South Africa at War: White Power and the Crisis in Southern Africa (Craighall: A.D. Donker, 1985), 98ff, 198ff; Ian Liebenberg, Ideologie in Konflik, 114ff; and Philip H. Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 29ff, 79ff). For more detail on the destabilization of southern Africa and the relationship between militarization and regional destabilization, see Leonard, South Africa at War, 59ff; Kenneth W. Grundy, The Militarization of South African Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 71-98; and Joseph Hanlon, Apartheid's Second Front: South Africa's War against its Neighbours (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1986).
30. For more detail on militarization, see Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan, eds., War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989); Richard Leonard, South Africa at War: White Power and the Crisis in Southern Africa (Craighall: A.D. Donker, 1985), 98ff, 198ff; Ian Liebenberg, Ideologie in Konflik, 114ff; and Philip H. Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 29ff, 79ff). For more detail on the destabilization of southern Africa and the relationship between militarization and regional destabilization, see Leonard, South Africa at War, 59ff; Kenneth W. Grundy, The Militarization of South African Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 71-98; and Joseph Hanlon, Apartheid's Second Front: South Africa's War against its Neighbours (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1986).
31. For more detail on militarization, see Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan, eds., War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989); Richard Leonard, South Africa at War: White Power and the Crisis in Southern Africa (Craighall: A.D. Donker, 1985), 98ff, 198ff; Ian Liebenberg, Ideologie in Konflik, 114ff; and Philip H. Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 29ff, 79ff). For more detail on the destabilization of southern Africa and the relationship between militarization and regional destabilization, see Leonard, South Africa at War, 59ff; Kenneth W. Grundy, The Militarization of South African Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 71-98; and Joseph Hanlon, Apartheid's Second Front: South Africa's War against its Neighbours (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1986).
32. For more detail on militarization, see Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan, eds., War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989); Richard Leonard, South Africa at War: White Power and the Crisis in Southern Africa (Craighall: A.D. Donker, 1985), 98ff, 198ff; Ian Liebenberg, Ideologie in Konflik, 114ff; and Philip H. Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 29ff, 79ff). For more detail on the destabilization of southern Africa and the relationship between militarization and regional destabilization, see Leonard, South Africa at War, 59ff; Kenneth W. Grundy, The Militarization of South African Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 71-98; and Joseph Hanlon, Apartheid's Second Front: South Africa's War against its Neighbours (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1986).
33. For more detail on militarization, see Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan, eds., War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989); Richard Leonard, South Africa at War: White Power and the Crisis in Southern Africa (Craighall: A.D. Donker, 1985), 98ff, 198ff; Ian Liebenberg, Ideologie in Konflik, 114ff; and Philip H. Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 29ff, 79ff). For more detail on the destabilization of southern Africa and the relationship between militarization and regional destabilization, see Leonard, South Africa at War, 59ff; Kenneth W. Grundy, The Militarization of South African Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 71-98; and Joseph Hanlon, Apartheid's Second Front: South Africa's War against its Neighbours (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1986).
34. For more detail on militarization, see Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan, eds., War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989); Richard Leonard, South Africa at War: White Power and the Crisis in Southern Africa (Craighall: A.D. Donker, 1985), 98ff, 198ff; Ian Liebenberg, Ideologie in Konflik, 114ff; and Philip H. Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 29ff, 79ff). For more detail on the destabilization of southern Africa and the relationship between militarization and regional destabilization, see Leonard, South Africa at War, 59ff; Kenneth W. Grundy, The Militarization of South African Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 71-98; and Joseph Hanlon, Apartheid's Second Front: South Africa's War against its Neighbours (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1986).
35. For more detail on militarization, see Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan, eds., War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989); Richard Leonard, South Africa at War: White Power and the Crisis in Southern Africa (Craighall: A.D. Donker, 1985), 98ff, 198ff; Ian Liebenberg, Ideologie in Konflik, 114ff; and Philip H. Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 29ff, 79ff). For more detail on the destabilization of southern Africa and the relationship between militarization and regional destabilization, see Leonard, South Africa at War, 59ff; Kenneth W. Grundy, The Militarization of South African Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 71-98; and Joseph Hanlon, Apartheid's Second Front: South Africa's War against its Neighbours (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1986).
36. Especially after the failed 1952 Defiance Campaign and the mass arrests and bannings of the 1960s, the ANC, SACP and PAC opted for the "armed struggle." See Albert Luthuli, Let my People Go: An Autobiography (Glasgow: Fount Paperbacks, 1982), 196-207; Heidi Holland, The Struggle, 128; and Francis Meli, A History of the ANC: South Africa Belongs to Us (London: James Currey, 1989), 145ff, on the ANC's position; and Philip Ata Kgosana, Lest We Forget: An Autobiography (Johannesburg: Skotaviile, 1988), 51ff; and Liebenberg, Ideologie in Konflik, 92-101, on the PAC's position.
37. Especially after the failed 1952 Defiance Campaign and the mass arrests and bannings of the 1960s, the ANC, SACP and PAC opted for the "armed struggle." See Albert Luthuli, Let my People Go: An Autobiography (Glasgow: Fount Paperbacks, 1982), 196-207; Heidi Holland, The Struggle, 128; and Francis Meli, A History of the ANC: South Africa Belongs to Us (London: James Currey, 1989), 145ff, on the ANC's position; and Philip Ata Kgosana, Lest We Forget: An Autobiography (Johannesburg: Skotaviile, 1988), 51ff; and Liebenberg, Ideologie in Konflik, 92-101, on the PAC's position.
38. Especially after the failed 1952 Defiance Campaign and the mass arrests and bannings of the 1960s, the ANC, SACP and PAC opted for the "armed struggle." See Albert Luthuli, Let my People Go: An Autobiography (Glasgow: Fount Paperbacks, 1982), 196-207; Heidi Holland, The Struggle, 128; and Francis Meli, A History of the ANC: South Africa Belongs to Us (London: James Currey, 1989), 145ff, on the ANC's position; and Philip Ata Kgosana, Lest We Forget: An Autobiography (Johannesburg: Skotaviile, 1988), 51ff; and Liebenberg, Ideologie in Konflik, 92-101, on the PAC's position.
39. Especially after the failed 1952 Defiance Campaign and the mass arrests and bannings of the 1960s, the ANC, SACP and PAC opted for the "armed struggle." See Albert Luthuli, Let my People Go: An Autobiography (Glasgow: Fount Paperbacks, 1982), 196-207; Heidi Holland, The Struggle, 128; and Francis Meli, A History of the ANC: South Africa Belongs to Us (London: James Currey, 1989), 145ff, on the ANC's position; and Philip Ata Kgosana, Lest We Forget: An Autobiography (Johannesburg: Skotaviile, 1988), 51ff; and Liebenberg, Ideologie in Konflik, 92-101, on the PAC's position.
40. Especially after the failed 1952 Defiance Campaign and the mass arrests and bannings of the 1960s, the ANC, SACP and PAC opted for the "armed struggle." See Albert Luthuli, Let my People Go: An Autobiography (Glasgow: Fount Paperbacks, 1982), 196-207; Heidi Holland, The Struggle, 128; and Francis Meli, A History of the ANC: South Africa Belongs to Us (London: James Currey, 1989), 145ff, on the ANC's position; and Philip Ata Kgosana, Lest We Forget: An Autobiography (Johannesburg: Skotaviile, 1988), 51ff; and Liebenberg, Ideologie in Konflik, 92-101, on the PAC's position.
41. For more detail on the early years of Poqo and the establishment of the liberation army of the PAC, see Tom Lodge, "The Pan-Africanist Congress, 1959-1990," in Ian Liebenberg et al., The Long March, 111-120;
42. and Tom Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983), 231ff, 295ff.
43. APLA's military organization, setting up of structures. and spreading wings into Africa proved to be difficult for the PAC "in diaspora." Their problems were compounded by strategic military differences and political leadership struggles within the PAC (see Lodge, "The PAC," in Liebenberg, The Long March, 111ff). Instability in African states that sympathized with the PAC cause also proved to be a liability (see Kgosana, Lest We Forget, 79-91). The PAC distrusted Marxism and took some time to embark on Maoism as a guerilla approach (Lodge, ibid., 118). The PAC's leaning towards Peking complicated matters for the organization, as many African states favored Soviet influence and Marxism-Leninism as ideological and doctrinal tools. While Kgosana deals narratively with problems of administration, training, and logistics, his analysis lacks rigor and a critical element. Lodge is more useful with regard to the PAC's organizational difficulties.
44. APLA's military organization, setting up of structures. and spreading wings into Africa proved to be difficult for the PAC "in diaspora." Their problems were compounded by strategic military differences and political leadership struggles within the PAC (see Lodge, "The PAC," in Liebenberg, The Long March, 111ff). Instability in African states that sympathized with the PAC cause also proved to be a liability (see Kgosana, Lest We Forget, 79-91). The PAC distrusted Marxism and took some time to embark on Maoism as a guerilla approach (Lodge, ibid., 118). The PAC's leaning towards Peking complicated matters for the organization, as many African states favored Soviet influence and Marxism-Leninism as ideological and doctrinal tools. While Kgosana deals narratively with problems of administration, training, and logistics, his analysis lacks rigor and a critical element. Lodge is more useful with regard to the PAC's organizational difficulties.
45. APLA's military organization, setting up of structures. and spreading wings into Africa proved to be difficult for the PAC "in diaspora." Their problems were compounded by strategic military differences and political leadership struggles within the PAC (see Lodge, "The PAC," in Liebenberg, The Long March, 111ff). Instability in African states that sympathized with the PAC cause also proved to be a liability (see Kgosana, Lest We Forget, 79-91). The PAC distrusted Marxism and took some time to embark on Maoism as a guerilla approach (Lodge, ibid., 118). The PAC's leaning towards Peking complicated matters for the organization, as many African states favored Soviet influence and Marxism-Leninism as ideological and doctrinal tools. While Kgosana deals narratively with problems of administration, training, and logistics, his analysis lacks rigor and a critical element. Lodge is more useful with regard to the PAC's organizational difficulties.
46. This does not necessarily reflect an ideological preference for a particular movement or its military wing, because the struggle for liberation formed a whole in many respects. However, in practice, South Africans were painfully aware of the different ideological and doctrinal approaches and the disconcerting discord and infighting (a "struggle within the struggle") in the ranks of the liberationists, analogous to the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. See Masipula Sithole, Zimbabwe: Struggles within the Struggle (Salisbury/Harare: Rujeko Publishers, 1979). These struggles undermined efficiency and sometimes led to loss of life among compatriots and combatants.
47. For a discussion of MK force levels, see Tsepe Motumi, "The Spear of the Nation - The Recent History of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)" in About Turn: The Transformation of the South African Military and Intelligence, eds., Jakkie Cilliers and Markus Reichardt (Halfway House: Institute for Defence Policy, 1996), 100. Motumi argues that while no more than an estimated 10,000-12,000 members of MK received formal training outside the country's borders, a large percentage of its 28,000 members (an estimate listed with the Joint Military Co-ordinating Council [JMCC] during negotiations) received internal training reflecting different levels of proficiency.
48. Great uncertainty existed about APLA force levels, according to Tom Lodge, "Soldiers of the Storm: A Profile of the Azanian People's Liberation Army," in Cilliers and Reichardt, eds., About Turn. While claims have been made that force levels exceeded 10,000 members, even 15,000, only about 5,500 former APLA combatants joined the SANDF during the integration process.
49. For an extensive rundown of force levels during the years of combat in Angola as well as counter-insurgency work during the 1980s, see Bill Sass, "The Union and South African Defence Force - 1912-1994," in Cilliers and Reichardt, About Turn.
50. Already in the early 1960s Albert Luthuli, in looking at the harnessing of apartheid in defensive strategies and structures, warned: "[T]his last [phenomenon] is a new feature of South African life. Since the Emergency of 1960, a thorough reorganization has taken place in the relation between the police force and the army. The army has a new role - not the defense of our borders, but 'internal security.' It is clear that if we [the ANC] press our claims to the rights of citizenship and human dignity, this newly organized force will be turned against us as a last resort" (A. Luthuli, Let my People Go. Glasgow: Fount Paperbacks 1962 [1983], 205). The army's role was to be expanded. Whereas the police played the dominant role in the maintenance of state security in the 1970s, structural responsibility for state security was transferred to the State Security Council and the defense establishment in the 1980s. These changes concurred with the coming to power of President P.W. Botha. His preference for the military set the scene for "creeping praetorianism" and "praetorianism of a special type." For more detail, see James Seife, "The State Security Apparatus: Implications for Covert Operations," in The Hidden Hand: Covert Operations in South Africa, eds. Anthony Minnaar, Ian Liebenberg, and Charl Schutte (Pretoria: HSRC/IDASA, 1994), 99-107; Philip H. Frankel, "The Politics of Police Control," Comparative Politics 12(4) (1980): 481-499; and J.C.R. Liebenberg, "Apartheid's Military in Politics: Naked Power Revealed," Journal for Contemporary History 15(1) (1990): 130-141.
51. Already in the early 1960s Albert Luthuli, in looking at the harnessing of apartheid in defensive strategies and structures, warned: "[T]his last [phenomenon] is a new feature of South African life. Since the Emergency of 1960, a thorough reorganization has taken place in the relation between the police force and the army. The army has a new role - not the defense of our borders, but 'internal security.' It is clear that if we [the ANC] press our claims to the rights of citizenship and human dignity, this newly organized force will be turned against us as a last resort" (A. Luthuli, Let my People Go. Glasgow: Fount Paperbacks 1962 [1983], 205). The army's role was to be expanded. Whereas the police played the dominant role in the maintenance of state security in the 1970s, structural responsibility for state security was transferred to the State Security Council and the defense establishment in the 1980s. These changes concurred with the coming to power of President P.W. Botha. His preference for the military set the scene for "creeping praetorianism" and "praetorianism of a special type." For more detail, see James Seife, "The State Security Apparatus: Implications for Covert Operations," in The Hidden Hand: Covert Operations in South Africa, eds. Anthony Minnaar, Ian Liebenberg, and Charl Schutte (Pretoria: HSRC/IDASA, 1994), 99-107; Philip H. Frankel, "The Politics of Police Control," Comparative Politics 12(4) (1980): 481-499; and J.C.R. Liebenberg, "Apartheid's Military in Politics: Naked Power Revealed," Journal for Contemporary History 15(1) (1990): 130-141.
52. Already in the early 1960s Albert Luthuli, in looking at the harnessing of apartheid in defensive strategies and structures, warned: "[T]his last [phenomenon] is a new feature of South African life. Since the Emergency of 1960, a thorough reorganization has taken place in the relation between the police force and the army. The army has a new role - not the defense of our borders, but 'internal security.' It is clear that if we [the ANC] press our claims to the rights of citizenship and human dignity, this newly organized force will be turned against us as a last resort" (A. Luthuli, Let my People Go. Glasgow: Fount Paperbacks 1962 [1983], 205). The army's role was to be expanded. Whereas the police played the dominant role in the maintenance of state security in the 1970s, structural responsibility for state security was transferred to the State Security Council and the defense establishment in the 1980s. These changes concurred with the coming to power of President P.W. Botha. His preference for the military set the scene for "creeping praetorianism" and "praetorianism of a special type." For more detail, see James Seife, "The State Security Apparatus: Implications for Covert Operations," in The Hidden Hand: Covert Operations in South Africa, eds. Anthony Minnaar, Ian Liebenberg, and Charl Schutte (Pretoria: HSRC/IDASA, 1994), 99-107; Philip H. Frankel, "The Politics of Police Control," Comparative Politics 12(4) (1980): 481-499; and J.C.R. Liebenberg, "Apartheid's Military in Politics: Naked Power Revealed," Journal for Contemporary History 15(1) (1990): 130-141.
53. Already in the early 1960s Albert Luthuli, in looking at the harnessing of apartheid in defensive strategies and structures, warned: "[T]his last [phenomenon] is a new feature of South African life. Since the Emergency of 1960, a thorough reorganization has taken place in the relation between the police force and the army. The army has a new role - not the defense of our borders, but 'internal security.' It is clear that if we [the ANC] press our claims to the rights of citizenship and human dignity, this newly organized force will be turned against us as a last resort" (A. Luthuli, Let my People Go. Glasgow: Fount Paperbacks 1962 [1983], 205). The army's role was to be expanded. Whereas the police played the dominant role in the maintenance of state security in the 1970s, structural responsibility for state security was transferred to the State Security Council and the defense establishment in the 1980s. These changes concurred with the coming to power of President P.W. Botha. His preference for the military set the scene for "creeping praetorianism" and "praetorianism of a special type." For more detail, see James Seife, "The State Security Apparatus: Implications for Covert Operations," in The Hidden Hand: Covert Operations in South Africa, eds. Anthony Minnaar, Ian Liebenberg, and Charl Schutte (Pretoria: HSRC/IDASA, 1994), 99-107; Philip H. Frankel, "The Politics of Police Control," Comparative Politics 12(4) (1980): 481-499; and J.C.R. Liebenberg, "Apartheid's Military in Politics: Naked Power Revealed," Journal for Contemporary History 15(1) (1990): 130-141.
54. See Regis Debray, Strategy for Revolution (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1970), and Revolution in the Revolution (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1967) by the same author.
55. See Regis Debray, Strategy for Revolution (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1970), and Revolution in the Revolution (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1967) by the same author.
56. See Walter Laqueur, ed., The Guerilla Reader: A Historical Anthology (New York: New American Library, 1977), 238ff; and Debray, Revolution in the Revolution, 74-83.
57. See Walter Laqueur, ed., The Guerilla Reader: A Historical Anthology (New York: New American Library, 1977), 238ff; and Debray, Revolution in the Revolution, 74-83.
58. For more detail, see Roger Simon, Gramsci's Political Thought: An Introduction (London: Lawrence and Wishart Press, 1982), 69ff. The struggle to defeat a dominant hegemony pulls the embryo civil society into hardcore politics. There are many definitions of civil society. See Ian Liebenberg, Can the Phoenix Fly? Transition from Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Africa: The Role of Political Leadership and Some Strategies to Attain Democracy (Pretoria: HSRC, 1995), 12-13. See also Doreen Atkinson, "State and Civil Society in Flux: Parameters of a Changing Debate," Theoria 79 (May 1992): 1-28. Edmund Keller's definition of civil society as "autonomous organized groups bent on challenging authoritarian regimes to open up the political system" seems to be the most appropriate here (Keller, "Liberalization, Democratization and Democracy in Africa: Comparative Perspectives," Africa Insight 25[4] [1995]: 225). For an extensive debate around the concept of civil society and the hegemonic struggle on the verge of the 1994 elections in South Africa, see The State and Civil Society, the special May 1992 edition of Theoria (Natal University Press, Durban, South Africa).
59. For more detail, see Roger Simon, Gramsci's Political Thought: An Introduction (London: Lawrence and Wishart Press, 1982), 69ff. The struggle to defeat a dominant hegemony pulls the embryo civil society into hardcore politics. There are many definitions of civil society. See Ian Liebenberg, Can the Phoenix Fly? Transition from Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Africa: The Role of Political Leadership and Some Strategies to Attain Democracy (Pretoria: HSRC, 1995), 12-13. See also Doreen Atkinson, "State and Civil Society in Flux: Parameters of a Changing Debate," Theoria 79 (May 1992): 1-28. Edmund Keller's definition of civil society as "autonomous organized groups bent on challenging authoritarian regimes to open up the political system" seems to be the most appropriate here (Keller, "Liberalization, Democratization and Democracy in Africa: Comparative Perspectives," Africa Insight 25[4] [1995]: 225). For an extensive debate around the concept of civil society and the hegemonic struggle on the verge of the 1994 elections in South Africa, see The State and Civil Society, the special May 1992 edition of Theoria (Natal University Press, Durban, South Africa).
60. For more detail, see Roger Simon, Gramsci's Political Thought: An Introduction (London: Lawrence and Wishart Press, 1982), 69ff. The struggle to defeat a dominant hegemony pulls the embryo civil society into hardcore politics. There are many definitions of civil society. See Ian Liebenberg, Can the Phoenix Fly? Transition from Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Africa: The Role of Political Leadership and Some Strategies to Attain Democracy (Pretoria: HSRC, 1995), 12-13. See also Doreen Atkinson, "State and Civil Society in Flux: Parameters of a Changing Debate," Theoria 79 (May 1992): 1-28. Edmund Keller's definition of civil society as "autonomous organized groups bent on challenging authoritarian regimes to open up the political system" seems to be the most appropriate here (Keller, "Liberalization, Democratization and Democracy in Africa: Comparative Perspectives," Africa Insight 25[4] [1995]: 225). For an extensive debate around the concept of civil society and the hegemonic struggle on the verge of the 1994 elections in South Africa, see The State and Civil Society, the special May 1992 edition of Theoria (Natal University Press, Durban, South Africa).
61. For more detail, see Roger Simon, Gramsci's Political Thought: An Introduction (London: Lawrence and Wishart Press, 1982), 69ff. The struggle to defeat a dominant hegemony pulls the embryo civil society into hardcore politics. There are many definitions of civil society. See Ian Liebenberg, Can the Phoenix Fly? Transition from Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Africa: The Role of Political Leadership and Some Strategies to Attain Democracy (Pretoria: HSRC, 1995), 12-13. See also Doreen Atkinson, "State and Civil Society in Flux: Parameters of a Changing Debate," Theoria 79 (May 1992): 1-28. Edmund Keller's definition of civil society as "autonomous organized groups bent on challenging authoritarian regimes to open up the political system" seems to be the most appropriate here (Keller, "Liberalization, Democratization and Democracy in Africa: Comparative Perspectives," Africa Insight 25[4] [1995]: 225). For an extensive debate around the concept of civil society and the hegemonic struggle on the verge of the 1994 elections in South Africa, see The State and Civil Society, the special May 1992 edition of Theoria (Natal University Press, Durban, South Africa).
62. For more detail, see Roger Simon, Gramsci's Political Thought: An Introduction (London: Lawrence and Wishart Press, 1982), 69ff. The struggle to defeat a dominant hegemony pulls the embryo civil society into hardcore politics. There are many definitions of civil society. See Ian Liebenberg, Can the Phoenix Fly? Transition from Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Africa: The Role of Political Leadership and Some Strategies to Attain Democracy (Pretoria: HSRC, 1995), 12-13. See also Doreen Atkinson, "State and Civil Society in Flux: Parameters of a Changing Debate," Theoria 79 (May 1992): 1-28. Edmund Keller's definition of civil society as "autonomous organized groups bent on challenging authoritarian regimes to open up the political system" seems to be the most appropriate here (Keller, "Liberalization, Democratization and Democracy in Africa: Comparative Perspectives," Africa Insight 25[4] [1995]: 225). For an extensive debate around the concept of civil society and the hegemonic struggle on the verge of the 1994 elections in South Africa, see The State and Civil Society, the special May 1992 edition of Theoria (Natal University Press, Durban, South Africa).
63. See Antonio Gramsci, in Selections from the Prison Notebooks, eds., Q. Hoare and G. N. Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), 240.
64. For a working definition of the professional soldier, the reader is referred to the Defence Management Programme, Civil-Military Relations (Module Three), 1994, presented by the Graduate School of Public and Development Management, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. Latin American examples of praetorian soldiers are dealt with in detail by Robert H. Dix, "Military Coups and Military Rule in Latin America," Armed Forces & Society 20, 3 (Spring 1994): 439-456. For African examples, as well as problems of military disengagement from politics and subsequent democratization, see Robin Luckham, "Dilemmas of Military Disengagement and Democratization in Africa," IDS Bulletin 26(2) (1995): 49-61. The South African version of the praetorian soldier is different from others in that civilian leaders with militaristic inclinations of the National Party minority regime brought the soldiers into politics; professional South African soldiers did not engage in politics of their own will. For this reason I refer to South African praetorianism as "praetorianism of a special type." This is probably not much of a surprise, given that South Africa was a "colony of a special type"!
65. For a working definition of the professional soldier, the reader is referred to the Defence Management Programme, Civil-Military Relations (Module Three), 1994, presented by the Graduate School of Public and Development Management, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. Latin American examples of praetorian soldiers are dealt with in detail by Robert H. Dix,
66. For a working definition of the professional soldier, the reader is referred to the Defence Management Programme, Civil-Military Relations (Module Three), 1994, presented by the Graduate School of Public and Development Management, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. Latin American examples of praetorian soldiers are dealt with in detail by Robert H. Dix, "Military Coups and Military Rule in Latin America," Armed Forces & Society 20, 3 (Spring 1994): 439-456. For African examples, as well as problems of military disengagement from politics and subsequent democratization, see Robin Luckham, "Dilemmas of Military Disengagement and Democratization in Africa," IDS Bulletin 26(2) (1995): 49-61. The South African version of the praetorian soldier is different from others in that civilian leaders with militaristic inclinations of the National Party minority regime brought the soldiers into politics; professional South African soldiers did not engage in politics of their own will. For this reason I refer to South African praetorianism as "praetorianism of a special type." This is probably not much of a surprise, given that South Africa was a "colony of a special type"!
67. It should now be clear why I refer to the SADF of the 1980s as a "praetorian army of a special type." It had a status quo orientation, but not a full arbitrator status. Neither was it a fully civilian ruler army because there was some reminiscence of civilian and constitutional control within a severely limited democratic structure over the army. The army was drawn into politics by apartheid politicians - not by the army leadership - which is in marked contrast to the classical ruler army. See University of the Witwatersrand, Civil-Military Relations (Module Three).
68. Compare the revolutionary Israeli soldier before the establishment of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) and his/her positive influence on doctrines - i.e., tank doctrines of the later IDF. For more detail, see Ian V. Hogg, Israeli War Machine: The Men, the Machines, the Tactics (London: Hamlyn Books, 1983).
69. A third revolutionary army, linked to the Black Consciousness Movement and the Azanian People's Organization, namely the Azanian Liberation Army (AZANLA), has not been studied in any detail. There is ample space for future research here. Other minor groupings who also opted for armed resistance, such as the Armed Resistance Movement (ARM), established in 1962 and "rounded up" by the South African Police a mere two years later, whose contributions often bordered on the farcical (but were probably more heroic for that), will not be dealt with in this article. For more detail on ARM, see Andries du Toit, "Fragile Defiance: The African Resistance Movement," in Ian Liebenberg et al., eds., The Long March: The Story of the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa (Pretoria: Kagiso-Haum, 1994), 96-103. See also Tom Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983): 240-241.
70. A third revolutionary army, linked to the Black Consciousness Movement and the Azanian People's Organization, namely the Azanian Liberation Army (AZANLA), has not been studied in any detail. There is ample space for future research here. Other minor groupings who also opted for armed resistance, such as the Armed Resistance Movement (ARM), established in 1962 and "rounded up" by the South African Police a mere two years later, whose contributions often bordered on the farcical (but were probably more heroic for that), will not be dealt with in this article. For more detail on ARM, see Andries du Toit, "Fragile Defiance: The African Resistance Movement," in Ian Liebenberg et al., eds., The Long March: The Story of the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa (Pretoria: Kagiso-Haum, 1994), 96-103. See also Tom Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983): 240-241.
71. Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945, 231.
72. Tom Lodge, "The Pan Africanist Congress, 1959-1990," in Liebenberg et al., The Long March, 113.
73. Lodge, "The Pan Africanist Congress: 1959-1990," 118-119.
74. Lodge, "Revolutionary Exile Politics, 1969-1975," in Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945, 317. While Kgosana is much more positive about the time in exile (though he also refers to problems [such as "the fiasco of Zaire") in Lest We Forget, 79-83), Lodge is much more critical in his analysis of this period.
75. Lodge, "Revolutionary Exile Politics, 1969-1975," in Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945, 317. While Kgosana is much more positive about the time in exile (though he also refers to problems [such as "the fiasco of Zaire") in Lest We Forget, 79-83), Lodge is much more critical in his analysis of this period.
76. See also Gary van Staden, "Return of the Prodigal Son: Prospects for a Revival of the Pan Africanist Congress," International Affairs Bulletin 12(3) (1989): 21ff; and Gary van Staden, "PAC: Walking its Own Tightrope," Work in Progress (1990) 11ff. For exposure and problems during the diaspora in Africa, the reader is referred to Lodge, "The Pan Africanist Congress: 1959-1996," in Liebenberg et al., The Long March, 116-123; and Kgosana, Lest We Forget, 55ff.
77. See also Gary van Staden, "Return of the Prodigal Son: Prospects for a Revival of the Pan Africanist Congress," International Affairs Bulletin 12(3) (1989): 21ff; and Gary van Staden, "PAC: Walking its Own Tightrope," Work in Progress (1990) 11ff. For exposure and problems during the diaspora in Africa, the reader is referred to Lodge, "The Pan Africanist Congress: 1959-1996," in Liebenberg et al., The Long March, 116-123; and Kgosana, Lest We Forget, 55ff.
78. See also Gary van Staden, "Return of the Prodigal Son: Prospects for a Revival of the Pan Africanist Congress," International Affairs Bulletin 12(3) (1989): 21ff; and Gary van Staden, "PAC: Walking its Own Tightrope," Work in Progress (1990) 11ff. For exposure and problems during the diaspora in Africa, the reader is referred to Lodge, "The Pan Africanist Congress: 1959-1996," in Liebenberg et al., The Long March, 116-123; and Kgosana, Lest We Forget, 55ff.
79. See also Gary van Staden, "Return of the Prodigal Son: Prospects for a Revival of the Pan Africanist Congress," International Affairs Bulletin 12(3) (1989): 21ff; and Gary van Staden, "PAC: Walking its Own Tightrope," Work in Progress (1990) 11ff. For exposure and problems during the diaspora in Africa, the reader is referred to Lodge, "The Pan Africanist Congress: 1959-1996," in Liebenberg et al., The Long March, 116-123; and Kgosana, Lest We Forget, 55ff.
80. The PAC, however, gained fewer votes than the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the National Party (NP). The IFP gained 10.5% (43 seats), the NP gained 20.4% (82 seats) and the PAC gained only 1.2% (5 seats). In no province did the PAC gain a majority, but it registered its strongest support in the Eastern and Western Cape. The PAC is on a par with other small parties in South African politics, namely the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), which gained 0.5% (2 seats) and the radical Workers List Party (WLP), no seats yet.
81. Luthuli, Let my People Go, 118.
82. Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945, 236.
83. See Joe Slovo, MK strategist and later an influential ANC/SACP leader, quoted by Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa, 239.
84. This statement is somewhat romanticized. The ANC was only to become committed to "a national democratic revolution" when a "revolutionary programme" was adopted at the Morogoro conference (1969). See Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa, 301.
85. Williams, "The Other Armies: Writing the History of MK," in Liebenberg et al., The Long March, 24.
86. For more detail, consult Rocky Williams, in Liebenberg, The Long March, 29ff.
87. Since the early 1970s, the SAP played an integral part in upholding apartheid laws and maintaining state security, notably under the reign of John Vorster and Jimmy Kruger. For more detail, see P.H. Frankel, "South Africa: The Politics of Police Control," Comparative Politics 12(4): 481-499, an article published in 1980. The role of the police was only later eclipsed by the military. For more detail, see Grundy, The Militarization of South African Politics;
88. Since the early 1970s, the SAP played an integral part in upholding apartheid laws and maintaining state security, notably under the reign of John Vorster and Jimmy Kruger. For more detail, see P.H. Frankel, "South Africa: The Politics of Police Control," Comparative Politics 12(4): 481-499, an article published in 1980. The role of the police was only later eclipsed by the military. For more detail, see Grundy, The Militarization of South African Politics;
89. Deon Geldenhuys, Diplomacy of Isolation: South African foreign Policy Making (Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1984), 89-100;
90. and Liebenberg, Ideologie in Konflik, 114-118.
91. See Grundy, The Militarization of South African Politics, 58-78; and Cock and Nathan, War and Society, Part II. The commando system was used since colonial days to bolster the limited colonial forces. The system was used during the border wars in the Eastern Cape in the 1800s and also during the First and Second South African Wars (or Anglo-Boer Wars). The system fell into disuse between 1910 and 1948, but was reactivated during the apartheid years and greatly bolstered the national service system, the Permanent Force, and the Citizen Force of the South African Government during the years 1960-1980. Currently, downsizing of the commando system is being considered since the threat of "the revolutionary onslaught" has diminished due to a more legitimate state structure. For more information on the evolving role of the South African military over the years, see Deon F. S. Fourie, "The Evolving Experience," in James M. Roherty, Defence Policy Formulation: Towards Comparative Analysis (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press), 87-106.
92. See Grundy, The Militarization of South African Politics, 58-78; and Cock and Nathan, War and Society, Part II. The commando system was used since colonial days to bolster the limited colonial forces. The system was used during the border wars in the Eastern Cape in the 1800s and also during the First and Second South African Wars (or Anglo-Boer Wars). The system fell into disuse between 1910 and 1948, but was reactivated during the apartheid years and greatly bolstered the national service system, the Permanent Force, and the Citizen Force of the South African Government during the years 1960-1980. Currently, downsizing of the commando system is being considered since the threat of "the revolutionary onslaught" has diminished due to a more legitimate state structure. For more information on the evolving role of the South African military over the years, see Deon F. S. Fourie, "The Evolving Experience," in James M. Roherty, Defence Policy Formulation: Towards Comparative Analysis (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press), 87-106.
93. See Grundy, The Militarization of South African Politics, 58-78; and Cock and Nathan, War and Society, Part II. The commando system was used since colonial days to bolster the limited colonial forces. The system was used during the border wars in the Eastern Cape in the 1800s and also during the First and Second South African Wars (or Anglo-Boer Wars). The system fell into disuse between 1910 and 1948, but was reactivated during the apartheid years and greatly bolstered the national service system, the Permanent Force, and the Citizen Force of the South African Government during the years 1960-1980. Currently, downsizing of the commando system is being considered since the threat of "the revolutionary onslaught" has diminished due to a more legitimate state structure. For more information on the evolving role of the South African military over the years, see Deon F. S. Fourie, "The Evolving Experience," in James M. Roherty, Defence Policy Formulation: Towards Comparative Analysis (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press), 87-106.
94. See Williams in Liebenberg et al., The Long March, 30.
95. See Stephen Davis, Apartheid's Rebels: Inside South Africa's Hidden War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 118-125.
96. Both the revolutionary armies and the South African security forces transgressed human rights in the era of the struggle for liberation. The current Commission for Truth and Reconciliation can do well to look into transgressions of human rights on both sides. For more detail on this complex issue, see Ian Liebenberg, The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa: Context, Future and Some Imponderables, a paper delivered in February 1995 at a forum of the Centre for Constitutional Analysis, Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), Pretoria, South Africa (forthcoming in The Journal of Public Policy 11 (May 1997), South African law journal).
97. Both the revolutionary armies and the South African security forces transgressed human rights in the era of the struggle for liberation. The current Commission for Truth and Reconciliation can do well to look into transgressions of human rights on both sides. For more detail on this complex issue, see Ian Liebenberg, The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa: Context, Future and Some Imponderables, a paper delivered in February 1995 at a forum of the Centre for Constitutional Analysis, Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), Pretoria, South Africa (forthcoming in The Journal of Public Policy 11 (May 1997), South African law journal).
98. In 1990, following the departure of the ailing President P.W. Botha from the political scene, the softliners in the South African Government gained dominance over the hardliners. F.W. de Klerk unbanned the ANC, PAC, and SACP, invited exiles to return, and opened the door for a negotiated settlement. For more detail on military operations and the relation between mass action, underground activity and MK's activities, see Davis, Apartheid's Rebels, 116-158. See also Francis Meli, A History of the ANC: South Africa Belongs to Us (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1988),145-163. Meli deals at length with the new organizational structures and framework that were announced at Morogoro (1969) and subsequent developments. See also Motumi and Lodge in Cilliers and Reichardt, About Turn, 84ff and 105ff.
99. In 1990, following the departure of the ailing President P.W. Botha from the political scene, the softliners in the South African Government gained dominance over the hardliners. F.W. de Klerk unbanned the ANC, PAC, and SACP, invited exiles to return, and opened the door for a negotiated settlement. For more detail on military operations and the relation between mass action, underground activity and MK's activities, see Davis, Apartheid's Rebels, 116-158. See also Francis Meli, A History of the ANC: South Africa Belongs to Us (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1988),145-163. Meli deals at length with the new organizational structures and framework that were announced at Morogoro (1969) and subsequent developments. See also Motumi and Lodge in Cilliers and Reichardt, About Turn, 84ff and 105ff.
100. In 1990, following the departure of the ailing President P.W. Botha from the political scene, the softliners in the South African Government gained dominance over the hardliners. F.W. de Klerk unbanned the ANC, PAC, and SACP, invited exiles to return, and opened the door for a negotiated settlement. For more detail on military operations and the relation between mass action, underground activity and MK's activities, see Davis, Apartheid's Rebels, 116-158. See also Francis Meli, A History of the ANC: South Africa Belongs to Us (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1988),145-163. Meli deals at length with the new organizational structures and framework that were announced at Morogoro (1969) and subsequent developments. See also Motumi and Lodge in Cilliers and Reichardt, About Turn, 84ff and 105ff.
101. By 1987, both sides realized that there was a political stalemate. No one side could wrench the other out of power. In July 1987, South Africans from inside the country and prominent exiled ANC leaders met in Dakar. In 1989, with the adoption of the Harare Declaration in Zimbabwe, the ANC committed itself publicly to a negotiated solution to South Africa's problems rather than a revolutionary seizure of power as part of a national democratic revolution. The political stalemate that caused this new approach is well described in Liebenberg, Ideologie in Konflik, 129-134; Pierre du Toit, Power Plays: Bargaining Tactics for Transforming South Africa (Halfway House: South Books, 1991), 58ff; and Willie Esterhuyse and Pierre du Toit, eds., The Myth Makers: The Elusive Bargain for South Africa's Future (Halfway House: Southern Books, 1990), 10ff, 36ff, 63ff. See also Adam and Moodley, The Negotiated Revolution, op. cit.
102. By 1987, both sides realized that there was a political stalemate. No one side could wrench the other out of power. In July 1987, South Africans from inside the country and prominent exiled ANC leaders met in Dakar. In 1989, with the adoption of the Harare Declaration in Zimbabwe, the ANC committed itself publicly to a negotiated solution to South Africa's problems rather than a revolutionary seizure of power as part of a national democratic revolution. The political stalemate that caused this new approach is well described in Liebenberg, Ideologie in Konflik, 129-134; Pierre du Toit, Power Plays: Bargaining Tactics for Transforming South Africa (Halfway House: South Books, 1991), 58ff; and Willie Esterhuyse and Pierre du Toit, eds., The Myth Makers: The Elusive Bargain for South Africa's Future (Halfway House: Southern Books, 1990), 10ff, 36ff, 63ff. See also Adam and Moodley, The Negotiated Revolution, op. cit.
103. By 1987, both sides realized that there was a political stalemate. No one side could wrench the other out of power. In July 1987, South Africans from inside the country and prominent exiled ANC leaders met in Dakar. In 1989, with the adoption of the Harare Declaration in Zimbabwe, the ANC committed itself publicly to a negotiated solution to South Africa's problems rather than a revolutionary seizure of power as part of a national democratic revolution. The political stalemate that caused this new approach is well described in Liebenberg, Ideologie in Konflik, 129-134; Pierre du Toit, Power Plays: Bargaining Tactics for Transforming South Africa (Halfway House: South Books, 1991), 58ff; and Willie Esterhuyse and Pierre du Toit, eds., The Myth Makers: The Elusive Bargain for South Africa's Future (Halfway House: Southern Books, 1990), 10ff, 36ff, 63ff. See also Adam and Moodley, The Negotiated Revolution, op. cit.
104. By 1987, both sides realized that there was a political stalemate. No one side could wrench the other out of power. In July 1987, South Africans from inside the country and prominent exiled ANC leaders met in Dakar. In 1989, with the adoption of the Harare Declaration in Zimbabwe, the ANC committed itself publicly to a negotiated solution to South Africa's problems rather than a revolutionary seizure of power as part of a national democratic revolution. The political stalemate that caused this new approach is well described in Liebenberg, Ideologie in Konflik, 129-134; Pierre du Toit, Power Plays: Bargaining Tactics for Transforming South Africa (Halfway House: South Books, 1991), 58ff; and Willie Esterhuyse and Pierre du Toit, eds., The Myth Makers: The Elusive Bargain for South Africa's Future (Halfway House: Southern Books, 1990), 10ff, 36ff, 63ff. See also Adam and Moodley, The Negotiated Revolution, op. cit.
105. For a list of successful military activities between 1970 and 1980, see, inter alia, Mai Palmberg, ed., The Struggle for Africa (London: Zed Books, 1983), chapter 9, 237ff.
106. For more detail and background on theory and praxis as well as militant action (including guerilla activities), see Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy (Surrey: Unwin Brothers, 1971); Debray, Strategy for Revolution (1970); Debray, Revolution in the Revolution (1967); E.J. Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries: Contemporary Essays (London: Quartet Books, 1966); W. Laqueur (ed.), The Guerilla Reader: A Historical Anthology (New York: New American Library, 1977).
107. For more detail and background on theory and praxis as well as militant action (including guerilla activities), see Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy (Surrey: Unwin Brothers, 1971); Debray, Strategy for Revolution (1970); Debray, Revolution in the Revolution (1967); E.J. Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries: Contemporary Essays (London: Quartet Books, 1966); W. Laqueur (ed.), The Guerilla Reader: A Historical Anthology (New York: New American Library, 1977).
108. For more detail and background on theory and praxis as well as militant action (including guerilla activities), see Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy (Surrey: Unwin Brothers, 1971); Debray, Strategy for Revolution (1970); Debray, Revolution in the Revolution (1967); E.J. Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries: Contemporary Essays (London: Quartet Books, 1966); W. Laqueur (ed.), The Guerilla Reader: A Historical Anthology (New York: New American Library, 1977).
109. For more detail and background on theory and praxis as well as militant action (including guerilla activities), see Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy (Surrey: Unwin Brothers, 1971); Debray, Strategy for Revolution (1970); Debray, Revolution in the Revolution (1967); E.J. Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries: Contemporary Essays (London: Quartet Books, 1966); W. Laqueur (ed.), The Guerilla Reader: A Historical Anthology (New York: New American Library, 1977).
110. For more detail and background on theory and praxis as well as militant action (including guerilla activities), see Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy (Surrey: Unwin Brothers, 1971); Debray, Strategy for Revolution (1970); Debray, Revolution in the Revolution (1967); E.J. Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries: Contemporary Essays (London: Quartet Books, 1966); W. Laqueur (ed.), The Guerilla Reader: A Historical Anthology (New York: New American Library, 1977).
111. "Revolutionary creativity" is indeed a wide-ranging phenomenon. For an excellent case study on anarchism and anarchist approaches to military strategies and tactics, see George Eisenwein and Adrian Shubert, Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Context 1931-1939 (London: Longman Books, 1995), especially chapter 5, pp. 79-97, and chapter 8, pp. 144-160.
112. See James M. Roherty, ed., Defense Policy Formation: Towards Comparative Analysis (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1980), 66.
113. Von Decker, quoted in Laqueur, The Guerilla Reader, 58.
114. Amilcar Cabral, quoted in Laqueur, The Guerilla Reader, 241.
115. See Christopher Hodgkinson, The Philosophy of Leadership (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 7. See also Russel Brownlee and Ian Liebenberg, "Reflections on the Integration of the Military in South Africa," African Security Review 4(2) (1995): 28.
116. See Christopher Hodgkinson, The Philosophy of Leadership (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 7. See also Russel Brownlee and Ian Liebenberg, "Reflections on the Integration of the Military in South Africa," African Security Review 4(2) (1995): 28.
117. See Laqueur, The Guerilla Reader, 61.
118. Cabral, in Laqueur, The Guerilla Reader, 241. The development of a new military ethic is also of importance here. It is, however, outside the ambit of this article. For more detail on how the community-based military ethics of MK can contribute to instill a human rights culture, see Rocky Williams, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Morality and the Development of a Professional Military Ethic," African Defence Review 4(3) (1995): 3-15. For some remarks on the reprofessionalization of an army steeped in praetorianism and suffering from a lack of human rights orientation (and constitutionalism), see the case study of Paul W. Zagorski, "Civil Military Relations and Argentine Democracy: The Armed Forces under the Menem Government," Armed Forces & Society 20(3) (1994): 423-437.
119. Cabral, in Laqueur, The Guerilla Reader, 241. The development of a new military ethic is also of importance here. It is, however, outside the ambit of this article. For more detail on how the community-based military ethics of MK can contribute to instill a human rights culture, see Rocky Williams, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Morality and the Development of a Professional Military Ethic," African Defence Review 4(3) (1995): 3-15. For some remarks on the reprofessionalization of an army steeped in praetorianism and suffering from a lack of human rights orientation (and constitutionalism), see the case study of Paul W. Zagorski, "Civil Military Relations and Argentine Democracy: The Armed Forces under the Menem Government," Armed Forces & Society 20(3) (1994): 423-437.
120. Cabral, in Laqueur, The Guerilla Reader, 241. The development of a new military ethic is also of importance here. It is, however, outside the ambit of this article. For more detail on how the community-based military ethics of MK can contribute to instill a human rights culture, see Rocky Williams, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Morality and the Development of a Professional Military Ethic," African Defence Review 4(3) (1995): 3-15. For some remarks on the reprofessionalization of an army steeped in praetorianism and suffering from a lack of human rights orientation (and constitutionalism), see the case study of Paul W. Zagorski, "Civil Military Relations and Argentine Democracy: The Armed Forces under the Menem Government," Armed Forces & Society 20(3) (1994): 423-437.
121. See Rocky Williams, Civil-Military Relations and a Democratic South Africa: Whither the Man on Horseback? Paper submitted to the Centre for Constitutional Analysis, HSRC, Pretoria, South Africa (1993).
122. During the rather intricate process of integration, the "old" SADF contributed the large bulk of the forces to be integrated together with the "homeland armies," referred to as the "forgotten armies" (see Cilliers and Reichardt, "The History of the Homeland Armies," About Turn) and MK and APLA and AZANLA substantial lower numbers. According to Motumi, "'The Spear of the Nation" in About Turn and Lodge ("Soldiers of the Storm") in the same work, the MR numbers were roughly 17,000 (not finalized) and APLA 5,500. AZANLA brought in even fewer. The "homeland armies" contributed different numbers of trained soldiers, with Bophuthatswana and Transkei defense forces (BDF and TDF) potentially the biggest - about 4,000 persons each. The "homeland" armies posed special problems during the integration process. See, for example, Cilliers and Reichardt's statement in About Turn that armies from the former satellites: "Unfortunately brings to the SANDF a number of potentially dangerous legacies to which the new government will need to remain alert. Most of this is that their officers have tasted political power as an effective way of satisfying their demands . . . this raises the spectre of further disciplinary problems as the new military tackles the challenge of integration."
123. During the rather intricate process of integration, the "old" SADF contributed the large bulk of the forces to be integrated together with the "homeland armies," referred to as the "forgotten armies" (see Cilliers and Reichardt, "The History of the Homeland Armies," About Turn) and MK and APLA and AZANLA substantial lower numbers. According to Motumi, "'The Spear of the Nation" in About Turn and Lodge ("Soldiers of the Storm") in the same work, the MR numbers were roughly 17,000 (not finalized) and APLA 5,500. AZANLA brought in even fewer. The "homeland armies" contributed different numbers of trained soldiers, with Bophuthatswana and Transkei defense forces (BDF and TDF) potentially the biggest - about 4,000 persons each. The "homeland" armies posed special problems during the integration process. See, for example, Cilliers and Reichardt's statement in About Turn that armies from the former satellites: "Unfortunately brings to the SANDF a number of potentially dangerous legacies to which the new government will need to remain alert. Most of this is that their officers have tasted political power as an effective way of satisfying their demands . . . this raises the spectre of further disciplinary problems as the new military tackles the challenge of integration."
124. During the rather intricate process of integration, the "old" SADF contributed the large bulk of the forces to be integrated together with the "homeland armies," referred to as the "forgotten armies" (see Cilliers and Reichardt, "The History of the Homeland Armies," About Turn) and MK and APLA and AZANLA substantial lower numbers. According to Motumi, "'The Spear of the Nation" in About Turn and Lodge ("Soldiers of the Storm") in the same work, the MR numbers were roughly 17,000 (not finalized) and APLA 5,500. AZANLA brought in even fewer. The "homeland armies" contributed different numbers of trained soldiers, with Bophuthatswana and Transkei defense forces (BDF and TDF) potentially the biggest - about 4,000 persons each. The "homeland" armies posed special problems during the integration process. See, for example, Cilliers and Reichardt's statement in About Turn that armies from the former satellites: "Unfortunately brings to the SANDF a number of potentially dangerous legacies to which the new government will need to remain alert. Most of this is that their officers have tasted political power as an effective way of satisfying their demands . . . this raises the spectre of further disciplinary problems as the new military tackles the challenge of integration."
125. During the rather intricate process of integration, the "old" SADF contributed the large bulk of the forces to be integrated together with the "homeland armies," referred to as the "forgotten armies" (see Cilliers and Reichardt, "The History of the Homeland Armies," About Turn) and MK and APLA and AZANLA substantial lower numbers. According to Motumi, "'The Spear of the Nation" in About Turn and Lodge ("Soldiers of the Storm") in the same work, the MR numbers were roughly 17,000 (not finalized) and APLA 5,500. AZANLA brought in even fewer. The "homeland armies" contributed different numbers of trained soldiers, with Bophuthatswana and Transkei defense forces (BDF and TDF) potentially the biggest - about 4,000 persons each. The "homeland" armies posed special problems during the integration process. See, for example, Cilliers and Reichardt's statement in About Turn that armies from the former satellites: "Unfortunately brings to the SANDF a number of potentially dangerous legacies to which the new government will need to remain alert. Most of this is that their officers have tasted political power as an effective way of satisfying their demands . . . this raises the spectre of further disciplinary problems as the new military tackles the challenge of integration."
126. For more detail, see Jakkie Cilliers, director of the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP, South Africa), Formal Control over Armed Forces in Established Democracies - The Case for a Constitutional Army, a lecture given to the Defence Management Programme at the University of the Witwatersrand's Business School, 26 July 1994. See also Cilliers, in African Defence Review, 8 and 14. Since then, civilian control over the South African defense community has progressed. A civilian-run (or partly civilian-run) Defence Secretariat has been established and a civilian defense ministry is being put up. Research has shown that the future development of the defense community will probably leave South Africans divided. While downsizing is critically accepted, and demobilization seen as an inescapable reality, South Africans are divided on issues such as the unionization of the military, women in the military, and the future of arms production and the arms industry. For more detail on an extensive research program by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) of South Africa, see Charl Schutte and Diana Ehlers, "Political Update: In Defence of Change," Information Update 5(4) (1995): 56-63. See also Jakkie Cilliers, Bill Sass, Tsepe Motumi, and Chad Schutte, "Public Opinion on Defence and Security Issues" in Cilliers and Reichardt, About Turn, and Markus Reichardt and Jakkie Cilliers, "Swords and Business: The Past and Future of the South African Defence Industry" in the same work.
127. For more detail, see Jakkie Cilliers, director of the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP, South Africa), Formal Control over Armed Forces in Established Democracies - The Case for a Constitutional Army, a lecture given to the Defence Management Programme at the University of the Witwatersrand's Business School, 26 July 1994. See also Cilliers, in African Defence Review, 8 and 14. Since then, civilian control over the South African defense community has progressed. A civilian-run (or partly civilian-run) Defence Secretariat has been established and a civilian defense ministry is being put up. Research has shown that the future development of the defense community will probably leave South Africans divided. While downsizing is critically accepted, and demobilization seen as an inescapable reality, South Africans are divided on issues such as the unionization of the military, women in the military, and the future of arms production and the arms industry. For more detail on an extensive research program by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) of South Africa, see Charl Schutte and Diana Ehlers, "Political Update: In Defence of Change," Information Update 5(4) (1995): 56-63. See also Jakkie Cilliers, Bill Sass, Tsepe Motumi, and Chad Schutte, "Public Opinion on Defence and Security Issues" in Cilliers and Reichardt, About Turn, and Markus Reichardt and Jakkie Cilliers, "Swords and Business: The Past and Future of the South African Defence Industry" in the same work.
128. For more detail, see Jakkie Cilliers, director of the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP, South Africa), Formal Control over Armed Forces in Established Democracies - The Case for a Constitutional Army, a lecture given to the Defence Management Programme at the University of the Witwatersrand's Business School, 26 July 1994. See also Cilliers, in African Defence Review, 8 and 14. Since then, civilian control over the South African defense community has progressed. A civilian-run (or partly civilian-run) Defence Secretariat has been established and a civilian defense ministry is being put up. Research has shown that the future development of the defense community will probably leave South Africans divided. While downsizing is critically accepted, and demobilization seen as an inescapable reality, South Africans are divided on issues such as the unionization of the military, women in the military, and the future of arms production and the arms industry. For more detail on an extensive research program by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) of South Africa, see Charl Schutte and Diana Ehlers, "Political Update: In Defence of Change," Information Update 5(4) (1995): 56-63. See also Jakkie Cilliers, Bill Sass, Tsepe Motumi, and Chad Schutte, "Public Opinion on Defence and Security Issues" in Cilliers and Reichardt, About Turn, and Markus Reichardt and Jakkie Cilliers, "Swords and Business: The Past and Future of the South African Defence Industry" in the same work.
129. For more detail, see Jakkie Cilliers, director of the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP, South Africa), Formal Control over Armed Forces in Established Democracies - The Case for a Constitutional Army, a lecture given to the Defence Management Programme at the University of the Witwatersrand's Business School, 26 July 1994. See also Cilliers, in African Defence Review, 8 and 14. Since then, civilian control over the South African defense community has progressed. A civilian-run (or partly civilian-run) Defence Secretariat has been established and a civilian defense ministry is being put up. Research has shown that the future development of the defense community will probably leave South Africans divided. While downsizing is critically accepted, and demobilization seen as an inescapable reality, South Africans are divided on issues such as the unionization of the military, women in the military, and the future of arms production and the arms industry. For more detail on an extensive research program by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) of South Africa, see Charl Schutte and Diana Ehlers, "Political Update: In Defence of Change," Information Update 5(4) (1995): 56-63. See also Jakkie Cilliers, Bill Sass, Tsepe Motumi, and Chad Schutte, "Public Opinion on Defence and Security Issues" in Cilliers and Reichardt, About Turn, and Markus Reichardt and Jakkie Cilliers, "Swords and Business: The Past and Future of the South African Defence Industry" in the same work.
130. For more detail, see Jakkie Cilliers, director of the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP, South Africa), Formal Control over Armed Forces in Established Democracies - The Case for a Constitutional Army, a lecture given to the Defence Management Programme at the University of the Witwatersrand's Business School, 26 July 1994. See also Cilliers, in African Defence Review, 8 and 14. Since then, civilian control over the South African defense community has progressed. A civilian-run (or partly civilian-run) Defence Secretariat has been established and a civilian defense ministry is being put up. Research has shown that the future development of the defense community will probably leave South Africans divided. While downsizing is critically accepted, and demobilization seen as an inescapable reality, South Africans are divided on issues such as the unionization of the military, women in the military, and the future of arms production and the arms industry. For more detail on an extensive research program by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) of South Africa, see Charl Schutte and Diana Ehlers, "Political Update: In Defence of Change," Information Update 5(4) (1995): 56-63. See also Jakkie Cilliers, Bill Sass, Tsepe Motumi, and Chad Schutte, "Public Opinion on Defence and Security Issues" in Cilliers and Reichardt, About Turn, and Markus Reichardt and Jakkie Cilliers, "Swords and Business: The Past and Future of the South African Defence Industry" in the same work.
131. Roherty, Defence Policy Formation, 9.
132. For information on the changes in South and Southern Africa's intelligence environment, see a useful exploratory article entitled, "South Africa's New Intelligence Environment," by Kevin O'Brien in About Turn. Between the De Klerk and Botha regimes the role and functions of intelligence gathering and application changed (Robert D'A Henderson, "South African Intelligence under De Klerk," Cilliers and Reichardt, eds., About Turn) It happened more so after the turnover to nonracial majority rule.
133. For information on the changes in South and Southern Africa's intelligence environment, see a useful exploratory article entitled, "South Africa's New Intelligence Environment," by Kevin O'Brien in About Turn. Between the De Klerk and Botha regimes the role and functions of intelligence gathering and application changed (Robert D'A Henderson, "South African Intelligence under De Klerk," Cilliers and Reichardt, eds., About Turn) It happened more so after the turnover to nonracial majority rule.
134. Intelligence gathering is here understood to be transparent, in line with a constitutional state and working democracy (or what is generally known as the "rechtstaat"). It includes parliamentary oversight and a civilian ministry of defense working within the ambit of a constitution with checks and balances and a guaranteed and protected Bill of Rights as accepted by the citizens through their elected representatives. The revolutionary army's ability to gather intelligence will enhance the efficacy of the new army. See Von Decker, in Laqueur, The Guerilla Reader, 140ff. For a case study on checks and balances in a (social) democratic state, see Finn Ravnborg, "An International Perspective on Law and Ethics: The Case of Denmark," in Anthony Minnaar, Ian Liebenberg, and Chart Schutte, eds., The Hidden Hand, 90-99. For more detail on a new approach to military intelligence, see Jakkie Cilliers and Markus Reichardt, eds., About Turn: The Transformation of the South African Military and Intelligence (Midrand: Institute for Defence Policy, 1996). The chapters by Robert Henderson and Kevin O'Brien on the evolving southern African intelligence environment are especially relevant.
135. Intelligence gathering is here understood to be transparent, in line with a constitutional state and working democracy (or what is generally known as the "rechtstaat"). It includes parliamentary oversight and a civilian ministry of defense working within the ambit of a constitution with checks and balances and a guaranteed and protected Bill of Rights as accepted by the citizens through their elected representatives. The revolutionary army's ability to gather intelligence will enhance the efficacy of the new army. See Von Decker, in Laqueur, The Guerilla Reader, 140ff. For a case study on checks and balances in a (social) democratic state, see Finn Ravnborg, "An International Perspective on Law and Ethics: The Case of Denmark," in Anthony Minnaar, Ian Liebenberg, and Chart Schutte, eds., The Hidden Hand, 90-99. For more detail on a new approach to military intelligence, see Jakkie Cilliers and Markus Reichardt, eds., About Turn: The Transformation of the South African Military and Intelligence (Midrand: Institute for Defence Policy, 1996). The chapters by Robert Henderson and Kevin O'Brien on the evolving southern African intelligence environment are especially relevant.
136. Intelligence gathering is here understood to be transparent, in line with a constitutional state and working democracy (or what is generally known as the "rechtstaat"). It includes parliamentary oversight and a civilian ministry of defense working within the ambit of a constitution with checks and balances and a guaranteed and protected Bill of Rights as accepted by the citizens through their elected representatives. The revolutionary army's ability to gather intelligence will enhance the efficacy of the new army. See Von Decker, in Laqueur, The Guerilla Reader, 140ff. For a case study on checks and balances in a (social) democratic state, see Finn Ravnborg, "An International Perspective on Law and Ethics: The Case of Denmark," in Anthony Minnaar, Ian Liebenberg, and Chart Schutte, eds., The Hidden Hand, 90-99. For more detail on a new approach to military intelligence, see Jakkie Cilliers and Markus Reichardt, eds., About Turn: The Transformation of the South African Military and Intelligence (Midrand: Institute for Defence Policy, 1996). The chapters by Robert Henderson and Kevin O'Brien on the evolving southern African intelligence environment are especially relevant.
137. See Cilliers and Reichardt, About Turn, chapter on "forgotten armies."
138. See, for example, the role of the army in the agricultural and health field in Burkina Faso because of the lack of NGOs and public institutions after the Sankara coup, in Thomas Santara Speaks: The Burkina Faso Revolution 1983-1987 (Toronto: Pathfinder Books, 1988). A further insightful article in this regard is the one by Basile Laetare Guissou, "Militaires et Militarisme en Afrique: Cas du Burkina Faso," Afrique & Developpement, XX, 2 (1995), 55-75.
139. See, for example, the role of the army in the agricultural and health field in Burkina Faso because of the lack of NGOs and public institutions after the Sankara coup, in Thomas Santara Speaks: The Burkina Faso Revolution 1983-1987 (Toronto: Pathfinder Books, 1988). A further insightful article in this regard is the one by Basile Laetare Guissou, "Militaires et Militarisme en Afrique: Cas du Burkina Faso," Afrique & Developpement, XX, 2 (1995), 55-75.
140. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), an encompassing attempt at generating economic growth and meeting national housing, health and infrastructure needs in South Africa, is but one example. For more detail, see Ian Liebenberg and Petrus de Kock, "Some Conjectures and Perspectives on the RDP White Paper," Politeia 14(1): 106-111. See also RDP White Paper, Discussion Document (Pretoria: Government Printers, 1994). A shorter article dealing with the RDP by De Kock and Liebenberg, "The RDP: From the White Waters into the Waterfall," can be found in Afford-ability, 3,2 (February/March 1995), 16-19.
141. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), an encompassing attempt at generating economic growth and meeting national housing, health and infrastructure needs in South Africa, is but one example. For more detail, see Ian Liebenberg and Petrus de Kock, "Some Conjectures and Perspectives on the RDP White Paper," Politeia 14(1): 106-111. See also RDP White Paper, Discussion Document (Pretoria: Government Printers, 1994). A shorter article dealing with the RDP by De Kock and Liebenberg, "The RDP: From the White Waters into the Waterfall," can be found in Afford-ability, 3,2 (February/March 1995), 16-19.
142. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), an encompassing attempt at generating economic growth and meeting national housing, health and infrastructure needs in South Africa, is but one example. For more detail, see Ian Liebenberg and Petrus de Kock, "Some Conjectures and Perspectives on the RDP White Paper," Politeia 14(1): 106-111. See also RDP White Paper, Discussion Document (Pretoria: Government Printers, 1994). A shorter article dealing with the RDP by De Kock and Liebenberg, "The RDP: From the White Waters into the Waterfall," can be found in Afford-ability, 3,2 (February/March 1995), 16-19.
143. South Africa's first exposure to, and experience in, peacekeeping went awry and was met with little success (and even less acclamation) when the National Peacekeeping Force (NPKF) was internally deployed in Thokosa on the eve of the first nonracial and democratic elections in 1994. Limited training within severely limited time frames, inappropriate training approaches, lack of discipline, wrong deployment, and political horse-trading and weak management (more closely related to "muddling through") caused the attempt to fail abysmally. See Cilliers and Reichardt, "The National Peacekeeping Force: The Triumph of Politics over Security," in About Turn. Valuable lessons were learned on how not to attempt such a process, yet the experience left South Africans with a dented national pride.
144. For more detail, see Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills, eds., Peacekeeping in Africa, Vol. 2 (Midrand: Institute for Defence Policy and South African Institute of International Affairs, 1995).
145. For a contextualization of peace support operations in Africa within an evolving security environment, see Jakkie Cilliers, "The Evolving Security Architecture in Southern Africa," Africa Insight, 26,1 (1996), 13-25.
146. See Jakkie Cilliers, "The Security Agencies and the South African Constitution" in IDP Papers, 3 (March 1996), 1ff. For a broader perspective on the subordination of armies in Africa to civilian control see Simon Baynham, "The Subordination of African Armies to Civilian Control: Theory and Praxis," Africa Insight, 22,1 (1992): 259-263.
147. See Jakkie Cilliers, "The Security Agencies and the South African Constitution" in IDP Papers, 3 (March 1996), 1ff. For a broader perspective on the subordination of armies in Africa to civilian control see Simon Baynham, "The Subordination of African Armies to Civilian Control: Theory and Praxis," Africa Insight, 22,1 (1992): 259-263.
148. For more detail, see Jakkie Cilliers, The Role of the Security and Order Institutions in Nation-Building. Paper presented on behalf of the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP) at a conference entitled "Democratic Nationbuilding in Post-Election South Africa," HSRC, Pretoria, 24 March 1994. See also Jakkie Cilliers, "The South African Defence Force of the Future," in Nic Rhoodie and Ian Liebenberg, eds., Democratic Nationbuilding in South Africa (Pretoria: HC RC Publishers, 1994), 385-396; and Rocky Williams, "The Creation of a Legitimate Defence Force in a Post Settlement South Africa," op. cit., 397-410.
149. For more detail, see Jakkie Cilliers, The Role of the Security and Order Institutions in Nation-Building. Paper presented on behalf of the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP) at a conference entitled "Democratic Nationbuilding in Post-Election South Africa," HSRC, Pretoria, 24 March 1994. See also Jakkie Cilliers, "The South African Defence Force of the Future," in Nic Rhoodie and Ian Liebenberg, eds., Democratic Nationbuilding in South Africa (Pretoria: HC RC Publishers, 1994), 385-396; and Rocky Williams, "The Creation of a Legitimate Defence Force in a Post Settlement South Africa," op. cit., 397-410.
150. For more detail, see Jakkie Cilliers, The Role of the Security and Order Institutions in Nation-Building. Paper presented on behalf of the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP) at a conference entitled "Democratic Nationbuilding in Post-Election South Africa," HSRC, Pretoria, 24 March 1994. See also Jakkie Cilliers, "The South African Defence Force of the Future," in Nic Rhoodie and Ian Liebenberg, eds., Democratic Nationbuilding in South Africa (Pretoria: HC RC Publishers, 1994), 385-396; and Rocky Williams, "The Creation of a Legitimate Defence Force in a Post Settlement South Africa," op. cit., 397-410.
151. In a concluding footnote it remains important to note that in a changed and challenging environment and an era of debate on the radical redefinition of security, it will become increasingly important to look at armies and military institutions within a more holistic (ecosystemic, deconstructural, even post-modern) perspective. Driven by new imperatives globally and regionally, it can enrich us all to give greater space to critical theory in its many manifestations when asking about the military: "Quo Vadis?" And as a werda or password, the well-known question posed by a guard replying to his commanding officer, Hagar's question, "Do you see the enemy?" could be enlightening (and a potential innovative hermeneutical key to new ways of thinking about the old). The sentry's contemplative retort to the CO's question was: "Define enemy. . . ." Apart from proving that one should possibly not appoint philosophers as sentries, this illustration could have accrued value. Maybe this could be a new starting point for critical questioning. My thanks to Peter Vale (Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht, The Netherlands and the University of Western Cape) for pointing out to me that my article arguably is written within an ambit and context lacking critical analysis and post-modern theory!