The prohibition-repeal amendments: A natural experiment in interest group influence

Public Choice

Volumn 90, Issue 1-4, 1997, Pages 139-163

  Munger, Michael ^a   Schaller, Thomas ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^b OHIO UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031488475     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-5728-5_6     Document Type: Article

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