The Unstable Dynamics of a Strategic Technology: Disarmament, Unemployment, and the Interwar Battleship

Technology and Culture

Volumn 38, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 386-423

  Mcbride, William M ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0031488270     PISSN: 0040165X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3107127     Document Type: Article

References (177)

1. Henry Steele Commager and Richard Morris, series editors' introduction to Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940, by William E. Leuchtenburg (New York, 1963), p. ix.
2. Battle cruisers, designed as scouts for the battle fleet or as the dominant ship in guerre de course, carried guns as large as battleships, but the large propulsion plants required for their high speed necessitated a significant reduction in their armored protection. Battle cruisers fared poorly at the 1916 Battle of Jutland and senior U.S. naval officers eventually concluded that the type was worthless. See Robert L. O'Connell, Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the U.S. Navy (Boulder, 1991), pp. 241-42. Only two (Alaska and Guam) of the six expensive, lightly armored, and relatively slow Alaska-class battle cruisers were completed. Work on the third, Hawaii, was suspended in December 1943. The remaining three were not laid down and their allocations were shifted to aircraft carrier production. See Robert O. Dulin and William H. Garzke Jr., Battleships: U.S. Battleships in World War II (Annapolis, 1976), chap. 6.
3. Battle cruisers, designed as scouts for the battle fleet or as the dominant ship in guerre de course, carried guns as large as battleships, but the large propulsion plants required for their high speed necessitated a significant reduction in their armored protection. Battle cruisers fared poorly at the 1916 Battle of Jutland and senior U.S. naval officers eventually concluded that the type was worthless. See Robert L. O'Connell, Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the U.S. Navy (Boulder, 1991), pp. 241-42. Only two (Alaska and Guam) of the six expensive, lightly armored, and relatively slow Alaska-class battle cruisers were completed. Work on the third, Hawaii, was suspended in December 1943. The remaining three were not laid down and their allocations were shifted to aircraft carrier production. See Robert O. Dulin and William H. Garzke Jr., Battleships: U.S. Battleships in World War II (Annapolis, 1976), chap. 6.
4. I am referring to the concept of thought collective (Denkkollektiv) and thought style (Denkstil) elucidated by Ludwig Fleck in Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, ed. Thaddeus K. Trenn and Robert K. Merton (Chicago, 1979), p. 39.
5. Selig Adler, "Hoover's Foreign Policy and the New Left," in The Hoover Presidency: A Reappraisal, ed. Martin L. Fausold and George T. Mazuzan (Albany, 1974), pp. 153-54. Ellis W. Hawley, "Herbert Hoover and Modern American History: Sixty Years After," in Hoover and the Historians (West Branch, Iowa, 1989), quote on p. 5. A useful review of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis the Japanese is Norman A. Graebner, "Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese," in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations 1931-1941, ed. Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (New York, 1973). See also Alexander DeConde, "Herbert Hoover and Foreign Policy: A Retrospective Assessment," in Herbert Hoover Reassessed: Essays Commemorating the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Inauguration of Our Thirty-First President, Senate Document No. 96-63, 96th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, 1981), and Joan Hoff Wilson, "A Reevaluation of Herbert Hoover's Foreign Policy," in Fausold and Mazuzan (quote on p. 171).
6. Selig Adler, "Hoover's Foreign Policy and the New Left," in The Hoover Presidency: A Reappraisal, ed. Martin L. Fausold and George T. Mazuzan (Albany, 1974), pp. 153-54. Ellis W. Hawley, "Herbert Hoover and Modern American History: Sixty Years After," in Hoover and the Historians (West Branch, Iowa, 1989), quote on p. 5. A useful review of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis the Japanese is Norman A. Graebner, "Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese," in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations 1931-1941, ed. Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (New York, 1973). See also Alexander DeConde, "Herbert Hoover and Foreign Policy: A Retrospective Assessment," in Herbert Hoover Reassessed: Essays Commemorating the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Inauguration of Our Thirty-First President, Senate Document No. 96-63, 96th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, 1981), and Joan Hoff Wilson, "A Reevaluation of Herbert Hoover's Foreign Policy," in Fausold and Mazuzan (quote on p. 171).
7. Selig Adler, "Hoover's Foreign Policy and the New Left," in The Hoover Presidency: A Reappraisal, ed. Martin L. Fausold and George T. Mazuzan (Albany, 1974), pp. 153-54. Ellis W. Hawley, "Herbert Hoover and Modern American History: Sixty Years After," in Hoover and the Historians (West Branch, Iowa, 1989), quote on p. 5. A useful review of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis the Japanese is Norman A. Graebner, "Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese," in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations 1931-1941, ed. Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (New York, 1973). See also Alexander DeConde, "Herbert Hoover and Foreign Policy: A Retrospective Assessment," in Herbert Hoover Reassessed: Essays Commemorating the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Inauguration of Our Thirty-First President, Senate Document No. 96-63, 96th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, 1981), and Joan Hoff Wilson, "A Reevaluation of Herbert Hoover's Foreign Policy," in Fausold and Mazuzan (quote on p. 171).
8. Selig Adler, "Hoover's Foreign Policy and the New Left," in The Hoover Presidency: A Reappraisal, ed. Martin L. Fausold and George T. Mazuzan (Albany, 1974), pp. 153-54. Ellis W. Hawley, "Herbert Hoover and Modern American History: Sixty Years After," in Hoover and the Historians (West Branch, Iowa, 1989), quote on p. 5. A useful review of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis the Japanese is Norman A. Graebner, "Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese," in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations 1931-1941, ed. Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (New York, 1973). See also Alexander DeConde, "Herbert Hoover and Foreign Policy: A Retrospective Assessment," in Herbert Hoover Reassessed: Essays Commemorating the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Inauguration of Our Thirty-First President, Senate Document No. 96-63, 96th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, 1981), and Joan Hoff Wilson, "A Reevaluation of Herbert Hoover's Foreign Policy," in Fausold and Mazuzan (quote on p. 171).
9. Selig Adler, "Hoover's Foreign Policy and the New Left," in The Hoover Presidency: A Reappraisal, ed. Martin L. Fausold and George T. Mazuzan (Albany, 1974), pp. 153-54. Ellis W. Hawley, "Herbert Hoover and Modern American History: Sixty Years After," in Hoover and the Historians (West Branch, Iowa, 1989), quote on p. 5. A useful review of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis the Japanese is Norman A. Graebner, "Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese," in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations 1931-1941, ed. Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (New York, 1973). See also Alexander DeConde, "Herbert Hoover and Foreign Policy: A Retrospective Assessment," in Herbert Hoover Reassessed: Essays Commemorating the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Inauguration of Our Thirty-First President, Senate Document No. 96-63, 96th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, 1981), and Joan Hoff Wilson, "A Reevaluation of Herbert Hoover's Foreign Policy," in Fausold and Mazuzan (quote on p. 171).
10. Kenneth J. Hagan, This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power (New York, 1991), p. 228.
11. Philip A. Crowl, "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," in The Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, 1986).
12. Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore, 1956), pp. 38-39. Weibe J. Bijker, Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs: Toward a Theory of Sociotechnical Change (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), p. 282. Budget data from Roger Dingman, Power in the Pacific (Chicago, 1979), p. 39. For the marginalizing of aircraft and submarines, see O'Connell, chap. 6.
13. Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore, 1956), pp. 38-39. Weibe J. Bijker, Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs: Toward a Theory of Sociotechnical Change (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), p. 282. Budget data from Roger Dingman, Power in the Pacific (Chicago, 1979), p. 39. For the marginalizing of aircraft and submarines, see O'Connell, chap. 6.
14. Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore, 1956), pp. 38-39. Weibe J. Bijker, Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs: Toward a Theory of Sociotechnical Change (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), p. 282. Budget data from Roger Dingman, Power in the Pacific (Chicago, 1979), p. 39. For the marginalizing of aircraft and submarines, see O'Connell, chap. 6.
15. Since World War I the U.S. naval profession has divided itself into technologically defined thought collectives that have championed various strategic and tactical doctrines, primarily based on the battleship, submarine, and aircraft. The aviation collective in particular has advocated its own technological and strategic ascendance. These thought collectives have intersected to varying degrees, and all are subsets of the larger navalist thought collective that, until World War II, was dominated by the battleship-based strategic paradigm. For the relationships of naval officers toward their technologies, see Elting Morison, Men, Machines, and Modern Times (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), chaps. 2 and 6; O'Connell (n. 2 above); Alex Roland, Undersea Warfare in the Age of Sail (Bloomington, Ind., 1977); and Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern Navalism (New York, 1972). For an account of aviation as a challenger to the supremacy of the battleship, see William M. McBride, "Challenging a Strategic Paradigm: Aviation and the U.S. Navy Special Policy Board of 1924," Journal of Strategic Studies 14 (1991): 72-89.
16. Since World War I the U.S. naval profession has divided itself into technologically defined thought collectives that have championed various strategic and tactical doctrines, primarily based on the battleship, submarine, and aircraft. The aviation collective in particular has advocated its own technological and strategic ascendance. These thought collectives have intersected to varying degrees, and all are subsets of the larger navalist thought collective that, until World War II, was dominated by the battleship-based strategic paradigm. For the relationships of naval officers toward their technologies, see Elting Morison, Men, Machines, and Modern Times (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), chaps. 2 and 6; O'Connell (n. 2 above); Alex Roland, Undersea Warfare in the Age of Sail (Bloomington, Ind., 1977); and Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern Navalism (New York, 1972). For an account of aviation as a challenger to the supremacy of the battleship, see William M. McBride, "Challenging a Strategic Paradigm: Aviation and the U.S. Navy Special Policy Board of 1924," Journal of Strategic Studies 14 (1991): 72-89.
17. Since World War I the U.S. naval profession has divided itself into technologically defined thought collectives that have championed various strategic and tactical doctrines, primarily based on the battleship, submarine, and aircraft. The aviation collective in particular has advocated its own technological and strategic ascendance. These thought collectives have intersected to varying degrees, and all are subsets of the larger navalist thought collective that, until World War II, was dominated by the battleship-based strategic paradigm. For the relationships of naval officers toward their technologies, see Elting Morison, Men, Machines, and Modern Times (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), chaps. 2 and 6; O'Connell (n. 2 above); Alex Roland, Undersea Warfare in the Age of Sail (Bloomington, Ind., 1977); and Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern Navalism (New York, 1972). For an account of aviation as a challenger to the supremacy of the battleship, see William M. McBride, "Challenging a Strategic Paradigm: Aviation and the U.S. Navy Special Policy Board of 1924," Journal of Strategic Studies 14 (1991): 72-89.
18. Since World War I the U.S. naval profession has divided itself into technologically defined thought collectives that have championed various strategic and tactical doctrines, primarily based on the battleship, submarine, and aircraft. The aviation collective in particular has advocated its own technological and strategic ascendance. These thought collectives have intersected to varying degrees, and all are subsets of the larger navalist thought collective that, until World War II, was dominated by the battleship-based strategic paradigm. For the relationships of naval officers toward their technologies, see Elting Morison, Men, Machines, and Modern Times (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), chaps. 2 and 6; O'Connell (n. 2 above); Alex Roland, Undersea Warfare in the Age of Sail (Bloomington, Ind., 1977); and Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern Navalism (New York, 1972). For an account of aviation as a challenger to the supremacy of the battleship, see William M. McBride, "Challenging a Strategic Paradigm: Aviation and the U.S. Navy Special Policy Board of 1924," Journal of Strategic Studies 14 (1991): 72-89.
19. For the technological limits of aircraft, see McBride, "Challenging a Strategic Paradigm."
20. The one exception to Hoover's general policy was his grudging permission for the navy to transfer funding allocated for shore establishments, under the July 1932 Emergency Relief and Construction Act, to the construction of three new destroyers. See Robert H. Levine, The Politics of American Naval Rearmament, 1930-1938 (New York, 1988), pp. 41-61. Roosevelt in 1932 proposed a $100 million reduction in the annual naval budget and a $30 million cap on annual naval construction funding over the next five years. See Michael A. West, "Laying the Legislative Foundation: The House Naval Affairs Committee and the Construction of the Treaty Navy" (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1980), pp. 275-77.
21. The one exception to Hoover's general policy was his grudging permission for the navy to transfer funding allocated for shore establishments, under the July 1932 Emergency Relief and Construction Act, to the construction of three new destroyers. See Robert H. Levine, The Politics of American Naval Rearmament, 1930-1938 (New York, 1988), pp. 41-61. Roosevelt in 1932 proposed a $100 million reduction in the annual naval budget and a $30 million cap on annual naval construction funding over the next five years. See Michael A. West, "Laying the Legislative Foundation: The House Naval Affairs Committee and the Construction of the Treaty Navy" (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1980), pp. 275-77.
22. Arthur M. Schlesinger does not mention naval construction as part of the $3.3 billion NIRA public works package in his The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal (Boston, 1958). Nor is there any mention in Leuchtenburg (n. 1 above); see chap. 3, especially pp. 55-61. Frank Freidel mentions NIRA naval construction in passing, characterizing it as "palatable" to Roosevelt; see Frank Freidel Jr., Franklin D. Roosevelt: Launching the New Deal (Boston, 1973), p. 432. Freidel observes that Hoover allocated $15 million in relief funds for ships and shore bases (although he does not point out that the funds were for operation and maintenance, not new construction). See also William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology and Armed Force in European Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago, 1982), chap. 8, especially p. 270. On Cleveland and the navy, see Walter R. Herrick, The American Naval Revolution (Baton Rouge, La., 1966), pp. 160, 173-75.
23. Arthur M. Schlesinger does not mention naval construction as part of the $3.3 billion NIRA public works package in his The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal (Boston, 1958). Nor is there any mention in Leuchtenburg (n. 1 above); see chap. 3, especially pp. 55-61. Frank Freidel mentions NIRA naval construction in passing, characterizing it as "palatable" to Roosevelt; see Frank Freidel Jr., Franklin D. Roosevelt: Launching the New Deal (Boston, 1973), p. 432. Freidel observes that Hoover allocated $15 million in relief funds for ships and shore bases (although he does not point out that the funds were for operation and maintenance, not new construction). See also William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology and Armed Force in European Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago, 1982), chap. 8, especially p. 270. On Cleveland and the navy, see Walter R. Herrick, The American Naval Revolution (Baton Rouge, La., 1966), pp. 160, 173-75.
24. Arthur M. Schlesinger does not mention naval construction as part of the $3.3 billion NIRA public works package in his The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal (Boston, 1958). Nor is there any mention in Leuchtenburg (n. 1 above); see chap. 3, especially pp. 55-61. Frank Freidel mentions NIRA naval construction in passing, characterizing it as "palatable" to Roosevelt; see Frank Freidel Jr., Franklin D. Roosevelt: Launching the New Deal (Boston, 1973), p. 432. Freidel observes that Hoover allocated $15 million in relief funds for ships and shore bases (although he does not point out that the funds were for operation and maintenance, not new construction). See also William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology and Armed Force in European Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago, 1982), chap. 8, especially p. 270. On Cleveland and the navy, see Walter R. Herrick, The American Naval Revolution (Baton Rouge, La., 1966), pp. 160, 173-75.
25. Arthur M. Schlesinger does not mention naval construction as part of the $3.3 billion NIRA public works package in his The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal (Boston, 1958). Nor is there any mention in Leuchtenburg (n. 1 above); see chap. 3, especially pp. 55-61. Frank Freidel mentions NIRA naval construction in passing, characterizing it as "palatable" to Roosevelt; see Frank Freidel Jr., Franklin D. Roosevelt: Launching the New Deal (Boston, 1973), p. 432. Freidel observes that Hoover allocated $15 million in relief funds for ships and shore bases (although he does not point out that the funds were for operation and maintenance, not new construction). See also William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology and Armed Force in European Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago, 1982), chap. 8, especially p. 270. On Cleveland and the navy, see Walter R. Herrick, The American Naval Revolution (Baton Rouge, La., 1966), pp. 160, 173-75.
26. Frank Freidel Jr., "Hoover and Roosevelt and Historical Continuity," in Hoover Reassessed (n. 4 above), p. 288. Admiral Land to Secretary Swanson, June 13, 1933, Record Group 19, Records of the Bureau of Construction & Repair, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter RG 19), and Swanson to Roosevelt, June 15, 1933, Record Group 80, Records of the Secretary of the Navy, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter RG 80), cited in West, p. 329, nn. 47, 48. See also Waldo H. Heinrichs Jr., "The Role of the United States Navy," in Borg and Okamoto (n. 4 above).
27. Frank Freidel Jr., "Hoover and Roosevelt and Historical Continuity," in Hoover Reassessed (n. 4 above), p. 288. Admiral Land to Secretary Swanson, June 13, 1933, Record Group 19, Records of the Bureau of Construction & Repair, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter RG 19), and Swanson to Roosevelt, June 15, 1933, Record Group 80, Records of the Secretary of the Navy, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter RG 80), cited in West, p. 329, nn. 47, 48. See also Waldo H. Heinrichs Jr., "The Role of the United States Navy," in Borg and Okamoto (n. 4 above).
28. U.S. Senate, Hearings: Building the United States Navy to the Strength Permitted by the Washington and London Naval Treaties, 72nd Cong., 1st sess. (1932), cited in O'Connell (n. 2 above), p. 291, n. 62.
29. Dingman (n. 7 above), p. 152. Battleship numbers from Christopher Hall, Britain, America, and Arms Control, 1921-1937 (New York, 1987), p. 13, table 1.1.
30. The treaty measured naval power in capital ship tonnage, giving the United States parity with Britain while granting Japan a secondary status according to a 5:5: 3 ratio. Battleships were limited to 35,000 tons displacement, and a ten-year building holiday for battleships and battle cruisers went into effect. Britain was allowed to build two new battleships after the conference, and the United States was allowed to retain three superdreadnoughts of the 1916 program. Aircraft carriers were also limited by a ceiling on total tonnage, with each ship to displace no more than 27,000 tons. Auxiliary ships of less than 10,000 tons (cruisers, destroyers, and submarines) were not limited in any way.
31. The Five-Power Treaty did not limit aircraft. A committee of aviation experts from Britain, Japan, Italy, France, and the United States deferred discussion of the aircraft question believing "that it is not practicable to impose any effective limitations upon the numbers or characteristics of aircraft, either commercial or military, except in the single case of lighter-than-air craft. The committee is of the opinion that the use of aircraft in warfare should be governed by the rules of warfare as adapted to aircraft by a further conference which should be held at a later date"; Report of Special Committee on Limitation of Aircraft in Warfare, cited in Tenth Annual Report of the N.A.C.A. (National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics) in Aviation, December 22, 1924, reprinted in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (hereafter USNIP) 51 (1925): 493-96, quote on p. 495.
32. The Five-Power Treaty did not limit aircraft. A committee of aviation experts from Britain, Japan, Italy, France, and the United States deferred discussion of the aircraft question believing "that it is not practicable to impose any effective limitations upon the numbers or characteristics of aircraft, either commercial or military, except in the single case of lighter-than-air craft. The committee is of the opinion that the use of aircraft in warfare should be governed by the rules of warfare as adapted to aircraft by a further conference which should be held at a later date"; Report of Special Committee on Limitation of Aircraft in Warfare, cited in Tenth Annual Report of the N.A.C.A. (National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics) in Aviation, December 22, 1924, reprinted in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (hereafter USNIP) 51 (1925): 493-96, quote on p. 495.
33. The "Basic Naval Policy" may be found in General Board to Secretary of the Navy, G.B. No. 438, Serial 1347, April 21, 1927, in Foreign Affairs -Disarmament File, Presidential Papers, Hoover Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa. Trade data from Gerald E. Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The United States Navy and the Far East, 1921-1931 (Columbia, Mo., 1963), p. 190. The disagreement between Hoover and the General Board over the worldwide strategy and large navy inherent in the "Basic Naval Policy" was paralleled by late - Cold War tensions among national strategy, developed by the president/National Security Council; Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)/commander-in-chiefs' strategies, formulated by the JCS; defense strategy developed within the Department of Defense; and service strategies created within each of the armed services and used for "setting their own institutional agendas, rationalizing their requirements, and arguing for a larger or protected slice of the budget." Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore, 1989), chap. 5, quote on pp. 57-58.
34. The "Basic Naval Policy" may be found in General Board to Secretary of the Navy, G.B. No. 438, Serial 1347, April 21, 1927, in Foreign Affairs -Disarmament File, Presidential Papers, Hoover Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa. Trade data from Gerald E. Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The United States Navy and the Far East, 1921-1931 (Columbia, Mo., 1963), p. 190. The disagreement between Hoover and the General Board over the worldwide strategy and large navy inherent in the "Basic Naval Policy" was paralleled by late - Cold War tensions among national strategy, developed by the president/National Security Council; Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)/commander-in-chiefs' strategies, formulated by the JCS; defense strategy developed within the Department of Defense; and service strategies created within each of the armed services and used for "setting their own institutional agendas, rationalizing their requirements, and arguing for a larger or protected slice of the budget." Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore, 1989), chap. 5, quote on pp. 57-58.
35. "Navy Up To Par, Coolidge Believes," Washington Star, January 10, 1925, reprinted in USNIP 51 (1925): 481-82. Captain Dudley Knox, USN (Ret.), "New Naval Limitation Conference Predicted," Baltimore Sun, January 7, 1925, reprinted in USNIP 51 (1925): 498-500. For cruiser funding, see Hall, pp. 39-40.
36. "Navy Up To Par, Coolidge Believes," Washington Star, January 10, 1925, reprinted in USNIP 51 (1925): 481-82. Captain Dudley Knox, USN (Ret.), "New Naval Limitation Conference Predicted," Baltimore Sun, January 7, 1925, reprinted in USNIP 51 (1925): 498-500. For cruiser funding, see Hall, pp. 39-40.
37. "Navy Up To Par, Coolidge Believes," Washington Star, January 10, 1925, reprinted in USNIP 51 (1925): 481-82. Captain Dudley Knox, USN (Ret.), "New Naval Limitation Conference Predicted," Baltimore Sun, January 7, 1925, reprinted in USNIP 51 (1925): 498-500. For cruiser funding, see Hall, pp. 39-40.
38. "Navy Up To Par, Coolidge Believes," Washington Star, January 10, 1925, reprinted in USNIP 51 (1925): 481-82. Captain Dudley Knox, USN (Ret.), "New Naval Limitation Conference Predicted," Baltimore Sun, January 7, 1925, reprinted in USNIP 51 (1925): 498-500. For cruiser funding, see Hall, pp. 39-40.
39. "Navy Up To Par, Coolidge Believes," Washington Star, January 10, 1925, reprinted in USNIP 51 (1925): 481-82. Captain Dudley Knox, USN (Ret.), "New Naval Limitation Conference Predicted," Baltimore Sun, January 7, 1925, reprinted in USNIP 51 (1925): 498-500. For cruiser funding, see Hall, pp. 39-40.
40. See Wheeler, chap. 6 and Hall, p. 58. See O'Connell (n. 2 above), p. 292. Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, December 1928, quoted in Raymond G. O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium: The United States and the London Naval Conference of 1930 (New York, 1969), p. 20.
41. See Wheeler, chap. 6 and Hall, p. 58. See O'Connell (n. 2 above), p. 292. Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, December 1928, quoted in Raymond G. O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium: The United States and the London Naval Conference of 1930 (New York, 1969), p. 20.
42. See Wilson (n. 4 above). As William Appleman Williams observed, Hoover believed that "[t]he armed forces of the United States had the one purpose of guaranteeing 'That no foreign soldier will land on American soil. To maintain forces less than that strength is to destroy national safety, to maintain greater forces is not only economic injury to our people but a threat against our neighbors and would be a righteous cause for ill will among them.'" William Appleman Williams, "What This Country Needs . . . The Shattered Dream: Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression," in Hoover Reassessed (n. 4 above), p. 445.
43. Hoover in a statement to his cabinet, reprinted in Ray L. Wilbur and Arthur M. Hyde, The Hoover Policies (New York, 1937), p. 601. Hoover published J. Reuben Clark's memorandum, suppressed by Coolidge, which invalidated use of the Monroe Doctrine as a justification for U.S. intervention in Latin America; Williams, p. 444.
44. Hoover in a statement to his cabinet, reprinted in Ray L. Wilbur and Arthur M. Hyde, The Hoover Policies (New York, 1937), p. 601. Hoover published J. Reuben Clark's memorandum, suppressed by Coolidge, which invalidated use of the Monroe Doctrine as a justification for U.S. intervention in Latin America; Williams, p. 444.
45. Military historiography also generally lauds Roosevelt while castigating the New Era Republicans. In light of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, Hoover, Calvin Coolidge, and Warren Harding at best were misguided in their pursuit of international arms reductions. Dudley Knox, the navy's interwar court historian, characterized treaty limitations as "disappointing" and the reason for the "defeat" of the Open Door Policy. Knox claimed that the opposite would have occurred had New Era Republicans emulated the "strong naval policies" of Theodore Roosevelt or followed "the wisdom of President Wilson in striving, after 1916, to create a preeminent American Navy"; Dudley W. Knox, A History of the United States Navy (New York, 1948), p. 431. See also Philip T. Rosen, "The Treaty Navy, 1919-1937," in In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775-1984, ed. Kenneth J. Hagan (Westport, 1984). More recently, Robert W. Love has claimed that Hoover had a "crabbed view of the utility of naval power" and characterized his defense policies as "eccentric" and Hoover as a "pacifist"; Robert W. Love Jr., History of the U.S. Navy, 1775-1941 (Harrisburg, 1992), pp. 558-59. Stephen Pelz simply writes off Hoover and attributes "a fateful delay in American naval building" not to the New Era Republicans but to Roosevelt's difficulties with Congress; Stephen E. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), p. 5. For a more balanced recent treatment, see Dean C. Allard, "Naval Rearmament, 1930-1941: An American Perspective," Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire 73 (1991): 35-54.
46. Military historiography also generally lauds Roosevelt while castigating the New Era Republicans. In light of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, Hoover, Calvin Coolidge, and Warren Harding at best were misguided in their pursuit of international arms reductions. Dudley Knox, the navy's interwar court historian, characterized treaty limitations as "disappointing" and the reason for the "defeat" of the Open Door Policy. Knox claimed that the opposite would have occurred had New Era Republicans emulated the "strong naval policies" of Theodore Roosevelt or followed "the wisdom of President Wilson in striving, after 1916, to create a preeminent American Navy"; Dudley W. Knox, A History of the United States Navy (New York, 1948), p. 431. See also Philip T. Rosen, "The Treaty Navy, 1919-1937," in In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775-1984, ed. Kenneth J. Hagan (Westport, 1984). More recently, Robert W. Love has claimed that Hoover had a "crabbed view of the utility of naval power" and characterized his defense policies as "eccentric" and Hoover as a "pacifist"; Robert W. Love Jr., History of the U.S. Navy, 1775-1941 (Harrisburg, 1992), pp. 558-59. Stephen Pelz simply writes off Hoover and attributes "a fateful delay in American naval building" not to the New Era Republicans but to Roosevelt's difficulties with Congress; Stephen E. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), p. 5. For a more balanced recent treatment, see Dean C. Allard, "Naval Rearmament, 1930-1941: An American Perspective," Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire 73 (1991): 35-54.
47. Military historiography also generally lauds Roosevelt while castigating the New Era Republicans. In light of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, Hoover, Calvin Coolidge, and Warren Harding at best were misguided in their pursuit of international arms reductions. Dudley Knox, the navy's interwar court historian, characterized treaty limitations as "disappointing" and the reason for the "defeat" of the Open Door Policy. Knox claimed that the opposite would have occurred had New Era Republicans emulated the "strong naval policies" of Theodore Roosevelt or followed "the wisdom of President Wilson in striving, after 1916, to create a preeminent American Navy"; Dudley W. Knox, A History of the United States Navy (New York, 1948), p. 431. See also Philip T. Rosen, "The Treaty Navy, 1919-1937," in In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775-1984, ed. Kenneth J. Hagan (Westport, 1984). More recently, Robert W. Love has claimed that Hoover had a "crabbed view of the utility of naval power" and characterized his defense policies as "eccentric" and Hoover as a "pacifist"; Robert W. Love Jr., History of the U.S. Navy, 1775-1941 (Harrisburg, 1992), pp. 558-59. Stephen Pelz simply writes off Hoover and attributes "a fateful delay in American naval building" not to the New Era Republicans but to Roosevelt's difficulties with Congress; Stephen E. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), p. 5. For a more balanced recent treatment, see Dean C. Allard, "Naval Rearmament, 1930-1941: An American Perspective," Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire 73 (1991): 35-54.
48. Military historiography also generally lauds Roosevelt while castigating the New Era Republicans. In light of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, Hoover, Calvin Coolidge, and Warren Harding at best were misguided in their pursuit of international arms reductions. Dudley Knox, the navy's interwar court historian, characterized treaty limitations as "disappointing" and the reason for the "defeat" of the Open Door Policy. Knox claimed that the opposite would have occurred had New Era Republicans emulated the "strong naval policies" of Theodore Roosevelt or followed "the wisdom of President Wilson in striving, after 1916, to create a preeminent American Navy"; Dudley W. Knox, A History of the United States Navy (New York, 1948), p. 431. See also Philip T. Rosen, "The Treaty Navy, 1919-1937," in In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775-1984, ed. Kenneth J. Hagan (Westport, 1984). More recently, Robert W. Love has claimed that Hoover had a "crabbed view of the utility of naval power" and characterized his defense policies as "eccentric" and Hoover as a "pacifist"; Robert W. Love Jr., History of the U.S. Navy, 1775-1941 (Harrisburg, 1992), pp. 558-59. Stephen Pelz simply writes off Hoover and attributes "a fateful delay in American naval building" not to the New Era Republicans but to Roosevelt's difficulties with Congress; Stephen E. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), p. 5. For a more balanced recent treatment, see Dean C. Allard, "Naval Rearmament, 1930-1941: An American Perspective," Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire 73 (1991): 35-54.
49. Military historiography also generally lauds Roosevelt while castigating the New Era Republicans. In light of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, Hoover, Calvin Coolidge, and Warren Harding at best were misguided in their pursuit of international arms reductions. Dudley Knox, the navy's interwar court historian, characterized treaty limitations as "disappointing" and the reason for the "defeat" of the Open Door Policy. Knox claimed that the opposite would have occurred had New Era Republicans emulated the "strong naval policies" of Theodore Roosevelt or followed "the wisdom of President Wilson in striving, after 1916, to create a preeminent American Navy"; Dudley W. Knox, A History of the United States Navy (New York, 1948), p. 431. See also Philip T. Rosen, "The Treaty Navy, 1919-1937," in In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775-1984, ed. Kenneth J. Hagan (Westport, 1984). More recently, Robert W. Love has claimed that Hoover had a "crabbed view of the utility of naval power" and characterized his defense policies as "eccentric" and Hoover as a "pacifist"; Robert W. Love Jr., History of the U.S. Navy, 1775-1941 (Harrisburg, 1992), pp. 558-59. Stephen Pelz simply writes off Hoover and attributes "a fateful delay in American naval building" not to the New Era Republicans but to Roosevelt's difficulties with Congress; Stephen E. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), p. 5. For a more balanced recent treatment, see Dean C. Allard, "Naval Rearmament, 1930-1941: An American Perspective," Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire 73 (1991): 35-54.
50. Herbert C. Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and Presidency, 1920-1933 (New York, 1952), p. 340. In the fall of 1929, the navy had 331 ships in commission: 16 battleships, 15 cruisers, 3 aircraft carriers, 8 minelayers, 103 destroyers, 82 submarines, 29 patrol ships, and 75 noncombatant service ships. Report of the Chief of Naval Operations in Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1929 (Including Operations to November 15, 1929) (Washington, D.C., 1929), pp. 79- 80.
51. Herbert C. Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and Presidency, 1920-1933 (New York, 1952), p. 340. In the fall of 1929, the navy had 331 ships in commission: 16 battleships, 15 cruisers, 3 aircraft carriers, 8 minelayers, 103 destroyers, 82 submarines, 29 patrol ships, and 75 noncombatant service ships. Report of the Chief of Naval Operations in Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1929 (Including Operations to November 15, 1929) (Washington, D.C., 1929), pp. 79-80.
52. Sperry pointed out to Hoover that measuring naval strength by tonnage alone was inaccurate; telephone message from Sperry to Hoover, December 12, 1921, Limitation of Armaments Conference File, Commerce Papers, Hoover Papers, Hoover Library. Hoover was serving as a member of the executive committee of the U.S. Advisory Committee to the American Delegation.
53. General Board to Secretary of the Navy, G.B. No. 438-1, Serial 1427, June 10, 1929, Foreign Affairs - Disarmament File, Presidential Papers, Hoover Papers, Hoover Library. On U.S. naval war gaming, see Ronald H. Spector, Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession (Newport, R.I., 1977), chap. 6, especially pp. 74-82.
54. See the detailed formulas contained in General Board to Secretary of the Navy, G.B. No. 438-1, Serial 1430 (Secret), August 1, 1929, Foreign Affairs -Disarmament File, Presidential Papers, Hoover Papers, Hoover Library.
55. For an overview of the London naval conference, see Wheeler (n. 17 above), chap. 7, and O'Connor (n. 19 above). No notes were taken during the Hoover-MacDonald meeting; Hall (n. 14 above), pp. 78-79.
56. For a view of the London conference from the Japanese side, see Kobiyashi Tatsuo, "The London Naval Treaty, 1930," Japan Erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, 1928-1932, ed. James William Morley (New York, 1984). The Japanese government of Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi saw Japan's future in a reordering of the domestic economy and expansion of foreign trade. Naval agreement at London was viewed as essential to buy Western support for a solution to Japan's economic problems; Arthur E. Tiedemann, introduction to Japan Erupts, p. 9. Hall, p. 80.
57. For a view of the London conference from the Japanese side, see Kobiyashi Tatsuo, "The London Naval Treaty, 1930," Japan Erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, 1928-1932, ed. James William Morley (New York, 1984). The Japanese government of Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi saw Japan's future in a reordering of the domestic economy and expansion of foreign trade. Naval agreement at London was viewed as essential to buy Western support for a solution to Japan's economic problems; Arthur E. Tiedemann, introduction to Japan Erupts, p. 9. Hall, p. 80.
58. For a view of the London conference from the Japanese side, see Kobiyashi Tatsuo, "The London Naval Treaty, 1930," Japan Erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, 1928-1932, ed. James William Morley (New York, 1984). The Japanese government of Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi saw Japan's future in a reordering of the domestic economy and expansion of foreign trade. Naval agreement at London was viewed as essential to buy Western support for a solution to Japan's economic problems; Arthur E. Tiedemann, introduction to Japan Erupts, p. 9. Hall, p. 80.
59. Hoover to Secretary of the Navy, November 2, 1929, Foreign Affairs - Disarmament File, Disarmament Conference 1929, November 1-10 Folder, Presidential Papers, Hoover Papers, Hoover Library.
60. See Wheeler, chap. 7, and William F. Trimble, "Admiral Hilary P. Jones and the 1927 Geneva Naval Conference," Military Affairs 43 (1979): 1-4. For Pratt, see Gerald E. Wheeler, Admiral William Veazie Pratt, U.S. Navy: A Sailor's Life (Washington, D.C., 1974) and the useful contextual essay by Craig L. Symonds, "William Veazie Pratt: 17 September 1930-30 June 1933," in The Chiefs of Naval Operations, ed. Robert W. Love Jr. (Annapolis, 1980).
61. See Wheeler, chap. 7, and William F. Trimble, "Admiral Hilary P. Jones and the 1927 Geneva Naval Conference," Military Affairs 43 (1979): 1-4. For Pratt, see Gerald E. Wheeler, Admiral William Veazie Pratt, U.S. Navy: A Sailor's Life (Washington, D.C., 1974) and the useful contextual essay by Craig L. Symonds, "William Veazie Pratt: 17 September 1930-30 June 1933," in The Chiefs of Naval Operations, ed. Robert W. Love Jr. (Annapolis, 1980).
62. See Wheeler, chap. 7, and William F. Trimble, "Admiral Hilary P. Jones and the 1927 Geneva Naval Conference," Military Affairs 43 (1979): 1-4. For Pratt, see Gerald E. Wheeler, Admiral William Veazie Pratt, U.S. Navy: A Sailor's Life (Washington, D.C., 1974) and the useful contextual essay by Craig L. Symonds, "William Veazie Pratt: 17 September 1930-30 June 1933," in The Chiefs of Naval Operations, ed. Robert W. Love Jr. (Annapolis, 1980).
63. Hall, p. 101.
64. Both cruiser and submarine tonnage ratios were critical to Japanese strategic and tactical planning regarding war with the United States. Both ship types were necessary to reduce the advancing U.S. fleet through attrition to a size comparable to the Japanese fleet; Tiedemann, p. 9. On submarines, see O'Connell (n. 2 above), pp. 295-96. See also Edward P. Stafford, The Far and the Deep (New York, 1967).
65. Both cruiser and submarine tonnage ratios were critical to Japanese strategic and tactical planning regarding war with the United States. Both ship types were necessary to reduce the advancing U.S. fleet through attrition to a size comparable to the Japanese fleet; Tiedemann, p. 9. On submarines, see O'Connell (n. 2 above), pp. 295-96. See also Edward P. Stafford, The Far and the Deep (New York, 1967).
66. Both cruiser and submarine tonnage ratios were critical to Japanese strategic and tactical planning regarding war with the United States. Both ship types were necessary to reduce the advancing U.S. fleet through attrition to a size comparable to the Japanese fleet; Tiedemann, p. 9. On submarines, see O'Connell (n. 2 above), pp. 295-96. See also Edward P. Stafford, The Far and the Deep (New York, 1967).
67. Department of State, press release, April 12, 1930, cited in Hall, p. 104, n. 82. This mirrored the $1.17 billion Navy Department proposal for new ships submitted to the director of the budget the previous year. Secretary of State Stimson pointed out that one modern 10,000-ton cruiser cost more than double the original price of the Library of Congress; Secretary of State Press Release, May 31, 1929, Foreign Affairs - Disarmament File, Presidential Papers, Hoover Papers, Hoover Library. Also see Hall, pp. 106-7.
68. Quotes from President Hoover's message to the Senate reprinted in Hoover, Memoirs (n. 23 above), pp. 349-52. Also see West (n. 10 above), p. 32.
69. Quotes from President Hoover's message to the Senate reprinted in Hoover, Memoirs (n. 23 above), pp. 349-52. Also see West (n. 10 above), p. 32.
70. Hall, pp. 116-17. Historical characterizations of the naval budget reductions as "meat-ax" cuts accept the contemporary navy's view of the worldwide scope of its mission and are influenced by post facto knowledge of the conflict with Japan. See, for example, Robert G. Albion, Makers of Naval Policy, 1798-1947 (Annapolis, 1980), chap. 12, and West, pp. 49-50. They ignore the fact that that definition of the navy's mission had been drafted by the General Board, which sought to aggrandize the navy through the adoption of the most comprehensive strategic responsibilities.
71. Hall, pp. 116-17. Historical characterizations of the naval budget reductions as "meat-ax" cuts accept the contemporary navy's view of the worldwide scope of its mission and are influenced by post facto knowledge of the conflict with Japan. See, for example, Robert G. Albion, Makers of Naval Policy, 1798-1947 (Annapolis, 1980), chap. 12, and West, pp. 49-50. They ignore the fact that that definition of the navy's mission had been drafted by the General Board, which sought to aggrandize the navy through the adoption of the most comprehensive strategic responsibilities.
72. Hall, pp. 116-17. Historical characterizations of the naval budget reductions as "meat-ax" cuts accept the contemporary navy's view of the worldwide scope of its mission and are influenced by post facto knowledge of the conflict with Japan. See, for example, Robert G. Albion, Makers of Naval Policy, 1798-1947 (Annapolis, 1980), chap. 12, and West, pp. 49-50. They ignore the fact that that definition of the navy's mission had been drafted by the General Board, which sought to aggrandize the navy through the adoption of the most comprehensive strategic responsibilities.
73. William L. Neumann, "Franklin Delano Roosevelt: A Disciple of Admiral Mahan," USNIP 78 (1952): 713-19, esp. p. 718. Eleanor Roosevelt said that her husband had always characterized Mahan's histories as books that he found "most illuminating"; ibid, p. 719. Two of Roosevelt's appointees as chief of naval operations (CNO) during the 1930s were eminent members of the "Gun Club": Admirals William D. Leahy and Harold Stark. The successful careers of these Bureau of Ordnance officers, or rather the popularity of ordnance officers with Congress and politicians in general, may be linked with the great number of ordnance facilities scattered around the country and the magnitude of the contracts for armor plate and weapons that the bureau handled. See Albion, pp. 170-71, and p. 384 on the "Gun Club." For useful treatments of these two prewar CNOs, see John Major, "William Daniel Leahy, 2 January 1937-1 August 1939" and B. Mitchell Simpson III, "Harold Raynsford Stark, 1 August 1939-26 March 1942," both in Love, Chiefs of Naval Operations (n. 30 above).
74. William L. Neumann, "Franklin Delano Roosevelt: A Disciple of Admiral Mahan," USNIP 78 (1952): 713-19, esp. p. 718. Eleanor Roosevelt said that her husband had always characterized Mahan's histories as books that he found "most illuminating"; ibid, p. 719. Two of Roosevelt's appointees as chief of naval operations (CNO) during the 1930s were eminent members of the "Gun Club": Admirals William D. Leahy and Harold Stark. The successful careers of these Bureau of Ordnance officers, or rather the popularity of ordnance officers with Congress and politicians in general, may be linked with the great number of ordnance facilities scattered around the country and the magnitude of the contracts for armor plate and weapons that the bureau handled. See Albion, pp. 170-71, and p. 384 on the "Gun Club." For useful treatments of these two prewar CNOs, see John Major, "William Daniel Leahy, 2 January 1937-1 August 1939" and B. Mitchell Simpson III, "Harold Raynsford Stark, 1 August 1939-26 March 1942," both in Love, Chiefs of Naval Operations (n. 30 above).
75. William L. Neumann, "Franklin Delano Roosevelt: A Disciple of Admiral Mahan," USNIP 78 (1952): 713-19, esp. p. 718. Eleanor Roosevelt said that her husband had always characterized Mahan's histories as books that he found "most illuminating"; ibid, p. 719. Two of Roosevelt's appointees as chief of naval operations (CNO) during the 1930s were eminent members of the "Gun Club": Admirals William D. Leahy and Harold Stark. The successful careers of these Bureau of Ordnance officers, or rather the popularity of ordnance officers with Congress and politicians in general, may be linked with the great number of ordnance facilities scattered around the country and the magnitude of the contracts for armor plate and weapons that the bureau handled. See Albion, pp. 170-71, and p. 384 on the "Gun Club." For useful treatments of these two prewar CNOs, see John Major, "William Daniel Leahy, 2 January 1937-1 August 1939" and B. Mitchell Simpson III, "Harold Raynsford Stark, 1 August 1939-26 March 1942," both in Love, Chiefs of Naval Operations (n. 30 above).
76. William L. Neumann, "Franklin Delano Roosevelt: A Disciple of Admiral Mahan," USNIP 78 (1952): 713-19, esp. p. 718. Eleanor Roosevelt said that her husband had always characterized Mahan's histories as books that he found "most illuminating"; ibid, p. 719. Two of Roosevelt's appointees as chief of naval operations (CNO) during the 1930s were eminent members of the "Gun Club": Admirals William D. Leahy and Harold Stark. The successful careers of these Bureau of Ordnance officers, or rather the popularity of ordnance officers with Congress and politicians in general, may be linked with the great number of ordnance facilities scattered around the country and the magnitude of the contracts for armor plate and weapons that the bureau handled. See Albion, pp. 170-71, and p. 384 on the "Gun Club." For useful treatments of these two prewar CNOs, see John Major, "William Daniel Leahy, 2 January 1937-1 August 1939" and B. Mitchell Simpson III, "Harold Raynsford Stark, 1 August 1939-26 March 1942," both in Love, Chiefs of Naval Operations (n. 30 above).
77. William L. Neumann, "Franklin Delano Roosevelt: A Disciple of Admiral Mahan," USNIP 78 (1952): 713-19, esp. p. 718. Eleanor Roosevelt said that her husband had always characterized Mahan's histories as books that he found "most illuminating"; ibid, p. 719. Two of Roosevelt's appointees as chief of naval operations (CNO) during the 1930s were eminent members of the "Gun Club": Admirals William D. Leahy and Harold Stark. The successful careers of these Bureau of Ordnance officers, or rather the popularity of ordnance officers with Congress and politicians in general, may be linked with the great number of ordnance facilities scattered around the country and the magnitude of the contracts for armor plate and weapons that the bureau handled. See Albion, pp. 170-71, and p. 384 on the "Gun Club." For useful treatments of these two prewar CNOs, see John Major, "William Daniel Leahy, 2 January 1937-1 August 1939" and B. Mitchell Simpson III, "Harold Raynsford Stark, 1 August 1939-26 March 1942," both in Love, Chiefs of Naval Operations (n. 30 above).
78. Albion, p. 67. On Roosevelt as ship designer, see, for example, Roosevelt to Captain Wilson, December 17, 1934; Roosevelt to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, March 15, 1938; and Roosevelt to Commander Callaghan, August 29, 1938, all in President's Official File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. (hereafter FDR Official File), 18s.
79. See the correspondence on this dating from the fall of 1938 in FDR Official File 18i. Also of interest is Douglas H. Robinson and Charles L. Keller, "Up Ship!": A History of the U.S. Navy's Rigid Airships (Annapolis, 1982).
80. Standley quoted in Thaddeus V. Tuleja, Statesmen and Admirals: Quest for a Far Eastern Naval Policy (New York, 1963), p. 91. While Theodore Roosevelt was instrumental in the rise of the U.S. Navy, his relationship with the service involved policy rather than technology issues. Although he ordered the Newport Conference of 1908 to review the charges made by William Sims and others that U.S. capital ship designs were inferior, Roosevelt did not interfere and let the naval hierarchy, and its technical experts, sort things out.
81. Felix Herbert, Republican National Committee, to Lawrence Richey, secretary to President Hoover, October 20, 1932, Navy Correspondence File, Presidential Papers - Cabinet, Hoover Papers, Hoover Library. Commander Whortley, memorandum to all naval reserve officers in the Great Lakes area, October 5, 1932, Naval Reserve File, Presidential Papers - Subject File, Hoover Papers, Hoover Library.
82. Harold G. Brownson, "The Naval Policy of the United States," USNIP 59 (1933) and editor's comments, both cited in Neumann (n. 36 above), p. 719.
83. A recent treatment of Stark is B. Mitchell Simpson, Admiral Harold R. Stark: Architect of Victory, 1939-1945 (Columbia, Mo., 1989).
84. Stark to Roosevelt, June 22, 1933, and Stark to Roosevelt, March 21, 1933, President's Personal File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. (hereafter FDR Personal File), Box 166.
85. For Vinson's experiences during his first term as chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee and his work for renewed naval construction, see West (n. 10 above), chap. 4. New York Times, November 30, 1932, cited in West, p. 276, n. 4; also see pp. 275-77.
86. For Vinson's experiences during his first term as chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee and his work for renewed naval construction, see West (n. 10 above), chap. 4. New York Times, November 30, 1932, cited in West, p. 276, n. 4; also see pp. 275-77.
87. For Vinson's experiences during his first term as chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee and his work for renewed naval construction, see West (n. 10 above), chap. 4. New York Times, November 30, 1932, cited in West, p. 276, n. 4; also see pp. 275-77.
88. West, pp. 299-305; Secretary Adams to Congressman Vinson, December 22, 1932, RG 80, quoted on pp. 299-300. See also Navy Department, The United States Navy in Peace Time: The Navy in Its Relation to the Industrial, Scientific, Economic, and Political Development of the Nation (Washington, D.C., 1931).
89. West, pp. 299-305; Secretary Adams to Congressman Vinson, December 22, 1932, RG 80, quoted on pp. 299-300. See also Navy Department, The United States Navy in Peace Time: The Navy in Its Relation to the Industrial, Scientific, Economic, and Political Development of the Nation (Washington, D.C., 1931).
90. West, pp. 299-305; Secretary Adams to Congressman Vinson, December 22, 1932, RG 80, quoted on pp. 299-300. See also Navy Department, The United States Navy in Peace Time: The Navy in Its Relation to the Industrial, Scientific, Economic, and Political Development of the Nation (Washington, D.C., 1931).
91. Secretary Swanson wrote: "The recent [NIRA shipbuilding] program is in close accord with the purposes of the National Recovery Act, since it will substantially aid unemployment and the restoration of commercial, industrial, and agricultural activity. Approximately 85 percent of the moneys spent on this naval construction will go directly into the pockets of labor; about half at the shipyards and the remainder scattered throughout the country among the producers and fabricators of raw materials. Every State will benefit." Department of the Navy, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for the Fiscal Year 1933 (Washington, D.C., 1933), p. 2.
92. New York Times, March 21, 1933, cited in West, p. 305, n. 24. Commander A.B. Court, memorandum to Chief of Naval Operations, "History of development of current Naval Building Programs, and the effect of these programs on Treaty Strength," July 8, 1934, RG 80, cited in West, p. 305, n. 25.
93. New York Times, March 21, 1933, cited in West, p. 305, n. 24. Commander A.B. Court, memorandum to Chief of Naval Operations, "History of
94. Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly: A Study in Economic Ambivalence (Princeton, 1966), pp. 24-25. West, p. 295.
95. Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly: A Study in Economic Ambivalence (Princeton, 1966), pp. 24-25. West, p. 295.
96. Roosevelt's message to foreign leaders, his message to Congress, and foreign replies are reprinted in Franklin D. Roosevelt, Roosevelt's, Foreign Policy, 1933-1941: Franklin D. Roosevelt's Unedited Speeches and Messages (New York, 1942), pp. 11-19. My quotations are from p. 12 and p. 14, respectively.
97. These letters are typical of those in FDR Official File 18.
98. Moley wrote "if Franklin Roosevelt can be said to have had any philosophy at all, that philosophy rested on the fundamental belief that the success of concerted international action toward recovery presupposed the beginnings of recovery at home. He did not believe that our depression could be conquered by international measures." Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York, 1939), p 88. This assessment is echoed by Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. in The Age of Roosevelt: The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933 (Boston, 1957), p. 442.
99. Moley wrote "if Franklin Roosevelt can be said to have had any philosophy at all, that philosophy rested on the fundamental belief that the success of concerted international action toward recovery presupposed the beginnings of recovery at home. He did not believe that our depression could be conquered by international measures." Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York, 1939), p 88. This assessment is echoed by Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. in The Age of Roosevelt: The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933 (Boston, 1957), p. 442.
100. Roosevelt to Assistant Navy Secretary H. L. Roosevelt, June 18, 1934, FDR Official File 18.
101. CNO to Secretary of the Navy, March 24, 1933, an enclosure to Secretary Swanson to Roosevelt, April 5, 1933, in FDR Official File 18, Box 12.
102. On the technological limits placed by Congress on the first battleships, see John C. Reilly and Robert L. Scheina, American Battleships, 1886-1923: Predreadnought Design and Construction (Annapolis, 1980), chaps. 3-6. West (n. 10 above), pp. 326- 28.
103. On the technological limits placed by Congress on the first battleships, see John C. Reilly and Robert L. Scheina, American Battleships, 1886-1923: Predreadnought Design and Construction (Annapolis, 1980), chaps. 3-6. West (n. 10 above), pp. 326-28.
104. Department of the Navy, Annual Report (n. 46 above), "Appendix: United States Naval Policy."
105. Admiral Land to Secretary Swanson, June 13, 1933, RG 19, and Swanson to Roosevelt, June 15, 1933, RG 80, cited in West, p. 329, nn. 47, 48. New York Times, August 3, 1933, cited in West, p. 331, n. 54.
106. Admiral Land to Secretary Swanson, June 13, 1933, RG 19, and Swanson to Roosevelt, June 15, 1933, RG 80, cited in West, p. 329, nn. 47, 48. New York Times, August 3, 1933, cited in West, p. 331, n. 54.
107. Shipyards located in Democratic strongholds that received NIRA contracts were Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia; Bethlehem Shipbuilding in Quincy, Massachusetts; New York Shipbuilding in Camden, New Jersey; Federal Shipbuilding in Kearny, New Jersey; United Dry Dock in New York City; and the Boston, Philadelphia, New York, Charleston, and Norfolk Navy Yards. Navy Press Release, June 19, 1933, RG 80, cited in West, p. 332, n. 55. On Newall's conversion see Roger S. McGrath to Louis Howe, Presidential Secretary, August 15, 1933, FDR Official File 18.
108. Regarding the funding, see New York Times, June 17, 1933, cited in West, p. 330, n. 51. For the Morrow Board and the thousand-plane navy, see Archibald D. Turnbull and Clifford L. Lord, History of United States Naval Aviation (New Haven, Conn., 1949), chaps. 23 and 24.
109. Regarding the funding, see New York Times, June 17, 1933, cited in West, p. 330, n. 51. For the Morrow Board and the thousand-plane navy, see Archibald D. Turnbull and Clifford L. Lord, History of United States Naval Aviation (New Haven, Conn., 1949), chaps. 23 and 24.
110. King to Secretary of the Navy, August 11, 1933, serial Aer-P-3-ML, FDR Official File 18. Secretary of the Navy to Secretary Ickes, August 10, 1933, FDR Official File 18.
111. West, pp. 338-40.
112. West, pp. 348-64. See John C. Walter, "William Harrison Standley: 1 July 1933- 1 January 1937" in Love, Chiefs of Naval Operations (n. 30 above) and West, p. 375. Secretary Cordell Hull to Roosevelt, February 21, 1934, FDR Personal File 5901.
113. West, pp. 348-64. See John C. Walter, "William Harrison Standley: 1 July 1933-1 January 1937" in Love, Chiefs of Naval Operations (n. 30 above) and West, p. 375. Secretary Cordell Hull to Roosevelt, February 21, 1934, FDR Personal File 5901.
114. West, pp. 348-64. See John C. Walter, "William Harrison Standley: 1 July 1933- 1 January 1937" in Love, Chiefs of Naval Operations (n. 30 above) and West, p. 375. Secretary Cordell Hull to Roosevelt, February 21, 1934, FDR Personal File 5901.
115. Senator Park Trammell was an old warhorse who initiated similar legislation in the Senate. On enactment of the Vinson-Trammell Act see West, chap. 6. See also Roosevelt's statement in the New York Herald, March 28, 1934, reprinted in West, p. 435. On WPA funding, see West, p. 436.
116. Arthur J. Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy; Strategic Illusions, 1936-1941 (Oxford, 1981), p. 9.
117. Sadao Asada, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," in Borg and Okamoto (n. 4 above). According to Asada, the 1930 London Naval Treaty aggravated "internal splits within the navy and a steady erosion of the top ministry leadership by the high command and middle-echelon officers. . . . With the rise of violently anti-British, anti-American, and pro-German elements, the navy's policy was increasingly dominated by highly emotional modes of thinking and myopic strategic preoccupations. By the mid-1930s the 'moderate' naval leadership had been reduced to a decided minority" (pp. 225-26). For opposition to the Five-Power Treaty, see Sadao Asada, "Japanese Admirals and the Politics of Naval Limitation: Katō Tomosaburo and Katō Kanji" in Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century, 1900-1945: Essays in Honour of Arthur Marder, ed. Gerald Jordan (London, 1977).
118. Sadao Asada, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," in Borg and Okamoto (n. 4 above). According to Asada, the 1930 London Naval Treaty aggravated "internal splits within the navy and a steady erosion of the top ministry leadership by the high command and middle-echelon officers. . . . With the rise of violently anti- British, anti-American, and pro-German elements, the navy's policy was increasingly dominated by highly emotional modes of thinking and myopic strategic preoccupations. By the mid-1930s the 'moderate' naval leadership had been reduced to a decided minority" (pp. 225-26). For opposition to the Five-Power Treaty, see Sadao Asada, "Japanese Admirals and the Politics of Naval Limitation: Katō Tomosaburo and Katō Kanji" in Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century, 1900-1945: Essays in Honour of Arthur Marder, ed. Gerald Jordan (London, 1977).
119. Pelz (n. 22 above), pp. 19, 25; Tuleja (n. 39 above), p. 95; also see "Warship Building," Japan Advertiser, December 25, 1935, reprinted in USNIP 62 (1936): 435- 37.
120. Pelz (n. 22 above), pp. 19, 25; Tuleja (n. 39 above), p. 95; also see "Warship Building," Japan Advertiser, December 25, 1935, reprinted in USNIP 62 (1936): 435- 37.
121. Pelz (n. 22 above), pp. 19, 25; Tuleja (n. 39 above), p. 95; also see "Warship Building," Japan Advertiser, December 25, 1935, reprinted in USNIP 62 (1936): 435- 37.
122. Pelz (n. 22 above), pp. 19, 25; Tuleja (n. 39 above), p. 95; also see "Warship Building," Japan Advertiser, December 25, 1935, reprinted in USNIP 62 (1936): 435-37.
123. Asada, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," pp. 240-42. Resignation of the navy minister would have caused a constitutional crisis. On the Japanese domestic decision to abrogate the ratio system, see Pelz, chaps. 1, 3, and 4.
124. Asada, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," p. 235. The Japanese relied on their new Type 6 submarines and torpedo-carrying Mitsubishi Type 96 bombers stationed in the Marshall and Caroline Islands; see Pelz, also Tuleja, pp. 88-89, and Asada, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," p. 243 and n. 81. As Asada observes, such a strategy assumed the United States would pursue a decisive fleet encounter early in the war rather than build up overwhelming strength before advancing westward. The Japanese strategy for war with the United States was consistently myopic. The 1936 Tactical Plan, for example, specified only initial stages of operations against the United States; later stages would be "expedient measures as the occasion may demand" ("The Japanese Navy and the United States," p. 236).
125. Asada, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," p. 235. The Japanese relied on their new Type 6 submarines and torpedo-carrying Mitsubishi Type 96 bombers stationed in the Marshall and Caroline Islands; see Pelz, also Tuleja, pp. 88-89, and Asada, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," p. 243 and n. 81. As Asada observes, such a strategy assumed the United States would pursue a decisive fleet encounter early in the war rather than build up overwhelming strength before advancing westward. The Japanese strategy for war with the United States was consistently myopic. The 1936 Tactical Plan, for example, specified only initial stages of operations against the United States; later stages would be "expedient measures as the occasion may demand" ("The Japanese Navy and the United States," p. 236).
126. Asada, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," p. 235. The Japanese relied on their new Type 6 submarines and torpedo-carrying Mitsubishi Type 96 bombers stationed in the Marshall and Caroline Islands; see Pelz, also Tuleja, pp. 88-89, and Asada, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," p. 243 and n. 81. As Asada observes, such a strategy assumed the United States would pursue a decisive fleet encounter early in the war rather than build up overwhelming strength before advancing westward. The Japanese strategy for war with the United States was consistently myopic. The 1936 Tactical Plan, for example, specified only initial stages of operations against the United States; later stages would be "expedient measures as the occasion may demand" ("The Japanese Navy and the United States," p. 236).
127. Asada, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," p. 235. The Japanese relied on their new Type 6 submarines and torpedo-carrying Mitsubishi Type 96 bombers stationed in the Marshall and Caroline Islands; see Pelz, also Tuleja, pp. 88-89, and Asada, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," p. 243 and n. 81. As Asada observes, such a strategy assumed the United States would pursue a decisive fleet encounter early in the war rather than build up overwhelming strength before advancing westward. The Japanese strategy for war with the United States was consistently myopic. The 1936 Tactical Plan, for example, specified only initial stages of operations against the United States; later stages would be "expedient measures as the occasion may demand" ("The Japanese Navy and the United States," p. 236).
128. Asada, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," p. 234. Yamamoto believed that Japan lacked the resources and industrial might to win a war with the United States and endorsed the ratio system: "The 5 : 5 : 3 ratio works just fine for us; it [the Five-Power Treaty] is a treaty to restrict the other parties [the United States and Britain]" (ibid).
129. See Tim Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, The Western Front and the Emergence of Modern, Warfare, 1900-1918 (London, 1987), chaps. 2 and 3. Asada, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," p. 237.
130. See Tim Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, The Western Front and the Emergence of Modern, Warfare, 1900-1918 (London, 1987), chaps. 2 and 3. Asada, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," p. 237.
131. Asada, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," p. 242. See Pelz, pp. 31-32 on the Yamato class. As early as 1931, three years before Yamato-class design began in October 1934, the Japanese successfully tested an 18.1-inch battleship gun that delivered "30 percent more power" on impact than a 16-inch gun, the largest then in existence (ibid.). Gun "power" is an imprecise term. An analysis based on the ballistic data in Dulin and Garzke (n. 2 above), pp. 234-35 and 240-41, tables C-7 and C-11, indicates that at a range of 30,000 yards the striking energy of the Yamato-class 18.1-inch gun was approximately 52 percent greater than that of the U.S. Navy's Mark 5 16-inch/45 caliber gun, which was carried by the superdreadnought Maryland of the 1916 Program; at a range of 20,000 yards, the Japanese 18.1-inch gun delivered approximately 51 percent more striking energy than the U.S. Mark 5 gun. Striking energy - a function of shell mass, velocity, and shape -contributes to kinetic penetration or damage to armor plate.
132. Pelz, pp. 33-39.
133. Roosevelt to Swanson, Navy Day Letter, 1935, published in the Times (London), reprinted in USNIP 62 (1936): 116. Chicago Tribune, "Address by Admiral Standley," reprinted in USNIP 62 (1936): 115-16. For a discussion of naval issues during Standley's tenure as CNO, see Walter (n. 61 above).
134. Roosevelt to Swanson, Navy Day Letter, 1935, published in the Times (London), reprinted in USNIP 62 (1936): 116. Chicago Tribune, "Address by Admiral Standley," reprinted in USNIP 62 (1936): 115-16. For a discussion of naval issues during Standley's tenure as CNO, see Walter (n. 61 above).
135. Roosevelt to Swanson, Navy Day Letter, 1935, published in the Times (London), reprinted in USNIP 62 (1936): 116. Chicago Tribune, "Address by Admiral Standley," reprinted in USNIP 62 (1936): 115-16. For a discussion of naval issues during Standley's tenure as CNO, see Walter (n. 61 above).
136. Roosevelt to Swanson, Navy Day Letter, 1935, published in the Times (London), reprinted in USNIP 62 (1936): 116. Chicago Tribune, "Address by Admiral Standley," reprinted in USNIP 62 (1936): 115-16. For a discussion of naval issues during Standley's tenure as CNO, see Walter (n. 61 above).
137. Wyoming State Senator Charles S. Bream to Roosevelt, November 26, 1935, FDR Official File 1818.
138. Transcript of Presidential Press Conference, November 13, 1935 (excerpt), reprinted in Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, vol. 3, ed. Edgar B. Nixon (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), pp. 58-60. Presidential memorandum to Charles Swanson, September 20, 1935, FDR Official File 18s. Standley resented Roosevelt's "inflated opinion of his knowledge of naval strategy and tactics"; Standley quoted in Tuleja (n. 39 above), p. 91. Roosevelt to Secretary of the Navy, December 17, 1934, FDR Official File 18i.
139. Naval Aide Wilson Brown, memo to Roosevelt, December 1934, FDR Official File 18s.
140. Between 1935 and 1937 a total of seventy-seven battleship designs were prepared by the Bureau of Construction & Repair; Dulin and Garzke (n. 2 above), p. 27. "The biggest is the best" approach to battleship design dates from Lieutenant Homer Poundstone, USN, "Size of Battleships for U.S. Navy," USNIP 29 (1903): 161-74.
141. Hall (n. 14 above), p. 184.
142. Marder (n. 63 above), pp. 9-10. On the common upper limit, see Pelz (n. 22 above), passim. Marder notes that the Japanese official war history maintained that the Japanese delegation was "pretty sure" Nagano's proposal would be rejected, but that "it was not necessarily a cloak for the unwillingness of the Navy to continue the shipbuilding limitations," and that the Naval General Staff was sincere in their support for the proposal as a way to save on naval expenditures; Senshi Sōsho (War History Series) vol. 91, Daihon'ei kaigunbu: Rengo kantai (I): Kaisen made (Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Department, Combined Fleet (I): Until the Outbreak of War) (Tokyo, 1975), p. 284, cited in Marder, pp. 11-12, n. 11.
143. Marder (n. 63 above), pp. 9-10. On the common upper limit, see Pelz (n. 22 above), passim. Marder notes that the Japanese official war history maintained that the Japanese delegation was "pretty sure" Nagano's proposal would be rejected, but that "it was not necessarily a cloak for the unwillingness of the Navy to continue the shipbuilding limitations," and that the Naval General Staff was sincere in their support for the proposal as a way to save on naval expenditures; Senshi Sōsho (War History Series) vol. 91, Daihon'ei kaigunbu: Rengo kantai (I): Kaisen made (Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Department, Combined Fleet (I): Until the Outbreak of War) (Tokyo, 1975), p. 284, cited in Marder, pp. 11-12, n. 11.
144. Capital ship size was limited to 35,000 tons and, for the first time, battleship guns were limited in size (to a 14-inch bore). The maximum size for new aircraft carriers was set at 23,000 tons. Tonnage and maximum gun-size restrictions were adopted for cruisers and submarines. Italy subscribed to the provisions of the treaty in 1938. See Marder, p. 12.
145. Admiralty memorandum for the Committee on Imperial Defence, January 6, 1938, ADM 116/3735, cited in Marder, p. 13, n. 12. Vinson's threat is in the "Vinson to Push for Naval Construction Program if Japan Spurns Treaty," Baltimore Sun, November 28, 1934.
146. Admiralty memorandum for the Committee on Imperial Defence, January 6, 1938, ADM 116/3735, cited in Marder, p. 13, n. 12. Vinson's threat is in the "Vinson to Push for Naval Construction Program if Japan Spurns Treaty," Baltimore Sun, November 28, 1934.
147. Marder, pp. 13-14, Japanese Foreign Office statement cited on p.14, n. 13.
148. Ibid.
149. Allard (n. 22 above), pp. 45-50. New York Herald Tribune, January 14, 1937, reprinted in USNIP 63 (1937): 418-19.
150. Allard (n. 22 above), pp. 45-50. New York Herald Tribune, January 14, 1937, reprinted in USNIP 63 (1937): 418-19.
151. Allard (n. 22 above), pp. 45-50. New York Herald Tribune, January 14, 1937, reprinted in USNIP 63 (1937): 418-19.
152. Presidential press conference, January 8, 1937, reprinted in Nixon (n. 74 above), p. 575.
153. See articles from the New York Herald Tribune, May 18, 1937, and the Washington Herald, May 22, 1937, in USNIP 63 (1937): 1034.
154. See articles from the New York Herald Tribune, May 18, 1937, and the Washington Herald, May 22, 1937, in USNIP 63 (1937): 1034.
155. See articles from the New York Herald Tribune, May 18, 1937, and the Washington Herald, May 22, 1937, in USNIP 63 (1937): 1034.
156. New York Herald Tribune, "Difficulties with Steel," February 14, 1937, reprinted in USNIP 63 (1937): 572-73.
157. New York Herald Tribune, "Difficulties with Steel," February 14, 1937, reprinted in USNIP 63 (1937): 572-73.
158. Brunner to Roosevelt, January 5, 1937; Burnisori to Roosevelt, September 9, 1937; Roosevelt to Burnison, September 13, 1937, FDR Official File 1698.
159. Private shipbuilders traditionally complained that the cost and building estimates of government shipyards bore no relation to reality. See the case of the turbo-electric drive for the 1916 capital ship program in William M. McBride, "Strategic Determinism in Technology Selection: The Electric Battleship and U.S. Naval-Industrial Relations," Technology and Culture 33 (1992): 248-77.
160. Representative Powers to Roosevelt, October 11, 1937; Senator Moore to Roosevelt, October 11, 1937; Roosevelt to Senator Moore, October 20, 1937, FDR Official File 1698.
161. McIntyre to Secretary Edison, November 27, 1937, FDR Official File 1698.
162. Secretary Edison to McIntyre, December 9, 1937, FDR Official File 1698. Burnison to Roosevelt, undated, in December 1937 folder, FDR Official File 99.
163. Roosevelt quoted in Charles A. Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940 (New Haven, 1946), p. 151.
164. William McNeill pointed out the link between the Gladstone government's broadening of the political franchise with the Reform Act of 1884 and the subsequent increase in the British naval estimates later that year. The income tax was paid by a small percentage of the electorate while the majority of the new electorate would benefit from government contracts, i.e., naval construction and voted for them; McNeill (n. 11 above), pp. 269-70. The political mechanism for the 1884-1914 naval race was in place. Paul Kennedy apparently did not consider naval construction employment a social issue. He emphasized the limitations placed on late-19th-century British naval spending by the "demands of a mass democracy for social and economic improvements." The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London, 1976), p. 194.
165. President George Bush's administration did push fighter aircraft production for export to help its campaign standing in California and other areas of the aerospace gun belt.
166. Merritt Roe Smith, Harpers Ferry Armory and the New Technology: The Challenge of Change (Ithaca, N.Y., 1977), chaps. 1 and 9. A recent case involved the navy's F/A-18 Hornet aircraft, which owed its acquisition in great measure to Senator Edward Kennedy, a long-standing opponent of defense expenditures. Engines for the Hornet were manufactured in Massachusetts. Kennedy and Speaker of the House Thomas O'Neill were "mighty proponents of the F-18, and pivotal to its acceptance by Congress." James P. Stevenson, The Pentagon Paradox: The Development of the F-18 Hornet (Annapolis, 1993), p. 219. A recent useful anthology is The Pentagon and the Cities, ed. Andrew Kirby (Newbury Park, Calif., 1992), especially Richard Barff, "Living by the Sword and Dying by the Sword?: Defense Spending and New England's Economy."
167. Merritt Roe Smith, Harpers Ferry Armory and the New Technology: The Challenge of Change (Ithaca, N.Y., 1977), chaps. 1 and 9. A recent case involved the navy's F/A- 18 Hornet aircraft, which owed its acquisition in great measure to Senator Edward Kennedy, a long-standing opponent of defense expenditures. Engines for the Hornet were manufactured in Massachusetts. Kennedy and Speaker of the House Thomas O'Neill were "mighty proponents of the F-18, and pivotal to its acceptance by Congress." James P. Stevenson, The Pentagon Paradox: The Development of the F-18 Hornet (Annapolis, 1993), p. 219. A recent useful anthology is The Pentagon and the Cities, ed. Andrew Kirby (Newbury Park, Calif., 1992), especially Richard Barff, "Living by the Sword and Dying by the Sword?: Defense Spending and New England's Economy."
168. Merritt Roe Smith, Harpers Ferry Armory and the New Technology: The Challenge of Change (Ithaca, N.Y., 1977), chaps. 1 and 9. A recent case involved the navy's F/A- 18 Hornet aircraft, which owed its acquisition in great measure to Senator Edward Kennedy, a long-standing opponent of defense expenditures. Engines for the Hornet were manufactured in Massachusetts. Kennedy and Speaker of the House Thomas O'Neill were "mighty proponents of the F-18, and pivotal to its acceptance by Congress." James P. Stevenson, The Pentagon Paradox: The Development of the F-18 Hornet (Annapolis, 1993), p. 219. A recent useful anthology is The Pentagon and the Cities, ed. Andrew Kirby (Newbury Park, Calif., 1992), especially Richard Barff, "Living by the Sword and Dying by the Sword?: Defense Spending and New England's Economy."
169. Merritt Roe Smith, Harpers Ferry Armory and the New Technology: The Challenge of Change (Ithaca, N.Y., 1977), chaps. 1 and 9. A recent case involved the navy's F/A- 18 Hornet aircraft, which owed its acquisition in great measure to Senator Edward Kennedy, a long-standing opponent of defense expenditures. Engines for the Hornet were manufactured in Massachusetts. Kennedy and Speaker of the House Thomas O'Neill were "mighty proponents of the F-18, and pivotal to its acceptance by Congress." James P. Stevenson, The Pentagon Paradox: The Development of the F-18 Hornet (Annapolis, 1993), p. 219. A recent useful anthology is The Pentagon and the Cities, ed. Andrew Kirby (Newbury Park, Calif., 1992), especially Richard Barff, "Living by the Sword and Dying by the Sword?: Defense Spending and New England's Economy."
170. See Ann Markusen et al., The Rise of the Gun Belt: The Military Remapping of Industrial America (New York, 1991). On September 6, 1994, with the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) facing congressional budget cuts, the Pentagon, using tactics devoid of subtlety, released graphics which indicated that the missile's contractors and subcontractors were spread over twenty states.
171. On "classifying" Hoover, see David Burner and Thomas R. West, "A Technocrat's Morality: Conservatism and Hoover the Engineer," in The Hofstadter Aegis: A Memorial, ed. Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick (New York, 1974). While Hoover was "moral" regarding arms expenditures, he did authorize a political burglary by a naval officer from the Office of Naval Intelligence; see Jeffery M. Dorwart, Conflict of Duty: The U.S. Navy's Intelligence Dilemma (Annapolis, 1983), pp. 3-5. Roosevelt, on the other hand, availed himself of "private" spies; his "personal naval secret agent" was Vincent Astor, his neighbor at Hyde Park and a naval reserve intelligence officer. See Dorwart, pp. 114-15 and chap. 15.
172. On "classifying" Hoover, see David Burner and Thomas R. West, "A Technocrat's Morality: Conservatism and Hoover the Engineer," in The Hofstadter Aegis: A Memorial, ed. Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick (New York, 1974). While Hoover was "moral" regarding arms expenditures, he did authorize a political burglary by a naval officer from the Office of Naval Intelligence; see Jeffery M. Dorwart, Conflict of Duty: The U.S. Navy's Intelligence Dilemma (Annapolis, 1983), pp. 3-5. Roosevelt, on the other hand, availed himself of "private" spies; his "personal naval secret agent" was Vincent Astor, his neighbor at Hyde Park and a naval reserve intelligence officer. See Dorwart, pp. 114-15 and chap. 15.
173. On "classifying" Hoover, see David Burner and Thomas R. West, "A Technocrat's Morality: Conservatism and Hoover the Engineer," in The Hofstadter Aegis: A Memorial, ed. Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick (New York, 1974). While Hoover was "moral" regarding arms expenditures, he did authorize a political burglary by a naval officer from the Office of Naval Intelligence; see Jeffery M. Dorwart, Conflict of Duty: The U.S. Navy's Intelligence Dilemma (Annapolis, 1983), pp. 3-5. Roosevelt, on the other hand, availed himself of "private" spies; his "personal naval secret agent" was Vincent Astor, his neighbor at Hyde Park and a naval reserve intelligence officer. See Dorwart, pp. 114-15 and chap. 15.
174. Navy Secretary Swanson to Roosevelt, December 21, 1937, FDR Personal File 1722.
175. Peter Paret, "Clausewitz," in Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy (n. 6 above); Clausewitz quoted on p. 199. For more detail, see Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 1984), bk. 1, chaps. 1 and 2.
176. Peter Paret, "Clausewitz," in Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy (n. 6 above); Clausewitz quoted on p. 199. For more detail, see Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 1984), bk. 1, chaps. 1 and 2.
177. Peter Paret, "Clausewitz," in Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy (n. 6 above); Clausewitz quoted on p. 199. For more detail, see Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 1984), bk. 1, chaps. 1 and 2.