Courts, Cabinet and Coalition Parties: The Politics of Euthanasia in a Parliamentary Setting

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 27, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 551-571

  Steunenberg, Bernard ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0031487576     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123497000264     Document Type: Article

References (71)

1. This also holds for assisted suicide and the ending of a life without the consent of the person involved. Since assisted suicide is regarded as being similar to euthanasia in regard to its legal consequences, it will not be distinguished from euthanasia in this article.
2. Of course, the latter depends critically on the willingness of physicians to report a case of euthanasia to the public prosecutor.
3. See the following court decisions: Rotterdam Court, 1 December 1981 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1982: 63); Alkmaar Court, 10 May 1983 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1983: 407); Amsterdam High Court, 17 November 1983 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1984: 43); Groningen Court, 1 March 1984 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1984: 450); Leeuwarden High Court, 11 October 1984 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1985: 241). Previous court cases on euthanasia include: Utrecht Court, 11 March 1952 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1952: 275); Leeuwarden Court, 21 February 1973 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1973: 183).
4. See the following court decisions: Rotterdam Court, 1 December 1981 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1982: 63); Alkmaar Court, 10 May 1983 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1983: 407); Amsterdam High Court, 17 November 1983 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1984: 43); Groningen Court, 1 March 1984 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1984: 450); Leeuwarden High Court, 11 October 1984 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1985: 241). Previous court cases on euthanasia include: Utrecht Court, 11 March 1952 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1952: 275); Leeuwarden Court, 21 February 1973 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1973: 183).
5. See the following court decisions: Rotterdam Court, 1 December 1981 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1982: 63); Alkmaar Court, 10 May 1983 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1983: 407); Amsterdam High Court, 17 November 1983 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1984: 43); Groningen Court, 1 March 1984 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1984: 450); Leeuwarden High Court, 11 October 1984 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1985: 241). Previous court cases on euthanasia include: Utrecht Court, 11 March 1952 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1952: 275); Leeuwarden Court, 21 February 1973 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1973: 183).
6. See the following court decisions: Rotterdam Court, 1 December 1981 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1982: 63); Alkmaar Court, 10 May 1983 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1983: 407); Amsterdam High Court, 17 November 1983 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1984: 43); Groningen Court, 1 March 1984 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1984: 450); Leeuwarden High Court, 11 October 1984 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1985: 241). Previous court cases on euthanasia include: Utrecht Court, 11 March 1952 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1952: 275); Leeuwarden Court, 21 February 1973 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1973: 183).
7. See the following court decisions: Rotterdam Court, 1 December 1981 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1982: 63); Alkmaar Court, 10 May 1983 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1983: 407); Amsterdam High Court, 17 November 1983 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1984: 43); Groningen Court, 1 March 1984 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1984: 450); Leeuwarden High Court, 11 October 1984 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1985: 241). Previous court cases on euthanasia include: Utrecht Court, 11 March 1952 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1952: 275); Leeuwarden Court, 21 February 1973 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1973: 183).
8. See the following court decisions: Rotterdam Court, 1 December 1981 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1982: 63); Alkmaar Court, 10 May 1983 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1983: 407); Amsterdam High Court, 17 November 1983 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1984: 43); Groningen Court, 1 March 1984 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1984: 450); Leeuwarden High Court, 11 October 1984 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1985: 241). Previous court cases on euthanasia include: Utrecht Court, 11 March 1952 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1952: 275); Leeuwarden Court, 21 February 1973 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1973: 183).
9. See the following court decisions: Rotterdam Court, 1 December 1981 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1982: 63); Alkmaar Court, 10 May 1983 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1983: 407); Amsterdam High Court, 17 November 1983 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1984: 43); Groningen Court, 1 March 1984 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1984: 450); Leeuwarden High Court, 11 October 1984 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1985: 241). Previous court cases on euthanasia include: Utrecht Court, 11 March 1952 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1952: 275); Leeuwarden Court, 21 February 1973 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1973: 183).
10. Supreme Court, 27 November 1984 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1985: 106).
11. The Supreme Court formally based its decision on noodtoestand (emergency), which is based on the force majeure article of the Code of the Criminal Law (Article 40). Until then, the possibility of an appeal to an emergency situation had never been related to the issue of euthanasia.
12. See the explanatory memorandum of the 1986 draft proposal for a bill, in which the cabinet summarizes the standards that were developed in the jurisprudence on euthanasia at that time (Kamerstukken II, 1985-86, 19.359, nr. 2). For the position of the Royal Dutch Medical Association (KNMG) on euthanasia, see 'Standpunt inzake euthanasie', Medisch Contact, 39 (1984), 990-8.
13. See, for instance, G. Smith, Politics in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis (London: Heinemann, 1976), for a review of political systems in Western Europe. The Dutch political system is discussed extensively in R. B. Andeweg and G. A. Irwin, Dutch Government and Politics (Basingstoke, Hants: Macmillan, 1993).
14. See, for instance, G. Smith, Politics in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis (London: Heinemann, 1976), for a review of political systems in Western Europe. The Dutch political system is discussed extensively in R. B. Andeweg and G. A. Irwin, Dutch Government and Politics (Basingstoke, Hants: Macmillan, 1993).
15. The Senate may use the threat of a veto to amend a bill. A number of examples exist in which the Senate 'forces' the cabinet to introduce an amendment to a bill in the House. The discussion in the Senate is then adjourned in anticipation of the discussion of the amendment in the House. If the House accepts the amendment, the Senate will approve the original bill and the amendment, which will both become law. Since the original proposal will be (partially) replaced by the second one, this procedure provides the Senate with an indirect means of amending a legislative proposal.
16. See G. Brennan and H. Kliemt, 'Finite Lives and Social Institutions', Kyklos, 47 (1994), 551-71, for a game theoretical foundation for the emergence of political parties and the existence of party discipline.
17. See also G. Tsebelis, 'Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartism', British Journal of Political Science, 25 (1995), 289-325, for a characterization of political parties as veto players in a parliamentary setting.
18. P. T. Spiller and M. L. Spitzer, 'Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 8 (1992), 8-46.
19. One may argue that different courts may not have the same preferences and therefore variations in the outcomes may exist. However, most judicial systems have a hierarchical structure to secure homogeneity in interpretation by the right of appeal. If appeal involves substantial transaction costs, variations in court interpretation may exist.
20. See, for instance, the following contributions to this literature: R. Gely and P. T. Spiller, 'A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6 (1990), 263-300; J. Ferejohn and C. Shipan, 'Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6 (1990) (Special Issue), S1 -20; P. T. Spiller and R. Gely, 'Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of US Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988', Rand Journal of Economics, 23 (1992), 463-92; Spiller and Spitzer, 'Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines'; W. N. Eskridge and J. Ferejohn, 'Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modem Regulatory State', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 8 (1992), 165-89; J. A. Ferejohn and B. R. Weingast, 'A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation', International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (1992), 263-79; R. Gely and P. T. Spiller, 'The Political Economy of Supreme Court Constitutional Decisions: The Case of Roosevelt's Court-Packing Plan', International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (1992), 45-67; and L. Cohen and M. L. Spitzer, 'Solving the Chevron Puzzle', Law and Contemporary Problems, 51 (1994), 67-110.
21. See, for instance, the following contributions to this literature: R. Gely and P. T. Spiller, 'A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6 (1990), 263-300; J. Ferejohn and C. Shipan, 'Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6 (1990) (Special Issue), S1 -20; P. T. Spiller and R. Gely, 'Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of US Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988', Rand Journal of Economics, 23 (1992), 463-92; Spiller and Spitzer, 'Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines'; W. N. Eskridge and J. Ferejohn, 'Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modem Regulatory State', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 8 (1992), 165-89; J. A. Ferejohn and B. R. Weingast, 'A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation', International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (1992), 263-79; R. Gely and P. T. Spiller, 'The Political Economy of Supreme Court Constitutional Decisions: The Case of Roosevelt's Court-Packing Plan', International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (1992), 45-67; and L. Cohen and M. L. Spitzer, 'Solving the Chevron Puzzle', Law and Contemporary Problems, 51 (1994), 67-110.
22. See, for instance, the following contributions to this literature: R. Gely and P. T. Spiller, 'A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6 (1990), 263-300; J. Ferejohn and C. Shipan, 'Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6 (1990) (Special Issue), S1 -20; P. T. Spiller and R. Gely, 'Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of US Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988', Rand Journal of Economics, 23 (1992), 463-92; Spiller and Spitzer, 'Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines'; W. N. Eskridge and J. Ferejohn, 'Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modem Regulatory State', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 8 (1992), 165-89; J. A. Ferejohn and B. R. Weingast, 'A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation', International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (1992), 263-79; R. Gely and P. T. Spiller, 'The Political Economy of Supreme Court Constitutional Decisions: The Case of Roosevelt's Court-Packing Plan', International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (1992), 45-67; and L. Cohen and M. L. Spitzer, 'Solving the Chevron Puzzle', Law and Contemporary Problems, 51 (1994), 67-110.
23. See, for instance, the following contributions to this literature: R. Gely and P. T. Spiller, 'A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6 (1990), 263-300; J. Ferejohn and C. Shipan, 'Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6 (1990) (Special Issue), S1 -20; P. T. Spiller and R. Gely, 'Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of US Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988', Rand Journal of Economics, 23 (1992), 463-92; Spiller and Spitzer, 'Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines'; W. N. Eskridge and J. Ferejohn, 'Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modem Regulatory State', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 8 (1992), 165-89; J. A. Ferejohn and B. R. Weingast, 'A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation', International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (1992), 263-79; R. Gely and P. T. Spiller, 'The Political Economy of Supreme Court Constitutional Decisions: The Case of Roosevelt's Court-Packing Plan', International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (1992), 45-67; and L. Cohen and M. L. Spitzer, 'Solving the Chevron Puzzle', Law and Contemporary Problems, 51 (1994), 67-110.
24. See, for instance, the following contributions to this literature: R. Gely and P. T. Spiller, 'A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6 (1990), 263-300; J. Ferejohn and C. Shipan, 'Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6 (1990) (Special Issue), S1 -20; P. T. Spiller and R. Gely, 'Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of US Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988', Rand Journal of Economics, 23 (1992), 463-92; Spiller and Spitzer, 'Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines'; W. N. Eskridge and J. Ferejohn, 'Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modem Regulatory State', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 8 (1992), 165-89; J. A. Ferejohn and B. R. Weingast, 'A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation', International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (1992), 263-79; R. Gely and P. T. Spiller, 'The Political Economy of Supreme Court Constitutional Decisions: The Case of Roosevelt's Court-Packing Plan', International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (1992), 45-67; and L. Cohen and M. L. Spitzer, 'Solving the Chevron Puzzle', Law and Contemporary Problems, 51 (1994), 67-110.
25. See, for instance, the following contributions to this literature: R. Gely and P. T. Spiller, 'A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6 (1990), 263-300; J. Ferejohn and C. Shipan, 'Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6 (1990) (Special Issue), S1 -20; P. T. Spiller and R. Gely, 'Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of US Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988', Rand Journal of Economics, 23 (1992), 463-92; Spiller and Spitzer, 'Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines'; W. N. Eskridge and J. Ferejohn, 'Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modem Regulatory State', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 8 (1992), 165-89; J. A. Ferejohn and B. R. Weingast, 'A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation', International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (1992), 263-79; R. Gely and P. T. Spiller, 'The Political Economy of Supreme Court Constitutional Decisions: The Case of Roosevelt's Court-Packing Plan', International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (1992), 45-67; and L. Cohen and M. L. Spitzer, 'Solving the Chevron Puzzle', Law and Contemporary Problems, 51 (1994), 67-110.
26. See, for instance, the following contributions to this literature: R. Gely and P. T. Spiller, 'A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6 (1990), 263-300; J. Ferejohn and C. Shipan, 'Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6 (1990) (Special Issue), S1 -20; P. T. Spiller and R. Gely, 'Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of US Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988', Rand Journal of Economics, 23 (1992), 463-92; Spiller and Spitzer, 'Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines'; W. N. Eskridge and J. Ferejohn, 'Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modem Regulatory State', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 8 (1992), 165-89; J. A. Ferejohn and B. R. Weingast, 'A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation', International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (1992), 263-79; R. Gely and P. T. Spiller, 'The Political Economy of Supreme Court Constitutional Decisions: The Case of Roosevelt's Court-Packing Plan', International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (1992), 45-67; and L. Cohen and M. L. Spitzer, 'Solving the Chevron Puzzle', Law and Contemporary Problems, 51 (1994), 67-110.
27. See, for instance, the following contributions to this literature: R. Gely and P. T. Spiller, 'A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6 (1990), 263-300; J. Ferejohn and C. Shipan, 'Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6 (1990) (Special Issue), S1 -20; P. T. Spiller and R. Gely, 'Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of US Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988', Rand Journal of Economics, 23 (1992), 463-92; Spiller and Spitzer, 'Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines'; W. N. Eskridge and J. Ferejohn, 'Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modem Regulatory State', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 8 (1992), 165-89; J. A. Ferejohn and B. R. Weingast, 'A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation', International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (1992), 263-79; R. Gely and P. T. Spiller, 'The Political Economy of Supreme Court Constitutional Decisions: The Case of Roosevelt's Court-Packing Plan', International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (1992), 45-67; and L. Cohen and M. L. Spitzer, 'Solving the Chevron Puzzle', Law and Contemporary Problems, 51 (1994), 67-110.
28. For an introduction to spatial modelling, see J. M. Enelow and M. J. Hinich, The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
29. i as the ideal point for coalition party i, and c as the ideal point of the cabinet.
30. See also Ferejohn and Shipan, 'Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy', p. 6.
31. See B. Steunenberg, 'Regulatory Policymaking in a Parliamentary Setting', in P. Herder-Dorneich, K-E. Schenk and D. Schmidtchen, eds, Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie: Neue Politische Ökonomie der Regulierung, Deregulierung und Privatisierung (Tübingen: Mohr, 1994), pp. 36-57, at pp. 42-3, for a similar result.
32. r].
33. See, for instance, Gely and Spiller, 'A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases'; Ferejohn and Shipan, 'Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy'; and Spiller and Spitzer, 'Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines'.
34. See, for instance, Gely and Spiller, 'A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases'; Ferejohn and Shipan, 'Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy'; and Spiller and Spitzer, 'Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines'.
35. See, for instance, Gely and Spiller, 'A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases'; Ferejohn and Shipan, 'Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy'; and Spiller and Spitzer, 'Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines'.
36. Ferejohn and Weingast, 'A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation'.
37. An alternative view is suggested by S. Rose-Ackerman, 'Comment on Ferejohn and Shipan's "Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy"', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6 (1990) (Special Issue), S21-7, who argues that courts are not so much interested in the policy outcomes but in the procedural principles that are used to derive a particular outcome. This view implies a multidimensional model in which a policy as well as a procedural dimension play a role. An example of such a model is found in L. Cohen and M. L. Spitzer, 'Solving the Chevron Puzzle'.
38. An alternative view is suggested by S. Rose-Ackerman, 'Comment on Ferejohn and Shipan's "Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy"', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6 (1990) (Special Issue), S21-7, who argues that courts are not so much interested in the policy outcomes but in the procedural principles that are used to derive a particular outcome. This view implies a multidimensional model in which a policy as well as a procedural dimension play a role. An example of such a model is found in L. Cohen and M. L. Spitzer, 'Solving the Chevron Puzzle'.
39. In this article I will not distinguish between a textualist interpretation, that is, an interpretation as close as possible to the text of the statutory regulation, and an intentionalist interpretation, that is, one as close as possible to the intentions of the enacting legislature. The model used in the article does not allow for differences between the intentions or preferences of a governing coalition and the outcome that will be enacted. Both interpretations therefore point to the status quo ante. See K. A. Shepsle, 'Congress Is a "They", Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron', International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (1992), 239-56, for a critique of the textualist-intentionalist position.
40. Note that only in the exceptional case that j = q will a policy advocate not give a new statutory interpretation.
41. r.
42. For other accounts of the euthanasia debate in the Netherlands, see J. K. M. Gevers, 'Legal Developments Concerning Active Euthanasia on Request in the Netherlands', Bioethics, 1 (1987), 156-62; B. Sluyters, 'Euthanasia in the Netherlands', Medico-Legal Journal, 57 (1989), 34-43; and H. A. M. J. ten Have and J. V. M. Welie, 'Euthanasia: Normal Medical Practice?' Hastings Center Report, 22 (1992), 34-8.
43. For other accounts of the euthanasia debate in the Netherlands, see J. K. M. Gevers, 'Legal Developments Concerning Active Euthanasia on Request in the Netherlands', Bioethics, 1 (1987), 156-62; B. Sluyters, 'Euthanasia in the Netherlands', Medico-Legal Journal, 57 (1989), 34-43; and H. A. M. J. ten Have and J. V. M. Welie, 'Euthanasia: Normal Medical Practice?' Hastings Center Report, 22 (1992), 34-8.
44. For other accounts of the euthanasia debate in the Netherlands, see J. K. M. Gevers, 'Legal Developments Concerning Active Euthanasia on Request in the Netherlands', Bioethics, 1 (1987), 156-62; B. Sluyters, 'Euthanasia in the Netherlands', Medico-Legal Journal, 57 (1989), 34-43; and H. A. M. J. ten Have and J. V. M. Welie, 'Euthanasia: Normal Medical Practice?' Hastings Center Report, 22 (1992), 34-8.
45. This debate occurred after a period in which the opinions of voters on this issue changed significantly. In 1966, 49 per cent of the population strongly objected to euthanasia and regarded it as a serious criminal offence. By 1975, only 24 per cent opposed euthanasia, and by 1991 this figure had dropped to 9 per cent. From the mid-1970s on, a majority of voters thought that euthanasia should be permitted. By 1991, 58 per cent held this view. Another 33 per cent of voters did not completely object to euthanasia, but indicated that euthanasia should only be permitted under particular circumstances. See the Social and Cultural Planning Office, Social and Cultural Report 1988 (Alphen aan den Rijn: Samsom, 1988), Chapter 11, and the Social and Cultural Planning Office, Social and Cultural Report 1992 (The Hague: VUGA, 1992), Chapter 11.
46. This debate occurred after a period in which the opinions of voters on this issue changed significantly. In 1966, 49 per cent of the population strongly objected to euthanasia and regarded it as a serious criminal offence. By 1975, only 24 per cent opposed euthanasia, and by 1991 this figure had dropped to 9 per cent. From the mid-1970s on, a majority of voters thought that euthanasia should be permitted. By 1991, 58 per cent held this view. Another 33 per cent of voters did not completely object to euthanasia, but indicated that euthanasia should only be permitted under particular circumstances. See the Social and Cultural Planning Office, Social and Cultural Report 1988 (Alphen aan den Rijn: Samsom, 1988), Chapter 11, and the Social and Cultural Planning Office, Social and Cultural Report 1992 (The Hague: VUGA, 1992), Chapter 11.
47. Based on parliamentary questions to government, only one deviation appears to have occurred in this period. In 1993-94 the minister of justice, a member of the Christian Democrats, insisted that cases in which a physician performed euthanasia on patients when it was not clear that they would soon die as a result of illness, were to be prosecuted. According to jurisprudence, this standard is not (and was not then) a relevant criterion in assessing a physician's liability to punishment.
48. The proposal of the cabinet did not yet have the status of a bill, but it could become a bill in the near future.
49. This code regulates the disposing of a body once a person has died.
50. For the elections in 1981, 1986 and 1989, these manifestos are compiled in I. Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1981 (The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij, 1981); I. Lipschits, Verkiezings- programma's 1986 (The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij, 1986); and I. Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1989 (The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij, 1989).
51. For the elections in 1981, 1986 and 1989, these manifestos are compiled in I. Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1981 (The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij, 1981); I. Lipschits, Verkiezings- programma's 1986 (The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij, 1986); and I. Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1989 (The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij, 1989).
52. For the elections in 1981, 1986 and 1989, these manifestos are compiled in I. Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1981 (The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij, 1981); I. Lipschits, Verkiezings- programma's 1986 (The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij, 1986); and I. Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1989 (The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij, 1989).
53. In 1991 an extensive study estimated the extent to which euthanasia occurs in the Netherlands. This study indicated that, annually, about 2,300 persons die as a result of euthanasia. In about 1,400 cases a physician performs euthanasia; in about 400 cases a physician assists the patient in committing suicide. By contrast, it was also estimated that physicians receive about 9,000 euthanasia requests from patients annually. See P. J. van der Maas, J. J. M. van Delden and L. Pijnenborg, Medische beslissingen rond het levenseinde: het onderzoek voor de Commissie onderzoek medische praktijk inzake euthanasie (The Hague: SDU, 1991); and P. J. van der Maas, J. J. M. van Delden, L. Pijnenborg and C. W. N. Looman, 'Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life', The Lancet, 338 (1991), 669-74.
54. In 1991 an extensive study estimated the extent to which euthanasia occurs in the Netherlands. This study indicated that, annually, about 2,300 persons die as a result of euthanasia. In about 1,400 cases a physician performs euthanasia; in about 400 cases a physician assists the patient in committing suicide. By contrast, it was also estimated that physicians receive about 9,000 euthanasia requests from patients annually. See P. J. van der Maas, J. J. M. van Delden and L. Pijnenborg, Medische beslissingen rond het levenseinde: het onderzoek voor de Commissie onderzoek medische praktijk inzake euthanasie (The Hague: SDU, 1991); and P. J. van der Maas, J. J. M. van Delden, L. Pijnenborg and C. W. N. Looman, 'Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life', The Lancet, 338 (1991), 669-74.
55. See Supreme Court, 21 October 1986 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1987: 607), and Supreme Court, 23 June 1987 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1988: 157). In the period 1984-93, the Supreme Court gave its opinion on euthanasia in four other cases. See: Supreme Court, 15 December 1987 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1988: 811); S upreme Court, 3 May 1988 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1989: 391); Supreme Court, 28 April 1989 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1990: 46, 47); and Supreme Court, 28 May 1991 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1991: 789).
56. See Supreme Court, 21 October 1986 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1987: 607), and Supreme Court, 23 June 1987 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1988: 157). In the period 1984-93, the Supreme Court gave its opinion on euthanasia in four other cases. See: Supreme Court, 15 December 1987 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1988: 811); S upreme Court, 3 May 1988 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1989: 391); Supreme Court, 28 April 1989 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1990: 46, 47); and Supreme Court, 28 May 1991 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1991: 789).
57. See Supreme Court, 21 October 1986 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1987: 607), and Supreme Court, 23 June 1987 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1988: 157). In the period 1984-93, the Supreme Court gave its opinion on euthanasia in four other cases. See: Supreme Court, 15 December 1987 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1988: 811); S upreme Court, 3 May 1988 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1989: 391); Supreme Court, 28 April 1989 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1990: 46, 47); and Supreme Court, 28 May 1991 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1991: 789).
58. See Supreme Court, 21 October 1986 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1987: 607), and Supreme Court, 23 June 1987 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1988: 157). In the period 1984-93, the Supreme Court gave its opinion on euthanasia in four other cases. See: Supreme Court, 15 December 1987 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1988: 811); S upreme Court, 3 May 1988 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1989: 391); Supreme Court, 28 April 1989 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1990: 46, 47); and Supreme Court, 28 May 1991 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1991: 789).
59. See Supreme Court, 21 October 1986 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1987: 607), and Supreme Court, 23 June 1987 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1988: 157). In the period 1984-93, the Supreme Court gave its opinion on euthanasia in four other cases. See: Supreme Court, 15 December 1987 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1988: 811); S upreme Court, 3 May 1988 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1989: 391); Supreme Court, 28 April 1989 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1990: 46, 47); and Supreme Court, 28 May 1991 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1991: 789).
60. See Supreme Court, 21 October 1986 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1987: 607), and Supreme Court, 23 June 1987 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1988: 157). In the period 1984-93, the Supreme Court gave its opinion on euthanasia in four other cases. See: Supreme Court, 15 December 1987 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1988: 811); S upreme Court, 3 May 1988 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1989: 391); Supreme Court, 28 April 1989 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1990: 46, 47); and Supreme Court, 28 May 1991 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1991: 789).
61. See the 1986 and 1989 party manifestos for the Liberal party, Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1986, pp. 439, 468, and Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1989, p. 63. For the Labour party, see Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1986, p. 304, and Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1989, p. 249.
62. See the 1986 and 1989 party manifestos for the Liberal party, Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1986, pp. 439, 468, and Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1989, p. 63. For the Labour party, see Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1986, p. 304, and Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1989, p. 249.
63. See the 1986 and 1989 party manifestos for the Liberal party, Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1986, pp. 439, 468, and Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1989, p. 63. For the Labour party, see Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1986, p. 304, and Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1989, p. 249.
64. See the 1986 and 1989 party manifestos for the Liberal party, Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1986, pp. 439, 468, and Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1989, p. 63. For the Labour party, see Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1986, p. 304, and Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1989, p. 249.
65. See the 1986 and 1989 party manifestos of the Christian Democrats, Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1986, pp. 18-19, and Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1989, pp. 381, 430.
66. See the 1986 and 1989 party manifestos of the Christian Democrats, Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1986, pp. 18-19, and Lipschits, Verkiezingsprogramma's 1989, pp. 381, 430.
67. Medical decisions, which the Christian Democrats do not regard as euthanasia, as is indicated in their party manifestos for the 1986 and the 1989 elections, include: the suspension of a treatment of a patient who has lost consciousness in an irrevocable way; and death as an unintended result of a treatment that aims to reduce a patient's suffering. However, the conscious ending of a person's life, as euthanasia has been defined in this article, remains a criminal offence.
68. If the ideal point of the Supreme Court is found between the Christian Democrats and the Liberal party as indicated in Figure 2, the equilibrium interpretation will be equivalent to the Supreme Court's ideal point. If, however, the Supreme Court's most preferred point is found to the left of the policy position of the Liberal party, which is regarded as less likely, it will select the Liberal party position as the equilibrium interpretation.
69. See, for instance, Spiller and Gely, 'Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of US Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988', and Spiller and Spitzer, 'Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines'.
70. See, for instance, Spiller and Gely, 'Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of US Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988', and Spiller and Spitzer, 'Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines'.
71. Ferejohn and Weingast, 'A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation'.