Multidimensional signalling and diversification

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 168-187

  Chen, Yongmin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031482383     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2555946     Document Type: Article

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