On distinguishing between Leviathan and Public Interest governments in a federal state

Public Choice

Volumn 92, Issue 3-4, 1997, Pages 281-299

  Abizadeh, Sohrab ^a   Cyrenne, Philippe ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WINNIPEG   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031482256     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1017942011468     Document Type: Article

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