Simian sovereignty

Political Theory

Volumn 25, Issue 6, 1997, Pages 821-849

  Goodin, Robert E ^b   Pateman, Carole ^a   Pateman, Roy ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0031481250     PISSN: 00905917     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0090591797025006003     Document Type: Article

References (120)

1. Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 78.
2. Henry Beston, The Outermost House (1928; reprint, London: Ballatine, 1971), 20.
3. "A Declaration on Great Apes," The Great Ape Project: Equality Before Humanity, ed. Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), 4-7. This declaration bears the signature of the editors and thirty-four contributors to the book.
4. For the classic statement of this position, see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1961), chap. 10. Cf. Charles R. Beitz, "Sovereignty and Morality," Political Theory Today, ed. David Held (Oxford, UK: Polity, 1991), 236-54.
5. For the classic statement of this position, see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1961), chap. 10. Cf. Charles R. Beitz, "Sovereignty and Morality," Political Theory Today, ed. David Held (Oxford, UK: Polity, 1991), 236-54.
6. "Declaration on Great Apes," 6.
7. David Held, Democracy and the Global Order (Oxford, UK: Polity, 1995), 133.
8. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1976), 187.
9. Robert Wokler, "Perfectible Apes in Decadent Cultures: Rousseau's Anthropology Revisted," Daedalus 107 (Summer 1978), 107-34 at 109.
10. Londa Schiebinger, Nature's Body: Gender in the Making of Modern Science (Boston: Beacon, 1993), 94 and chap. 3 more generally.
11. Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1983), chap. 3, sec. 3. Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (New York: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1993).
12. Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1983), chap. 3, sec. 3. Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (New York: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1993).
13. Wokler, "Perfectible Apes in Decadent Cultures," 111.
14. In note 10 of his Second Discourse, Rousseau wondered "whether various animals similar to men, which travelers have without much observation taken for Beasts, either because of some differences they noticed in their outward confirmation, or merely because these Animals did not speak, might not indeed be genuine Savage men whose, race, dispersed in the woods in ancient times, had had no occasion to develop any of its virtual faculties, had not acquired any degree of perfection, and was still in the primitive state of Nature." Earlier, in August 1661, Samuel Pepys wrote in his diary: "it is a great baboone, but so much like a man in most things, that (although they say there is a Species of them) yet I cannot believe but that it is a monster got of a man and a she-baboone. I do believe it already understands much English; and I am of the mind it might be taught to speak or make signs"; Pepys Diary, ed. R. Latham (London: The Folio Society, 1996), vol. I, pp. 149-50.
15. James Burnet, Lord Monboddo, The Origin and Progress of Language, 2d ed. (1774; reprint, New York: Garland, 1970), vol. I. On Monboddo, see Robert Wokler, "Apes and Races in the Scottish Enlightenment: Monboddo and Kames on the Nature of Man," Philosophy and Science in the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. Peter Jones (Edinburgh, Scotland: John Donald, 1988).
16. James Burnet, Lord Monboddo, The Origin and Progress of Language, 2d ed. (1774; reprint, New York: Garland, 1970), vol. I. On Monboddo, see Robert Wokler, "Apes and Races in the Scottish Enlightenment: Monboddo and Kames on the Nature of Man," Philosophy and Science in the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. Peter Jones (Edinburgh, Scotland: John Donald, 1988).
17. Initially, at least, the opposing views over which they prevailed were prevalent and forcefully put: Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle, powerfully challenged Descartes's claims on this score, and Erasmus Darwin points to their moral capacities, as manifested particularly in the way they "form contracts of friendship with each other, [and] with mankind." See Thomas, Man and the Natural World, chap. 3, sec. 3, and Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature.
18. Initially, at least, the opposing views over which they prevailed were prevalent and forcefully put: Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle, powerfully challenged Descartes's claims on this score, and Erasmus Darwin points to their moral capacities, as manifested particularly in the way they "form contracts of friendship with each other, [and] with mankind." See Thomas, Man and the Natural World, chap. 3, sec. 3, and Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature.
19. Thomas Taylor, Vindication of the Rights of Brutes (London: Edward Jeffrey, 1792).
20. Melincourt, in The Works of Thomas Love Peacock (London: Constable, 1924), vol. 2. Sir Oran ("a specimen of the natural and original man - the wild man of the woods") had supposedly been caught in Angola and transported to London. He learned, among other accomplishments, to play the flute and French horn; he also became a member of parliament, and his silence enhanced his reputation.
21. This is carried over into, for example, Jean Bodin's classic analysis of sovereignty; see, for example, The Six Books of the Commonwealth (1576; reprint, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), bk. 1, chap. 10.
22. Leo Gross, "The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948," American Journal of International Law 42 (1948), 20-41. Held, Democracy and the Global Order.
23. Leo Gross, "The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948," American Journal of International Law 42 (1948), 20-41. Held, Democracy and the Global Order.
24. This theme runs throughout the work of Michael Walzer: Just & Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), chap. 4; "The Moral Standing of States," Philosophy & Public Affairs 9 (1980), 209-29; Thick and Thin, 63-84. It is also evident in the recent work of John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and, more especially, "The Law of Peoples," On Human Rights, ed. Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 41-82. See similarly Marshall Cohen, "Moral Skepticism and International Relations," Philosophy & Public Affairs 13 (1984), 299-346.
25. This theme runs throughout the work of Michael Walzer: Just & Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), chap. 4; "The Moral Standing of States," Philosophy & Public Affairs 9 (1980), 209-29; Thick and Thin, 63-84. It is also evident in the recent work of John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and, more especially, "The Law of Peoples," On Human Rights, ed. Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 41-82. See similarly Marshall Cohen, "Moral Skepticism and International Relations," Philosophy & Public Affairs 13 (1984), 299-346.
26. This theme runs throughout the work of Michael Walzer: Just & Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), chap. 4; "The Moral Standing of States," Philosophy & Public Affairs 9 (1980), 209-29; Thick and Thin, 63-84. It is also evident in the recent work of John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and, more especially, "The Law of Peoples," On Human Rights, ed. Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 41-82. See similarly Marshall Cohen, "Moral Skepticism and International Relations," Philosophy & Public Affairs 13 (1984), 299-346.
27. This theme runs throughout the work of Michael Walzer: Just & Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), chap. 4; "The Moral Standing of States," Philosophy & Public Affairs 9 (1980), 209-29; Thick and Thin, 63-84. It is also evident in the recent work of John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and, more especially, "The Law of Peoples," On Human Rights, ed. Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 41-82. See similarly Marshall Cohen, "Moral Skepticism and International Relations," Philosophy & Public Affairs 13 (1984), 299-346.
28. This theme runs throughout the work of Michael Walzer: Just & Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), chap. 4; "The Moral Standing of States," Philosophy & Public Affairs 9 (1980), 209-29; Thick and Thin, 63-84. It is also evident in the recent work of John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and, more especially, "The Law of Peoples," On Human Rights, ed. Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 41-82. See similarly Marshall Cohen, "Moral Skepticism and International Relations," Philosophy & Public Affairs 13 (1984), 299-346.
29. This theme runs throughout the work of Michael Walzer: Just & Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), chap. 4; "The Moral Standing of States," Philosophy & Public Affairs 9 (1980), 209-29; Thick and Thin, 63-84. It is also evident in the recent work of John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and, more especially, "The Law of Peoples," On Human Rights, ed. Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 41-82. See similarly Marshall Cohen, "Moral Skepticism and International Relations," Philosophy & Public Affairs 13 (1984), 299-346.
30. Held, Democracy and Global Order. James R. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1979).
31. Held, Democracy and Global Order. James R. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1979).
32. Sidgwick, Elements of Politics (London: Macmillan, 1891), chap 15, p. 230.
33. Article 2 begins by saying, "1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members," going on to say that "4. All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . . [but] 7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."
34. Stephen D. Krasner, "Westphalia and All That," Ideas and Foreign Policy, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 235-64.
35. In the terms of Bodin, again, "Sovereignty . . . is not limited either in power, or in function, or in length of time"; Six Books of the Commonwealth, bk. 1, chap. 8, p. 348. Of course, as a matter of internal domestic rule, what was "sovereign" in this strong sense was itself subject to endless dispute: some say the monarch, others the legislature, others the "constitution" or the "people." Those, however, were disputes over where sovereignty was vested within the state. What it meant to be sovereign was, traditionally, clear enough.
36. Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, trans. F. W. Kelsey (1625; reprint, Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1925). Cf. Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth, bk. 1, chap. 10.
37. Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, trans. F. W. Kelsey (1625; reprint, Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1925). Cf. Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth, bk. 1, chap. 10.
38. On the importance of Locke's theory for dispossession in America, see James Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chap. 5.
39. Those with full sovereign status were "civilized states"; Malcolm Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1986), 43-45.
40. These are nicely surveyed in J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, "The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations," International Organization 48 (1994), 107-30.
41. Indeed, the UN charter itself simply codified the Westphalian order, as already noted. See further Held, Democracy & the Global Order.
42. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); "Power and Independence Revisited," International Organisation 41 (1987), 725-53. Geoffrey Garrett and Barry R. Weingast, "Ideas, Interests and Institutions: Constructing the European Community's Internal Market," Ideas and Foreign Policy, ed. Goldstein and Keohane, 173-206. Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange, "Political Responses to Interdependence: What's Left for the Left?" International Organization 46 (1991), 539-64.
43. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); "Power and Independence Revisited," International Organisation 41 (1987), 725-53. Geoffrey Garrett and Barry R. Weingast, "Ideas, Interests and Institutions: Constructing the European Community's Internal Market," Ideas and Foreign Policy, ed. Goldstein and Keohane, 173-206. Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange, "Political Responses to Interdependence: What's Left for the Left?" International Organization 46 (1991), 539-64.
44. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); "Power and Independence Revisited," International Organisation 41 (1987), 725-53. Geoffrey Garrett and Barry R. Weingast, "Ideas, Interests and Institutions: Constructing the European Community's Internal Market," Ideas and Foreign Policy, ed. Goldstein and Keohane, 173-206. Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange, "Political Responses to Interdependence: What's Left for the Left?" International Organization 46 (1991), 539-64.
45. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); "Power and Independence Revisited," International Organisation 41 (1987), 725-53. Geoffrey Garrett and Barry R. Weingast, "Ideas, Interests and Institutions: Constructing the European Community's Internal Market," Ideas and Foreign Policy, ed. Goldstein and Keohane, 173-206. Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange, "Political Responses to Interdependence: What's Left for the Left?" International Organization 46 (1991), 539-64.
46. Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy, eds., Institutions for the Earth (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993).
47. Kathryn Sikkink, "Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks and Sovereignty in Latin America," International Organization 47 (1993), 411-41; reprinted in Ideas and Foreign Policy, ed. Goldstein and Keohane, 139-71.
48. Kathryn Sikkink, "Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks and Sovereignty in Latin America," International Organization 47 (1993), 411-41; reprinted in Ideas and Foreign Policy, ed. Goldstein and Keohane, 139-71.
49. See more generally Stephen D. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," Comparative Political Studies 21 (1988), 66-94, esp. 86-90; Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World (Aldershot, UK: Elgar, 1992); cf. Raymond Vernon, "Sovereignty at Bay: Ten Years After," International Organization 35 (1981), 517-29. In these circumstances, "It is not sovereignty, as classically conceived, that is problematic," as Beitz says, "for analytical purposes, this conception is unproblematically obsolecent. What should be problematic in international relations is the persistence of the political rhetoric of sovereignty which is sometimes linked to the pursuit of autonomy in foreign policy, in an increasingly integrated and functionally complex international system." Beitz, "Sovereignty & Morality," 242. Ruth Lapidoth, Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997).
50. See more generally Stephen D. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," Comparative Political Studies 21 (1988), 66-94, esp. 86-90; Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World (Aldershot, UK: Elgar, 1992); cf. Raymond Vernon, "Sovereignty at Bay: Ten Years After," International Organization 35 (1981), 517-29. In these circumstances, "It is not sovereignty, as classically conceived, that is problematic," as Beitz says, "for analytical purposes, this conception is unproblematically obsolecent. What should be problematic in international relations is the persistence of the political rhetoric of sovereignty which is sometimes linked to the pursuit of autonomy in foreign policy, in an increasingly integrated and functionally complex international system." Beitz, "Sovereignty & Morality," 242. Ruth Lapidoth, Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997).
51. See more generally Stephen D. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," Comparative Political Studies 21 (1988), 66-94, esp. 86-90; Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World (Aldershot, UK: Elgar, 1992); cf. Raymond Vernon, "Sovereignty at Bay: Ten Years After," International Organization 35 (1981), 517-29. In these circumstances, "It is not sovereignty, as classically conceived, that is problematic," as Beitz says, "for analytical purposes, this conception is unproblematically obsolecent. What should be problematic in international relations is the persistence of the political rhetoric of sovereignty which is sometimes linked to the pursuit of autonomy in foreign policy, in an increasingly integrated and functionally complex international system." Beitz, "Sovereignty & Morality," 242. Ruth Lapidoth, Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997).
52. See more generally Stephen D. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," Comparative Political Studies 21 (1988), 66-94, esp. 86-90; Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World (Aldershot, UK: Elgar, 1992); cf. Raymond Vernon, "Sovereignty at Bay: Ten Years After," International Organization 35 (1981), 517-29. In these circumstances, "It is not sovereignty, as classically conceived, that is problematic," as Beitz says, "for analytical purposes, this conception is unproblematically obsolecent. What should be problematic in international relations is the persistence of the political rhetoric of sovereignty which is sometimes linked to the pursuit of autonomy in foreign policy, in an increasingly integrated and functionally complex international system." Beitz, "Sovereignty & Morality," 242. Ruth Lapidoth, Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997).
53. See more generally Stephen D. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," Comparative Political Studies 21 (1988), 66-94, esp. 86-90; Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World (Aldershot, UK: Elgar, 1992); cf. Raymond Vernon, "Sovereignty at Bay: Ten Years After," International Organization 35 (1981), 517-29. In these circumstances, "It is not sovereignty, as classically conceived, that is problematic," as Beitz says, "for analytical purposes, this conception is unproblematically obsolecent. What should be problematic in international relations is the persistence of the political rhetoric of sovereignty which is sometimes linked to the pursuit of autonomy in foreign policy, in an increasingly integrated and functionally complex international system." Beitz, "Sovereignty & Morality," 242. Ruth Lapidoth, Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997).
54. Goldstein and Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy.
55. Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
56. R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
57. Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 48-49
58. Walzer, "Thick and Thin," 68-69.
59. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991), 4.
60. Gideon Gottleib, "Nations without States," Foreign Affairs 73 (May/June 1994), 100-12.
61. Donna Haraway, Primate Visions (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1989), 10.
62. See, for example, W. Mason, "Sociability and Social Organization in Monkeys and Apes," Advances in Experimental Social Psychology I, ed. L. Berkowitz (New York: Academic Press, 1964), 277-305; and Frans B. M. de Waal, Chimpanzee Politics (London: Cape, 1982) and "Conflict Resolution in Monkeys and Apes," Primates: The Road to Self-Sustaining Populations, ed. Kurt Benirschke (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1986), 341-50.
63. See, for example, W. Mason, "Sociability and Social Organization in Monkeys and Apes," Advances in Experimental Social Psychology I, ed. L. Berkowitz (New York: Academic Press, 1964), 277-305; and Frans B. M. de Waal, Chimpanzee Politics (London: Cape, 1982) and "Conflict Resolution in Monkeys and Apes," Primates: The Road to Self-Sustaining Populations, ed. Kurt Benirschke (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1986), 341-50.
64. See, for example, W. Mason, "Sociability and Social Organization in Monkeys and Apes," Advances in Experimental Social Psychology I, ed. L. Berkowitz (New York: Academic Press, 1964), 277-305; and Frans B. M. de Waal, Chimpanzee Politics (London: Cape, 1982) and "Conflict Resolution in Monkeys and Apes," Primates: The Road to Self-Sustaining Populations, ed. Kurt Benirschke (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1986), 341-50.
65. Donna Haraway, "Animal Sociology and a Natural Economy of the Body Politic," Signs 4 (1978), 21-36, 37-60; see further her Primate Visions.
66. Cited in Haraway, Primate Visions, 63.
67. Furthermore, "since the gorilla is only slightly more distinct, it has almost equal right to be considered a fourth species of Homo"; ibid., 97. Haraway, Primate Visions, mounts a radical postmodernist attack on these and many cognate categorizations, more generally.
68. Furthermore, "since the gorilla is only slightly more distinct, it has almost equal right to be considered a fourth species of Homo"; ibid., 97. Haraway, Primate Visions, mounts a radical postmodernist attack on these and many cognate categorizations, more generally.
69. Jared Diamond, "The Third Chimpanzee," The Great Ape Project, ed. Cavalieri and Singer, 88-101 at 93-95. Lesser apes - monkey and gibbons - are slightly more distant relations, sharing 93 percent and 95 percent of DNA with humans, respectively. See further, Diamond, The Rise and Fall of the Third Chimpanzee (New York: HarperCollins, 1991).
70. Jared Diamond, "The Third Chimpanzee," The Great Ape Project, ed. Cavalieri and Singer, 88-101 at 93-95. Lesser apes - monkey and gibbons - are slightly more distant relations, sharing 93 percent and 95 percent of DNA with humans, respectively. See further, Diamond, The Rise and Fall of the Third Chimpanzee (New York: HarperCollins, 1991).
71. But in very many other respects, humans and chimpanzees are strikingly similar. Consider, for example, the fact that "our principal haemoglobin, the oxygen-carrying protein that gives blood its red color, is identical in all 287 units with chimpanzee haemoglobin." Ibid., 95.
72. Gilbert Ryle, A Rational Animal (London: Athlone, 1962). Jonathan Bennett, Rationality (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1964).
73. Gilbert Ryle, A Rational Animal (London: Athlone, 1962). Jonathan Bennett, Rationality (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1964).
74. R. A. Garner, B. T. Garner, and T. E. Van Cantfort, eds., Teaching Sign Language to Chimpanzees (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989). See also The Great Ape Project, ed. Cavalieri and Singer, especially chapters by Fouts and Fouts (pp. 28-41), Miles (pp. 42-57), and Patterson and Gordon (pp. 58-78); and Haraway, Primate Visions, esp. chap. 6.
75. R. A. Garner, B. T. Garner, and T. E. Van Cantfort, eds., Teaching Sign Language to Chimpanzees (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989). See also The Great Ape Project, ed. Cavalieri and Singer, especially chapters by Fouts and Fouts (pp. 28-41), Miles (pp. 42-57), and Patterson and Gordon (pp. 58-78); and Haraway, Primate Visions, esp. chap. 6.
76. R. A. Garner, B. T. Garner, and T. E. Van Cantfort, eds., Teaching Sign Language to Chimpanzees (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989). See also The Great Ape Project, ed. Cavalieri and Singer, especially chapters by Fouts and Fouts (pp. 28-41), Miles (pp. 42-57), and Patterson and Gordon (pp. 58-78); and Haraway, Primate Visions, esp. chap. 6.
77. Haraway, Primate Visions, 131-32.
78. Tom Wolfe, The Right Stuff (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1979), chap. 9.
79. "A Declaration on Great Apes," 5.
80. M. I. Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology (London: Chatto & Windus, 1980).
81. For an analytical gloss on this Hegelian theme, see Jon Elster, Logic & Society (London: Wiley, 1978), 70-77.
82. Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Oxford, UK: Polity, 1988).
83. Tully, Approach to Political Philosophy, 166; see also 148-49, 171.
84. Henry Reynolds, The Law of the Land, 2d ed. (Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin, 1992). Similarly in Africa: see Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa, 31-38.
85. Henry Reynolds, The Law of the Land, 2d ed. (Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin, 1992). Similarly in Africa: see Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa, 31-38.
86. In the words of the "Declaration on Great Apes," 6: "The value of the great apes as research tools lies precisely in the combination of two conflicting factors: on one hand, the fact that, both physically and psychologically, they very closely resemble our own species; and on the other, the fact that they are denied the ethical and legal protection that we give to our own species."
87. This is particularly evident in the subtitle to Cavalieri and Singer's The Great Ape Project: Equality Before Humanity. See also Peter Singer's earlier Animal Liberation (London: Cape, 1976) and Stephen R. L. Clark's Moral Status of Animals (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1977).
88. This is particularly evident in the subtitle to Cavalieri and Singer's The Great Ape Project: Equality Before Humanity. See also Peter Singer's earlier Animal Liberation (London: Cape, 1976) and Stephen R. L. Clark's Moral Status of Animals (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1977).
89. This is particularly evident in the subtitle to Cavalieri and Singer's The Great Ape Project: Equality Before Humanity. See also Peter Singer's earlier Animal Liberation (London: Cape, 1976) and Stephen R. L. Clark's Moral Status of Animals (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1977).
90. Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer, eds., The Great Ape Project: Equality Before Humanity (New York: St Martin's, 1993), 284, 299. See, more generally, Benirshcke, ed., Primates: The Road to Self-Sustaining Populations, esp. John F. Oates, "African Primate Conservation: General Needs and Specific Priorities," 21-29.
91. Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer, eds., The Great Ape Project: Equality Before Humanity (New York: St Martin's, 1993), 284, 299. See, more generally, Benirshcke, ed., Primates: The Road to Self-Sustaining Populations, esp. John F. Oates, "African Primate Conservation: General Needs and Specific Priorities," 21-29.
92. Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer, eds., The Great Ape Project: Equality Before Humanity (New York: St Martin's, 1993), 284, 299. See, more generally, Benirshcke, ed., Primates: The Road to Self-Sustaining Populations, esp. John F. Oates, "African Primate Conservation: General Needs and Specific Priorities," 21-29.
93. In an epilogue, the editors of The Great Ape Project elaborate on that proposal in the following terms: "[O]rang-utangs, gorillas and chimpanzees . . . living in natural conditions in their own territories . . . will have no need of our assistance; they will need only to be left alone. We do have world institutions . . . to protect weaker countries from stronger ones. We also have considerable historical experience with the United Nations acting as a protector of non-autonomous human regions, known as United Nations Trust Territories. It is to an international body of this kind that the defense of the first nonhuman independent territories and a role in the regulation of mixed human and non-human territories could be entrusted." Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer, "The Great Ape Project - and Beyond," The Great Ape Project, ed. Cavalieri and Singer, 304-12 at 311.
94. For details of their operation, see Timothy B. Hamlin, "Debt-for-Nature Swaps: A New Strategy for Protecting Environmental Interests in Developing Nations," Ecology Law Quarterly 15 (1989), 1065-88.
95. Granting independence is freeing: how well that is tracked by notions of "transferring title" is, perhaps, an open question. On the process more generally, see James R. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1979).
96. John Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature, 2d ed. (London: Duckworth, 1980), chap. 2.
97. The analogy was even stronger in the antebellum period: see Daniel H. Deudney, "The Philadelphia System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-Union, Circa 1788-1861," International Organization 49 (1995), 191-228.
98. As the "Declaration on Great Apes," 5 itself suggests.
99. These might best be thought of as international analogues to "conservation servitudes" in domestic law; see Gerald Korngold, "Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the Context of in Gross Real Convenants and Easements," Texas Law Review 63 (1984), 433-95.
100. But we might, alternatively (or additionally), think in terms of eventually repatriating "imprisoned" apes, those in medical laboratories or zoos, to those homelands once established. The signatories to the Declaration on Great Apes explicitly urge this approach.
101. "The denial of the basic rights of particular other species will not . . . assist the world's poor and oppressed to win their just struggles. Nor is it reasonable to ask that the members of these other species should wait until all humans have achieved their rights first" ("Declaration on Great Apes," 6).
102. Jeremy Waldron, "Introduction," Theories of Rights, ed. J. Waldron (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984), 9-12.
103. One important function of domestic property law, just as of international law, is to impose duties (e.g., of respecting others' prerogatives) as well as to confer rights. In particular, one of the crucial functions of sovereigns in ordinary human communities is to communicate international expectations (about human rights, fair trading, etc.) to their citizens. But in nonstandard cases, like underage heirs, it seems sufficient that the trustees themselves respect their duties toward others: no one would seriously suggest that we deprive beneficiaries of a trust of their property rights, just because they are themselves just as incapable of comprehending the duties as they are of comprehending the rights that go with property ownership. The same would seem to apply, mutatis mutandis, to the rights and duties associated with sovereignty in the international community.
104. Robert Wokler, "Keeping it in the Family" (Review of The Great Ape Project), Times Literary Supplement, 17 September 1993, 6.
105. Joel Feinberg, "The Child's Right to an Open Future," in Freedom & Fulfillment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 76-97.
106. See further Robert E. Goodin and Diane Gibson, "Rights, Young and Old," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 17 (1997), 185-203.
107. Jane Goodall, The Chimpanzees of Gombe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). Richard Wrangham and Dale Peterson, Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1996).
108. Jane Goodall, The Chimpanzees of Gombe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). Richard Wrangham and Dale Peterson, Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1996).
109. Short, "Primate Ethics."
110. Colin Turnbull, The Mountain People (London: Cape, 1973) and Wayward Servants: The Two Worlds of the African Pygmies (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1965), esp. 165-66.
111. Colin Turnbull, The Mountain People (London: Cape, 1973) and Wayward Servants: The Two Worlds of the African Pygmies (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1965), esp. 165-66.
112. Lapidoth, Autonomy, chap. 6.
113. Walker, Inside/Outside. For examples within ethnically divided societies, see Lapidoth, Autonomy, 46. The development of the European Union provides yet more; see J.H.H. Weiler, "The Transformation of Europe," Yale Law Journal 100 (1991), 2403-83 and Theodora Kostakopoulou, "Towards a Theory of Constructive Citizenship in Europe," Journal of Political Philosophy 4 (1996), 337-58.
114. Walker, Inside/Outside. For examples within ethnically divided societies, see Lapidoth, Autonomy, 46. The development of the European Union provides yet more; see J.H.H. Weiler, "The Transformation of Europe," Yale Law Journal 100 (1991), 2403-83 and Theodora Kostakopoulou, "Towards a Theory of Constructive Citizenship in Europe," Journal of Political Philosophy 4 (1996), 337-58.
115. Walker, Inside/Outside. For examples within ethnically divided societies, see Lapidoth, Autonomy, 46. The development of the European Union provides yet more; see J.H.H. Weiler, "The Transformation of Europe," Yale Law Journal 100 (1991), 2403-83 and Theodora Kostakopoulou, "Towards a Theory of Constructive Citizenship in Europe," Journal of Political Philosophy 4 (1996), 337-58.
116. Walker, Inside/Outside. For examples within ethnically divided societies, see Lapidoth, Autonomy, 46. The development of the European Union provides yet more; see J.H.H. Weiler, "The Transformation of Europe," Yale Law Journal 100 (1991), 2403-83 and Theodora Kostakopoulou, "Towards a Theory of Constructive Citizenship in Europe," Journal of Political Philosophy 4 (1996), 337-58.
117. Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968). See also David D. Laitin, Language Repertoires and State Construction in Africa (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
118. Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968). See also David D. Laitin, Language Repertoires and State Construction in Africa (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
119. Jeremy Waldron, ed., Nonsense upon Stilts (London: Methuen, 1987).
120. Even if the differences are only ones of degree, however, differences of degree eventually amount to differences in kind. Clearly, there is a line to be drawn here, but where exactly to draw it is, we agree, unclear.