The microeconomics of an indigenous African institution: The rotating savings and credit association

Economic Development and Cultural Change

Volumn 45, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 745-772

  Van Den Brink, Rogier ^a   Chavas, Jean Paul ^b  

^a WORLD BANK GROUP   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CREDIT SCHEME; MICROFINANCE; ROTATING SAVINGS AND CREDIT ASSOCIATION; RURAL CREDIT; URBAN CREDIT;

AFRICA;

EID: 0031464252     PISSN: 00130079     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/452306     Document Type: Article

References (47)

1. The ROSCA is known as tontine in Francophone West Africa, dashi among the Nupe in Nigeria, isusu among the Ibo and Yoruba, and as susu in Ghana. It is called ekub in Ethiopia. In Tanzania, it is called upatu, and it is known as chilemba in many other parts of East Africa. In other parts of the world, the ROSCA is called arisan (Indonesia), pia huey (Thailand), ko (Japan), ho (Vietnam), kye (Korea), and hui (central China). Many non-African examples of the ROSCA can be found in T. Firth and B. S. Yamey, Capital, Saving and Credit in Peasant Societies (Chicago: Aldine, 1964).
2. For a general introduction to rural credit markets in developing countries, see J. D. Von Pischke, Dale W. Adams, and Gordon Donald, Rural Financial Markets in Developing Countries: Their Use and Abuse (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, for the Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, 1983).
3. Timothy Besley, Stephen Coate, and Glenn Loury, "The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 792-810, and "Rotating Savings and Credit Associations, Credit Markets and Efficiency," Review of Economic Studies 61 (1994): 701-19. In their 1994 article, Besley, Coate, and Loury showed that ROSCAs are inefficient compared to an "idealized competitive credit market." In this article, we explore the relative efficiency of ROSCAs compared to more realistic credit markets, allowing for borrowing rates to be higher than saving rates as commonly found in many developing countries.
4. Timothy Besley, Stephen Coate, and Glenn Loury, "The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations," American Economic Review 83 (1993): 792-810, and "Rotating Savings and Credit Associations, Credit Markets and Efficiency," Review of Economic Studies 61 (1994): 701-19. In their 1994 article, Besley, Coate, and Loury showed that ROSCAs are inefficient compared to an "idealized competitive credit market." In this article, we explore the relative efficiency of ROSCAs compared to more realistic credit markets, allowing for borrowing rates to be higher than saving rates as commonly found in many developing countries.
5. A. Bhaduri, "A Study in Agricultural Backwardness under Semi-Feudalism," Economic Journal 83 (1973): 341-52; K. Basu, "Implicit Interest Rates, Usury and Isolation in Backward Agriculture," Cambridge Journal of Economics 8 (1984): 145-59; G. Hart, "Interlocking Transactions: Obstacles, Precursors or Instruments of Agrarian Capitalism?" Journal of Development Economics 23 (1986): 177-203.
6. A. Bhaduri, "A Study in Agricultural Backwardness under Semi-Feudalism," Economic Journal 83 (1973): 341-52; K. Basu, "Implicit Interest Rates, Usury and Isolation in Backward Agriculture," Cambridge Journal of Economics 8 (1984): 145-59; G. Hart, "Interlocking Transactions: Obstacles, Precursors or Instruments of Agrarian Capitalism?" Journal of Development Economics 23 (1986): 177-203.
7. A. Bhaduri, "A Study in Agricultural Backwardness under Semi-Feudalism," Economic Journal 83 (1973): 341-52; K. Basu, "Implicit Interest Rates, Usury and Isolation in Backward Agriculture," Cambridge Journal of Economics 8 (1984): 145-59; G. Hart, "Interlocking Transactions: Obstacles, Precursors or Instruments of Agrarian Capitalism?" Journal of Development Economics 23 (1986): 177-203.
8. Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Rational Peasants, Efficient Institutions and a Theory of Rural Organization: Methodological Remarks for Development Economics," in The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions, ed. Pranab Bardhan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
9. S. Ardener, "The Social and Economic Significance of the Contribution Club among a Section of the Southern Ibo," in Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research, Sociology Section (Ibadan, 1953), pp. 128-42, and "The Comparative Study of Rotating Credit Associations," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 92 (1964): 201-29; F. J. A. Bouman, "Indigenous Savings and Credit Societies in the Third World: A Message," Savings and Development 1 (1977): 181-220; C. Geertz, "The Rotating Credit Association: A 'Middle Rung' in Development," Economic Development and Cultural Change 10 (1962): 241-63; H. F. Illy, "Saving and Credit System of the Bamileke in Cameroon: A Study on the Internal Financing of Development," in Development Policy in Africa, ed. J. Voss (Bonn: Verlag Neve Gesellschaft Gmbh, 1973), pp. 293-314; M. P. Miracle, D. S. Miracle, and L. Cohen, "Informal Savings Mobilization in Africa," Economic Development and Cultural Change 28 (1980): 701-24; Noble Y. Nweze, "The Role of Women's Traditional Savings and Credit Cooperatives in Small-Farm Development," African Social Science Series Research Report no. 11 (Winrock International Institute for Agricultural Development, Morrilton, Ark., 1990); W. A. Warmington, "Savings and Indebtedness among Cameroon Plantation Workers," Africa 28 (1958): 329-43.
10. S. Ardener, "The Social and Economic Significance of the Contribution Club among a Section of the Southern Ibo," in Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research, Sociology Section (Ibadan, 1953), pp. 128-42, and "The Comparative Study of Rotating Credit Associations," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 92 (1964): 201-29; F. J. A. Bouman, "Indigenous Savings and Credit Societies in the Third World: A Message," Savings and Development 1 (1977): 181-220; C. Geertz, "The Rotating Credit Association: A 'Middle Rung' in Development," Economic Development and Cultural Change 10 (1962): 241-63; H. F. Illy, "Saving and Credit System of the Bamileke in Cameroon: A Study on the Internal Financing of Development," in Development Policy in Africa, ed. J. Voss (Bonn: Verlag Neve Gesellschaft Gmbh, 1973), pp. 293-314; M. P. Miracle, D. S. Miracle, and L. Cohen, "Informal Savings Mobilization in Africa," Economic Development and Cultural Change 28 (1980): 701-24; Noble Y. Nweze, "The Role of Women's Traditional Savings and Credit Cooperatives in Small-Farm Development," African Social Science Series Research Report no. 11 (Winrock International Institute for Agricultural Development, Morrilton, Ark., 1990); W. A. Warmington, "Savings and Indebtedness among Cameroon Plantation Workers," Africa 28 (1958): 329-43.
11. S. Ardener, "The Social and Economic Significance of the Contribution Club among a Section of the Southern Ibo," in Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research, Sociology Section (Ibadan, 1953), pp. 128-42, and "The Comparative Study of Rotating Credit Associations," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 92 (1964): 201-29; F. J. A. Bouman, "Indigenous Savings and Credit Societies in the Third World: A Message," Savings and Development 1 (1977): 181-220; C. Geertz, "The Rotating Credit Association: A 'Middle Rung' in Development," Economic Development and Cultural Change 10 (1962): 241-63; H. F. Illy, "Saving and Credit System of the Bamileke in Cameroon: A Study on the Internal Financing of Development," in Development Policy in Africa, ed. J. Voss (Bonn: Verlag Neve Gesellschaft Gmbh, 1973), pp. 293-314; M. P. Miracle, D. S. Miracle, and L. Cohen, "Informal Savings Mobilization in Africa," Economic Development and Cultural Change 28 (1980): 701-24; Noble Y. Nweze, "The Role of Women's Traditional Savings and Credit Cooperatives in Small-Farm Development," African Social Science Series Research Report no. 11 (Winrock International Institute for Agricultural Development, Morrilton, Ark., 1990); W. A. Warmington, "Savings and Indebtedness among Cameroon Plantation Workers," Africa 28 (1958): 329-43.
12. S. Ardener, "The Social and Economic Significance of the Contribution Club among a Section of the Southern Ibo," in Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research, Sociology Section (Ibadan, 1953), pp. 128-42, and "The Comparative Study of Rotating Credit Associations," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 92 (1964): 201-29; F. J. A. Bouman, "Indigenous Savings and Credit Societies in the Third World: A Message," Savings and Development 1 (1977): 181-220; C. Geertz, "The Rotating Credit Association: A 'Middle Rung' in Development," Economic Development and Cultural Change 10 (1962): 241-63; H. F. Illy, "Saving and Credit System of the Bamileke in Cameroon: A Study on the Internal Financing of Development," in Development Policy in Africa, ed. J. Voss (Bonn: Verlag Neve Gesellschaft Gmbh, 1973), pp. 293-314; M. P. Miracle, D. S. Miracle, and L. Cohen, "Informal Savings Mobilization in Africa," Economic Development and Cultural Change 28 (1980): 701-24; Noble Y. Nweze, "The Role of Women's Traditional Savings and Credit Cooperatives in Small-Farm Development," African Social Science Series Research Report no. 11 (Winrock International Institute for Agricultural Development, Morrilton, Ark., 1990); W. A. Warmington, "Savings and Indebtedness among Cameroon Plantation Workers," Africa 28 (1958): 329-43.
13. S. Ardener, "The Social and Economic Significance of the Contribution Club among a Section of the Southern Ibo," in Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research, Sociology Section (Ibadan, 1953), pp. 128-42, and "The Comparative Study of Rotating Credit Associations," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 92 (1964): 201-29; F. J. A. Bouman, "Indigenous Savings and Credit Societies in the Third World: A Message," Savings and Development 1 (1977): 181-220; C. Geertz, "The Rotating Credit Association: A 'Middle Rung' in Development," Economic Development and Cultural Change 10 (1962): 241-63; H. F. Illy, "Saving and Credit System of the Bamileke in Cameroon: A Study on the Internal Financing of Development," in Development Policy in Africa, ed. J. Voss (Bonn: Verlag Neve Gesellschaft Gmbh, 1973), pp. 293-314; M. P. Miracle, D. S. Miracle, and L. Cohen, "Informal Savings Mobilization in Africa," Economic Development and Cultural Change 28 (1980): 701-24; Noble Y. Nweze, "The Role of Women's Traditional Savings and Credit Cooperatives in Small-Farm Development," African Social Science Series Research Report no. 11 (Winrock International Institute for Agricultural Development, Morrilton, Ark., 1990); W. A. Warmington, "Savings and Indebtedness among Cameroon Plantation Workers," Africa 28 (1958): 329-43.
14. S. Ardener, "The Social and Economic Significance of the Contribution Club among a Section of the Southern Ibo," in Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research, Sociology Section (Ibadan, 1953), pp. 128-42, and "The Comparative Study of Rotating Credit Associations," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 92 (1964): 201-29; F. J. A. Bouman, "Indigenous Savings and Credit Societies in the Third World: A Message," Savings and Development 1 (1977): 181-220; C. Geertz, "The Rotating Credit Association: A 'Middle Rung' in Development," Economic Development and Cultural Change 10 (1962): 241-63; H. F. Illy, "Saving and Credit System of the Bamileke in Cameroon: A Study on the Internal Financing of Development," in Development Policy in Africa, ed. J. Voss (Bonn: Verlag Neve Gesellschaft Gmbh, 1973), pp. 293-314; M. P. Miracle, D. S. Miracle, and L. Cohen, "Informal Savings Mobilization in Africa," Economic Development and Cultural Change 28 (1980): 701-24; Noble Y. Nweze, "The Role of Women's Traditional Savings and Credit Cooperatives in Small-Farm Development," African Social Science Series Research Report no. 11 (Winrock International Institute for Agricultural Development, Morrilton, Ark., 1990); W. A. Warmington, "Savings and Indebtedness among Cameroon Plantation Workers," Africa 28 (1958): 329-43.
15. S. Ardener, "The Social and Economic Significance of the Contribution Club among a Section of the Southern Ibo," in Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research, Sociology Section (Ibadan, 1953), pp. 128-42, and "The Comparative Study of Rotating Credit Associations," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 92 (1964): 201-29; F. J. A. Bouman, "Indigenous Savings and Credit Societies in the Third World: A Message," Savings and Development 1 (1977): 181-220; C. Geertz, "The Rotating Credit Association: A 'Middle Rung' in Development," Economic Development and Cultural Change 10 (1962): 241-63; H. F. Illy, "Saving and Credit System of the Bamileke in Cameroon: A Study on the Internal Financing of Development," in Development Policy in Africa, ed. J. Voss (Bonn: Verlag Neve Gesellschaft Gmbh, 1973), pp. 293-314; M. P. Miracle, D. S. Miracle, and L. Cohen, "Informal Savings Mobilization in Africa," Economic Development and Cultural Change 28 (1980): 701-24; Noble Y. Nweze, "The Role of Women's Traditional Savings and Credit Cooperatives in Small-Farm Development," African Social Science Series Research Report no. 11 (Winrock International Institute for Agricultural Development, Morrilton, Ark., 1990); W. A. Warmington, "Savings and Indebtedness among Cameroon Plantation Workers," Africa 28 (1958): 329-43.
16. S. Ardener, "The Social and Economic Significance of the Contribution Club among a Section of the Southern Ibo," in Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research, Sociology Section (Ibadan, 1953), pp. 128-42, and "The Comparative Study of Rotating Credit Associations," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 92 (1964): 201-29; F. J. A. Bouman, "Indigenous Savings and Credit Societies in the Third World: A Message," Savings and Development 1 (1977): 181-220; C. Geertz, "The Rotating Credit Association: A 'Middle Rung' in Development," Economic Development and Cultural Change 10 (1962): 241-63; H. F. Illy, "Saving and Credit System of the Bamileke in Cameroon: A Study on the Internal Financing of Development," in Development Policy in Africa, ed. J. Voss (Bonn: Verlag Neve Gesellschaft Gmbh, 1973), pp. 293-314; M. P. Miracle, D. S. Miracle, and L. Cohen, "Informal Savings Mobilization in Africa," Economic Development and Cultural Change 28 (1980): 701-24; Noble Y. Nweze, "The Role of Women's Traditional Savings and Credit Cooperatives in Small-Farm Development," African Social Science Series Research Report no. 11 (Winrock International Institute for Agricultural Development, Morrilton, Ark., 1990); W. A. Warmington, "Savings and Indebtedness among Cameroon Plantation Workers," Africa 28 (1958): 329-43.
17. Big Babanki is a small chiefdom in the North West Province, 30 kilometers north of Bamenda, the provincial capital. It lies in the hilly, savanna region known as the Grassfields of Cameroon. Coffee is the main cash crop for men, while the production and marketing of food crops, dominated by women, is rapidly becoming an important sector of the economy. Some of the data collected were part of a replication effort of an earlier survey conducted in 1970 and published in F. J. A. Bouman and K. Harteveld, "The Djanggi, a Traditional Form of Saving and Credit in West Cameroon," Sociologia Ruralis 16 (1976): 103-19. The same questionnaire was used again in 1979 to interview a sample of 46 members in the same ROSCAs (if they were still functional). Some comparisons between the two points in time could be made with respect to the functioning of the ROSCAs in a changing economic environment. The survey information provided a case study for the empirical investigation of the functioning of ROSCAs (Rogier van den Brink, "Big Babanki Revisited: A Study on Rotating Savings and Credit Associations in the Grassfields of Cameroon" [Department of Agricultural Sociology of the Tropics and Subtropics, Landbouwhogeschool, Wageningen, Netherlands, 1991]).
18. Big Babanki is a small chiefdom in the North West Province, 30 kilometers north of Bamenda, the provincial capital. It lies in the hilly, savanna region known as the Grassfields of Cameroon. Coffee is the main cash crop for men, while the production and marketing of food crops, dominated by women, is rapidly becoming an important sector of the economy. Some of the data collected were part of a replication effort of an earlier survey conducted in 1970 and published in F. J. A. Bouman and K. Harteveld, "The Djanggi, a Traditional Form of Saving and Credit in West Cameroon," Sociologia Ruralis 16 (1976): 103-19. The same questionnaire was used again in 1979 to interview a sample of 46 members in the same ROSCAs (if they were still functional). Some comparisons between the two points in time could be made with respect to the functioning of the ROSCAs in a changing economic environment. The survey information provided a case study for the empirical investigation of the functioning of ROSCAs (Rogier van den Brink, "Big Babanki Revisited: A Study on Rotating Savings and Credit Associations in the Grassfields of Cameroon" [Department of Agricultural Sociology of the Tropics and Subtropics, Landbouwhogeschool, Wageningen, Netherlands, 1991]).
19. For the sake of simplicity, we will focus our discussion on ROSCAs with fixed contributions.
20. David H. Penny, "Farm Credit Policy in the Early Stages of Agricultural Development," Australian Journal of Agricultural Development 12 (1968): 32-45; Dan Soen and Patrice de Comarmond "Savings Associations among the Bamilèkè: Traditional and Modern Cooperation in Southwest Cameroon" American Anthropologist 74 (1972): 1170-79; Steve Haggblade, "Africanization from Below: The Evolution of Cameroonian Savings Societies into Western-Style Banks," Rural Africana 2 (1978): 35-55.
21. David H. Penny, "Farm Credit Policy in the Early Stages of Agricultural Development," Australian Journal of Agricultural Development 12 (1968): 32-45; Dan Soen and Patrice de Comarmond "Savings Associations among the Bamilèkè: Traditional and Modern Cooperation in Southwest Cameroon" American Anthropologist 74 (1972): 1170-79; Steve Haggblade, "Africanization from Below: The Evolution of Cameroonian Savings Societies into Western-Style Banks," Rural Africana 2 (1978): 35-55.
22. David H. Penny, "Farm Credit Policy in the Early Stages of Agricultural Development," Australian Journal of Agricultural Development 12 (1968): 32-45; Dan Soen and Patrice de Comarmond "Savings Associations among the Bamilèkè: Traditional and Modern Cooperation in Southwest Cameroon" American Anthropologist 74 (1972): 1170-79; Steve Haggblade, "Africanization from Below: The Evolution of Cameroonian Savings Societies into Western-Style Banks," Rural Africana 2 (1978): 35-55.
23. One should not associate this with the Asian stereotype. The term "landlord" is simply used to identify the president of the association and the one who owns the compound where the meetings of the njangeh are held.
24. The existence of written records on the operations of the ROSCA and the trouble bank greatly facilitates research into the ROSCA and, by extension, into developments in the wider village economy.
25. "CFA" stands for CFA franc, the currency unit in Cameroon.
26. A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization," American Economic Review 62 (1972): 777-95.
27. Although the people of the village routinely use the word "meeting," I will replace it by "trouble bank" to avoid confusion. In South Africa these associations are called stokvels. Elsewhere, they are also known as "Christmas clubs," since, as was the case in Cameroon, these trouble banks are often liquidated in December.
28. Fixed-fund associations, such as the meeting or trouble bank, are also frequently used outside the institutional context of the ROSCA. In these associations, members typically save small monthly amounts, ranging from CFA 50 to CFA 200. These associations are very popular among women; membership may easily reach 50-100 persons. Many of them are terminated around Christmastime-the season of festivities of various kinds, and a time when women would like to buy new clothes for their children. And the local branch of the national political party uses a fixed fund association to distribute party membership cards, obligatory for every Cameroonian citizen. Fixed-fund associations are also used by tax collectors.
29. Such data are easily obtained from the njangeh records kept by the secretary.
30. The ROSCA and the trouble bank are often confused with each other. These are two separate institutions that, however, can easily be combined to create a private, interest-charging banking system. For instance, in Nigeria private moneylenders would organize a ROSCA or associate themselves with existing ROSCAs in order to facilitate the repayment of high-interest-bearing loans by debtors. Considerable financial wealth was accumulated by these middlemen, and this system damaged the reputation of the ROSCA (Anthony I. Nwabughuogu, "The Isusu: An Institution for Capital Formation among the Ngwa Igbo; Its Origin and Development to 1951," Africa 54 [1984]: 46-58). The ROSCA in this case was part of a tied loan system exploited by financial middlemen to enforce the strict repayment of loans.
31. The story is that someone who had defaulted went to the plantations in the South West Province, and when he returned 10 years later, paid all his contributors, including the fines he had been charged, and was readmitted as a ROSCA member.
32. The attitude in the village with respect to common thievery can be disastrous for the thief; if he values his life his best bet is to run to the nearest police station and beg to be put safely behind bars.
33. James W. Friedman, Games Theory with Applications to Economics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
34. Besley, Coate, and Loury, "Economics," and "Rotating Savings and Credit Associations" (both in n. 3 above).
35. The assumption of a zero discount rate is rather restrictive. However, it greatly simplifies the discussion. For that reason, a zero discount rate will be assumed in the text. The results presented below can be easily extended to reflect a positive discount rate. See nn. 23-25, 27, and 28 below.
36. N+1/1 - ab. 29. In a historical study of ROSCAs among the Ngwa Igbo of Nigeria, Nwabughuogu (n. 17 above) confirms the hypothesis that ROSCAs were merely a monetary variation on a principle that had already proven its economic worth, i.e., the rotating labor association.
37. Note that the problems of clearing and even of weeding can be sequentially solved. However, one would not expect to find a rotating labor association with respect to, for instance, planting operations, which have a narrow window of opportunity.
38. In death aid societies part of the fund needed to organize the elaborate final farewell to the deceased is provided by the guests themselves. Donations are recorded so that the hosts will be able to reciprocate at a future date, i.e., the occurrence of a death in the guests' families.
39. ROSCAs may also be created for temporary lumpiness problems. For instance, it has been reported in Swaziland that in 1984 many ROSCAs started after the ravages of a cyclone forced many households to finance the rebuilding of their homes.
40. Van den Brink (n. 7 above).
41. It is sometimes argued that women have differential access to credit because women generally do not own marketable land rights and, as subordinates in the household, cannot establish independent reputations for creditworthiness. It is true that the traditional property rights system generally accords women only cultivation rights for annual crops, which do not easily transform into more permanent property titles. However, given the property rights regime in place, most men do not possess marketable land rights either. This does not prevent them from establishing their creditworthiness in the ROSCA system. Additionally, there hardly seems to be any relation between a husband's credit-worthiness and that of his wife. The ROSCAs and trouble banks provide women with ample opportunity to establish their own credit rating, irrespective of that of their husbands.
42. In litigation in the traditional courts, such dilemmas surface explicitly. It is difficult for the traditional justice system to differentiate the credit relation between the two parties from the other strands of their relationship. Interpretation problems quickly arise, and the final ruling may leave both parties dissatisfied.
43. Miracle, Miracle, and Cohen (n. 6 above). However, the mere citing of an interest rate out of its context can be misleading. Many of the examples of exorbitant rates given in the literature are not interest rates of explicit, unconditional credit contracts. They may be implied interest rates that are part of a more general implicit contract between the two parties. Typically, business contracts are set up as joint ventures in which each of the two parties contributes certain inputs while profits are shared according to a particular formula. Such contracts are essentially a type of sharecropping contract. The question then becomes whether the fact that the creditor receives profit shares is an example of exorbitant interest rates or rather an example of a particular type of risk-sharing arrangement that provides incentive mechanisms in a context of imperfect information and uncertainty.
44. The existing property regime clearly distinguishes between the crop, i.e., the product of labor and capital, and the land on which the crop stands. Within the village community, the sale of the land itself is deemed illegal. Sales to strangers, however, do in fact occur, but the payments are often masked as symbolic gifts given the notion of illegality that surrounds the outright sale of land.
45. Marshall D. Sahlins, Tribesmen (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1968).
46. Extension agents face the added problem of having to reconcile two potentially conflicting roles. They have to wear the conflicting hats of propagator and enforcer of a loan.
47. Moreover, although no quantitative data exist to our knowledge, we were told by various informants that the financial economy of Western Cameroon was crucially dependent on extremely wealthy ROSCAs (e.g., fund sizes of over $10,000 per month) run by Bamileke traders.