Government-party coordination in Japan's foreign policy-making: The issue of permanent membership in the UNSC

Asian Survey

Volumn 37, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 368-382

  Ahn, C S ^a  

^a U S DEPARTMENT OF STATE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COORDINATION PROCESS; FOREIGN POLICY; PARTY COORDINATION; PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP; POLICY MAKING; UNSC;

JAPAN;

EID: 0031459751     PISSN: 00044687     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2645654     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. "Text of UN Address" as reported by Kyodo, September 27, 1993.
2. Tanaka Shusei, "Kokuren Kaikaku ga Honsuji: 'Joninka Gaiko' ni Kago Ari (UN reform is the correct logic: Error in the diplomacy of UNSC entry)," Ronza, December 1994, p. 32. According to then Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Ishihara Nobuo, the reason for Tanaka's objection, as presented to Hosokawa and high-level MOFA officials, was "concern for being unable to avoid Japan's military cooperation with, and contribution to, the UN," in the event that Japan gained permanent membership in the UNSC. See Ishihara Nobuo, Kantei Nisen Rokpyaku Rokuju Hachinichi (Two thousand six hundred sixty-eight days in the prime minister's residence) (Tokyo: NHK Shuppansha, 1995), pp. 152-53.
3. Tanaka Shusei, "Kokuren Kaikaku ga Honsuji: 'Joninka Gaiko' ni Kago Ari (UN reform is the correct logic: Error in the diplomacy of UNSC entry)," Ronza, December 1994, p. 32. According to then Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Ishihara Nobuo, the reason for Tanaka's objection, as presented to Hosokawa and high-level MOFA officials, was "concern for being unable to avoid Japan's military cooperation with, and contribution to, the UN," in the event that Japan gained permanent membership in the UNSC. See Ishihara Nobuo, Kantei Nisen Rokpyaku Rokuju Hachinichi (Two thousand six hundred sixty-eight days in the prime minister's residence) (Tokyo: NHK Shuppansha, 1995), pp. 152-53.
4. The exchange between Tanaka and MOFA officials was described to the author by a former MOFA official in an interview, December 20, 1995. In an NHK interview on September 26, 1993, Tanaka said: "The Foreign Ministry itself is an administrative authority. It has to have support from the people. Therefore, it [Japan's candidacy] is a matter of when we will form a national consensus." For MOFA's original plan and strategy, see Sinyo Takahiro, "Nihon no Gaikokiko to Taikokuren Seisaku (Structure of Japanese foreign policy and Japanese policy toward the UN)," Kokusai Mondai, no. 408 (March 1994).
5. See Kawabe Ichiro, Jonin Rijikoku In (Entry to UNSC permanent membership), Iwanami Bukkureto, no. 363 (December 1994).
6. The agreement reads: "The new government, in accordance with the spirit of the Japanese constitution, strives for reform of the United Nations and aims at constructing a peaceful order of the world centered upon the United Nations. As for Japan's entry to the UNSC as a permanent member, we will not stretch ourselves, but will take a prudent approach by taking into considera-tion the progress of UN reform, the recommendations of neighboring Asian countries, and the consensus of the people," Tanaka Shusei, op. cit., pp. 28-29.
7. Ibid.
8. Kyodo, September 2, 1994.
9. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, September 10 and 12, 1994, morning ed., p. 2.
10. Tanaka, op. cit., pp. 29-30.
11. "Foreign Minister's Major Speeches and Articles at the 49th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations," September 27, 1994, issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
12. Tanaka, op. cit., pp. 30-31.
13. Ibid.
14. Interview with officials of MOFA's Comprehensive Policy Bureau, January 18, 1996.
15. Yomiuri Shimbun, September 5, 1994, morning ed., p. 2.
16. Asahi Shimbun, October 7, 1994, morning ed., p. 2.
17. "Text of UN Address," Kyodo, September 26, 1995.
18. Interview with officials of MOFA Comprehensive Policy Bureau, January 18, 1996. The "bickering" between MOFA and Murayama's aide was also reported in Kyodo's "News Analysis" of October 23, 1995.
19. The relevant part of the speech read, "with regard to the reform of the Security Council, it is required that its functions be strengthened by enhancing its effectiveness and its legitimacy. This will necessitate an expansion of the Council which will include an increase in its permanent membership and an improvement in its working methods, for example, through enhanced transparency." See "Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama at the Special Commemorative Meeting of the General Assembly on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the U.N.," New York, October 22, 1995, issued by the MOFA.
20. Kyodo, "News Analysis," October 23, 1995.
21. The decision to establish a formal mechanism of policymaking and coordination among the LDP, the JSP, and Sakigake was made on July 8, 1994 - nine days after the inauguration of the Murayama Cabinet - at the first meeting of the three-party policy coordination panel. The panel was chaired jointly by LDP Policy Affairs Research Council Chairman Kato Koichi, JSP Policy Board Chairman Sekiyama Nobuyuki, and Sakigake Policy Affairs Research Council Chairman Kan Naoto. The reason for establishing the three-party mechanism was said to be "to promote highly democratic and transparent policy-making and avoid behind-the-scenes maneuvers that caused the former ruling coalition to tumble." See pamphlet titled, "Murayama Renritsu Seiken Ishi Kettei Kikoto" (Organizational structure of the Murayama coalition government's decision-making), issued by the International Bureau of the Liberal Democratic Party, July 14, 1994.
22. Asahi Shimbun, September 6, 1994, morning ed., p. 2.
23. Author's interviews with Diet members, government officials, academics, and journalists between December 1995 and February 1996.
24. The JNP opposed it because Japan should not make efforts "to win a privileged position." See Asahi Shimbun, July 7, 1993, morning ed., p. 2.
25. Mainichi Shimbun, September 7, 1994, evening ed., p. 1.
26. Interview with a Sakigake Diet member, December 19, 1995.
27. Ishihara interview, December 12, 1995.
28. Interview with MITI official, January 10, 1996; with current and former JDA officials, January 16 and 17, and with a former MOFA security policy specialist on January 18, 1996; and with a MOFA Asian Affairs Bureau official, January 23, 1996.
29. See Shinoda Tomohito, Soridaijin no Kenryoku to Shidoryoku (The power and leadership of the prime minister) (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimposha, 1994), pp. 56-67, 115-19, 173-78.
30. See Kusano Atsushi, "Taigai Seisaku Kettei no Kiko to Katei" (Structure and proess of foreign policy decisions), in Aruga Tadashi et al., eds., Koza Kokusai Seiji: Nihon no Gaiko (International politics lecture series: Japan's foreign relations) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppansha, 1989), pp. 55-56.
31. For a constitutional and legal discussion on this subject, see Shinoda, op. cit., pp. 30-32.
32. Ibid.
33. Hans H. Baerwald, "The Diet and Foreign Policy," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 38-39, 47-54.
34. Interview with MOFA Asian Affairs Bureau official, January 23, 1996.
35. Asahi Shimbun, January 26, 1996, morning ed., p. 7.