The World Bank and conditionality

Journal of International Development

Volumn 9, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 507-516

  Hopkins, Raul ^a,c   Powell, Andrew ^b   Roy, Amlan ^a   Gilbert, Christopher L ^a  

^a QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b Central Bank of Argentina   (Argentina)

^c QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AID CONDITIONALITY; BANKING; CONDITIONALITY; DEBT SERVICE; WORLD BANK;

EID: 0031446954     PISSN: 09541748     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1328(199706)9:4<507::AID-JID460>3.0.CO;2-7     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. Aizenman, J. and Powell, A. (1995). 'The political economy of savings behavior and the role of international financial institutions', paper given at the CEPR conference, Political Economy, Sovereign Debt and the IMF, Cambridge, July 1995.
2. Anderson, R. W., Gilbert, C. L. and Powell A. (1989). 'Securitization and commodity contingency in international lending', American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 71 (Supp.), 523-530.
3. Anderson, R. W., Gilbert, C. L. and Powell, A. (1991). 'Securitizing development finance: the role of partial guarantees and commodity contingency'. In Priovolos, T. and Duncan, R. C. (eds) Commodity Risk Management and Finance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Bates, R. H. and Krueger, A. O. (1993). Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform. Oxford: Blackwell.
5. Davies, S. (1992). 'Green conditionality and food security: winners and losers from the greening of aid', Journal of International Development, 4, 151-165.
6. Eaton, J. and Gersowitz, M. (1981). 'Debt with potential repudiation: theoretical and empirical analysis', Review of Economic Studies, 48, 289-309.
7. Eaton, J., Gersowitz, M. and Stiglitz, J. E. (1986). 'The pure theory of country risk', European Economic Review, 30, 481-513.
8. Eberstadt, N. and Lewis, C. M. (1995). 'Privatizing the World Bank', The National Interest (Summer), 14-18.
9. Fafchamps, M. (1996). 'Sovereign debt, structural adjustment and conditionality', Journal of Development Economics, 50, 313-335.
10. Gavin, M. and Rodrik, D. (1995). 'The World Bank in historical perspective', American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 85, 329-34.
11. Geddes, B. (1992). The Politicians' Dilemma: Reforming the State in Latin America. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
12. Gilbert, C. L., Hopkins, R., Powell, A. and Roy, A. (1996). 'The World Bank: its functions and its future', ESRC, Global Economic Institutions, Working Paper, 15.
13. Johnson, J. H. and Wasty, S. S. (1993). 'Borrower ownership of adjustment programs and the political economy of reform', World Bank Discussion Paper, 199. Washington DC: World Bank.
14. Kahler, M. (1992). 'External influence, conditionality and the politics of influence'. In Haggard, S. and Kaufman, R. (eds) The Politics of Adjustment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 89-133.
15. Killick, T. (1996). 'Principals, agents and the limitations of BWI conditionality', The World Economy, 19, 211-229.
16. Killick, T. (1997). 'Principals, agents and the failings of conditionality', Journal of International Development (this issue).
17. Lessard, D. R. (1986). 'The management of international trade risks', Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 11, 255-264.
18. McCleary, W. (1989). 'Policy implementation under adjustment lending', Finance and Development, 26, 32-34.
19. Mosley, P. (1987). 'Conditionality as bargaining process: structural adjustment lending, 1980-86', Princeton Studies in International Finance, 168. Princeton: Princeton University.
20. Mosley, P., Harrigan, J. and Toye, J. (1991). Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-Based Lending, Vol. 1. London, Routledge.
21. Naïm, M. (1994). 'The World Bank: its role, governance and organizational culture'. In Bretton Woods Committee, Looking to the Future, C273-86, Washington DC.
22. Nelson, J. M. (1996). 'Promoting policy reforms: the twilight of conditionality', World Development, 24, 1551-1559.
23. Oliver, R. W. (1971). 'Early plans for a World Bank', Princeton Studies in International Finance, 29. Princeton: Princeton University.
24. Oliver, R. W. (1975). International Economic Co-operation and the World Bank. London: Macmillan.
25. Rodrik, D. (1995). 'Why is there multilateral lending?' In Bruno, M. and Pleskovic, B. (Eds) Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics. Washington DC: World Bank, pp. 167-193.
26. Stern, N. and Ferreira, F. (1993). 'The World Bank as an "Intellectual Actor"' STICERD, Development Economics Paper, 50, London School of Economics.
27. Tornell, A. and Lane, P. (1994). 'When good news is bad news: a non-representative model of the current account and fiscal policy', processed, Harvard University.
28. Walters, A. (1994). 'Do we need the IMF and the World Bank', Current Controversies, 10, London, Institute of Economic Affairs.
29. White, H. and Morrissey, O. (1997). 'Tailoring conditionality to donor-recipient relationships', processed, ISS, the Hague.
30. Wilson, B. M. (1994). 'When social democrats choose neoliberal economic policies: the case of Costa Rica', Comparative Politics, 26, 149-168.