Return of the caudillo: Autocratic democracy in Peru

Third World Quarterly

Volumn 18, Issue 5, 1997, Pages 899-912

  Mauceri, Philip ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN IOWA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AUTHORITARIANISM; CENTRALISATION; DEMOCRACY; FUJIMORE, A.; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK;

PERU;

EID: 0031433496     PISSN: 01436597     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01436599714650     Document Type: Article

References (37)

1. On the role of the media in the Fujimori era, see C Conaghan, Public Life in the Time of Alberto Fujimori (Working Paper #219), Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, June 1996.
2. Some have suggested that the Fujimori administration itself is a 'populist' regime. However, this would be an extreme case of concept stretching. For the populist interpretation, see K Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism in Latin America: the Peruvian case'. World Politics, 48(4), October 1995, pp 82-116; and B Kay, '"Fujipopulism" and the liberal state in Peru, 1990-1995', Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 38(4), Winter 1996, pp 55-98.
3. Some have suggested that the Fujimori administration itself is a 'populist' regime. However, this would be an extreme case of concept stretching. For the populist interpretation, see K Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism in Latin America: the Peruvian case'. World Politics, 48(4), October 1995, pp 82-116; and B Kay, '"Fujipopulism" and the liberal state in Peru, 1990-1995', Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 38(4), Winter 1996, pp 55-98.
4. The ability, or at least desire, to channel popular mobilisation into some institutional mechanism has been a defining aspect of Latin America's populist movements. See R B Collier & D Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991.
5. Fujimori's 1990 campaign slogan was 'Honesty, technology and work' and he clearly capitalised on the reputation of Japanese-Peruvians as hard workers, as well as on Japan's reputation as a world leader in technology. Moreover, Fujimori is often fond of pointing out that, as an engineer, he is interested in rinding solutions that work rather than talking or 'politicking'. On the 1990 campaign, see G Schmidt, 'Fujimori's 1990 upset victory in Peru: electoral rules, contingencies and adaptive strategies', Comparative Politics, 28(3), April 1996, pp 321-354.
6. The importance of Fujimori's Japanese ancestry in his formation as a politician is emphasised in Luis Jochamovitz, Ciudadano Fujimori: La Construcción de un Politicao Lima: PEISA, 1993.
7. See especially the discussion in MA Cameron, Democracy and Authoritarianism in Peru: Political Coalitions and Social Change, New York: St. Martins Press, 1994.
8. See P Mauceri, 'State reform, coalitions and the neo-liberal autogolpe in Peru', Latin American Research Review, 30(1), 1995, pp 7-37.
9. See F Tuesta Soldevilla, Los Enigmas del Poder: Fujimori, 1990-1996, Lima: Friedrich Ebert, 1996. See also MA Cameron, 'Political and economic origins of regime change in Peru: the eighteenth brumaire of Alberto Fujimori' in MA Cameron & P Mauceri (eds) The Peruvian Labyrinth: Polity, Economy and Society, University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1997, pp 37-69.
10. See F Tuesta Soldevilla, Los Enigmas del Poder: Fujimori, 1990-1996, Lima: Friedrich Ebert, 1996. See also MA Cameron, 'Political and economic origins of regime change in Peru: the eighteenth brumaire of Alberto Fujimori' in MA Cameron & P Mauceri (eds) The Peruvian Labyrinth: Polity, Economy and Society, University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1997, pp 37-69.
11. Most polls showed that over 70% of the public approved Fujimori's actions. However, as Conaghan has noted, that support appeared to be conditional on the ability of Fujimori to 'reform' government institutions rather than create an outright dictatorship. C Conaghan, 'Polls, political discourse and the public sphere: the spin on Peru's Fuji-golpe', in Peter H Smith (ed), Latin America in Comparative Perspective: New Approaches to Methods and Analysis, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995, pp 227-255.
12. Among these groups were Leon Dormido and COMACA, whose members largely included junior officers. Insight into the motivation for military discontent was provided by one of the leaders of the 13 November movement. Interview with General Jaime Salinas Sedó, in Lima, 20 August 1996. General Salinas was imprisoned by the Fujimori regime in the aftermath of 13 November in a process that violated many of the military's own institutional norms.
13. This assessment is based on a series of interviews carried out by the author with retired military officers during August 1996 in Lima.
14. The ability of Fujimori to maintain high personal approval ratings even as support for the government's programme was foundering is discussed by S Stokes, 'Economic reform and public opinion in Peru, 1990-1995', Comparative Political Studies, 29(5), 1996, pp 544-565.
15. Peru was one of the slowest countries in Latin America to set up a social compensation fund during the period of neoliberal reforms. For a comparative perspective on this theme see C Graham, Safety Nets, Politics and the Poor: Transitions to Market Economies, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994.
16. These debates were especially prominent in the remnants of Pérez de Cuellar's coalition, Unión por Perú (UPP). These insights were provided in an interview with UPP Congressman Carlos Chipoco, in Lima, 13 August 1996.
17. See EVK Fitgerald, 'State capitalism in Peru', in C McClintock & A Lowenthal (eds), The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983, pp 65-93.
18. Interview with former COPRI official, 26 July 1996.
19. See in particular their written works, C Boloña Behr, Cambio de Rumbo, Lima: Instituto de Economia de Libre Mercado, 1996; and B Boza, Doing Business in Peru: The New Legal Framework, New York, 1994.
20. See in particular their written works, C Boloña Behr, Cambio de Rumbo, Lima: Instituto de Economia de Libre Mercado, 1996; and B Boza, Doing Business in Peru: The New Legal Framework, New York, 1994.
21. Often the line between government advisor and representative of an international financial company can become blurred. Such is the apparent case with Susanna de la Puente, a close confidante of President Fujimori and his economic advisors who is also a vice-president of investment banking at the Wall Street firm of JP Morgan. See F Mattos, 'Nuestra mujer en Wall Street', La República: Dominical (Lima), 21 July 1996, pp 6-7.
22. See for example the discussion regarding Mexico by MA Centeno, Democracy Within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico, University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1994. pp 34-37.
23. Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Delegative democracy', Journal of Democracy, 5(1), 1994, pp 55-69.
24. This point is made especially by F Tuesta, 'El sistema electoral peruano: sus efectos en el sistema político', in F Tuesta (ed.), Simposio Sobre Reforma Electoral, Lima: IFES, pp 125-162.
25. A detailed examination of changes in legislative authority are found in E Bernales, 'Estructura del estado y modelo político en la constitución de 1993', in La Constitución de 1993: Analisis y Comentarios I Lima: Comisión Andina de Juristas, 1995, pp 97-108. An important historical overview of presidential power in Peru is found in C McClintock, 'Presidents, messiahs and constitutional breakdowns in Peru', in J Linz & A Valenzuela (eds), The Failure of Presidential Democracy: The Case of Latin America, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. pp 286-321.
26. A detailed examination of changes in legislative authority are found in E Bernales, 'Estructura del estado y modelo político en la constitución de 1993', in La Constitución de 1993: Analisis y Comentarios I Lima: Comisión Andina de Juristas, 1995, pp 97-108. An important historical overview of presidential power in Peru is found in C McClintock, 'Presidents, messiahs and constitutional breakdowns in Peru', in J Linz & A Valenzuela (eds), The Failure of Presidential Democracy: The Case of Latin America, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. pp 286-321.
27. J de la Puente, 'Los palaciegos', La República: Dominical, 21 July 1996, p 9.
28. See, M Rubio, 'Ministerio del presidencialismo', Cuestión de Estado, 1(2), 1993, p 23.
29. See, P Mauceri, State Under Siege: Development and Policy Making in Peru, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996, pp 108-111.
30. 'En suma, muchas restas', Caretas, 16 January 1997, p 58.
31. Angel Paez, 'La orden: archívese', La República: Dominical, 28 July 1996, p 10.
32. M Rubio, 'Ley Cantuta o cómo fabricar una sentencia', QueHacer 87(1), 1994, pp 4-7. See also SA Yupanqui, 'Cuando la Amnistia se convierte en impunidad', QueHacer, 95(3), 1995, pp 19-23.
33. M Rubio, 'Ley Cantuta o cómo fabricar una sentencia', QueHacer 87(1), 1994, pp 4-7. See also SA Yupanqui, 'Cuando la Amnistia se convierte en impunidad', QueHacer, 95(3), 1995, pp 19-23.
34. An interesting insight into this community and the shaping of Alberto Fujimori is found in L Jochamovitz, Ciudadano Fujimori.
35. These have included Alejandro Afuso Higa, director of the social programme FONCODES; Victor Kobashigawa, Vice-Minister of Education; Ana Kanashiro, director of the food and health agency INABIF; and Daniel Hokama, Minister of Energy and Mines.
36. 'La partida secreta', Caretas, 25 April 1996, pp 16-19.
37. The latest revelations are discussed in 'Acusación: la denuncia de Vaticano', Caretas, 22 August 1996, pp 16-19. In the midst of serious evidence regarding Montesinos' connections to drug trafficking, US anti-drug czar, retired General Barry McCaffrey, lauded Montesinos on a brief visit to Lima in late 1996.