Domestic constraints and international competitiveness: A research note on the China case

Journal of Contemporary China

Volumn 6, Issue 15, 1997, Pages 377-387

  Feng, Yi ^a,b   Li, Jieli ^c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

^b CLAREMONT GRADUATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^d OHIO UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC GROWTH; INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT; POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT;

CHINA;

EID: 0031431061     PISSN: 10670564     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10670569708724284     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. The classic example for the former argument can be found in Graham Allison, The Essence of Decision (Boston: Little Brown, 1971). For the latter position, see Emerson Niou, Peter Ordeshook and Gregory Rose, Balance of Power: Stability in the International Structure (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989). While the latter focuses on the international context as the primary subject of investigation, the former deals with domestic constraints as the crucial explanatory factors. Such a distinction can be better understood by examining the difference in their assumptions. The latter theory assumes that alliances or the international environs provide the sole basis for the critical changes in national capabilities, while the former theory assumes that internal means, such as economic growth and development, are the most crucial factors in determining a nation's power and security.
2. The classic example for the former argument can be found in Graham Allison, The Essence of Decision (Boston: Little Brown, 1971). For the latter position, see Emerson Niou, Peter Ordeshook and Gregory Rose, Balance of Power: Stability in the International Structure (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989). While the latter focuses on the international context as the primary subject of investigation, the former deals with domestic constraints as the crucial explanatory factors. Such a distinction can be better understood by examining the difference in their assumptions. The latter theory assumes that alliances or the international environs provide the sole basis for the critical changes in national capabilities, while the former theory assumes that internal means, such as economic growth and development, are the most crucial factors in determining a nation's power and security.
3. Robert Putnam, 'Diplomacy and domestic politics', International Organization 42, (1988), pp. 427-460; and Peter A. Gourevitch, 'The second image reversed: the international sources of domestic politics', International Organization 32(4), (1974), pp. 881-911.
4. Robert Putnam, 'Diplomacy and domestic politics', International Organization 42, (1988), pp. 427-460; and Peter A. Gourevitch, 'The second image reversed: the international sources of domestic politics', International Organization 32(4), (1974), pp. 881-911.
5. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and A. F. K. Organski, Principles of International Politics: People's Power, Preferences and Perceptions, a manuscript.
6. Specifically, they write, '[T]he ambition of leaders encourages attentiveness to the generation of such valued activities as enhancing wealth and security... [P]olicy choices must represent some balance between possibly unrealistic domestic demands and the limited possibilities of action given the external interests and resources that may be arrayed against the nation', Bueno de Mesquita and Organski, (1996), p. 109.
7. Peter A. Gourevitch, 'The second image reversed: the international sources of domestic politics', International Organization 32(4), (1974), p. 911.
8. See Alexander Gerschenkron, 'Economic backwardness in historical perspective', in Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Little Brown, 1966); and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System (New York: The Academic Press, 1974). Peter A. Gourevitch has provided an excellent review of these and other theories in 'The second image reversed: the international sources of domestic politics', International Organization 32(4), (1974), pp. 881-911.
9. See Alexander Gerschenkron, 'Economic backwardness in historical perspective', in Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Little Brown, 1966); and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System (New York: The Academic Press, 1974). Peter A. Gourevitch has provided an excellent review of these and other theories in 'The second image reversed: the international sources of domestic politics', International Organization 32(4), (1974), pp. 881-911.
10. See Alexander Gerschenkron, 'Economic backwardness in historical perspective', in Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Little Brown, 1966); and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System (New York: The Academic Press, 1974). Peter A. Gourevitch has provided an excellent review of these and other theories in 'The second image reversed: the international sources of domestic politics', International Organization 32(4), (1974), pp. 881-911.
11. See Alexander Gerschenkron, 'Economic backwardness in historical perspective', in Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Little Brown, 1966); and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System (New York: The Academic Press, 1974). Peter A. Gourevitch has provided an excellent review of these and other theories in 'The second image reversed: the international sources of domestic politics', International Organization 32(4), (1974), pp. 881-911.
12. Randall Collins, Weberian Sociological Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 145.
13. See Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Randall Collins, 'Some principles of long-term social change: the territorial power of states', in Louis Kriesberg, ed., Research in Social Movements, Conflicts, and Change Vol. 1 (Greenwich, CN: JAI Press, 1978); Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1978); and Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990).
14. See Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Randall Collins, 'Some principles of long-term social change: the territorial power of states', in Louis Kriesberg, ed., Research in Social Movements, Conflicts, and Change Vol. 1 (Greenwich, CN: JAI Press, 1978); Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1978); and Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990).
15. See Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Randall Collins, 'Some principles of long-term social change: the territorial power of states', in Louis Kriesberg, ed., Research in Social Movements, Conflicts, and Change Vol. 1 (Greenwich, CN: JAI Press, 1978); Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1978); and Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990).
16. See Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Randall Collins, 'Some principles of long-term social change: the territorial power of states', in Louis Kriesberg, ed., Research in Social Movements, Conflicts, and Change Vol. 1 (Greenwich, CN: JAI Press, 1978); Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1978); and Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990).
17. See Theda Skocpol, 'Social revolutions and mass military mobilization', World Politics 40(2), (1988), pp. 147-168; and Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
18. See Theda Skocpol, 'Social revolutions and mass military mobilization', World Politics 40(2), (1988), pp. 147-168; and Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
19. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1978).
20. Marina Arbetman and Jacek Kugler, eds, Political Capacity and Economic Behavior (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997); and A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980).
21. Marina Arbetman and Jacek Kugler, eds, Political Capacity and Economic Behavior (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997); and A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980).
22. In their works, Organski and Kugler (1980) and Arbetman and Kugler (1997) use the government's capability of extracting tax revenue from the nation as an index of the government's relative political capacity. Given the same resources, some governments are more capable of getting more tax revenues than others, and they are said to have higher relative political capacity.
23. A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980).
24. John K. Fairbank and Edwin O. Reischauer, China: Tradition and Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), pp. 211-257.
25. For example, even in relative peace time, the logistical line from Beijing that extended northward through Mongolia to the far distant Uliassutai and Kobdo cost over 12,000,000 pieces of silver in transport of supplies between 1781 and 1791, and state expenditure was far higher during actual war periods. See Wolfram Eberhard, A History of China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 295.
26. For the concept of a trading state versus that of a territorial state, see Richard N. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modem World (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
27. Ting Tsz Kao, The Chinese Frontiers (Aurora, IL: Chinese Scholarly Publishing Company, 1980), p. 124.
28. W. G. Beasley, The Rise of Modem Japan (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990), pp. 54-69.
29. It is interesting to note that at the same period of time when Japan was reforming itself to a modern industrial state, the Qing Dynasty was undergoing a similar kind of modernization reform, the 'Tongzhi Reform' or the 'self-strengthening movement' (1861-1895). These two reforms produced contrasting domestic consequences. Japan seized the opportunity and devoted resources to quickly modernize itself, while high external pressure persistently placed on the Qing Dynasty hampered resource extraction that could have been used by the Qing government to efficiently implement the reform.
30. John K. Fairbank and Edwin O. Reischauer, China: Tradition and Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), p. 355.
31. Between 1862 and 1874, the average annual deficit was 19 million taels, and by the last decade of the nineteenth century, the annual deficit rose to 20 million taels. See Pao Chao Hsieh, The Governmnt of China, 1644-1911 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1925), pp. 202-204. Because of the loss of revenue and heavy war indemnities, the Qing government was forced to rely on foreign loans to cope with financial strain. Between 1894 and 1911, about 746 million taels were borrowed from foreign lenders. See John K. Fairbank and Kwang-Ching Liu, The Cambridge History of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 65-66.
32. Between 1862 and 1874, the average annual deficit was 19 million taels, and by the last decade of the nineteenth century, the annual deficit rose to 20 million taels. See Pao Chao Hsieh, The Governmnt of China, 1644-1911 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1925), pp. 202-204. Because of the loss of revenue and heavy war indemnities, the Qing government was forced to rely on foreign loans to cope with financial strain. Between 1894 and 1911, about 746 million taels were borrowed from foreign lenders. See John K. Fairbank and Kwang-Ching Liu, The Cambridge History of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 65-66.
33. The major wars during these decades were the Korean War with the US (1950-1953); the Vietnamese War with the French, in which the Chinese military was actively involved (1954); war in the Taiwan Strait with Guomindang in 1958; a military campaign in 1959 to suppress a large armed uprising in Tibet; war with India (1962); the Vietnamese War with the US in which the Chinese military, especially artillery troops, was actively involved from the mid-1960s through the early 1970s, see the detail in Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 796; wars with Soviet Russia in the late 1960s and the early 1970s; war with South Vietnam for the Paracel Islands in 1974, see the detail in David G. Muller, Jr., China as a Maritime Power (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 152-154); and the border war with Vietnam (1979).
34. The major wars during these decades were the Korean War with the US (1950-1953); the Vietnamese War with the French, in which the Chinese military was actively involved (1954); war in the Taiwan Strait with Guomindang in 1958; a military campaign in 1959 to suppress a large armed uprising in Tibet; war with India (1962); the Vietnamese War with the US in which the Chinese military, especially artillery troops, was actively involved from the mid-1960s through the early 1970s, see the detail in Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 796; wars with Soviet Russia in the late 1960s and the early 1970s; war with South Vietnam for the Paracel Islands in 1974, see the detail in David G. Muller, Jr., China as a Maritime Power (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 152-154); and the border war with Vietnam (1979).
35. Jieli Li, 'Geopolitics of the Chinese Communist Party in the twentieth century', Sociological Perspectives 36(4), (1993), pp. 315-333.
36. John K. Fairbank, The United States and China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 457-462.
37. The data on the relative political capacity of China are from Arbetman and Kugler (1997).
38. See "The titan stirs', The Economist, (28 November 1992), p. 5.
39. Ibid., p. 14.
40. Freedom House, Freedom in the World (New York: Freedom House, 1978-1992) has presented results from an annual survey on political rights and civil liberties in the world since 1978. Based on a multi-criteria examination of freedom, it scores nations on a 1-7 scale with seven representing the least free, and rates nations as 'free', 'partly free', and 'unfree'. The PRC has been rated as 'unfree' and has a score of 7.
41. Yi Feng and Baizhu Chen, 'Macropolitical uncertainty and private investment', in Marina Arbetman and Jacek Kugler, eds, Political Capacity and Economic Behavior (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).
42. The mean of RPC for the PRC is 1.574 and its standard deviation is 0.283.
43. The distinguishing characteristic of a Stackelberg game is that one player gets to commit himself first and other players play accordingly. See Eric Rasmusen, Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 79.